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

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THE RESURRECTION AND MODERN THOUGHT

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THE RESURRECTION AND MODERN THOUGHT

BY

W. J. SPARROW SIMPSON, D.D.

CHAPLAIN OF ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL, ILFORD

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PREFACE.

IT is characteristic of many writings on the Resurrection of our Lord that they concentrate attention chiefly upon the evidences, while giving scanty recognition to the theology. This is, surely, even from an evidential standpoint, to be regretted; because the fact itself acquires a different value when seen to occupy a central place in a religious interpretation of human life and destiny. The writer is conscious of having dwelt insufficiently upon the doctrine in the volume which he was allowed to contribute to the Oxford Library of Practical Theology. An attempt was made to supplement this in an article contributed to Hastings' 'Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels.' But the exigences of space precluded a full discussion. A study of the theology and of the history of the doctrine is offered in the following pages.

Of central importance are the changes caused in S. Paul's theology by his experience of the manifested presence of the Risen Lord. The doctrinal conclusions drawn from the Resurrection in the Mission Sermons of the Acts should receive the most careful study. Then comes, in its matured development, the theology of the Resurrection as expounded by S. Paul: its bearing on our Lord's Divinity; its effect in the process of His exaltation; its effect on the justification of the Christian Community, on the moral and physical Resurrection of individuals. Thus

the theology of the Resurrection is shown to lie at the foundation of any real Christianity.

The history of the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body is traced from the Apostolic age down to modern days. And it is believed that a careful study of the two directions in which Christian thought has moved upon this momentous subject would greatly contribute to solve some difficulties which disturb the modern mind. A crude traditional theory, of a materialistic and quite unphilosophic character, is yielding to the Pauline teaching on the spiritual body.

The writer desires gratefully to acknowledge his indebtedness to the suggestions of Dr. Swete, and to the criticisms of Professor Crawford Burkitt, who both read over the work in proof. Thanks are also due to the Editor of the 'Church Quarterly Review' for permission to utilise material contributed to its pages.

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BOOK I. THE WITNESS OF THE TWELVE

CHAPTER I

OUR LORD'S PREDICTIONS OF HIS RESURRECTION

THE passages in which Christ is stated to have foretold His own Resurrection may form a preliminary study. They are numerous, and occur in the earliest form of the Gospel tradition. For various critical reasons, however, they do not all stand upon an equal level. And, in view of modern opinions about them, it is well to classify them in two divisions: those which are attended with some uncertainty; and those which are indisputable.

I

First, then, there are passages in which the reference to the Resurrection is by many modern expositors held to be uncertain.

1. One of these contains the words of Christ spoken at the cleansing of the Temple. When the Jews demanded a sign, Christ's answer was: "Destroy this Temple, and in three days I will raise it up."[1] The Jews understood the Temple to mean the House of Prayer. Their criticism was that this Temple had been forty-six years in building: it was therefore incredible that Christ could raise it in three days. But, says the Evangelist, "He spake of the Temple of His Body." "When therefore He was raised from the dead, His disciples remembered that He spake this; and they believed the Scripture, and the word which Jesus had said." Several recent critical writers[2] point out that the

[1] S. John ii. 18, 19.

[2] *E.g.* Wendt, 'T. J.' i. 323 and ii. 37; Barth, 'Hauptprobleme,' 188, 189.

occasion was the Temple-cleansing; that the words were spoken in the Temple; that the Temple and its building was the subject of conversation, at least on the side of the Jews; and that if the answer does not relate to it then the conversation was at cross purposes, and Christ's reply had no bearing on the Jews' objection. Moreover, this destruction and rebuilding of the Temple was the very charge brought against our Lord in His trial before Caiaphas: "We heard Him say, I will destroy this Temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands."[1] And further, this became part of the reviling when He was crucified.[2] Accordingly, while S. John has undoubtedly given the words a deeper meaning, it is suggested that the Jews were right as to the original sense. Indeed, the very passage itself implies that the deeper meaning has a mystic interpretation imposed upon the words by a revering faith after the Resurrection had taken place. It is remarkable that this modern critical view is anticipated and supported by Origen,[3] who asserts that the disciples applied to the Resurrection what had been originally spoken of the Temple, and that what led them to this application was the mention of the Three Days. Now while a mystic allusion is intelligible from the standpoint of faith, and while a believer may be prepared to think it underlay the other meaning in the Speaker's mind; yet clearly if what our Lord intended to convey to the Jews was the thought that He "felt in Himself the power to create and establish, after the briefest interval, a new form of worship,"[4] then the passage can hardly be appealed to as a prediction of His Resurrection.

2. Next may be taken the difficult passage on the sign of Jonah the prophet.

S. Matthew's report of our Lord's words is: "Then certain of the scribes and Pharisees answered him, saying, Master, we would see a sign from thee. But He answered and said unto them, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it but the sign of

[1] S. Mark xiv. 58; cf. S. Matt. xxvi. 61.
[2] S. Matt. xxvii. 40.
[3] On S. John T. x. (43) 27.
[4] Wendt.

Jonah the prophet: for as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale; so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. The men of Nineveh shall stand up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: for they repented at the preaching of Jonah; and behold, a greater than Jonah is here."

Here the sign of Jonah is his miraculous resuscitation: the parallel is Christ's Resurrection. Yet this was in the future. And the men of Nineveh repented at Jonah's preaching, while the preaching of Jesus makes less impression on the Jews. Wellhausen accordingly finds it difficult to say how this contrast could really be a sign.[1]

But the corresponding passage in S. Luke is different. In S. Luke[2] the words reported are: "And when the multitudes were gathering together unto Him, He began to say, This generation is an evil generation: it seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it but the sign of Jonah. For even as Jonah became a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of Man be to this generation."

Here nothing is said of the Resurrection. And the contrast between the men of Nineveh and our Lord's contemporaries is drawn as follows: "The men of Nineveh shall stand up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: for they repented at the preaching of Jonah; and behold, a greater than Jonah is here."

Now it is suggested by Wendt,[3] that here the sign of Jonah so far from denoting a miracle must denote rather the ordinary and the commonplace.

When the Jews would not recognise the Divine Authority and nature of Jesus' work, He condemns their sensational search for signs as an evidence of the unspirituality of the generation desiring them; and expressly refuses to satisfy any such craving. The only sign which His contemporaries shall be allowed to receive is the sign of Jonah: that is surely the non-miraculous utterance of a prophet and a

[1] 'Das Evangelium Matthäi,' p. 64. [2] xi. 29, 30.
[3] 'Teaching of Jesus,' ii. 146.

preacher. It was this which was sufficient for Nineveh. And if the men of that city stand favourably contrasted with Christ's contemporaries it was exactly because they recognised the truth in spite of the obscure appearance of the messenger. Thus the sign of Jonah is not the miraculous but the commonplace. Jonah was a sign to the Ninevites, not as a worker of miracles but as a preacher of repentance. The parallel suggested is moral not miraculous: a parallel in outward appearance of humiliation and insignificance; not in their miraculous experiences.

This interpretation is partly confirmed by the earliest of the narratives, for S. Mark, while he omits all reference to Jonah, reports that Jesus "sighed deeply in His Spirit and saith, Why doth this generation seek a sign; verily I say unto you, There shall no sign be given unto this generation. And He left them, and again entering into the boat, departed to the other side."[1]

It is noteworthy that S. Matthew gives the mention of the sign of Jonah on a second occasion.[2] And this time he omits all reference to the Resurrection. "And the Pharisees and Sadducees came, and tempting Him asked Him to show them a sign from heaven. But He answered and said unto them, When it is evening, ye say, It will be fair weather: for the heaven is red. And in the morning, It will be foul weather to-day: for the heaven is red and lowring. Ye know how to discern the face of the heaven; but ye cannot discern the signs of the times. An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given unto it, but the sign of Jonah. And He left them, and departed."

It would appear, therefore, probable that the interpretation of the sign of Jonah as parallel with Christ's Resurrection is (1) either an exposition added by the Evangelist;[3] (2) or else a saying of our Lord belonging to some other occasion. It may be admitted that it does not appear to

[1] S. Mark viii. 11-13. [2] xvi. 1-4.

[3] Cf. Feine, 'Jesus Christus und P.' p. 129 n.; Goguel, 'L'Apôtre P.' p. 272; Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 69; Pfleiderer, 'Urchristentum' (Ed. 2) i. 358; B. Weiss, in Meyer's Commentary; Kähler, 'Dogm. Zeitfragen,' ii. 163.

harmonise with the circumstances in which it is recorded; and in view of this uncertainty it may be safer not to include it in the list of our Lord's predictions.

Criticism, however, is not unanimous in this exposition. Barth holds the Resurrection-reference to be an authentic saying of our Lord, were it only on the ground of the inexactness between the Three days and Three nights and the Resurrection on the Third Day. The parallel would have been closer if composed after the event.[1]

II

Setting aside, however, these predictions, which seem to the critical mind less securely established, there are in the earliest tradition a series very clear and unquestionable.

In the Marcan narrative our Lord Himself is reported to have predicted His Resurrection upon three leading occasions (Mark viii. 31, ix. 9, x. 32).

1. The first of these was after the great confession by S. Peter :[2] "And he began to teach them that the Son of Man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the elders, and the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again."

It is important to notice here that while our Lord affirms these experiences to be a divine necessity (δεῖ), He does not give any explanation of their theological significance. Not a word is uttered to show wherein their necessity lies, or what will be the spiritual issue of His enduring them. Later dogmatic developments are entirely absent from the passage. And in the absence of any religious explanation to account for the death and the rising, it is perfectly natural that the announcement of the former, in spite of the latter, came upon S. Peter as a terrible shock, and prompted his immediate expostulation against their possibility. The stern rebuke which suppressed the Apostle's protest represents the conflict between two conceptions of the Messianic ideal: that of our Lord and that of His contemporaries. But it is clear that, in the existing stage of discipleship, the opposition had to be suppressed by rebuke rather than

[1] 'Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu,' p. 192. [2] S. Mark viii. 31.

removed by instruction. The period of intelligent perception had not yet arrived. The disciples must meantime accept the teaching on the Master's authority. But the fact must not be overlooked that no dogmatic interpretation of the coming experiences of the Christ was given.

2. Our Lord's second prediction of His Resurrection followed immediately upon the Transfiguration:[1] "As they were coming down from the mountain, he charged them that they should tell no man what things they had seen, save when the Son of Man should have risen again from the dead." After the severe rebuke which answered S. Peter's protest on the former occasion, it was not likely that the disciples would venture upon a protest a second time. That lesson had been learnt. They confined themselves to discussion upon its meaning. "And they kept the saying, questioning among themselves what the rising again from the dead should mean." Not, of course, that the idea of such an experience as resurrection from the dead was new to them, or foreign to their accepted beliefs. They undoubtedly believed in its universal occurrence at the end of history. But its occurrence as a proximate experience confined to one individual they did not understand. It formed no part of their traditional conceptions. But our Lord reinforced it in plainer terms, making it the subject of special instruction and prediction:[2] "And they went forth from thence, and passed through Galilee; and He would not that any man should know it. For he taught His disciples, and said unto them, The Son of Man is delivered up into the hands of men, and they shall kill Him; and when He is killed, after three days He shall rise again." Here again, as before, the experiences are predicted, but their meaning is not revealed. And the disciples are left in obvious perplexity. "But they understood not the saying, and were afraid to ask Him." He, on His side, volunteered no further explanation. Their perplexity could not be concealed from Him, but the time for explanations was not yet. The events must occur before their meaning could be really understood.

[1] S. Mark ix. 9. [2] *Ib.* ix. 30, 31.

The difficulty of the disciples when they questioned among themselves "what the rising again from the dead should mean"[1] could not be due to unintelligibility of the words. It must have been that their conceptions of the ultimate Resurrection left no place for an immediate and exceptional Resurrection of the one individual. Orthodox Jews of that period could not fail to apprehend what Resurrection meant. But they were perplexed with the idea of the Resurrection of their Master involving as it obviously did the repellent conception of His death. It was the death which was to their minds inconceivable. The death of the Messiah formed no part of the prevailing conception. It seemed self-contradictory. A dead Christ was not only a contradiction in terms, but a conception emptied of its religious and practical worth. They were reluctant even to think of it. They "feared to ask Him" because they felt instinctively that inquiry would fix His teaching upon themes from which they desired to avert it. But the thought of His Resurrection could not be entertained in minds reluctant to contemplate His death.

3. A third prediction followed. This time it is at the final ascent to Jerusalem.[2] S. Mark's account is extraordinarily graphic. Our Lord went before them; not, as ordinarily, with them. They followed, with grave forebodings. He evidently appeared absorbed in what was coming. Then he turned, rejoined them, and instruction began.

"Behold we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of Man shall be delivered unto the chief priests and the scribes; and they shall condemn Him to death, and shall deliver Him unto the Gentiles: and they shall mock Him, and shall spit upon Him, and shall scourge Him, and shall kill Him; and after three days He shall rise again."

Here the prediction becomes more vivid, more detailed, more solemn. He is dwelling in His Passion. It is thoroughly natural that the nearer He approached Jerusalem the deeper grew His description of the sufferings which awaited Him.[3]

[1] S. Mark ix. 9. [2] *Ib.* x. 32-34.
[3] See Barth, 'Hauptprobleme,' p. 195.

S. Mark does not describe the impression which these words produced. Perhaps he leaves it to be inferred from the mention of the disciples' amazement and fear.

It is significant that each of the three predictions is differently received by the Twelve. The first with a protest, the second with discussion, the third in silence.[1] This can scarcely be accidental. But it does not mean increased intelligence of the redemptive value of the coming experiences. It may mean submission to the apparently inevitable, or acquiescence in the Master's authority or superior wisdom. But since nothing has been told them in these predictions as to the redemptive consequences of His death, they could scarcely have put such construction upon it. They are of course still in the sphere of contemporary traditional ideals of the Messiah. There is, indeed, one passage which may have thrown light for the disciples upon the value of His approaching death. It followed close upon the third prediction: "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many" (S. Mark x. 45). But we cannot be sure what inferences at this period of their development the disciples were able to draw from this saying.

So again the words at the Institution of the Eucharist: "This is My Blood of the Covenant, which is shed for many,"[2] might have led them at the time to place a profound interpretation on the value of His death. But we cannot be sure how much the disciples understood.

It is very remarkable that all the three predictions agree in declaring not only the Resurrection, but also its occurrence on the Third Day.

III

Criticism often feels a difficulty in reconciling these predictions, clear, definite, detailed as they are, with the mental condition of the apostles at Eastertide, as represented by the Evangelists. They seem to have no expectation of their Master's Resurrection. The predictions seem to have fallen on unheeding ears. Hence it is asked, Could the apostles

[1] See Barth, p. 195, 196. [2] S. Mark xvi. 24.

have conceivably forgotten words which seem to have profoundly impressed them when spoken; words which they had met with vigorous protest, or discussed with perplexity? Some have accordingly concluded that the predictions could not possibly have been spoken.

1. Is it possible that the effect of our Lord's predictions of His Resurrection was partly weakened by the effect of His prayer in Gethsemane? When he said that His soul was "exceeding sorrowful even unto death," and prayed the Father, if it were possible, to "remove the cup" from Him (S. Mark xii. 34-36), did He not seem to declare that His death was not His will, and to suggest that there might be some alternative to its experience? Until the deeper meaning of Gethsemane dawned on the believing mind, as a profoundly spiritual agony, and no mere physical shrinking, the effect on the disciples might easily be to deepen their sense of ruin and overthrow. The death of Jesus, viewed as an external infliction induced by national and political force, wherever it dominates the mind, can never lead to thoughts of Resurrection. The external impressiveness of physical overthrow easily holds the imagination back from practical ascent to intellectual truth. That the predictions of Jesus should for the moment suffer total eclipse in face of His desolating Passion seems not only psychologically natural but almost inevitable.

2. Again, it must be remarked that the disciples possessed at the time the smallest insight into the redemptive significance of their Lord's Passion. As we have seen, the predictions had simply predicted a fact, but gave no intellectual explanation to it as a fact with the profoundest meaning. They had not been clearly told, they could not possibly understand, why their Lord should die. Criticism generally recognises that the estimate of Jesus given in S. Luke xxiv. 19. represents exactly the contemporary disciples' view.[1] "Jesus of Nazareth, which was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people: and how the chief priests and our rulers delivered Him up to be condemned to death, and crucified Him. But we hoped

[1] Cf. Holtzmann, p. 494.

that it was He which should redeem Israel. Yea, and beside all this, it is now the third day since these things came to pass. Moreover, certain women of our company amazed us, having been early at the tomb; and when they found not his body, they came, saying, that they had also seen a vision of angels, which said that He was alive. And certain of them that were with us went to the tomb, and found it even so as the women had said: but Him they saw not." (S. Luke xxiv. 19-24.) Here are the main contemporary ideas in the circle of discipleship. The Master's prophetic character is indisputable. His death is viewed purely as a work of human hostility. There is no conception of its divine meaning. If He had continued to live, the hope was that He would have delivered the Jewish people. But that He could manifestly only do by His life. A dead leader was impossible. A dead Messiah was unthinkable. Then comes a strange unexpected allusion to the Third Day. What does this allusion mean? Is it an indication that the Lord's thrice-spoken prediction "after three days He shall rise again" (S. Mark viii. 31; ix. 31; x. 34) was to this extent effective: productive of a vague indecisive hope? The report of Resurrection has reached them; but its result is to create amazement and perplexity.

Now all this is deeply natural. Critics sometimes assume that Christ's Resurrection would be easy for his disciples to expect simply because He predicted it. But we must remember the effect produced upon them by His death. This also He had predicted. "All ye shall be offended because of Me this night" must refer not only to the panic and denial, but also to the intellectual and religious scandal of His death. How deep that scandal was, S. Peter's protest and the disciples' perplexed discussion indicate. They could not reconcile His death with their theology. Doubtless when His Resurrection became experienced as a fact by them, it would reflect new light and meaning on His death. But His death taken by itself was so revolutionary to their Messianic ideas that it was more than sufficient to frustrate the effectiveness of His predictions that He would rise.

3. Recent criticism vacillates on the subject of Christ's

predictions of His Resurrection, between denial on the ground of the disciples' failure to expect it, and affirmation on the ground that without such predictions it is more difficult to account for the disciples' belief. On the whole it appears that denial was more characteristic of an older school of criticism.[1] They are accepted by Schwartzkopff,[2] Holtzmann,[3] Wendt.[4] There is, however, one prediction ascribed to our Lord which is widely accepted among negative critics: it is the prediction that after He was risen He would go before the disciples into Galilee. A very considerable number of critics construct an argument from this prediction as to the locality in which the visions of the risen Lord occurred. This will be considered in the chapter on the locality of the Appearances. Meantime, it must be noticed that one acknowledged prediction admits the principle, and makes rejection of other predictions illogical.

Unless criticism is exceedingly careful, it will go arguing in a circle here; founding the Apostles' faith on our Lord's prediction, and our Lord's prediction on the Apostles' faith.

IV

That our Lord actually uttered these predictions is confirmed by the psychological situation.

1. It is generally admitted that He predicted His own death. Even on purely humanitarian levels such a prediction must seem natural. It is sometimes said, indeed, that so long as He increased in public favour He could have found no great occasion, in the concrete experience of life, for supposing that He would meet with a violent death.[5]

But surely the contradictions between the popular conception of the office of Messiah and His own, involved a conflict which could only have one termination. It is perfectly natural that a presentiment of His death comes early in His public life. He foresees the time coming when the Bridegroom will be taken from the disciples.[6] This

[1] The predictions were rejected by Holsten, Strauss, and Keim, but also by Pfleiderer, 'Urchristentum' (Ed. 2), i. 360, 1902.

[2] 'Prophecies.' [3] 'Life of Jesus.' [4] 'System der Christlichen Lehre,' ii. 394.

[5] Schwartzkopff, p. 26. [6] S. Mark ii. 20.

anticipation is deepened when the popular favour is turned into dislike, and the hostility of the authorities of the nation becomes increasingly pronounced. The three main prophecies already considered are primarily prophecies of His death. His death is declared to be a divine necessity.[1] It is by no means the mere product of human violence in its blind opposition to the truth. It may be effected by political instrumentality, but it possesses an intrinsic religious worth. His blood is the blood of the covenant, shed for the salvation of many.[2] The original covenant between God and His people will be thereby elevated and perfected.[3] Jesus recognises in Himself the sinless mediator of salvation. Through His death will be constituted the spiritual kingdom of God. He is to give His life a ransom for many.[4]

2. It has been often said, and surely with truth, that, if our Lord predicted His death, He must have predicted His Resurrection also: for only so could He reconcile His death with His Messianic claim. If Jesus claimed to be the Christ, and also anticipated with certainty His own death, the contradiction could only be solved by an equally confident certainty of His Resurrection. Thus the prediction of His Resurrection seems confirmed by the requirements of His circumstances. If Christhood was His mission, and His death an absolutely essential condition of its fulfilment, the vindication of God's chosen must lie in reversing the death, that is in Resurrection. The Son of Man could not humanly go up to Jerusalem predicting His death unless He also predicted His Resurrection. Hence, most significantly, in keeping with the theological requirements of the position, every main prediction of His death is, in the earliest evangelical tradition, accompanied by an equally definite prediction of His Resurrection.

V

The argument for the reality of Christ's predictions may be put in another form.

[1] δεῖ, S. Mark viii. 31.
[2] S. Mark xiv. 24.
[3] Jer. xxxi. 31.
[4] S. Mark x. 45.

When the disciples became convinced that He was risen, they immediately proclaimed Him as the Messiah, and affirmed that He would return in glory. But it is necessary to ask, What is the connection between Messiahship and Resurrection? How would it follow that One who rose from the dead was therefore the Messiah? In certain circles the Resurrection of John the Baptist was asserted; but no one thereupon proclaimed him as Messiah. Messiahship does not follow upon Resurrection. How then did the apostles reach this conclusion? They can only have reached it through the teachings which our Lord had given them during His ministry. Our Lord must Himself have claimed Messiahship and predicted His coming in glory; otherwise the Easter Appearances would neither have proved His Messiahship, nor become the basis for their eschatology. Thus it has been recently urged that when the identification of Jesus with the Messiah had been already made by Jesus Himself, and imparted in instructions to His disciples, His Messiahship must have been introduced into the instructions ascribed to Him after He was risen. But the Easter instructions contain no such Messianic claims. They are completely absent. Why? Because they were already contained in the teaching of Jesus during His earthly life.[1]

But all this implies predictions. The very fact that so much is left unsaid in the Resurrection utterances means that it must have been spoken during the ministry. Nothing but the assumption that much had been already predicted can make the omissions in the Resurrection period intelligible. If the apostles understood at once, without being told, and were able to proclaim confidently and unanimously to the world, that the risen Jesus was the Messiah, and would return in glory, that implies predictions. If, then, the Marcan narrative, the earliest tradition, asserts that our Lord did announce many things beforehand, this assertion is exactly what the subsequent facts require. Without some such declarations the entire position becomes incoherent and unintelligible.

[1] See Schweitzer, p. 344.

VI

If the attempt be made to reconstruct the historical situation, it may be said that the predictions of His Death and Resurrection were actually made; that neither being conformable with the disciples' theology, sometimes the one aroused their incredulity, sometimes the other. Their inherited conceptions prevailed above their capacity to assimilate new ideas. Yet the new ideas although largely ineffective at the moment were by no means wholly lost. Then came the shock of the arrest, the condemnation, and the death. Thrown into complete confusion, what more natural than that their inherited conceptions should prevail, confirmed as they seemed to be by the fact of His ruin? And yet the recollection of His utterances lurked behind, still largely ineffective, yet indicated by vague reference to the Third Day since these things were done: a recollection too weak to kindle faith, or cause them to suspend the ordinary ministrations to the corpse; yet strong enough to open out their minds to further impressions when the time for His Appearances arrived. It is quite possible that the predictions formed part of the necessary preparation for His Appearances, and exerted more influence below the surface of the Apostles' minds than is ascertainable either in their words or actions. It is possible that their capacity to receive the subsequent Appearances was partially developed by the words which Christ had spoken. There is this element of truth in the criticism which postulates the predictions as a cause of the Apostles' faith. This may be, no doubt, and sometimes is, utilised against the objective reality of the Appearances. But that is its abuse. It may still be perfectly true that Christ's predictions prepared the way for His Appearances, and that they were even a necessary preparation.

CHAPTER II

THE BURIAL OF CHRIST

I

THE burial of our Lord is described in all the four Gospels. We begin with an analysis of their contents.

1. The main features of the Marcan narrative of the burial are three: the qualities of Joseph of Arimathea; his visit to Pilate; and his actions at the grave. First, as for his qualities, he is described as being in position, "a councillor of honourable estate"; a phrase denoting either a councillor and therefore distinguished, or else a councillor and also distinguished. He is, moreover, described, as "looking for the Kingdom of God"; a phrase denoting religious earnestness, but by no means necessarily implying discipleship. The language may mean no more than might be applicable to any pious Jew.

Secondly, of his visit to Pilate, S. Mark particularly notes that it was bold. Pilate's surprise, Pilate's caution, Pilate's concession, are all emphasised, and that in a manner to which the other Evangelists present no parallel. Indeed in the other accounts Pilate's surprise and caution are left out. They are none the less deeply significant and valuable details. For Pilate's surprise at the rapidity of the death of Jesus, unusual in such executions, prompted him to verify the fact of decease by inquiring from the officer in command. Thus it was after receiving official satisfaction of the reality of the death that Pilate gave permission to Joseph to take the body away. It is remarkable that we owe this knowledge of the official certificate of the death to the earliest Evangelist.

Thirdly, in the description of the actual burial, the Marcan narrative speaks of purchase of linen for the grave clothes, but omits all mention of spices and ointment, or of the ownership of the grave. The grave itself is said to have been hewn out of a rock; a stone is "rolled against the door." And two women, both of whom are named, are recorded as witnesses of the exact locality, "Behold *where* He was laid."

2. In the Lucan account of the burial the same general line is observed, the qualities of Joseph, the visit to Pilate, the scene at the grave. But there are very marked peculiarities. Greater stress is laid on Joseph's character, less on his position. The Marcan epithet "of honourable estate" is here replaced by "a good man and a righteous," which is further explained by the information that "he had not consented to their counsel and deed." After this, S. Luke adds the sentence, already found in S. Mark, that Joseph "was looking for the Kingdom of God." The order of the sentences is worth observing. The fact of Joseph's disapproval of the deed of the Sanhedrim can scarcely be a merely explanatory addition to the sentence found in S. Mark, for the explanation would surely follow, not precede it. Moreover, the religious zeal denoted by the phrase "looking for the Kingdom of God" would not necessarily carry with it disapproval of the Sanhedrim's decision. That would surely depend on the pious individual's estimate of Jesus' claim. It would not be fair to say that none of the Sanhedrim who voted against our Lord were looking for the Kingdom of God. We have no right to give the phrase a Christian significance or even necessarily a Christian tendency.

S. Luke's account of the visit to Pilate omits all reference to Pilate's surprise and caution. Indeed it even leaves his consent to be inferred. It could scarcely say less if it said anything. The Lucan narrative is reduced to the single sentence "this man went to Pilate, and asked for the body of Jesus." The omissions are so remarkable that it has been wondered whether S. Luke had the passage before him in his copy of S. Mark. If the passage was there, and yet he left it out, it becomes an important

instance of superiority to any tendency to "embroider" events with imaginary details, such as has been sometimes ascribed to the Evangelists. So far from expanding the passage S. Luke condensed it.

In the actual burial S. Luke adds that the tomb was one "where never man had yet lain." This does not at all follow from the Marcan account. Unless we are prepared to ascribe it to imagination, S. Luke must have had some independent source from which the statement was derived. The criticism that the later Evangelist only varies the earlier narrative is quite inaccurate. It is also noticeable that while S. Luke mentions that women were witnesses of the scene he omits their names, although S. Mark had given them. Quite characteristic also of S. Luke is the change by which "beheld *where* He was laid" becomes "beheld the tomb and *how* His body was laid." There is a tenderness of womanly devotion in the latter phrase.

3. In S. Matthew's account of the burial we find independent features again. He says that Joseph of Arimathea was rich. But he has omitted (1) the fact that he was a councillor, which both the other narratives affirm; (2) that he was looking for the Kingdom of God, also found both in S. Mark and S. Luke. And in place of the statement, given by S. Luke, that he had not consented to the counsel and deed of the Jews, we find the perfectly new announcement that he "also himself was Jesus' disciple."

Here also in S. Matthew we read for the first time that the tomb was "his own," and that it was hewn out in the rock. The stone rolled to the door of the tomb is described as great. Both the women who witnessed the burial, and whose names S. Luke omits, are mentioned in S. Matthew following S. Mark. But whereas S. Mark says they beheld "where He was laid," and S. Luke says they "beheld the tomb and how His body was laid," S. Matthew says they were "sitting over against the sepulchre."

S. Matthew then adds a distinctive contribution to the subject in his narrative of the guards at the grave.

4. In the Johannine account no mention is made of Joseph of Arimathea's wealth, or of his membership of the Sanhedrim,

or of his looking for the Kingdom of God. But the fact of his discipleship, found already in S. Matthew, is repeated; with, however, the qualifying words, "but secretly for fear of the Jews."

The visit to Pilate is less condensed than in S. Luke, resembling the account in S. Matthew, except that while S. Matthew says, "Pilate commanded it" [the Body] "to be given up," S. John says, "Pilate gave him leave." But no reference to the surprise and the caution of Pilate is made.

And curiously S. John does not mention the taking down from the Cross. In this also he resembles S. Matthew, rather than either S. Mark or S. Luke.

But in S. John we find, and nowhere else, that Nicodemus assisted at the burial. This introduction of another figure into the scene at the grave is the more important because to him is ascribed the "bringing a mixture of myrrh and aloes." The Synoptists have said nothing of the use of spices at the burial. The tendency of recent criticism appears to be to say that the Synoptists are right and the fourth Evangelist mistaken; that there was no time on the night of the entombment for any such preparations. The Sabbath was close at hand. Hence the Synoptists assign the bringing of the spices to the women who visited the grave on Easter morning. But to say this is to assume more than we really know. We really are not competent to say whether it was possible to enwrap the dead in the folds with the spices within the time before the Sabbath began.

II

1. This analysis shows that while the earliest form of the tradition described Joseph of Arimathea as a member of the Sanhedrim and omitted his discipleship, being followed in these points by S. Luke, the later form omits his membership of the Sanhedrim and describes him as a disciple (S. Matthew and S. John). A recent criticism strangely suggests that this alteration was due to Christian feeling which preferred to believe that their Lord was buried by a disciple, and to idealise the conditions of the burial. Considering that the

fourth Evangelist states without hesitation that our Lord was betrayed by one disciple, and denied by another, it is difficult to see why the thought of burial by a stranger should have distressed him into a preference for fiction over truth. Certainly there is no tendency to idealise in his version of the conduct of Judas and Peter. If such tendency existed, why did it confine itself to the detail of the burial? Why leave untouched the much more serious instances of betrayal and denial? It is admittedly curious that the Gospels which ascribe councillorship to Joseph omit discipleship, and *vice versa*. But still the two are not incompatible ideas. The existence of secret discipleship in the Sanhedrim cannot be called impossible. Nor does there seem any reason why the primitive community should have objected to the thought that the disciple who buried their Lord was also a member of the Sanhedrim. Whatever the explanation may be it does not seem accounted for by idealising tendencies; that is to say, preference for pleasing fiction to unpleasant truth. Is there any solid ground for the supposition that the alteration was intended to substitute a new version for the former Gospel and not to supplement it? The further statement in S. Mark, that Joseph was "looking for the Kingdom of God" is not the language natural to one who knew him to be a disciple. It may be that S. Mark was not aware of the fact. On the other hand discipleship was, especially at that period, a term capable of many degrees. And the fourth Evangelist's statement, that Joseph's allegiance was secret for fear of the Jews, may account for S. Mark's ignorance of the fact, or for his selection of a vaguer phrase. What was obvious about Joseph of Arimathea was that he was in sympathy with the disciples in their hopes of the Kingdom of God. But secret discipleship is of all things liable to misconception. What Joseph's mental condition in reference to Jesus Christ really was S. Mark makes no attempt to determine. Such analysis of the spiritual state is not at all his scope. But it is exactly what we should expect in the fourth Evangelist. And there we actually find it. It is conceivable that the information as to his secret discipleship was derived from Joseph himself. This is, of course, mere

hypothesis. But it is conceivable. And therefore we have no right to propound a hypothesis which makes the Gospel statements inconceivable, and then to declare that one or other must be necessarily untrue.

2. Closely akin to this question of Joseph of Arimathea's discipleship is the question, What was his motive in arranging the burial of the Crucified? It has been suggested recently that his motive was regard for the Jewish law.

Now the difficulties created by this theory are numerous:

(1) If burial in such cases came in the usual course, there was no necessity for Joseph of Arimathea to intervene at all. He had only to let things go their ordinary way. The Jews had already taken the preliminary steps in this direction (S. John xix. 31).

(2) Nor was there any necessity for him to remove the body to the private grave instead of allowing its interment in the ordinary grave for the condemned.

(3) There is no trace of any interest on his part in the crucified robbers. And yet there must have been, if his sole interest were fulfilment of the Jewish criminal law.

(4) The earliest Evangelist considers Joseph's visit to Pilate an act of courage. If the burial were part of the ordinary course there would be no courage required, either in reference to the Roman official or to the Jewish people. S. John ascribes no courage to the Jews who asked Pilate not to allow the bodies to remain on the cross on the Sabbath day (S. John xix. 31). But if Joseph of Arimathea was going counter to the opinion of his own people and their authorities then, indeed, his visit to Pilate deserved the epithet "brave."

III

There are some important points to notice in the evidence for the burial of our Lord.

1. The first is the identification of the place of burial. Apart from the story of the guards, quite a number of persons knew which grave it was wherein the sacred body was placed. If attention be confined to the earliest form of the tradition, certainly Joseph of Arimathea knew

in what grave he placed the body. And the same earliest tradition expressly says that the women "beheld where He was laid." Among these women is named S. Mary Magdalene. Surely this disposes of the strange recent criticism that the women in their confusion on Easter morning, not knowing among the multitude of graves which was the real burying-place, looked into an empty tomb by mistake where a gardener was at work, who would have corrected their blunder had they waited to allow him time to finish his sentence. This theory contradicts the earliest form of the tradition, that of S. Mark.

2. The burial of the body is extremely important as being assumed in all statements about the empty grave. It has recently been said that the discovery of the empty tomb is all the less worthy of credit, since Jesus, if he had been handed over to punishment, would have been cast by the Roman soldiers into a common pit.[1] No authority is given for this statement. Inferences from general practices to a particular instance are surely precarious, especially in the presence of evidence to the contrary. It would require something more than this assertion to overthrow the earliest Christian tradition. May not something intervene to change a usual practice? Is not the peculiarity of history that you cannot predict human conduct in this logical sort of way? The Roman practice was to leave the victim of crucifixion hanging on the cross to become the prey of birds and beasts. But who would dream of saying that there were no exceptions to this rule? Josephus induced the Emperor Titus to take down from the cross three crucified persons while still alive.[2] Would any one argue that this cannot be historic because the rule was otherwise? The Jewish practice, no doubt, was the burial of the condemned. This was the Jewish law. But Josephus assures us that even the Jews themselves broke the law of burial at times. In the 'Wars of the Jews,' he writes: "They proceeded to that degree of impiety as to cast away their dead bodies without burial, although the Jews used to take so much care of the burial of men, that they took down those

[1] Reinach's 'Orpheus,' p. 331. [2] Autobiography of Josephus, ch. 75.

that were condemned and crucified, and buried them before the going down of the sun." [1]

Loisy thinks it probable that Jewish law would be observed in Jerusalem even in cases of those condemned by Roman authority. We note that Loisy can only assume that the observance of Jewish law in cases of the condemned was probable. We cannot tell for certain that the body of Jesus would have been "cast by the Roman soldiers into a common pit." Loisy thinks that relatives might obtain permission for burial of one condemned. No relative, however, obtained it for Jesus' body: nor any of the Twelve. The three crucified men whom Josephus induced the imperial authority to take down from the cross were not relatives; they were only friends. He "remembered them as his former acquaintances." A strong case might be made out against the likelihood of Josephus' request, still more of its being granted. No one, however, appears to doubt the facts. They are constantly quoted as if they were true. Why should not Joseph of Arimathea make a similar request to Pilate? Because, says Loisy, the whole Sanhedrim had decided the death of Jesus; and it is inexplicable how a member of the same Council could have concerned himself in the burial. But this difficulty seems expressly anticipated and met by S. Luke's assurance that Joseph of Arimathea had not consented to their counsel and deed. The implication is, as Loisy admits, that Joseph had been present at their deliberations, and had refused to vote with them. But, asks Loisy, how did Luke learn what passed in the discussions of the great Council? This singular question suggests the critic's limitations. Do not the secret decisions of conferences ever leak out? Could not Joseph himself confide in a friend, or inform the Church? Moreover, why Joseph of Arimathea could not act independently against the Council's decisions, so far at least as the burial, is inexplicable: more especially if, as a record says, he was a courageous person.

It is reported of a distinguished modern Englishman, that his conduct in various important Councils was marked by an independence which no opposition, however numerous,

[1] Josephus, 'Wars of the Jews,' iv. v. 2, Whiston's transl.

appeared to affect. Whereas most men would be disposed to defer to the prudence or sagacity of a vast majority of their colleagues, this distinguished individual only grew intensified thereby in his convictions; even if, as sometimes happened, he stood absolutely alone. Now why should not Joseph of Arimathea have been a person of such a character?

CHAPTER III

THE EMPTY GRAVE

BEFORE we reach the Resurrection Appearances, that which confronts us in the narrative is the empty grave.

I

And first we summarise the contents of the documents. According to S. Mark the women, whose names he gives, brought spices to anoint the body. Their anxiety was who should roll away the stone from the door of the tomb, "for it was exceeding great." They find the stone rolled back already. Entering the tomb they see a young man arrayed in white who reassures them, and then announces the Resurrection: "He is risen; He is not here; behold the place where they laid Him!" Then follows a message to the disciples and Peter, "He goeth before you into Galilee: then shall ye see Him, as He said unto you." The result of the communication is that the women fled trembling and astonished, and "said nothing to any one."

According to S. Matthew there was an earthquake; and an angel rolled away the stone, terrified the guards, and reassured the women, delivering a similar announcement of the Resurrection, "He is not here, for He is risen, even as He said. Come, see the place where the Lord lay." Then follows the message to the disciples, without any special mention of Peter: "Go quickly and tell His disciples He is risen from the dead; and lo, He goeth before you into Galilee; there shall you see Him; lo, I have told you." The result of the communication, according to S. Matthew, is that

the women "departed quickly from the tomb with fear and great joy, and ran to bring His disciples word." On the way Jesus met them, and repeated the angel's message.

The differences between these two accounts are obvious enough. The fear, amazement, and silence in S. Mark are resolved into fear and great joy and communicativeness. The fact that they "ran to bring His disciples word" is made to appear as the result of the angel's communication. If we take the Marcan narrative as our basis, it would seem obvious that the reason why our Lord appeared to the women repeating the angel message was that they were so overcome by fear and amazement that, as S. Mark reports, "they said nothing to any one for they were afraid." This failure of the women to carry the news of the Resurrection was remedied by our Lord's appearance to them.

What then has S. Matthew done? He has transposed the order of events. The "ran to bring His disciples word" was not, as S. Matthew's order makes it seem, the effect of the angel message, but of our Lord's reiteration of the same.

In S. Luke, the women brought the spices which they had prepared, and "found the stone rolled away from the tomb." They "entered in and found not the body of the Lord Jesus." "Two men in dazzling apparel" deliver the announcement of the Resurrection: "Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen." Then follows a reminder of His teaching given when He was yet in Galilee.

No appearance of Jesus to the women is recorded. But the effect of the angel's announcement is their obedience. "They remembered His words, and returned from the tomb, and told all these things to the Eleven and to all the rest." The result of the women's message is disbelief; with the sole exception that Peter paid a visit to the tomb, and "departed wondering." S. Luke also describes the two disciples on the Emmaus road, discussing the problem presented by the empty grave, and considering the statement of the women, that the body could not be found.

The fourth Evangelist describes the visit of only one woman, Mary Magdalene, to the grave, and her announcement to S. Peter and S. John, who investigate the grave for

themselves. The presence of other women may be implied in the plural, "we know not where they have laid Him." The fourth Evangelist also lays stress on the disposition of the grave-clothes as evidence for Resurrection.

Now the diversities in these narratives are numerous. But whether the angel was inside or outside the grave; whether there was one angel or two; whether the form of the message was a reminiscence about Galilee or a command to assemble there; whether the women said nothing to any one for they were afraid; or ran to carry His disciples word; whether one woman or several, or various groups at different times, visited the grave; in any case these narratives yield a uniform and very impressive tradition that the grave was empty on Easter Day.

II

That the grave was empty seems required by the contemporary idea of Resurrection. One of the most extreme of recent negative critics, Arnold Meyer,[1] recognises that the empty grave not only harmonises with the entire N.T. miraculous element, but with the whole contemporary Jewish view of the world. A Resurrection without an empty grave would have been to popular Judaism unthinkable. The Jewish and Christian conceptions presented in Dan. xii. 2, 2 Macc. vii. 11, and S. John v. 28 clearly demonstrate the inseparability of the empty grave from the idea of Resurrection. The empty grave was a necessary postulate for the disciples of Galilee.

III

But, it is said, however true it may be that this was the popular Jewish idea, it was not the conception of S. Paul. S. Paul's outlook, urges Arnold Meyer, was not that of the ordinary Jew: for S. Paul maintained that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God; that we sow not the body that shall be; and his theory of the heavenly body in 2 Cor. v. is suggestive of entire indifference to the fate of that which was consigned to the grave. Arnold Meyer also

[1] 'Die Auferstehung J.,' pp. 13, 24, 121.

asserts that for S. Paul the risen Christ was entirely spirit; in proof of which, he appeals to 2 Cor. iii. 17: "Now the Lord is the Spirit." Confirmatory of S. Paul's theological indifference to the question of the empty grave, is the fact that he never mentions it; not even in that exhaustive account of the evidence given in the opening of 1 Cor. xv. Arnold Meyer considers this omission of immense significance. It means, to him, either that S. Paul did not consider it evidentially valuable, or that he knew nothing about it, or that it was foreign to his ideas. Arnold Meyer's view is not original. It is shared by other critics.[1] But it has at least the advantage of being a thoroughgoing and uncompromising statement of the opinion.

On the other hand many critics[2] hold firmly that this interpretation of S. Paul's attitude towards the question of the empty grave is mistaken. This supposed indifference of S. Paul to the question of the empty sepulchre is based partly on the asserted independence of his theology, and partly on his omission of any reference to the fact. It may be convenient to consider these in order.

1. And first, the omission of the fact. It ought to be quite clear that S. Paul's ignorance, or indifference, on the subject cannot be justly inferred from the omissions in 1 Cor. xv.; for the simple reason that the summary there recorded was a tradition which he had received, not an invention of his own. It is therefore unconnected with peculiarities of his own thought and training. If the omission proved anything, it would militate against the Galilæan disciples' interest in the empty grave. But this is not asserted by the critics. It can prove nothing as to the ignorance of S. Paul. And to describe that brief list as an exhaustive account of the evidences is one of the strangest aberrations of criticism. It is evident, on the face of it, that

[1] *E.g.* Holtzmann, 'Life of Jesus,' p. 499. Schenkel.

[2] Among them are: Dobschütz, 'Ostern und Pfingsten,' pp. 7, 8, 9. Beyschlag, 'Stud. und Krit.,' 1864. Loofs, 'Die Auferstehungsberichte,' p. 12. Bartlett, 'Apostolic Age,' p. 4. Schmiedel, 'Encycl. Bibl.,' p. 4059. Knowling, 'Testimony,' p. 322. Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 105. Chase (in 'Cambridge Theol. Essays'). Schmöller, 'Stud. und Krit.,' 1894. Harnack also inclines that way. Krüger, 'Die Auferstehung J.,' p. 20.

no list ever had less claim to be considered as a narrative, still less as an exhaustive one.

But, after all, is not the empty grave implied in 1 Cor. xv.? The suggestion in the term ἐγείρειν, as applied to the dead, is that death is compared with sleep, and the resuscitation out of the one to the awakening out of the other.[1] The original tradition which S. Paul affirms that he received was "that Christ died ... and that He was buried and that He rose again" (1 Cor. xv. 3, 4). Died ... Buried ... Rose: this series is a series of physical experiences. They all occur to the same subject. That which died is that which was buried, and that which was buried is that which rose. This is the obvious sequence: and the readers of the Epistle could put no other construction upon it.[2] What sense, it has naturally been asked, has this interpolation of burial between death and resurrection, if the body which was buried had no connection with resurrection?[3] "The burial of Jesus appears between His death and resurrection: directly connected with them in a continuous and integral fashion; is represented just like them as an essential part of the tradition alongside the other main facts of our salvation. Here, then, it is impossible to regard the Resurrection as a mere endowment with a heavenly body which would have nothing whatever to do with the earthly body lying in the grave. We must rather admit that it is to be conceived as a coming forth of the body from the grave."[4] Arnold Meyer admits that, if S. Paul was indifferent to the empty grave, it is natural to inquire, why then did he mention the fact that our Lord was buried? This Meyer attempts to answer by reference to S. Paul's mystical tendencies as illustrated in such phrases as "buried with Christ" (Rom. vi. 4). It is however obvious to reply that whatever mystical applications may be made of the idea that Christ was buried they cannot affect the truth that the burial of Christ was a physical and literal fact. Nor can there be any more reason why the mystical expression "risen with Christ" should contradict the fact of Christ's physical resurrection. The mystic

[1] Schmöller, 'Stud. und Krit.,' 1894, 669.
[2] Cf. Riggenbach, p. 7.
[3] Beyschlag, 'Stud. und Krit.,' 1864.
[4] Schwartzkopff, p. 105.

meanings would never have arisen if the apostle had been unable to base them on historic occurrences.

2. But whatever account be given of S. Paul's omission of reference to the empty grave, it is certain that the question was not indifferent to him from a dogmatic point of view.

Meyer's inference from 2 Cor. iii. 17, that for S. Paul the risen Christ is entirely spirit, makes the apostle contradict his own doctrine of the spiritual body (1 Cor. xv). For the spiritual body is not in S. Paul's thought a body which has become converted into spirit: it is a body in which matter is made wholly subservient to the purposes of spirit. Nor can S. Paul's indifference to the empty grave be any more justly inferred from his theory of the "tabernacle not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building," in 2 Cor. v. The teaching given there expressly presupposes the destruction of the existing body, as prior to the reception of the body not of this creation. The inference would rather be that Christ's buried body was dissolved rather than that it remained. A similar thought is suggested by the triumphant conception, in Rom. viii. 10, 11, of the power of Christ's Spirit over the two departments of human nature, the soul and the body. The indwelling Christ produces, according to S. Paul, a double resurrection of the believer, first moral and then physical. Thus the whole of human nature is subjected to the Resurrection influence. And the parallel is drawn between the past experience of Christ Jesus and the future experience of Christians. The experience of the latter is to be a "quickening" of their "mortal bodies." The reference being manifestly to the corpse. Thus the parallel, and the references to the mortal bodies show clearly that in S. Paul's mind the Resurrection of our Lord was also a quickening of His mortal body. The passage includes alike S. Paul's conception of Resurrection and by implication his belief in the empty grave. On this conception the grave of Jesus cannot be considered by S. Paul otherwise than as empty.

In Rom. vi. 4 "raised" is the opposite of "buried." The suggestion is that the body experienced both.

This is the type of his fully matured instructions. And

certainly in the earlier doctrine of 1 Thess. iv. 17 (based on the postulate, "if we believe that Jesus died and rose again") "the dead in Christ shall rise first," he is evidently thinking of a literal physical resurrection from the dead.

Thus S. Paul's conception of the Resurrection of our Lord is not so essentially different from that of the Galilæan circle as criticism has sometimes represented.

With this conclusion Schmiedel agrees.[1] The explanation of S. Paul's silence about the empty sepulchre as due to the fact that resurrection of the dead body did not fit in with his theology, is, according to Schmiedel, wide of the mark. "If it were indeed the fact that his theology was opposed to this, it is nevertheless true that his theology came into being after his conversion to Christianity. When he first came to know of Jesus as risen he was still a Jew, and therefore convinced of resurrection in no other way than as reanimation of the body."

Prof. K. Lake says much the same: "It is almost as certain as anything which is not definitely stated can be, that S. Paul's doctrine of the translation of flesh and blood into spirit implied a belief in an empty tomb."[2]

IV

But it is argued that if the contemporary idea of Resurrection involved belief in the empty grave, the fact of its emptiness would easily be assured, after the appearances had happened, without the process of investigating whether the grave was really vacant or not. If the disciples came to believe that they had really seen Him as risen, which of them would think it necessary to test their experience by a visit to His grave? When Herod Antipas declared that John Baptist had risen did it occur to any disciple to look for the body in the place where they had buried it?

It is also suggested that unwillingness to incur ceremonial defilement would prevent intrusion within the grave.

Now it is probably correct to say that for men who had already experienced an Appearance of Christ as risen, research among the graves would be unnatural. A faith already

[1] Encycl. Bibl. s.v. 'Resurrection,' 4059. [2] K. Lake, 'Resurrection,' 192.

convinced by personal experience would not need or endure supporting by such investigations. A test of such a kind would already imply suspicions. But this objection has unconsciously misstated the case, because it has inverted the evidence. The evidence is that the grave was visited, and its emptiness ascertained, *before* the experience of the Christophanies occurred.

That this was the order of the incidents all the documents agree: first came the discovery that the grave was vacated, afterwards the experience of actual Appearances. Now clearly criticism can have no right to invert this order; no right to place the Appearances first, and then to consider them merely subjective visions, and then afterwards to describe the empty grave as an unverified theological inference. That the emptiness of the grave was involved in the popular idea of resurrection does not prove that the asserted emptiness in a particular instance originated in this way; nor can it justify an inversion of the incidents in defiance of all the evidence we possess. And without this inversion the opinion possesses no plausibility.

As to the question whether any person troubled to ascertain the condition of S. John Baptist's grave, after the assertion was made that he was risen; there is surely no parallel whatever between a narrative of which the whole point is that the grave was investigated and found empty, and an inquiry whether in another case, under totally different circumstances, a grave was visited or was not. In the case of S. John Baptist, the appearance of a person suggests the idea that he was risen. In the case of Christ, an empty grave suggests the idea that the body has been taken away. A parallel between these is only created by inverting the evidence in the case of Christ: an arbitrary and unjustifiable procedure.

As to the improbability that any investigation would be made at the grave, owing to Jewish reluctance to incur ceremonial defilement through contact with a corpse, it may be enough to suggest that ritual regulations are not proof against the human passions of love or of hate. It is a shallow view of human nature to suppose that external observances which, under normal conditions, might easily

get themselves obeyed, would be equally powerful under abnormal conditions, when the strongest passions of which human nature is capable were roused to an extraordinary degree. It seems to us self-evident that neither the devotion of a Mary Magdalene or of a S. John, nor the hatred of a Sanhedrist would, under the circumstance of Jesus' death, be controlled by fear of ceremonial defilement. This is especially the case with the Sanhedrist opponents of the apostles. For their whole religious position required them to be interested in the contents of that grave. They were publicly confronted with an announcement which implicated them in the gravest of conceivable crimes to a Jew, that of the murder of their own Messiah. The author of the Acts reports[1] that S. Peter, preaching in Jerusalem only six weeks after Easter, did not hesitate to apply to the Christ the Psalmist's words, "Neither wilt Thou give thy Holy One to see corruption," and to affirm the literal fulfilment of the passage in Jesus of Nazareth, "neither was He kept in Hades nor did His flesh see corruption." If this report actually represents S. Peter's sentiments, he laid himself open to a challenge on the part of his hearers, who might interrupt him with the remark: We know where Jesus was buried, and the body lies there still.[2]

The Sanhedrist opponents of S. Peter had the strongest of reasons for refuting such a charge. The Acts consistently represent them as reproaching the apostles with "intending to bring this man's blood upon" them. The whole situation implies a desperate eagerness to bring a crushing reply against S. Peter if only it could be found. "We cannot conceive them," it has been said, "in such circumstances, not attempting to cleanse themselves from that fearful stain of murder of Messiah, by proving to the senses that the Resurrection had not taken place."[3] If they could have pointed to the mouldering remains of a corpse in the grave, if they could have given even a plausible identification of the remains with the actual burying-place of Jesus of Nazareth, they would have placed a very formidable obstruction in the apostles' way. We may surely ask, did not so

[1] Acts ii. 31. [2] Cf. Ihmels, p. 26.
[3] Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 116.

obvious a measure occur to the able men of whom the Sanhedrim was composed? Yet there is not the trace of any hostile investigation at the grave where Jesus was buried; no attempt on the part of any opponent to ascertain which grave it was. It is no real argument to say that within a few weeks the remains would have been unrecognisable. If it could have been affirmed that this was the actual grave, and shown that the grave was the scene of decomposition, the Resurrection would have been almost impossible for Jews at Jerusalem to believe.

There is also evidence to show that in other instances Jews were not debarred from contact with the dead, nor from visiting the place of burial, nor from belief in beneficial influences obtainable at the grave. It is the Old Testament itself which records restoration of a corpse to life by contact with the bones of Elisha.[1] And such conceptions are known to have prevailed among the later Jews. They occur in the Talmud—"according to Sanhedrim 47[b] dust was taken from the grave of the Leader, the great Saint, . . . in order to cure fever, and indeed, not secretly: Rabbi Samuel approved of it. It is also a tradition . . . that the bones of Joseph were not allowed to remain in Egypt because the Egyptians might have been redeemed by them, since miraculous healing influences proceed from the bones of lesser saints, and even from the dust of their graves."[2] If such ideas prevailed among the contemporaries of our Lord, they would clearly override any fear of ritual contamination among those who believed Him to be "a righteous man," still more among all who were of the number of His disciples.

Wendt is so certain that the grave of Christ was discovered to be empty, that he considers the incident providentially permitted. For he shrinks from contemplating the reverence which Christendom would otherwise have bestowed upon the relics of Jesus Christ.[3] Thus the empty grave

[1] 2 Kings xiii. 21.

[2] Weber, 'd. Lehre d. Talmud,' p. 289. See the actual passage in Wünsche, 'Babylonische Talmud,' Tractate iv. Sanhedrim, § 125, T. ii. 89. 1888.

[3] Wendt, 'Lehre,' p. 404.

is providentially designed in order to spiritualise and refine the character of the Christian religion. If the Almighty is so concerned for the substance of Christianity as to secure the emptying of the grave of Jesus, would this be effected by an illusion or not rather by truth? For the emptiness of the grave has led Christendom, on this theory, into belief in Jesus' Resurrection. Thus the "providential" precautions against reverencing Christ's relics have promoted belief in the "illusion" of Christ's Resurrection! Was not this foreseen? Or was it "permitted," on the principle that of two evils one should choose the less? But it is really worth reflecting whether, if the emptiness of the grave of Christ had not been ascertained as a fact, some early and degenerate form of Christianity might not have arisen to venerate the relics of the buried Christ. This would have been perfectly harmonious with some merely humanitarian conception of the Prophet of Nazareth. Why is it that no such sect arose, that belief in the empty grave swept everything before it, and held undisputed dominion, alike in hostile and devoted circles, unless it was because the fact was so?

V

Those who definitely maintain that the grave of Christ was not empty, that the foul-engendered worm has fed upon the flesh of our Anointed One, simply reject the whole series of the narratives, including the most ancient form of the Gospel tradition. Whatever S. Mark omits, he says that the grave was empty. There is not the slightest evidence on the other side. But to say that the whole series of reported visits to the grave are fictions, fabricated inferences from a theological idea, is to say what is simply incredible. The Jewish Christian is supposed to hold that the Resurrection involves an empty grave. On the basis of this conception he is then supposed to build up the detailed life-like realistic incidents of Mary Magdalene, and the two disciples; incidents which are marked by extraordinary insight and penetration and psychological appropriateness.

To the critic Loisy, indeed, the angel words "Why seek ye the living among the dead," bear evident marks of the Evangelist's authorship, containing a fine thought converted almost into an aphorism, and a little over-refined for the circumstances.[1] Martineau, on the other hand, complains of the meagreness of the Lord's reply to the women; as being no more than a repetition of words which the angel had already spoken. Thus the one phrase is too original, and the other not original enough.

To most minds, however, the singular impressiveness of the utterance conveys a sense of its reality, granting the circumstances to be what the Evangelist declares.

The fourth Evangelist's description of the visit of the two disciples to the grave is extraordinarily life-like and convincing. The characteristics of each are painted with a firm hand, and in exact correspondence with the individuality of the Peter and John of the Synoptic narrative of the ministry. It does not read like fiction. Each acts naturally, inimitably, true to himself. While we could not have anticipated what each would do, we are at least able to feel the psychological accuracy of what each is said to have done. On receiving Mary Magdalene's report, "they have taken away the Lord out of the tomb, and we know not where they have laid Him"—a statement which contains an announcement of the emptiness of the grave with an evident ignorance of the idea of Resurrection—Peter and John both ran to the grave. That S. John paused outside the grave, stooping down and looking in and seeing the grave-clothes still there, is profoundly in keeping with that apostle's instinctive reserve. That S. Peter, on the contrary, did not pause outside, but pushed straight into the grave, is equally in keeping with his character. Very striking also is the graduated succession of terms expressive of "seeing." S. John outside the grave, stooping down and looking in—"seeth" (βλέπει) the linen clothes lying; takes in the general fact that the grave-clothes are there, without the body. Then Peter, within the grave, "beholdeth (θεωρεῖ) the linen clothes lying, and the napkin,

[1] 'Les Ev. Synoptiques,' p. 727.

that was upon His Head, not lying with the linen clothes, but rolled up in a place by itself." Peter gazes intently upon the details of this unaccountable phenomenon. Then, finally, S. John also entered, and "saw (εἶδεν) and believed": saw through to the meaning of the phenomena, and rose to an act of faith.

The visit of S. John and S. Peter to the grave of Christ should be compared with their visit with our Lord to the grave of Lazarus. The contrasts are significant and impressive, and can scarcely be other than intentional. In the one the stone still lies upon the grave, and has to be removed by human exertions (xi. 38, 39). In the other the stone is already taken away (xx. 1). But most impressive of all is the contrast between the words "And he that was dead came forth bound hand and foot with grave clothes, and his face was bound about with a napkin"; while the task is left to human agency to "loose him and let him go" (xi. 44); and the words "seeth the linen clothes lie, and the napkin, that was about His Head, not lying with the linen clothes, but wrapped together in a place by itself" (xx. 6, 7).

Latham, in his 'Risen Master,' published in 1901, called especial attention to the account in the fourth Evangelist of the disposition of the grave-clothes in the place where the Lord's body had lain, quoting from a pamphlet by the Reverend Arthur Beard (1873), called 'The Parable of the Grave-Clothes.' Beard suggested that S. John "understood that the Lord had risen, *because the grave-clothes were undisturbed*, and on this evidence he believed."[1] "John was the historian as well as the eye-witness of the deserted grave-clothes; and we understand from his history that when Jesus rose from the dead He withdrew from his grave-clothes without disturbing their arrangement; on His retiring from them the linen clothes fell flat on the rock, because their support was withdrawn, and because they were borne down by the hundred pounds' weight of aloes and myrrh. But there was no such weight pressing upon the napkin. Its smaller size, or the nature of its material, or its three-days'

[1] Latham, p. 3.

wrapping, or all these united together, apparently enabled it to retain its erect form after the support which had moulded it was withdrawn."[1]

Latham's own view, which is similar, but more developed, is expressed as follows: When S. John reached the grave "We read, 'he did not, however, go in.' Why is he careful to tell us this? Why does he use the word 'however'? Does not this word imply 'as he might naturally have been expected to do'? I incline to think that he was startled at the sight of the grave-clothes; he expected to find that the body had been taken away, but it had never entered into his head that the body would be taken and the grave-clothes left, That the grave-clothes should remain in the tomb at all might make him wonder a little, but that they should be lying undisturbed, as he would find out that they did, would give him infinitely more to wonder at. On first reaching the tomb he was struck by the sight of them seen through the door, and what he especially notes *is that they were lying flat*, and not, as might have been expected, in a heap. Very naturally he stopped for a moment and gazed."[2]...

Peter "regards the linen clothes *as they were lying*." It would have been unnecessary to speak of the position of these clothes unless there were something in it that caught attention. Peter then tells John of something more that he sees, namely, "the napkin, that was upon his head, not lying with the linen clothes, but rolled up in a place by itself." "Now the word used for 'rolled up' (ἐντετυλιγμένον) is employed (Matt. xxvii. 59, and Luke xxiii. 53) to express the wrapping of the Lord's body in the linen clothes, and it implies here that the napkin had been wrapped round the head and partially retained the annular form thus given it; I take it to mean that it was *not* folded so as to lie flat with the clothes."[3]

Thus Latham's theory is that the body had, so to say, evaporated through the linen. And when the angel said to the women, "Come and see the place where the Lord lay!" or "behold the place where they laid Him," "these verses give

[1] Latham, p. 4. [2] *Ib.* p. 41. [3] *Ib.* p. 43.

the idea that there must have been something to show."[1] The angels were directing the women's attention to the evidence of the grave-clothes. But "the women and the apostles look with different eyes on the risen Lord, and this difference corresponds to what they had respectively made out from the sight in the tomb. The women did not examine the grave-clothes sufficiently to perceive that the body must have vanished from among the folds, as I maintain it did."[2]

Dr. Sanday says: "We might perhaps paraphrase: 'the wonder of the Resurrection began to dawn upon them, though they were not prepared for it. At a later date they came to understand that prophecy had distinctly pointed to it, and that the whole mission of the Messiah would have been incomplete without it: but as yet this was hidden from them. They saw that something mysterious had happened, and they felt that what had happened was profoundly important; as yet they could not say more. The first step towards a full belief had been taken, though the full belief was still in the future.'"[3]

This detailed account of the two disciples' visit to the grave is only found in the latest Evangelist. Certain critics therefore suggest that it was elaborated in answer to opponents, and written with apologetic design. Against this, must be maintained the air of reality, already indicated, which pervades the whole passage and the conduct of the personages concerned in it. The mention of the visit in S. Luke is complicated by some uncertainty as to the MSS. The passage is: "But Peter arose, and ran unto the tomb; and stooping down and looking in, he seeth the linen clothes by themselves; and he departed to his home, wondering at that which was come to pass."[4]

The Revised Version includes this verse with, however, a marginal note that "some ancient authorities omit verse 12." The verse is placed in brackets in Westcott and Hort's text, chiefly on the authority of Codex Bezae; with the remark that

[1] Latham, p. 50. [2] *Ib.* p. 56.
[3] Sanday, 'The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel,' p. 162.
[4] S. Luke xxiv. 12.

the text is derived "from S. John xx. 3-10 (except 'arose' and 'wondering at that which was come to pass,') condensed and simplified, with omission of all that relates to the other disciple."[1] Some think that the narrative is continuous until this verse. But even if this verse were cancelled, there still remains in S. Luke another allusion to the visit of the disciples to the grave. Verse 24 reports "and certain of them that were with us went to the tomb, and found it even so as the women had said: but Him they saw not." The critic Blass[2] inquires whether this also is an interpretation. Its removal would no more leave a gap than the removal of verse 12. "But," he adds, "neither have we evidence for the omission, nor is the verse found in S. John." While, therefore, as an editor of the text, Blass felt "bound to omit verse 12 like Tischendorf and Westcott-Hort," yet "doubts still remain." Is verse 12 after all really derived from the fourth Evangelist? The statement that S. Peter "departed wondering" is certainly not derived from the *words* of the fourth Evangelist: is it an inference from the passage? Or is it derived from an independent authority? No explanation is yet suggested why an account of S. Peter's visit omitting S. John should be interpolated in S. Luke. S. Luke was clearly aware that more than one of the disciples visited the grave.[3] It is noticed by Plummer that the words employed in verse 12 include several Lucan characteristics.[4] And this has led to the suggestion that the verse was perhaps interpolated by S. Luke in his revised edition of the Gospel—"Luke made a rough copy first on cheap material, and then a better copy to give to Theophilus, who was a person of distinction. In this second copy he made alterations. But both remained in existence and became the parent of other copies, the Western text being derived from the rough draft, and the more widely diffused text from the presentation copy."[5]

[1] Notes on Select Readings, p. 71.

[2] Blass, 'Philology of the Gospels,' p. 189. [3] Verse 24.

[4] *E.g.* *ἀναστάς* (not found in S. John) and *τὸ γεγονός* not in S. John but specially figures in S. Luke—Plummer's S. Luke, p. 550.

[5] Plummer, *ib.* p. 567.

Such is Blass' theory as to the Acts. If something similar occurred, as Salmon thought, with the Gospel, it may account for the varieties in the MSS. as to verse 12. But, of course, this is not much more than conjecture. If the verbal similarities render Lucan authorship likely, how can the passage be condensed and simplified from S. John xx.? It seems accordingly necessary to decide between verbal similarities with S. Luke and substantial agreement with S. John. We should certainly see further if we could realise why S. Peter alone is mentioned in S. Luke. Keim[1] declared that he could not strike this verse 12 out, notwithstanding the editors of the text who omit it. The verse was required by the statement in verse 24. Nor does it seem probable that S. Luke derived the passage from S. John. Nor is it probable that a later interpolation building upon S. John would have named S. Peter alone in opposition to S. John.

VI

The various materialistic attempts to account for the emptiness of the grave may be grouped as follows :

1. First, an imposture practised by the disciples while the guards were asleep.

No part of the Resurrection narratives has been more severely criticised than S. Matthew's story of the soldiers at the grave. It has been argued recently[2] that the story is incredible alike in the action assigned to the Jewish authorities and to the Roman soldiers. The chief priests are exclusively concerned in suppressing truth: they purchase the silence of the men who know. The part assigned to the soldiers presents equal difficulties. The version of the story which they were paid to tell has no plausibility. Everybody knew that Roman soldiers do not mount guard in their sleep. Thus the self-contradictory character of their version would be evident to every hearer. Accordingly it is suggested that the story was composed, in apologetic interests, by believers, in reply to the charge that they had stolen the body away.

[1] 'Jesus of Nazareth,' vi. 315, n. 9. See also Bleek, De Wette, and Meyer.
[2] Loisy, 'Les Ev. Syn.,' ii. 736.

It must be remembered, however, that our present discussion is simply concerned with the empty grave. And it is necessary to distinguish between the fact of the empty grave and the explanation. The story in S. Matthew is connected with the explanation. It is an answer to the accusation of fraud raised against the disciples. The Christian proclaimed that the grave was empty. The Jew retorted that disciples stole the corpse. The Christian announced that the soldiers were paid to tell that lie. Now whether the Christian apologists' reply to the Jewish explanation carries conviction or not to the modern mind, the significant feature of the passage is that both sides alike agreed upon the fact that the grave was empty. S. Matthew's story of the bribery of the soldiers could have had no apologetic value whatever unless his Jewish opponents, like himself, accepted the fact of the empty grave. It is self-evident that if the Jews had been accustomed to say that the body of Jesus was never removed from the grave in Joseph's garden a very different answer must have been given than that in S. Matthew's Gospel. Thus the whole story of the guards strongly attests the Jewish belief that the grave was really vacated.[1] And this Jewish acknowledgment that the grave was empty appears to have been the ordinary and only view. It extends, so far as the present writer is aware, to all the subsequent hostile Jewish criticisms on the point. That the disciples removed the body was a saying commonly repeated among the Jews at the time when S. Matthew's gospel was written; and, as it has been truly observed, "this is enough to show that even in unbelieving Jewish circles the fact of the empty grave was admitted. If so, the evidence for it must have been too notorious to be denied."[2] Jewish anti-Christian propaganda, as far down as the twelfth century, still circulated a version in which the empty grave was admitted and the removal explained. The story is that when the queen heard that the elders had slain Jesus and had buried Him, and that He was risen again, she ordered them within three days to produce the body or forfeit their lives. "Then spake Judas, 'come and I will show you the man whom ye

[1] Cf. Rohrbach, p. 82. [2] 'Camb. Theol. Essays,' p. 336.

seek: for it was I who took the Fatherless from his grave. For I feared lest His disciples should steal Him away, and I have hidden Him in my garden, and led a waterbrook over the place." And the story goes on to describe that the body was actually produced.[1] This daring assertion of the actual production of the body never, we believe, obtained for itself a credence anywhere outside a fiercely hostile Jewish propaganda. The Palestinian explanation in S. Matthew could never conceivably have been written, if contemporary opponents had then asserted it.

Upon these assumptions of daring falsehood and fraud to the disciples Keim observes: "All these assumptions are repellent and disgraceful; they show that the holy conviction of the apostles and the first Christians . . . has not in the slightest degree influenced the hardened minds of such critics."[2]

2. Another explanation of the empty grave is that which ascribes the removal of the body to Joseph of Arimathea. Arnold Meyer suggests[3] that Joseph himself removed the body from a place which he had only intended as its temporary dwelling. He would not be likely to leave a stranger's remains permanently in his family burying ground. He was not a disciple, and his only interest in the burial was compliance with the Jewish ceremonial regulations. But Arnold Meyer is hard to reconcile with himself; for he elsewhere denies that Joseph's grave could be at Jerusalem.[4] The family grave must obviously have been at Arimathea, miles away! Elsewhere, again, Meyer declares that the difficulty of the narrative suggests that the grave was not empty at all![5] But Meyer is not alone in attributing the removal to Joseph. O. Holtzmann[6] maintains that Joseph of Arimathea on further reflection, for prudential reasons, withdrew the body from the grave in which he had at first allowed it to lie. He did it with the utmost secrecy; carefully withheld the fact from the disciples, who were consequently allowed to believe that their Master was risen. Joseph's

[1] Toledoth Jesu, in Baring Gould, 'Lost and Hostile Gospels,' p. 88.
[2] Keim, vi. 325. [3] Arnold Meyer, p. 118. [4] p. 123.
[5] p. 116. [6] 'Life of Jesus.'

position precluded any explanation; and thus, on the basis of a misconception, the inference of the Resurrection was made.

The reader is reminded of Tertullian's sarcastic suggestion that the gardener removed the corpse because he could not have visitors trampling his garden down.[1]

Other critics have felt that it is not safe to leave Joseph of Arimathea in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. His secret might leak out. It is never safe to leave a man, with a secret on his conscience, in the neighbourhood where the deed was perpetrated. What if, aghast at the unforeseen results of his action, a momentary impulse should lead him to confess the truth? Accordingly some critics suggest that he withdrew immediately afterwards, quite quietly, to the Dispersion. There, among strangers, where his identity was unknown, he was safe from the risk of pertinacious and awkward questionings. So the life of Joseph of Arimathea had to be rewritten, without a shred of documentary evidence, into conformity with the critics' presuppositions.

3. It was reserved for the rationalism of the closing eighteenth century to invent the theory that Jesus did not die upon the Cross, but only fainted, and recovered consciousness in the cool and quiet of the grave. The rationalist Venturini[2] constructed an independent romance, in which the invalid Jesus is carefully tended by the Essenes, and so far restored to health that He was able to show himself to His disciples. He lived retired in some sequestered district of Jerusalem, or perhaps on the Mount of Olives; and, as His gradually diminishing strength was almost gone, withdrew to some unknown corner and expired.

This is the school of rationalistic romance. Subject to no historical restraint, it gave free rein to its own weird imaginations.[3] Detailed criticism would be superfluous. Keim long ago treated it as it deserved.[4] Probably no living person could be induced to credit it. The abstract

[1] 'De Spectaculis,' ch. 30.

[2] 'Natürliche Geschichte des grossen Propheten von Nazareth,' 1806. 4 vols.

[3] Cf. Schweitzer 'Von Reimarus zu Wrede,' p. 47.

[4] 'Jesus of Nazara,' vi. 327-331.

possibility of recovering after crucifixion is acknowledged. It occurred in the case of one of the friends of Josephus.[1] But the total misrepresentation of the facts, and the immoral concealment of the truth, which such a theory ascribes to the Apostles, is surely its sufficient refutation. As to the reality of the death, Origen appealed to the conspicuousness of crucifixion in the presence of His nation: death was endured in full publicity "in order that no one might have it in his power to say that Jesus withdrew from the sight of men and only seemed to die."[2] Renan considered that the hatred of his enemies was sufficient guarantee to the reality of Jesus' death.[3] Réville appeals to the doubts and hesitations of the disciples as to His identity. The difficulties of recognition could never have been possible if the Appearances were a mere recovery without death. All the mysterious capacities of the body, its sudden manifestation and unaccountable disappearance, confirm the same. Réville dismisses the stealing as "un tissu d'invraisemblances matérielles et morales."[4] But the completest refutation of the theory is the answer given by Strauss.

"It is impossible that a being who had stolen half-dead out of the sepulchre, who crept about weak and ill, wanting medical treatment, who required bandaging, strengthening, and indulgence, and who still at last yielded to his sufferings, could have given to the disciples the impression that he was a conqueror over death and the grave, the Prince of Life: an impression which lay at the bottom of their future ministry. Such a resuscitation could only have weakened the impression which he had made upon them in life and in death, at the most could only have given it an elegiac voice, but could by no possibility have changed their sorrow into enthusiasm, have elevated their reverence into worship."[5]

4. Neither fraudulent disciples nor prudential Sanhedrists seem to another critical school to provide a satisfactory solution of the empty grave.

[1] 'Life of Josephus,' 75.
[2] 'Contr. Cel.' ii. 56.
[3] 'Life of Jesus.'
[4] Réville, ii. 455.
[5] Strauss, 'New Life of Jesus,' i. 412 (tr.).

Prof. Kirsopp Lake suggests that "the doubt is worth considering, whether the tomb which the women found open was the same as Joseph of Arimathea had closed. If it were not the same, the circumstances all seem to fall into line. The women came in the early morning to a tomb which they thought was the one in which they had seen the Lord buried. They expected to find a closed tomb, but they found an open one; and a young man, who was in the entrance, guessing their errand, tried to tell them that they had made a mistake in the place. 'He is not here,' he said, 'see the place where they laid Him'; and probably pointed to the next tomb. But the women were frightened at the detection of their errand and fled, only imperfectly or not at all understanding what they heard. It was only later on, when they knew that the Lord was risen, and—on their view—that his tomb must be empty, that they came to believe that the young man was something more than they had seen; that he was not telling them of their mistake, but announcing the Resurrection, and that his intention was to give them a message for the disciples."

Prof. Kirsopp Lake adds indeed that "these remarks are not to be taken as anything more than a suggestion of what might possibly have happened." And he also tells us that the Gospel version is based on the doctrine that Resurrection must imply an empty tomb. "Those who still believe in this necessity are justified in making the same inference: but those of us who believe that the Resurrection need *not* imply an empty tomb are justified in saying that the narrative might have been produced by causes in accordance with our belief, and that the inference of the women is one which is not binding on us. The empty tomb is for us doctrinally indefensible, and is historically insufficiently accredited. Thus the story of the empty tomb must be fought out on doctrinal, not on historical or critical grounds."

The real interest of this passage lies in its frank admission that the story of the empty grave is rejected on dogmatic grounds; because it does not harmonise with the critics' view of the real nature of Resurrection. Therefore he proceeds to rewrite the Gospel, for it is nothing less than this, into

harmony with his own dogmatic presupposition. Every detail which conflicts with his view that Resurrection has nothing to do with the buried body is ignored, or turned into the opposite of what it was meant to convey. It would not be difficult to criticise the version of the incidents which Prof. Kirsopp Lake considers possible. But intrinsic probability, the test which the author proposes, is of all things profoundly subjective. What appears to one mind "possible" or "probable" will appear very much the reverse to another. But the important matter is that the emptiness of the grave is really denied on dogmatic presuppositions. Whether, however, modern criticism is justified, on that ground, in asserting, in spite of all the Gospel statements to the contrary, that the first believers either looked in the wrong grave; or never looked at all; and, without verification, inferred the emptiness of the grave from their assurance that Christ was risen; must, we feel confident, be answered with a most emphatic negative.

VII

The conclusion to which a study of the evidence leads us is that the emptiness of the grave of Christ was primarily known, not as a theological inference from the nature of Resurrection, but as a fact investigated and actually ascertained.

With this conclusion a very large number of negative critics agree. They reject the theory that the empty grave was an unverified inference from the belief that He was risen; but they maintain instead that it was the empty grave which greatly contributed to create the Appearances, and the consequent faith that He was risen. They think that if the grave was actually found vacated, the fact would greatly conduce to visions of the risen Master, or at any rate to belief in His triumph over death and His exaltation to glory. But they think it difficult, in the absence of any such external aid to faith, to account for the vigorous joyous confidence in His victory, which undoubtedly pervaded and possessed the entire being of the first disciples.

It would not be difficult to produce a strong array of modern critics, of very different schools, who accept this

unanimous tradition of the empty grave—as Schenkel, Dobschütz, Loofs, Stapfer, Steude, Holtzmann, Réville, and Wendt.

It should, however, be recognised that the emptiness of the grave does not necessarily prove Resurrection. Believing as we do that all the evidence concurs in declaring that the grave was vacant, the interpretation of the fact must be ultimately one of two things: either this was a human work, or else it was the work of God. Either human hands removed the corpse, or the Almighty raised the dead. That is exactly the question. Two antagonistic conceptions of God and the world meet at the grave of Christ. And the ultimate decision will be largely determined by the entire range of a man's presuppositions.

Now the fourth Evangelist represents that the sight of the empty grave actually did in the case of one disciple create faith in the Resurrection. Belief then in the Resurrection existed, at least in one instance, prior to experiencing an actual appearance. It will, therefore, be open to criticism to suggest that the empty grave created the Appearances. For, of course, if it be granted that faith preceded the Appearances in any one instance, the possibility will be undeniable that it might have preceded them in other cases also.

But, while the fact of the empty grave is admittedly liable to this construction, there are very serious reasons for rejecting the assertion that the mere fact by itself could overcome the facts of death and defeat, and produce visions of triumph and glory. For the empty grave was not in itself necessarily conclusive. It was, as has been already said, open to more than one interpretation. It was not sufficient by itself for the exclusion of doubt. If the fourth Evangelist is to be credited when he affirms that it was sufficient in one very especial case, he is equally to be credited when he implies that it was not sufficient in any other.

There could be, after all, nothing peculiarly convincing in the sight of the emptied grave. It would undoubtedly make men think. This is what the evidence affirms. It would not necessarily create belief, but it would promote

inquiry. It would bewilder and confuse. It would form a stage in preparation for higher truth, or further development, because it would create an attitude of suspense. For anything we know to the contrary the empty grave may have been an indispensable preliminary to belief in the Resurrection. It introduced new thoughts, opened out new possibilities. It may be that such thoughts were indecisive and vague. But here was a definite solid fact; a fact to be accounted for. It challenged explanation. The explanation was ultimately either human action or divine.

VIII

The question remains, Whether it is therefore true to say that Christianity or the Church are founded upon an empty grave? The answer is included in the previous discussion. For we have already seen that the empty grave does not necessarily imply Resurrection. This inference is an inference of faith, a selection between alternative explanations. Not on the fact of the empty grave, but on the religious contents of the fact, is Christian faith, in reality, founded.

The modern inquiry, Whether the emptiness of the grave of Christ is necessary to the Christianity of to-day, must be postponed until we come to consider the nature of the Resurrection body. Suffice it to say for the present that the urgent insistence in the narratives that the grave was actually vacated shows how necessary the fact appeared to the Christianity of the apostolic age.

CHAPTER IV

THE THIRD DAY

THE phrase, as associated with our Lord's Resurrection, assumes various forms in the New Testament. The form in the earliest of the Gospels is, "after three days." This is the form in each of our Lord's three main predictions in S. Mark.[1]

In the other two Synoptic narratives the form is "the third day." We might perhaps at once have assumed the equivalence of these two phrases, had not a critic insisted that the earlier form "after three days" is less definite than the later "the third day." Wendt considers the form after three days "a specially characteristic sign of the priority of Mark, and of the verbal exactness with which he renders the apostolic tradition which stands as his authority."[2] But the force of this criticism is greatly modified by the fact that S. Paul, whose witness is far earlier than S. Mark, and whose authority was the apostolic circle at Jerusalem and especially S. Peter, does not employ this form but writes "the third day."[3] It seems difficult in face of such a fact to draw any special distinction between the two phrases. There is also the phrase "three days and three nights" which S. Matthew employs.[4] Moreover, when our Lord says, "I cast out devils and perform cures to-day and to-morrow, and the third day I am perfected,"[5] it is clear that the phrase the third day can be, and is, sometimes employed in the vaguer sense of a very brief interval. And further still, it so happens that

[1] S. Mark viii. 31, ix. 31, x. 34. [2] Wendt, 'Teaching of Jesus,' ii. 269.
[3] 1 Cor. xv. [4] S. Mark xii. 40. [5] S. Luke xiii. 32.

S. Matthew combines both expressions in a single passage. He represents the chief priest as saying to Pilate, "We remember that that deceiver said, while He was yet alive, after three days I rise again. Command therefore that the sepulchre be made sure until the third day."[1]

I

We first summarise the use of the phrase in the Gospels:

1. It occurs in all three of our Lord's main predictions of His Resurrection: at the great Confession of S. Peter; after the Transfiguration; on the way to Jerusalem.[2]

2. It occurs in the fourth Gospel, in the form, "Destroy this Temple, and in three days I will raise it up."[3]

3. It became an accusation at His trial before Caiaphas.[4]

4. It occurs in the derision at the Cross.[5] This also in the earliest Evangelist.

5. It is heard again in the misgivings of the chief priests which they confide to Pilate.[6]

6. It is echoed again on the journey to Emmaus.[7]

7. It is implied as actually fulfilled in the notes of time between Good Friday and Easter Day.

All the narratives agree that the journey to the grave was on the first day after the Sabbath.[8]

The Crucifixion is said to have happened on the day before the Sabbath:[9] and the Sabbath lay between.[10]

Thus according to the Evangelists it was predicted by Christ, remarked by opponents, discussed by disciples, and endorsed by the event.

II

But the tradition of the date of the Resurrection, on the Third Day, goes back behind all the existing Evangelists. It is part of the tradition received by S. Paul from the Community at Jerusalem. "I delivered unto you

[1] S. Matt. xxvii. 63-64. [2] S. Mark viii. 31, ix. 31, x. 34, and parallels.
[3] S. John ii. 19. [4] S. Matt. xxvi. 61. [5] S. Mark xv. 29.
[6] S. Matt. xxvii. 63. [7] S. Luke.
[8] S. Mark xvi. 2, S. Luke xxiv. 1, S. John xx. 1, S. Mark xxviii. 1.
[9] S. Mark xv. 42, S. John xix. 31. [10] S. Mark xvi. 1.

first of all," he tells the Corinthians, "that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that He was buried; and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures."[1] It is necessary here to anticipate our later investigations into the testimony of S. Paul, and to remember that this tradition was received by S. Paul most probably three years after his conversion. That is to say, between 4 and 10 years after the Resurrection took place: according to the date at which his conversion should be fixed.

It is, then, an excessively early tradition, received at first hand by S. Paul from S. Peter, in the actual place where the Resurrection happened. That is to say, from the best source, at the best place, at almost the best time. It is necessary to lay great stress on this, in order that the exceptional value of the evidence may be fully appreciated. Critics have constantly written as if we chiefly depended on the Gospels for our knowledge of the third day. Wendt, for instance, dwells almost entirely on S. Mark, merely giving a passing reference to S. Paul, leaving the impression that his evidence is less significant;[2] whereas the fact is that the testimony of the earliest of the Gospels must be at least some 30 years later than the date of S. Paul's tradition. We are authorised in saying from S. Paul's tradition that the Church of Jerusalem taught within ten years of the occurrence, at the latest, perhaps within four, that the Resurrection happened on the third day after the death. It is certainly difficult to see on what historic grounds a tradition so attested can be set aside. To this it should be added that there is no conflicting evidence, no necessity to decide between alternative reports, or "duplicated" versions. There is one steady consistent witness. All the later authorities endorse S. Paul. Pressensé was perfectly right to insist "that the Resurrection of Christ on the third day is guaranteed by a tradition more ancient than any evangelist."[3]

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4. [2] Wendt, 'T. J.,' ii. 269, n.

[3] Pressensé, 'J. C.,' p. 664.

III

But more than this. The third day, insignificant as the detail might at first sight appear, has stamped itself indelibly on one of the Christian devotional institutions, the observance of the Lord's Day.

S. Paul in writing to the Corinthians directs that the practice of almsgiving should take effect "upon the first day of the week."[1] He gives no explanation of the selection of this day. The Corinthians will evidently understand. In the Acts we read "upon the first day of the week, when we were gathered together to break bread, Paul discoursed with them"[2] [at Troas]. In the Revelation again the writer declares "I was in the spirit on the Lord's Day."[3]

Here we have the familiar evidence of the apostolic observance of Sunday. But the cause of the transference of the day from the last to the first of the week is the Apostolic conviction that the third day after the burial our Lord rose again from the dead. If on the third day, that is the first day of the week, Jesus rose again, "then," says Dr. Knowling, "we can understand why S. Paul does not consider it necessary to give any reason for the selection of that day."[4] The Resurrection occurred on the third day. "That we have here much of history, and not an application of prophecy, is," says Sabatier, "proved by the substitution in the Pauline Churches of the Lord's Day in the place of the Sabbath."[5]

In the Revelation the idea of the Lord's Day and the Resurrection are definitely associated together. If the writer "was in the Spirit on the Lord's Day," the announcement which he hears the Lord make is "I am the first and the last and the living one; and I was dead, and behold I am alive for evermore, and I have the keys of death and of Hades."[6]

"An unhistorical origin," says Strauss, "of the statement as to time, which lies at the foundation of the history of the Resurrection will be more difficult to admit than in the case

[1] 1 Cor. xvi. 2. [2] Acts xx. 7. [3] Rev. i. 10.

[4] Knowling, 'Witness of the Epistles,' p. 368. Cf. Maclear, 'Evidential Value of the Eucharist.'

[5] Sabatier, 'L'Apôtre Paul,' p. 65. [6] Rev. i. 10, 18.

of the locality of the Appearances. The primæval definite account that Jesus rose on the third day, and was seen after having so risen, seems to have every claim to historic validity."[1]

Strauss indeed qualifies this admission by attempting to prove that the Third Day was suggested partly for the theoretical necessity of rapid victory over death, and partly for scriptural exegesis, *e.g.* Hosea vi. 2 and S. Luke xii. 32 : *On the third day I shall be perfected.*

"It cannot be denied," says Schwartzkopff, "that the disciples understood literally Jesus' prediction of His Resurrection on the third day."[2] Schwartzkopff himself considers that this was a misunderstanding on their part, since he believes that our Lord intended to convey the notion of a short but indefinite period. But he owns that the consequence of the disciples' "misunderstanding" was that they must necessarily have expected Jesus' Resurrection on the third day.[3]

IV

Our next inquiry is : Whether this idea of the Resurrection on the third day is derived from the Old Testament.

S. Paul's account as received from the Church at Jerusalem is "that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures ; and that He was buried ; and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures." Here the death and its redemptive purpose are affirmed to be in accordance with the Old Testament. So also is the Resurrection. Does the phrase "according to the Scriptures" apply to the third day as well as to the Resurrection? It certainly would appear that it does. This is supported by the words ascribed to our Lord on the Emmaus road: "Thus it is written, that the Christ shall suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day ; and that repentance and remission of sins shall be preached in His name, unto all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem."[4]

Various Old Testament passages have been suggested as

[1] Strauss, 'New Life,' i. 438.
[2] Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 87.
[3] *Ib.* p. 88.
[4] S. Luke xxiv. 46, 47.

predicting the third day as the period between Christ's death and Resurrection.

1. First is the experience of the prophet Jonah. "Jonah was in the belly of the fish three days and three nights."[1] And this passage is expressly so interpreted in the report of our Lord's reference to the sign of the prophet Jonah in S. Matthew.[2] The difficulty however is, as we have already seen in discussing our Lord's predictions, that the earliest form of these words does not contain this reference to the three days, and indeed suggests an entirely different interpretation. If the Marcan form of our Lord's words is the original, and if the reference to the three days is a comment by the Evangelist, then we cannot tell at what period this interpretation was first placed upon the passage in Jonah. We have no longer our Lord's authority for the exposition. And it becomes all the more significant that S. Luke places our Lord's statement, "Thus it is written that the Christ should suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day," among the utterances spoken after the Resurrection and not before it. S. Luke's suggestion certainly is that the actual occurrence of the Resurrection on the third day led to an interpretation by our Lord of the Old Testament in accordance with the occurrence. It was not the reverse process that an interpretation of the Old Testament induced belief that the Resurrection occurred on the third day.

2. A second Old Testament passage not infrequently supposed to predict the third day is Hosea vi. 2:

> "Come and let us return unto the Lord:
> For He hath torn, and He will heal us;
> He hath smitten, and He will bind us up,
> After two days will He revive us;
> In the third day He will raise us up,
> And we shall live in His sight."

Patristic allegorical exposition has found in this passage a mystic reference to the Resurrection of Christ: but the Rabbinical interpretation finds in it not an individual but a national reference; and modern critical and historical

[1] Jonah i. 17. [2] S. Matt. xiii. 40.

exegesis unquestionably supports the latter. Delitzsch, for instance, explains as follows:

"The earlier Jewish and Christian expositors have taken the numbers, after two days and on the third day, chronologically. The Rabbins consequently suppose the prophecy to refer either to the three captivities, Egyptian, Babylonian, Roman, or to the three periods of the Temple.... Many of the Fathers on the other hand ... have found in them a prediction of His Resurrection on the third day.... But any direct allusion in the hope here uttered to the Death and Resurrection of Christ is proved to be untenable by the simple words and their context."[1]

On the other side a gifted writer[2] says: "The tradition that Jesus appeared on the third day, or after three days, to His disciples, is so naturally derived from the prophecy of Hosea: 'on the third day he shall raise us up'—a prophecy probably applied by Jesus to Himself—that we can place no reliance on its numerical accuracy." But it is very questionable whether the Resurrection of the Messiah on the third day is so naturally derived from the prophecy of Hosea. It did not appear so natural to the Jewish interpreters. We do not know that the words were applied by our Lord to Himself; there is no trace of any such application in the New Testament. If the passage was so expounded by our Lord it was in the period after the Resurrection, and therefore could not create the tradition of the third day. Least of all can we infer the unreliable character of the tradition on the ground of a questionable interpretation of a passage in Hosea.

Critics are greatly divided on the question whether the idea of the third day is traceable to the language of Hosea. Some consider that the original form of our Lord's prediction is "after three days," and that the form "on the third day" is a correction of the original, and that the original does not agree with Hosea's language. They conclude accordingly that the passage in Hosea cannot have been the same from which our Lord took the phrase "after three days."[3]

[1] Delitzsch, p. 95, 96. [2] 'Kernel and Husk,' p. 241.
[3] Rohrbach, p. 4.

Far more solid reasons are urged by another critic, Loofs.[1] He points out that the New Testament shows no signs of reference to the passage in Hosea. It is never quoted in the entire N.T. The Fathers, in collections of prophetic reference to Christ, *e.g.* Justin Martyr, nowhere mention these words of Hosea.

3. A third Old Testament passage has been suggested as predicting the Resurrection on the third day. It is the message brought by Isaiah to King Hezekiah: "I have heard thy prayer, I have seen thy tears: behold I will heal thee: on the third day thou shalt go up into the house of the Lord."[2]

But we do not know that this was ever applied by the Jews to the Messiah. It is enough to say that, while a mystic reference is easily discoverable in this passage after the event, we cannot assume that the passage credited the belief and convinced men in the absence of the fact.[3]

What must impress the reader of all these Old Testament passages is that they require a distinct effort to make them applicable. It is not meant by this that they possess no mystic reference. Very far from it. Only their remoteness, their apparent connection with other things, would disable them hopelessly from creating belief in an event which did not happen. To imagine that these vague statements led the disciples to believe that the Resurrection occurred on the third day when really nothing of the kind took place is psychologically incredible. That after the fact occurred the exposition became easy is quite intelligible. Our Lord, after He was risen, declared that the third day was determined by Old Testament predictions. It does not follow that this period is explicitly predicted or easily ascertained. It seems, on the contrary, clear that the disciples antecedently to being instructed by our Lord in the light of the event, did not for themselves discover it in the Old Testament at all. It is not in the least degree likely that they should. Considering that the death itself was a scandal and an overthrow of their Messianic hope; that they had no conception whatever of the pathway of the Messiah through crucifixion and

[1] 'Auferstehungsberichte,' p. 11. [2] 2 Kings xx. 5.
[3] Cf. Dobschütz, 'Ostern und Pfingsten,' p. 12.

resurrection, the question of the date when He would rise must have been outside the sphere of their considerations. The third day would be comparatively meaningless in their state of mind. And, further, it is generally admitted that only by a mystic use can such a reference to Christ's Resurrection be discovered in the ancient scriptures.

The situation compels the inference that it was not the Old Testament passages which created belief in the third day, but that conversely the Old Testament became illumined by the actual Resurrection on that date. It was not the Scripture which caused the belief, but the fact which explained the Scripture.[1]

And if the tradition of the empty grave has been challenged expressly on the ground that it is not mentioned by S. Paul, corresponding importance surely ought to be attached to the tradition of the third day for the very reason that S. Paul does mention it. It is scarcely impartial to undervalue what he omits without valuing what he records.

V

But there is a deeper meaning in "the third day" than a mere Old Testament reference. It appears that in ancient thought the third day was connected with the phenomena of dissolution. Traces of this survive in many religions. It was a maxim of the Chinese that the body should not be prepared for funeral till three days after death, as that was the proper time to wait to see whether it would come to life again.[2] Similarly the Parsees relate that the consciousness of the man sits three nights outside the body before finally relinquishing it.[3] Plato suggests a delay of burial for three days to distinguish between apparent and real death.[4] Popular opinion among the Jews held that after death "the soul hovered above the grave until the third day, desiring to return to the body; but when it sees the appearance change, then it leaves the body altogether."[5]

[1] Cf. Dobschütz, p. 13. [2] 'Li-Ki,' xxxiii. 4, quoted in A. Meyer, p. 152.
[3] Parson's 'Nature and Purpose of the Universe,' p. 156.
[4] Nomm. Bk. xii. 959, A. Burnet's Edit.
[5] See 'Bereschit Rabba,' trans. in Wünsch, 'Der Midrasch Bereschit Rabba,' 100. 10, vol. i. p. 504.

Thus at the grave of Lazarus Martha concludes that corruption has begun: for he has been dead four days.[1] Was it this thought which partly held the mind of the disciple on the Emmaus road when he reflected, "Yea, and beside all this, it is now the third day since these things came to pass"?[2] Was he hovering between a recollection of our Lord's prediction and a fear that the period of dissolution must be setting in?

Clearly, then, the significance of the Third Day, to the Eastern mind, as the date of Resurrection, is that it denotes the reality of the Death, and yet the exemption from corruption. It is Resurrection at the earliest moment consistent with the one, and at the latest consistent with the other. The following sentences of Bishop Pearson may sound remote from modern thought, but they accurately express the Scriptural idea: "He might have descended from the Cross before He died; but He would not, because He had undertaken to die for us. He might have revived Himself upon the Cross after He had given up the ghost, and before Joseph came to take Him down; but He would not, lest, as Pilate questioned whether He were already dead, so we might doubt whether He even died." It was necessary that some space should intervene between the Death and the Resurrection. But "when the verity of His Death was once sufficiently proved," there could be no more delay, "lest . . . any person after many days should doubt whether He rose with the same body with which He died."

It has further been often observed that the third day really means one day complete, and that the one day complete was the Sabbath. This, to the Jewish mind, certainly conveyed the idea of achievement and finished work.

VI

The importance of the third day is obvious in various directions.

Here, however, it is objected that the tradition is that on the third day He rose, not that on the third day He appeared. This objection is verbally correct. Neither S. Paul nor any

[1] A. Meyer, 'Auferstehung,' 183 and 353. [2] S. Luke xxiv. 21.

other writer says the third day He appeared to Cephas. S. Paul says, "and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures; and that He appeared to Cephas."[1] Thus, that the day of the Resurrection was also the day of the appearance to Cephas is not said. But surely it is implied. If Christ did not appear on the third day, how was it known that He rose on the third day? What is the meaning of the third day at all, unless it refers to an apostolic experience occurring on that day? If Christ did not appear on the third day, if the Resurrection is separable from the appearance of the Lord as risen, why should the Resurrection be assigned to the third day at all? Why not Good Friday night? For anything the apostles could prove to the contrary, this might have been the case, unless the Resurrection was dated by the Appearances. We must certainly agree with Bernhard Weiss that "only on the ground of the fact that appearances occurred on that day can the tradition have arisen that Jesus rose from the dead on the third day."[2]

Strauss inquired: Why, if the Resurrection occurred on the third day, did the disciples wait until the fiftieth to proclaim it? It might suffice to answer that even if no explanation were forthcoming, such objections could not even disturb the evidence of the tradition, still less refute it. But it seems curious that it did not occur to so acute a critic that a certain time to mature and take action might well be necessary. He himself postulates for a theory of his own, as we shall presently see, this necessity of time to develop. But the Acts explains the delay as imposed upon them by the Master's will, and by the necessity of reception of heavenly power, which was not bestowed till Pentecost. The whole conduct of the apostles after the Resurrection is presented in the Acts as deliberate: the very opposite of anything emotional or impulsive. They do not act as isolated individuals, but with the regularity of a corporate institution.

1. One importance of the third day Resurrection is that it makes the rationalist explanation of the faith as the result of self-generated visions incredible. For it is widely felt

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 4, 5. [2] B. Weiss, 'Life of Christ,' iii. 389.

that purely subjective changes from despair to hope and joy would at any rate take time. It is psychologically incredible that all this should be wrought in the space of some forty-eight hours. It is simply impossible, says Holsten,[1] that the first apostles should clearly, on the third day after the Crucifixion, experience a subjective vision of Christ. Strauss, with his usual frankness, admits the difficulty in remarkable terms: "If we look upon the Resurrection of Jesus as a miracle, it might take place as well on one day as another; a natural restoration to life must occur on some day soon after death, or it could not occur at all: on the other hand, the psychological revolution from which *we* suppose the visions of apostles to have proceeded, *appears to require a longer interval* for its development. *More than one day*, it would seem, should intervene before the disciples could recover from their terror at the unlooked-for result.... Supposing in particular that it was from renewed and profounder study of the sacred writings of the Old Testament that the certainty arose that their Jesus, in spite of suffering and death, had been the Messiah, that His suffering and death had been for Him only the passage to the glory of the Messiah, *for this also a longer time was requisite.* It appears therefore, if it is true that on the very first day after the death of Jesus appearances of His took place, not to be conceivable that those appearances were merely subjective visions of the disciples; and our view of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus appears to fall to pieces upon the impossibility of making that origin conceivable on the third day."[2]

Strauss's own reply to the difficulty is as follows: The difficulty is not insuperable; "a purely logical method was not yet possible."[3] The belief in the Resurrection was a reaction in the secret depths of the apostles' minds: followed by an "electric discharge in which the overloaded feelings relieved themselves. Criticism does not wait for reason. Imagination works everything. Reflection comes to the rescue afterwards."[4] Thus, thinks Strauss, even if it was established that the conviction of His Resurrection prevailed so early

[1] 'Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus,' p. 125, 6.
[2] Strauss, 'New Life,' i. p. 431. [3] *Ib.* p. 432. [4] *Ib.* p. 433.

as the Third Day, it might still be the product of subjective fancies.

But this explanation did not win its way to critical acceptance. It was still felt that such revolutions of thought and feeling take time. Criticism itself has not been content with Strauss's "electrical discharge." No one has drawn this out more conclusively than Keim, whose work should be consulted on this point. "The tradition that Jesus rose from the dead on the Third Day," says Bernhard Weiss, "can only have arisen in virtue of the fact that appearances occurred on that day."[1]

2. A second importance of this brief interval is that it compels the location of the first Appearances of the Risen Lord in Jerusalem. If only one complete day intervened between the Death and the Resurrection, then the Judæan series of manifestations must come first; for there would be no possibility of the disciples reaching Galilee by that time, even if they had started direct from Gethsemane. Thus this detail, deeply rooted as it is in the primitive tradition, and the Judæan Appearances, are mutually corroborative. And it must not be forgotten that "the third day" is supported by those Evangelists who give the Galilæan series of appearances. Thus, either they contradict themselves, or else they imply the existence of the series which they omit.

[1] 'Life of Christ,' iii. 389.

CHAPTER V

THE LOCALITY OF THE APPEARANCES

IF the recorded Appearances of the risen Christ are classified according to locality, they fall into two obvious groups: Judæa and Galilee. The Galilæan series is contained in S. Mark and S. Matthew; the Judæan in S. Luke, S. John, and the appendix to S. Mark.

A recent school of critics which, for sake of distinction, may be described as negative, deal with the documents somewhat in the following way:

1. They point out that in the original Gospel of S. Mark, Jesus is said before He died to have expressly fixed Galilee to be the meeting-place after His Resurrection: "After I am raised up, I will go before you into Galilee."[1] And the young man's message to the women at the grave repeats the same design: "Go tell His disciples and Peter, He goeth before you into Galilee; there shall ye see Him, as He said unto you."[2] Here the original Gospel abruptly ends with a statement that the women "said nothing to any one; for they were afraid." But the logic of the situation requires that the lost ending of S. Mark proceeded to describe a meeting in Galilee. It is also asserted that the disciples were already on their way to the northern province, having started on Thursday night or Friday morning immediately after the betrayal in Gethsemane. The words, "And they all left Him and fled,"[3] being explained to mean, fled clean away from Jerusalem toward their home in Galilee.

[1] S. Mark xiv. 28. [2] S. Mark xvi. 7. [3] S. Mark xiv. 50.

It is further considered that this view of the fact is confirmed by S. Matthew, who follows closely the Marcan narrative hitherto, and is scarcely likely to have deviated from his authority in describing the Resurrection events. S. Matthew, therefore, is supposed to supply the original but lost account. Now, S. Matthew places the scene of the meeting between the disciples and Christ in Galilee. He says indeed that Jesus appeared to the women near the grave at Jerusalem; but it was only to reinforce the message already given by the angels, "Go tell My brethren that they depart into Galilee, and there shall they see Me."

So far, then, all the evidence appears to be for Galilee.

2. On the other side, the Gospel of S. Luke, the Gospel of S. John, and the present conclusion to S. Mark, give a series of appearances in Judæa. Not only is this the case, but S. Luke appears so entirely unconscious of any appearance in Galilee that he goes on to refer to the Ascension itself. And, what is even more remarkable, the angel-message to the women appears in S. Luke changed from a direction to go to Galilee into a reminder that Christ spoke to them about His Resurrection when He was still in Galilee. Thus, whereas the Marcan version is "He goeth before you into Galilee, there shall you see Him, as He said unto you";[1] the Lucan version is, "Remember how He spake unto you when he was yet in Galilee, saying that the Son of Man must be delivered up... and the third day rise again."[2] Here then, it is said, we have the angel-message in an altered form. The Marcan version is the original. And, in accordance with it, the meeting must have taken place in Galilee.

3. The critical conclusion from this evidence is that the Galilæan series represents the earlier tradition; that the Judæan series arose at a later time, and does not possess the same historic worth, being rather the product of devout reflection, or apologetic requirements, in the developing Christian community.

Thus, it is asserted that the first appearances happened far away from the neighbourhood where the Christ was

[1] S. Mark xvi. 7. [2] S. Luke xxiv. 6-7.

buried, and certainly at a later period than the third day from the death.

The question is dealt with in the following way by Strauss.[1] "If Luke is correct in the statement that Jesus on the day of the Resurrection directed the disciples to remain in Jerusalem, He cannot, as Matthew says, have told them on the very same morning to go to Galilee, and as they would not have gone there against His express directions, they cannot have seen the appearances there of which Matthew and the author of the supplementary chapter in John give an account. Conversely, if Jesus had defined Galilee to the disciples as the place where they were to see Him, it is impossible to imagine what could have induced Him to show Himself to them on the same day in Jerusalem; and if, therefore, Matthew is correct, all the three other appearances to the disciples which took place in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem vanish into nothing."

I

First, then, let us take the series of appearances in Galilee.

1. According to the original Gospel of S. Mark, not only did the women visit the grave on Easter Day, and therefore were still in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, but the message sent to the disciples, "He goeth *before* you into Galilee," implies the presence of the disciples also in Jerusalem on that day.[2] Accordingly the theory that "they all left Him and fled" means fled direct home to Galilee, is refuted by the implications of the earliest Evangelist. S. Mark knows nothing of a flight of the apostles before Easter to Galilee.[3] The Apocryphal Gospel of Peter takes a similar line.[4] The apostles, if we may credit S. Mark, were still residing in the Holy City.

Now to place the first appearance of our Lord in Galilee it is of course necessary to transfer the apostles from Jerusalem. But

[1] Strauss, 'New Life,' i. 404.

[2] Cf. Rördam, 'Hibbert Journal,' July, 1905, p. 781.

[3] Loofs, 'Auferstehungsberichte.'

[4] Swete, 'Akhmîn fragment of the Apocryphal Gospel of S. Peter,' xii. pp. 24 and 28.

this has no historic basis whatever. When it is reported that all the disciples forsook Him and fled, the obvious sense of the words is fled from the Garden of Gethsemane; but there is no hint that they fled on and on, and never paused until they found themselves safe in their Galilæan home. On the contrary, it is expressly noted that Peter followed afar off to the high priest's palace (Mark xiv. 54). And the message entrusted to the women (in S. Mark xvi. 7), tell His brethren that He goes before them into Galilee, proves that the oldest tradition recognised the fact that the apostles were still waiting in Jerusalem.[1] Wellhausen[2] recognises that (according to Mark xvi. and Matt. xxviii.) the disciples did not flee from Jerusalem on Friday, but were in Jerusalem on Easter Day: but he thinks they then left, according to the order to go to Galilee, with a view to seeing the Risen there.

But what did the lost conclusion of S. Mark contain? It may be said, with approach to certainty, it must have contained an appearance of Christ in Galilee. The angel-message would seem to necessitate this. But was there anything further? Did the lost conclusion contain an appearance of Christ in Jerusalem? It is often confidently asserted that it did not.

But that is precisely what we find in S. Matthew after a similar injunction to go to Galilee. S. Matthew describes a manifestation of Christ to the women near Jerusalem, and afterwards to the Eleven in Galilee. Now suppose that the ending of S. Matthew had been lost after verse 7 which contains the angel's direction to the disciples to go to Galilee. If in the absence of the original we had inferred from that command that the lost conclusion must have contained a meeting in Galilee we should have argued correctly. But if we had also inferred from the same command that the original contained no meeting near Jerusalem we should have been quite mistaken. Ought not such considerations to increase our caution in dogmatising as to what was absent from missing documents?

2. S. Matthew, as has just been said, relates that the first appearance of the risen Lord took place near Jerusalem,

[1] See Loofs, p. 19. [2] On S. Luke xxiv. 13.

but he also adds a manifestation to the Eleven in Galilee. The question is whether these incidents followed in close succession. "There is certainly nothing in S. Matthew's narrative when analysed to compel this supposition. In fact, the disconnected character of this narrative is apparent from the Evangelist's very words. The narrative contains four sections: (*a*) the appearance of the angel, (*b*) the appearance of Christ, (*c*) the story of the guards, (*d*) the appearances in Galilee. Now, while the first of these sections is closely connected with the second by the words, 'and as they went,' and the second closely connected with the third by the words, 'when they were going,' no similar connection is given between the third section and the fourth. It is possible, then, to place an interval of time after the account of the guards and before the departure for Galilee. In which case room is found for a whole series of manifestations in Jerusalem."[1]

It seems, therefore, that the inference sometimes drawn from S. Mark that appearances to the apostles occurred exclusively in Galilee is due to the compression and condensation of the narrative.[2]

II

This brings us to the Judæan series of appearances.

For this the first authority is S. Luke. His whole narrative of the Resurrection circles round Jerusalem. He seems unconscious of any manifestations in Galilee. If we possessed his Gospel only, we should not know that the Risen Master was seen anywhere except in Judæa: save only in the conversion of S. Paul. The place of the burial, the empty grave, the road to Emmaus, and the house in the village, the assembled Eleven in the Jerusalem chamber: these are the absorbing interests in S. Luke. And there is nothing else. Moreover, the impression left by the narrative is that the appearances were completed on Easter Day. More remarkable still is the form, already quoted, of the

[1] 'Our Lord's Resurrection,' p. 47.

[2] The writer is glad to find this statement supported in an article in the 'Church Quarterly Review,' January, 1906, p. 352.

angel-message. The designation of Galilee as the place of meeting is converted into a reminiscence of a conversation held in that locality. And as if still more effectually to exclude a meeting in the northern province, the injunction is expressly added: "Tarry ye in the city until ye be clothed with powers from on high."[1] Here, then, are two forms of the angel-message: "Go tell His disciples and Peter, He goeth forth before you into Galilee; then shall ye see Him, as He said unto you"[2]; and, "remember how He spake unto you when He was yet in Galilee, saying that the Son of Man must be delivered up... and the third day rise again."[3]

But there is yet another striking feature of the Lucan narrative. Our first impression as we read his Gospel is that the Ascension itself took place on Easter Day. The narrative glides smoothly on, event passes into event, until at the close of the day we find ourselves at Bethany and the Ascension takes place. It begins with the women at the grave, passes on into Peter's visit, who departs wondering; then comes the Emmaus narrative; then the scene in the upper room; then without any apparent break our Lord leads them as far as Bethany, and, while blessing them, is parted from them. Whatever form of the text be adopted here, this can be nothing else than the Ascension. If we take this account by itself, it seems to place the Ascension and Resurrection on the same day. This would more effectually than ever exclude appearances in Galilee.

1. But to do justice to S. Luke's account it is necessary to consider his characteristics as a historian. Professor Ramsay has insisted that "S. Luke's style is compressed to the highest degree; and he expects a great deal from the reader... he states the bare facts that seem to him important, and leaves the reader to imagine the situation.... Hence though his style is simple and clear, yet it often becomes obscure from its brevity; and the meaning is lost, because the reader has an incomplete, or a positively false idea of the situation."[4] And further, according to the same authority,

[1] S. Luke xxiv. 49.
[2] S. Mark.
[3] S. Luke xxiv. 6, 7.
[4] 'Paul the Traveller,' p. 17.

"S. Luke was deficient in the sense of time." "It would be quite impossible from Acts alone to acquire any idea of the lapse of time. That is the fault of his age. . . . He dismisses ten years in a breath, and devotes a chapter to a single incident."[1] Plainly these characteristics must affect his Gospel account of the Resurrection. In fact we may find in that section the traces of considerable compression. If he seems at first to imply that the Ascension took place on Easter Day, a further study of the passage corrects the idea. For there does not seem sufficient time to crowd all the occurrences into the space of a single day. Emmaus is reached "toward evening" when "the day was far spent." Then followed the evening meal, which must have taken a little time. Then the return journey to Jerusalem, which was a distance of three score furlongs, or seven miles, would take the greater part of two hours. Then comes the conversation between the two disciples and the Eleven. Afterwards Christ Himself appears, and gives them an instruction in the Scriptures: the law, the prophets, and the Psalms. This surely required a considerable interval. A similar exposition to the two occupied perhaps most of the journey to Emmaus. Then, after this instruction, is placed the walk to Bethany and the Ascension. This could scarcely be before the middle of the night. And yet certainly the account gives the impression that the event was conceived as happening in the day.[2] Here, then, is an evident trace of condensation. The fact is the whole Resurrection account in S. Luke's Gospel easily falls into sections.[3] There is no necessity to suppose that all the sayings recorded were spoken on one and the same occasion; nor that the walk to Bethany took place that day. These may easily be instances when S. Luke becomes obscure from brevity. Those who believe that a series of appearances occurred in Galilee can hardly believe that, if Christ on Easter Day assigned Galilee for the place of meeting, He also said on the same day "tarry ye here in Jerusalem."[4] But if S. Luke has here

[1] 'Paul the Traveller,' p. 18. [2] 'Hibbert Journal,' July, 1905, p. 774.

[3] See the division into paragraphs in R.V.

[4] See Wellhausen on S. Luke xxiv. 49.

grouped the sayings together which, although spoken in the same upper chamber, were spoken on different occasions—the one at the beginning, the other at the close of the great forty days—the accuracy of the conversation is secured and the difficulty seems to be simply caused by compression.

Professor Rördam[1] points out that the words in S. Luke xxiv. 47-49, which seem as if spoken in the evening of Easter Day, were in reality spoken at the Ascension, forty days later. For the Ascension words in the Acts, "Ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem," etc., correspond with the Gospel passage on Easter Day, "And ye are witnesses of these things. And behold I send the promise of My Father upon you, but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem until ye be endued with power from on high."

2. S. Luke was no Jew of Palestine, his antecedents were Greek. Harnack is sure that his native place was Antioch. His knowledge of historic detail must have been obtained during a visit to Jerusalem.

Jerusalem meant more for a Greek than Galilee. It was the home of the apostles, the mother Church, the city whence his religion spread. Would not the Greek Evangelist feel a special interest in what he calls "the Holy City," and care especially to record, for the Gentile world, what had happened there? This is confirmed by the fact of S. Luke's obvious interest in great cities. As the Gospel ends with Jerusalem, so the Acts begins with Jerusalem, advances to Antioch, and terminates at Rome. There is a constant reiteration of the name Jerusalem in the chapter with which this Gospel ends.[2] S. Luke reveals throughout great interest in Judæa.[3] Was it not thus natural that he should record a Jerusalem series of appearances? Would it matter so much to the Greek that Christ also appeared elsewhere? And S. Luke was in Jerusalem within thirty years of the actual events.

[1] 'Hibbert Journal,' July, 1905, p. 776. [2] xxiv. 13, 18, 33, 47, 49, 52.

[3] Spitta, in a valuable essay on the geographical disposition of the life of Christ in the Synoptists, shows that all through his Gospel S. Luke manifests a decided preference for Judæa over Galilee. Spitta, 'Streitfragen,' 7, 9, 15, 69.

But from whom in Jerusalem did S. Luke derive his account? It is probable that at the date of his visit none of the original Twelve were there. He would certainly see S. James, the Lord's brother, head of the Jerusalem Church. But S. Peter, who informed S. Mark, had left Jerusalem before that time. Does the absence of S. Peter explain why S. Luke heard nothing of appearances of the risen Lord in Galilee? S. Luke at any rate found at Jerusalem a tradition of appearances in which Galilee was left out. Now, it certainly was not left out in the Marcan narrative. And S. Mark was a Palestinian and a Jerusalemite. How did it come to pass that the Galilæan series was omitted from recital in Jerusalem? How did it happen that a companion of S. Paul, inquiring at Jerusalem within thirty years of the events, heard nothing of these manifestations in Galilee? If the Galilæan series were, as the negative criticism supposes, the original and genuine account, how did it come to disappear? Harnack says it was "replaced by later legends which had arisen in Jerusalem."[1] But then Harnack has also to assert that S. Luke, "in direct opposition to S. Mark, has ascribed the first announcement of the Resurrection to women." But it must be remembered that S. Matthew does the same.[2] Here then S. Luke and S. Matthew agree. Since they worked independently, and both had S. Mark before them as they wrote, their agreement must have some further ground. Moreover, as we have already seen, S. Matthew places the first appearance of the risen Lord in Jerusalem. Accordingly, both the later Evangelists bear evidence for Jerusalem. Now, in face of these facts in Matthew and Luke, it is simply impossible to demonstrate that S. Mark gave no manifestation in Jerusalem. There is no real proof that the Lucan account contains "later legends." To keep exactly within what we know, it contains a report of two Judæan appearances. But it is just as reasonable to say that the Church of Jerusalem gave S. Luke a description of their own local experiences; and that these experiences were equal in value, and not different in character, from the experiences in Galilee. What we really possess in

[1] 'Luke the Physician,' p. 159. [2] S. Matt. xxviii. 8.

S. Luke is the testimony of the Jerusalem Church to its own experience.

3. It is necessary here to discuss more fully the different forms of the angel-message at the grave. As already stated, the Marcan form of the tradition is "go tell his disciples, and Peter, He goeth before you into Galilee: there shall ye see Him, as He said unto you."[1] The Lucan form is "remember how He spake unto you when He was yet in Galilee, saying that the Son of Man must be delivered up into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and the third day rise again. And they remembered His words. . . ."[2] It is scarcely possible to doubt which of these alternatives is the original form. The Marcan form agrees with the prediction on the Mount of Olives: "All ye shall be offended: for it is written I will smite the shepherd and the sheep shall be scattered abroad. Howbeit, after I am raised up, I will go before you into Galilee."[3] This is also reported in S. Matthew,[4] who also gives the angel-message in the Marcan form,[5] and further ascribes the same message to the risen Lord Himself: "Go tell My brethren that they depart into Galilee, and there shall they see Me."[6]

It is obviously then the Marcan narrative which represents the original. In the Lucan version the angel-message has been changed.

It is maintained by the critic Spitta that the promise "I will go before you into Galilee" does not denote an appearance in Galilee to the exclusion of one in Judæa. Rather the meaning is that Jesus will collect His scattered flock after His Resurrection, and then precede them into Galilee. It implies a work in Judæa first of all.[7]

Schweitzer suggests a similar interpretation. The "going before them into Galilee" means that Jesus "will return *with* them, at their head, from Jerusalem to Galilee." Accordingly Schweitzer argues that "the saying, far from directing the disciples to go away to Galilee, chains them to Jerusalem, there to await Him who should lead them home. It should

[1] S. Mark xiv. 7. [2] S. Luke xxiv. 7, 8. [3] S. Mark xiv. 27, 28.
[4] S. Matt. xxvi. 32. [5] *Ib.* xxviii. 7. [6] *Ib.* 10.
[7] Spitta, 'Streitfragen,' pp. 74-75.

not therefore be claimed as supporting the tradition of the Galilæan appearances." But, to justify this interpretation, Schweitzer is obliged to suppose that the angel-message in the Marcan form itself has been altered. There is, moreover, no real ground for interpreting the "going before them" in the sense of actual leadership. The word is surely used here in the same sense as when "He constrained His disciples to enter into the boat and to go before Him unto the other side to Bethsaida, while He Himself sendeth the multitude away."[1] We cannot doubt then that it is the Lucan form of the message which has been changed. The assignment of Galilee as the place of meeting has been altered into a reference to a conversation held in that locality. What was the motive for this alteration? Clearly to bring the angel-message into harmony with a narrative which is conclusively concerned with Judæan manifestations. By whom was the alteration made? The construction of the documents would suggest without any doubt that it was made by S. Luke himself.

4. If an attempt be made to reproduce the historic circumstances under which S. Luke wrote his account, it would seem that sometime after leaving Rome he resided in Achaia. S. Mark's Gospel, it is said, was written in Rome; S. Luke possessed a copy in Achaia. When he came to write on the Resurrection, the Gospel before him undoubtedly contained an account of an appearance in Galilee. He was familiar also, we may suppose, with the summary of the evidences reproduced by S. Paul in 1 Cor. xv. For this was clearly derived from Jerusalem. It contained a mention of the appearance to the 500. This was scarcely likely to have been located elsewhere than Galilee. Thus the implication of S. Paul confirmed S. Mark. Moreover, S. Mark, like himself, had been a companion of S. Paul. The locality of the Resurrection appearances was therefore not easily restricted to Jerusalem. And yet S. Luke felt such confidence in the authority which instructed him in Jerusalem that he had no hesitation in omitting the series in Galilee. He did omit it. He went further still. Finding himself confronted in the

[1] S. Mark vi. 45.

Marcan narrative with an angel-message assigning Galilee as the place for reassembling, and being unable to harmonise it with the tradition received by himself of appearances in Judæa, he changed the form of the message into agreement with the facts before him. Is this the explanation? If it is, it would not justify a hasty generalisation adverse to the historic reality of Synoptic reports.[1] Harnack's recent work on the 'Sayings of Jesus' goes far to establish the accuracy with which S. Luke utilised his materials. "Alterations in the subject-matter of the source showing distinct motives and bias are extremely rare when compared with stylistic changes."[2] "Such bias had no stronger influence with S. Luke than with S. Matthew."[3]

What it does seem to show is S. Luke's strong preference for personal information obtained direct. He is confident that the Church at Jerusalem could be relied upon. He went behind the documents to the living persons whom he met and knew.

But S. Luke wrote a second time. Beside the Gospel is the Acts.[4] It has been asserted that the antagonism between the substance of the angel-message in S. Mark, and the tradition which he himself had received at Jerusalem, led S. Luke to further investigations; in the course of which he ascertained that the period during which the risen Lord revealed Himself was forty days. And this he recorded in the opening of the Acts. But there really seems no proof that it was S. Luke whose information was increased. It is just as likely that he was correcting the misapprehension of some readers. For we notice that although he now gives additional sayings of the risen Master, he still confines attention, just as exclusively, to Jerusalem. And the Gospel retained the form of the angel-message which he had given it in his alteration of S. Mark. Indeed the account of the great forty days in the Acts is manifestly an ancient narrative derived from Jerusalem. For the distance between Bethany and the city is measured as "a Sabbath day's journey": an expression not likely to have originated with the Greek Evangelist. And the Apostles

[1] As Pfleiderer. [2] *Ib.* p. 113. [3] *Ib.* p. 115.
[4] Accepting Harnack's conclusion of authorship.

are addressed by the angel as "ye men of Galilee"; while in the following chapter S. Peter addresses the crowd as "ye men of Judæa." Moreover the whole interest of the opening chapter is concentrated upon Jerusalem. Jerusalem is expressly the centre from which the Gospel is to extend. And perhaps most remarkable of all is the amazing question put by the disciples to their risen Master, Whether he would at that time restore again the Kingdom to Israel. This is a question which certifies its own historic character. It betrays an ignorance of the Master's design which no forger could conceivably have ascribed to the Apostles at a later period. When the Catholic Church was extending rapidly everywhere, when Jerusalem itself had fallen, the immediate restoration of the Kingdom to Israel would neither have come within the range of probabilities, nor have formed an urgent portion of Christian expectation, nor have been ascribed to the Eleven. It is a conception obviously contemporary with the actual Resurrection period. We certainly seem led to the conclusion that S. Luke found no authority sufficiently convincing to justify him in recognising appearances in Galilee. But this confirms our confidence in his historical care.

III

Such, then, are the two series of appearances, the Galilæan and the Judæan.

The question next arising is, Are we to regard them as alternative versions? Must we make our choice between them? Or may we not accept them both? Among modern critics some decide for Galilee, some for Judæa, while others combine the two.

1. Prof. Kirsopp Lake argues very strongly against this last alternative; not merely because it is difficult, but chiefly because "the method of the growth of tradition is always synthetic"; that is to say, it joins together various versions of the same event. But, however correct this generalisation may be, it cannot possibly follow that Christ could not have been seen in two localities. The maxim may be generally true yet false in this particular instance, The duplication may be actual, not imagined. Prof. Kirsopp Lake admits as

much. He says "it is extremely probable that there has been a considerable confusion of localities": but yet he adds, "It is improbable that this will account for the whole of the Jerusalem tradition."

Improbable indeed. For the tendency of tradition to duplicate is surely controlled by certain principles. If criticism declares the two miracles of feeding the multitude to be duplicates of the same event, we may, of course, reply that the notebook of a physician will exhibit many cases of strong similarity, not however created by the tendencies of tradition to duplicate, but by the recurring needs of human nature in actual fact: but nevertheless the criticism has much to say for itself, and can point to the very striking similarity. But the narratives of the appearances of the Risen Lord in Galilee and Judæa do not possess the note of striking similarity. The narratives do not read like alternative versions of the same event. They cannot be reconciled by the easy expedient of changing the names of the locality, or by making a few alterations in the details. On the contrary, there is the greatest difference between the scene in the upper room at Jerusalem and the scene in the boat at the Galilæan lake. It is much easier to say that the two accounts of the draught of the fish, the one before the Passion and the other after the Resurrection, are duplicate versions of the one incident than to say this of the Galilæan and Judæan series of Resurrection appearances. They have exceedingly little in common. It would not be easy to take the Emmaus narrative and transfer the scene to Galilee. The one common feature which the narratives possess is that they are apostolic experiences of the Resurrection. But their distinctness, their independence, is most marked. The question is whether these phenomena can be properly accounted for by the acknowledged tendencies of tradition to duplicate. This is what would require to be proved. It is not too much to say that no proof has yet been presented.

2. Among critics who decide for the Galilæan series as the original tradition is Loisy.[1] Loisy maintains it first on the

[1] 'Les Ev. Synopt.' pp. 728.

ground of literary criticism, that S. Luke depends upon S. Mark; from whom he is supposed to have arbitrarily departed. Secondly, on the ground of historic criticism, that the apologetic preoccupations of the Evangelists make it incredible that, having described appearances in Jerusalem within three days of the Passion, they would omit this, and say that the first appearances only took place in Galilee after the apostles' return to that country. It is difficult not to see the very large assumptions upon which this criticism rests. It provokes interrogation at every turn. The Evangelists, for instance, do not say that the first appearances only took place in Galilee.

Harnack [1] also decides for the Galilæan tradition as against S. Luke. Harnack maintains that the mere undertaking to write another Gospel with S. Mark before him implies a supposed possession of better and further information. But does it follow that what he omits he considers unhistoric? The independence of S. Luke is particularly prominent, says Harnack, in the Passion and Resurrection history. Above all, in the last of these; where, in conformity with his own independent sources of information, he replaces the Marcan witness by the later Jerusalem story; and, in contradiction with Mark, makes the women the first witnesses to the Resurrection. Harnack puts no confidence in the Lucan account—Mark was a Jew and a Jerusalemite: Luke a Greek and an Antiochean. The Palestinian Church would never have accepted Matthew when he contained a tradition endorsed at Jerusalem. Yet Harnack himself has just allowed that S. Luke derived his information from Jerusalem. Harnack calls it the later Jerusalem story. Considering the period when S. Luke was in Jerusalem one wonders how much "later" S. Luke's information was than S. Matthew's.

Another critic,[2] who would confine the Appearances to Galilee, feels constrained by the Apocryphal Gospel of Peter to imagine that the disciples remained eight days in Jerusalem, to the end of the feast, without any knowledge of the Resurrection. Then at least the words "they all forsook Him and fled" do not mean fled away to Galilee. And

[1] Harnack, 'Lukas der Arzt,' p. 112 ff. [2] Rohrbach.

then also the Octave of Easter Day still found (as the fourth gospel affirms) the apostles in Jerusalem. This view at any rate lends considerable support to the Appearances in Jerusalem, even while rejecting them. For it affirms the apostles to be there, and gives no adequate explanation for their presence.

3. We may think that the Judæan series cannot be accounted for on different principles than those in Galilee. The later origin of the form seems asserted but not proved. (1) It will not account for the early tradition which has deeply imbedded itself in the whole apostolic literature that the Resurrection took place on the Third Day. This would have no basis and no meaning unless it was ascertained by manifestations on that very day. And such manifestations, if they occurred at all, at such an early date, must have occurred in Judæa; for it leaves no time to reach the northern province of Galilee. (2) It will not account for the tradition of the empty grave. The earliest narrative we possess, the original S. Mark, affirms a visit to the grave on Easter morning. This would be impossible if the women had fled to Galilee. Yet the earliest record affirms it. (3) Moreover there is the intrinsic character of the Judæan accounts. "Luke's story . . . of the disciples at Emmaus," says Holtzmann, who certainly will not be accused of apologetic bias, "would seem faithfully to reproduce the sentiments that prevailed among the disciples in general after His death."[1] If the historic situation is thus accurately and faithfully reproduced, is the locality hopelessly inaccurate and misleading? (4) And further, if the death was followed by flight to Galilee and the manifestations were only there, what brought the apostles back to Jerusalem? Above all, why was the Church founded, not in Galilee, but in Jerusalem? Prof. K. Lake can only reply that "Why this was so is one of the missing links in the chain of early history." It is "one of the most curious though least doubtful of facts in the history of the Church."[2] But it is only rejection of the Jerusalem series which makes it so.

"The whole tendency of early Christian thought was to

[1] Holtzmann, 'Life of Jesus,' p. 494. [2] Lake, p. 210.

emphasise Jerusalem and to forget Galilee." If the first Appearances were there, and they were bidden to tarry there, and the pentecostal gift was there, then the emphasis on Jerusalem becomes intelligible. (5) Moreover, the flight from Jerusalem to Galilee is pure assumption. All that the narrative says is, "they all left Him and fled."[1] To interpret "fled" as equivalent to "ran away and never paused until they found themselves in their northern homes" is a very large paraphrase, and an interpolation of ideas which the words do not necessarily contain. A criticism which is anxious not to read fuller contents into words than they absolutely must contain, ought not to embroider this passage with ideas which it certainly need not convey.

As a critic observes, "These words, 'they all left Him and fled' can only refer to the fact that they were scattered abroad in Jerusalem. They would probably find sufficient protection there. The very fact that no one but the Master was apprehended in Gethsemane makes the assumption that 'all' the disciples felt themselves irresistibly forced to flee directly into Galilee seem to be without justification. And even the 'all' should not be taken too strictly. For, only three verses after the flight is mentioned, Peter's disciple expressly relates of his master that he followed Jesus, though at a distance, into the palace of the high priest.[2] In his repeated denials, also, which no doubt betray a certain fear, Peter escapes unmolested. And there is nothing in the report to indicate that he then immediately withdrew from Jerusalem.[3] All this does not look like a universal panic-struck flight to a distance."[4]

Unless the historic character of S. Peter's denial is rejected, the interpreter who accepts it, and still believes in the flight to Galilee, would have to paraphrase the words—"they all left Him and fled" as meaning "fled away to Galilee, but not until after Peter had followed Him afar off to the high priest's palace, and sat with the servants and thrice denied Him." But is this to interpret? And further,

[1] S. Mark xiv. 50. [2] S. Mark xiv. 54. [3] S. Mark xiv. 72.
[4] Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 114.

if the fourth Evangelist is to be considered, both the mother of Jesus and the beloved disciple stood beside the Cross. Quite in keeping with this, the Apocryphal Gospel of Peter places the retreat to Galilee at the usual time, after the last day of the great festival. Although it is true that the narrative says nothing of Appearances in Jerusalem.

At the same time, the exclusive acceptance of the Jerusalem Appearances is quite impossible; notwithstanding various attempts of individual critics to do so.[1]

We therefore come to the problem of chronology. Is it possible to include both series within the time limit given? The limit of time is forty days. And even if that were taken in a figurative sense, the limit is further determined by the interval between the Passover and Pentecost. Accordingly we have to consider some forty days. Can space be found for both within that period? If the disciples remained in Jerusalem from Good Friday to the Sunday after Easter Day, nine or ten days must be deducted from the sum. That will leave us thirty. It is not likely that the disciples should remain in the city any longer. The feast was past, their foes were round them, their homes remote. Suppose them to start for Galilee on the tenth day after the Crucifixion. "The journey to and from Galilee with the Appearances there," says a learned writer, "must have cost the apostles at least ten days."[2] Let us call it ten without the Appearances. Twenty days remain. The recorded Appearances in Galilee are only two, that to the seven by the lake, and that to the 500; assuming this latter, as is most probable, to be rightly assigned to the northern province. To assemble so large a body of disciples might take some time. It could surely be done within the period of twenty days.[3] If, then, the two series can be included within the limit of time there is critical justification for accepting both.

[1] Loofs, Rudolph Hofman, and Alf. Resch take this course; cf. also Romberg in the 'N. K. Zeitschrift,' 1910, p. 288, and Horn, 'N. K. Z.,' 1902, p. 350.

[2] Dr. Wright, 'Synopsis,' p. 174.

[3] Dr. Sanday gives a somewhat similar distribution of time in his outlines of the life of Christ.

IV

But why the promise to meet the disciples in Galilee?—a promise spoken in Gethsemane and reiterated by the angel at the grave; and in S. Matthew reinforced by the risen Master Himself. The reason for the choice of Galilee is not hard to find. For assembling the general multitude of disciples it was the obvious place. Here the majority of them lived. The hostile authorities would be far away. To gather in considerable numbers, peacefully, and without risk of interruption, would be easy here.[1] No need to take precautions on a mountain in Galilee "for fear of the Jews." It would not be conducive to a receptive condition if the disciples were assembled in large numbers in the very centre of the hostile capital.[2]

Why, then, did the meeting not take place as arranged in Galilee? The answer has been admirably given by Prof. Rördam.[3]

"The answer to this objection is easy, owing to the strange fact that we have to deal with events from real life, and not logically constructed accounts. The key is that human nature is always the same. The women doubted the angel's word. Thereupon Christ appeared Himself to the women and removed their doubts. The women then told the tidings to the disciples, apostles included, but none of them believed. Thereupon Christ appeared to the Eleven ... removing their doubts and indicating a certain mountain in Galilee as the place for the general meeting predicted by the women."

To Prof. Rördam it seems that the Marcan account, as the original Lucan source, went on to relate that the doubt and unbelief of the disciples caused the place to be changed from Galilee to Jerusalem.[4]

This idea has been supported by a writer in the 'Church Quarterly Review' of January, 1906.[5]

[1] This is no new idea. See Lange's 'Life of Christ,' v. 108.

[2] Cf. Lange, vi. 53.

[3], Hibbert J.,' July, 1905, 'Lost Ending of S. Mark's G.' p. 784. [4] *Ib.* p. 780.

[5] p. 353; cf. also Vincent Rose, 'Études sur les Evangiles,' p. 299 (1902).

Is it in any way improbable that the risen Lord's original design was to manifest Himself in Galilee, and that this intention was frustrated by His disciples' lethargy?

It would not be the first time in history where the Divine plan was affected by human infirmities. In this case, the contradictions, between the message to go to Galilee, and the narratives relating Appearances in Jerusalem, are due to contradictions in the agents themselves; to conflicts between the will of Christ and the wills of His disciples. This diversity of purpose between the Master and the Twelve naturally reflects itself in the narrative. Indeed it would not be historical were it otherwise.

But S. Luke is not the only documentary evidence for Resurrection Appearances in Judæa. There is also the fourth Evangelist. Here, of course, everything will depend on the critical estimate of this wonderful work. But, at any rate, it is striking that this fourth narrative terminates with a Judæan series, and only in an appendix adds Appearances in Galilee. This order is remarkable. Not only is there a recognition of both series, but they are placed in the order which, assuming both to have occurred, is the obviously historical. If it had so happened that the fourth Evangelist had ended with the Appearance in Galilee, and then, as an appendix, had come an Appearance in Judæa, how easy the inference that the later legend had become tacked on to the earlier account. The existing order gives the Judæan tradition first, and the Galilæan tradition was obviously not added for the interest of the locality. Yet, incidentally, the result of the addition is that both localities are combined.

But whatever difficulties remain, due perhaps to compression, or method, or to some ignorance on our part of explanatory details; these difficulties are not sufficient to destroy the evidence of two distinct series of Appearances; nor can they be removed by cancelling either of the series.

V

A discussion of the localities of the Appearances ought not to close without a reminder of the immense importance occupied in it by a prediction ascribed to Jesus Christ.

It is worth while to dwell on this prediction. The disciples are supposed to have left for Galilee. Why? Their Master's direction sent them thither. "After I am risen I will go before you into Galilee." Did He then predict His Resurrection, and also calmly arrange for a subsequent reunion with His disciples? From the rationalist standpoint this is obviously hard to credit. Predictions so definite and detailed, directing a meeting at a certain locality subsequent to His death; what is to be made of them? Yet if He did not predict, and so arrange, the order which directed them to Galilee is gone. Spitta rightly detects the inconsistencies of a criticism which first discredits the prediction because it is a prediction, and then utilises it to exclude a manifestation in Judæa.[1]

An argument which locates the Appearances in Galilee on the ground that our Lord so predicted, obviously assumes the reality, and is implicated in the consequences of His predictions of His Resurrection. It is essential to that argument that Christ really did predict, and that the apostles really acted in a certain way as a result of the prediction.

But if Christ really did predict His Resurrection, it is impossible to avoid the theological problems which such a prediction entails.

[1] Spitta, 'Streitfragen,' p. 77.

CHAPTER VI

THE APPEARANCES OF THE RISEN MASTER

IT is the apostolic tradition not only that the grave was empty, and that the Lord rose from it, and that this occurred upon the Third Day; but also that He manifested Himself to the disciples after He was risen. All manifestations were after He was risen, and not at the time when He rose. The actual Resurrection no human eye beheld. It is not reported among the Gospel Appearances. The stone was rolled away, not to let the Master out, but to let the women in; not rolled away by the Lord Himself, as a modern critic supposes S. Mark to imply. In any case not a hint is given in the Canonical Gospels of a witness to the actual rising of Jesus out of the grave. This is in itself significant. It implies reserve. If the narratives were imaginations there is no likelihood that such reserve would exist. The Apocryphal Gospels do not observe it. There we find a truly stupendous account of the Lord issuing from the grave.

The Appearances of the Risen Master may be analysed according to the human senses to which they appealed, whether the sense of sight, or of hearing, or of touch. The different phenomena may be conveniently grouped together under these divisions.

I

And first as to the sense of sight. This is naturally first, as the initial form of gaining their attention. It is described in the Gospels by various expressions: "Jesus met them."[1]

[1] S. Matt. xxviii. 9.

"They saw Him,"[1] but this seeing included those who doubted. "They knew Him."[2] "They . . . supposed that they beheld a spirit."[3] "See [ἴδετε] My hands and My feet, that it is I Myself; handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye behold [θεωρεῖτε] Me having. And when He had said this He shewed unto them [ἔδειξεν] His hands and His feet."[4] Similarly also in the fourth Evangelist: "I have seen the Lord."[5] "He shewed unto them His hands and His side."[6] "They saw the Lord."[7] "Except I shall see in His hands the print of the nails."[8] "Because thou hast seen Me."[9] "And none of His disciples durst inquire of Him, Who art Thou? knowing that it was the Lord."[10] "Appearing unto them by the space of forty days."[11]

1. Appeal is made by the Risen Lord in these Appearances to the marks of the wounds inflicted in the Passion. S. Luke speaks of the hands and the feet.[12] S. Matt. mentions neither. S. John mentions "His hands and His side."[13]

These were necessary condescensions for evidential purposes. If the body of the Risen Master had appeared without the "tokens of His Passion," belief in His identity would have been, for the Galilæans, much more difficult. It seems quite true to say that there is a significance in the fact that these Appearances of the known form, with the marks certifying identity, occur in the manifestations to the Eleven who had known the earthly Jesus; while S. Paul, who had never seen the earthly Jesus, apparently received no similar indications.[14] The significance is that the form of the manifestation corresponds with the recipient. This does not in the least mean that it is therefore merely or chiefly subjective; it simply means that there are divine adaptations to individual needs. What did S. Paul actually see at his conversion? The statement that "the men that journeyed with him stood speechless,

[1] ἰδοντες, S. Matt. xxviii. 17. [2] ἐπέγνωσαν, S. Luke xxiv. 31. Cf. 35.
[3] θεῶρειν, S. Luke xxiv. 37. [4] S. Luke xxiv. 39. [5] S. John xx. 18.
[6] *Ibid.* 20. [7] *Ibid.* [8] *Ibid.* 25. [9] *Ibid.* 29. [10] S. John xxi. 12.
[11] Acts i. 3, ὀπτανόμενος αὐτοῖς. [12] S. Luke xxiv. 29-40.
[13] S. John xx. 20-25, 27. [14] Cf. A. Meyer, p. 175.

hearing the voice, but beholding no man" (Acts ix. 7) would seem to imply that S. Paul both heard and saw. This is not contradicted by the statement that he "could not see for the glory of that light" (Acts xxii. 11). That he did not know with Whom he was concerned would not at all prove that he saw no human form. We are not justified in saying, "all he saw was a blinding light, all he heard certain words."[1] His challenge to the Corinthians, "Am I not an apostle? Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?"[2] seems definitely to affirm a sight of Jesus in glory. This "seeing"[2] the Risen Lord experienced by S. Paul was not different in kind from the seeing experienced by the Twelve: but it was different in form, corresponding with the different antecedents of the recipient.

It has been suggested[3] that if the Risen Lord had appeared to disciples who had travelled to a great distance, say for instance, Alexandria, and had heard nothing of the details of the Passion, there is no necessity to suppose that the manifestation would have included the sacred wounds. For although, of course, such phenomenon is possible, it would rather hinder recognition than promote it. The scars of the Passion presuppose a knowledge of the Passion, without which they would be bewildering. Once again this does not mean a denial of their objective character. It emphasises the necessity of co-operation between the Risen Master and the disciples.

2. The next phenomenon is the variation in the Appearances which the Risen Lord assumed, and the consequent difficulties of recognition. He can be mistaken for a gardener, a traveller, a stranger, a spirit, and that by those who knew Him intimately. Mary Magdalene does not recognise Him at first, nor do the two on the Emmaus road, nor the seven on the sea. Such suggestions as that Mary Magdalene did not look up, or that she was preoccupied, or blinded by her tears, are surely very unsatisfying examples of apologetics. She did not even recognise His voice.

On the journey to Emmaus it was possible for two disciples

[1] A. Meyer, p. 188. [2] 1 Cor. ix. 1.
[3] Skrine, in 'Contemporary Review,' 1904, p. 867.

to hear a lengthy exposition from Him of the three departments of the Old Testament references to the Messiah, without realising, although greatly moved by it, who He was. This is particularly unexpected; for the signs of self-identity as shown in intellectual expression, tendencies, phrases, outlook, thoughts, would seem to be the most obvious and irresistible for those who already knew Him. Their instinctive apprehension might have been expected in spite of alteration in form and practice. But yet it was not so.

In S. Matthew's account of the Appearance to the apostles, which must represent a later, not an earlier manifestation (owing to the absence of any effort to convince them of His identity, and from the nature of the instruction given, which was obviously final), we still encounter the unexpected observation that "some doubted." Who they were we are not told. It is scarcely credible that they were apostles who had seen Him already at least twice before. A similar difficulty of recognition recurs at the Galilæan lake. "And none of the disciples durst inquire of Him, Who art Thou? knowing," [feeling instinctively, yet, as the sentence implies, with an element of misgiving] "that it was the Lord."[1] The suggestion here appears to be that recognition, in some cases, instead of becoming easier, becomes increasingly difficult.

Of these details some certainly lend themselves easily to a subjective interpretation. It is not wonderful that certain modern schools of thought should feel confirmed by them in an opinion of unreality.

And yet, another account can just as certainly be given of these variations of form and difficulties of recognition.

In the first place, it is quite open to question whether ordinary human beings could bear with impunity the sudden apparition of one risen from the dead. In spite of Tennyson's assertion that if he re-encountered his dead friend in the familiar haunts, he would not think it strange, a real indisputable appearance of the dead would be a tremendous strain on the nerves of ordinary people. To be suddenly confronted, without adequate warning, with one as alive whom we knew to have been a buried corpse, would be

[1] S. John xxi. 12.

likely to cause so serious a shock as perhaps to inflict a permanent injury to the mental and moral balance of the recipient. It would surely produce at least such a state of bewilderment as would render instruction or dispassionate judgment almost impossible. When we consider the emotional nature of S. Mary Magdalene there seem very obvious reasons why an appearance from the other world should not be made to her without due precautions and preparations. It is not surely without a meaning that she was first allowed to see the empty grave, and then to see a figure which she takes for the gardener, and should then be led to realise the truth through the utterance of her own name. All this at any rate falls in with the supposition here suggested. Then again, the prompt suppression of rapture and sentiment; the extremely practical duty imposed, of communicating what she knows rather than merely dwelling upon it; the effort to enable others to believe; the excessively cooling and sobering experience of other people's incredulity; seem a very significant continuance of the same discipline and watchful exercise of caution. Thus, messages are sent through one who has been, for a moment, and for a moment only, enabled to see, to prepare and warn others who have not seen yet. And so the manifestations widen. On the way to Emmaus instruction precedes manifestation, and the inability to discern is expressly ascribed to our Lord's own act; "their eyes were holden that they should not know Him:"[1] an explanation not at all conflicting with the statement in the existing conclusion of S. Mark, that it was due to external difference in the appearance of our Lord.[2]

Then, if in the upper room appearance precedes instruction, the preparations have been numerous. The message of the women, the sight of the empty grave, the quiet assurance of S. John, the appearance to S. Peter, the evidence of the Emmaus disciples: all these were so many preparations and precautions before our Lord took His place again at the head of the apostolic body. The variations, therefore, in our Lord's Appearances are open to a perfectly consistent objective interpretation.

[1] S. Luke xxiv. 16. [2] S. Mark xvi. 12.

We ought not, of course, to speak with too great confidence, as if, assuming the reality of the Appearances, it would follow that Christian thought could easily understand why everything was done, and could solve all difficulties. The existence of inexplicable phenomena is no argument against their truth. But still it does seem that even the strange paradox of the increasing difficulties in recognition, as the Appearances proceed, is not at all insoluble.

The difficulties of recognition suggest the objective nature of the Appearances. If the Christophanies had been mere self-generated visions, surely there would be no hesitation or uncertainty who the figure was. Yet this slowness to recognise pervades the whole series of the narratives. If the eye sees that of which the mind is full, at least it does not fail to recognise what it sees. A mind preoccupied, or filled with adverse conceptions, may see and not understand the meaning of an object perceived. The phenomena, therefore, suggest that the Appearances were rather forced upon the mind's attention from without than created from within.

It is sometimes said indeed that this element of doubt is unhistoric, the product of an apologetic desire to show that the apostles were neither easily convinced, nor even persuaded, nor led away by their emotions, but cautious before accepting the reality of the Appearances. Now, plainly, if the element of doubt were invented by the Evangelists, then we know nothing at all of the conditions under which the apostles came to believe. Then the difficulties of recognition cannot be utilised to show the subjective nature of the experience. Criticism cannot both utilise a narrative as historic and at the same time discredit it as unhistoric. But indeed this element of doubt pervades the whole of the apostolic evidence. It recurs in the story of S. Paul. So uniform and persistent a feature as this hesitation and difficulty, this ignorance of Christ's identity while standing in His presence, cannot be a mere interpolation. It is manifestly a faithful reproduction of the disciples' experience. To adopt any other view is not to interpret documents but to rewrite them.

Indeed, it is very questionable whether such a statement as that in S. Matthew, "when they saw Him, they worshipped Him, *but some doubted*,"[1] is at all calculated to promote an apologetic interest, or to assure the reader that he may therefore rest content with the sagacity of the witnesses. It is not even said that these doubters afterwards came to believe: unless the "some" who "doubted" were of the Eleven disciples. In any case it is not said. And the effect of the passage upon the reader is probably rather disconcerting than reassuring. We find ourselves suddenly confronted with a shadow of cold suspicion which we did not expect. How could this be invented by some designing apologist?

The variations in the Appearances of the Risen Lord, and the increasing difficulty of recognition, or at least the uncertainties and slowness of perception in the later accounts, have been frequently explained as denoting that the Risen Body was going through a process of change during the forty days. But this is wholly mistaken. It has arisen from the assumption that the body which was manifested is identical in its conditions with the spiritual body behind the manifestations. But if, as we believe, the whole Appearances are manifestations, within the realm of sense, of a spiritual body whose essential nature is beyond the reach of human senses, it would follow that we cannot transfer the changes in the manifested form to the essential reality behind it.

Is not the explanation rather to be sought in the Master's desire to emphasise the unearthly, the heavenly, character of the life into which He had entered?

3. Then there are, thirdly, the contradictions presented by the Risen Body. It is solid and tangible, and can partake of food: yet the closed door is no obstruction to its entrance; it disappears in an equally mysterious way. It seems at once to be subjected to the laws of terrestrial existence and to transcend them. It comes and it goes in the manner of a disembodied spirit; yet it is temporarily within reach of the human senses. These contradictions have often perplexed

[1] S. Matt. xxviii. 17.

the thoughtful reader.[1] They seem at times to render the whole incredible. The modern mind postulates one thing or the other: either a body entirely altered, or else a body entirely like our own. But yet if this postulate were complied with in the accounts, what should we really possess? If the Appearances of the Risen Christ had assumed a purely ethereal form, it would have given no suggestion of identity. It would have revealed Him as entirely different. It would have rendered belief in His sameness difficult. It would not have taught a Resurrection. It would have revealed a mere survival of spirit. If, on the other hand, the Appearances had assumed a body entirely resembling our own, then it would have taught the apostles nothing of the conditions of the future life. It would have been simply a resumption of the old physical state. It would have been such another case as the restoration of Lazarus. Thus, if any Appearance was to declare at once the double facts of identity and superiority, the existence of contradictions is inevitable.

Indeed, to imagine an Appearance which should reveal itself to human senses, should suggest the ideas of identity and superiority, and yet present no contradictions, is surely a task impossible. Contradiction is the result of teaching two antithetical ideas simultaneously. This is the essence of paradox. In fact, the Appearances of the Risen Master may be described as an enacted paradox. The signification which we sometimes desire, the reduction of the paradox to one or other of its elements, would secure simplicity at the expense of the balancing of truth. The revelation of the existences of a higher world in the earthly sphere involves the element of contradiction.

While it was one purpose of the Appearances to establish His identity, and therefore physical similarities with the past were needful, as in the scars of the wounds; another simultaneous purpose was to establish the *superiority* of His new condition. Hence new capacities are manifested by His Body such as belong to no ordinary terrestrial life. Hence, the moment instruction is completed, and identity revealed

[1] *E.g.* Hermann Fichte, 'Vermischte Schriften,' ii. 134.

and recognised, He vanishes out of their sight. Hence the implication that His method of returning to Jerusalem was not that of ordinary procedure along the road, but one transcending the powers of our fleshly constitution. Hence the suggestion that His ordinary dwelling during the long intervals between the occasional Appearances was not Jerusalem or Galilee but the other world.

4. Then again the Appearances of the Risen Lord were restricted within a limited circle. They were granted to disciples alone: except in the one instance of S. Paul. The first to call attention to this limitation was S. Peter in his sermon in the Acts. Origen taught that the Risen Christ "had no longer anything which was capable of being seen by the multitude: all who had formerly seen Him were not now able to behold Him." Thus spiritually injurious manifestations were mercifully withheld.[1] Nor indeed, as Origen also reminds us, was He perpetually present, or constantly showing Himself, even to His apostles and the circle of faith. They were not able to bear it. Objections to the method of Christ's Appearances are just as valid against the method of the providential government of the world. It would be quite easy to arrange things differently from what they are, and to allege that the world would be better if it were arranged on such a principle.[2]

This restriction of the Appearances, with the one exception of S. Paul, to the circle of discipleship does undoubtedly remove Christ's Resurrection from the category of ordinary historical facts. That there was no Appearance to the nation or to the chief authorities of the nation, no opportunity of testing and verifying for themselves by personal experience, has indeed a profoundly moral and religious significance: but it also precludes us from describing the Resurrection as the most certain fact in history. It is the religious experience and testimony of a carefully selected inner circle of faith. This is not what we mean by ordinary historic occurrences.

Adverse criticism of the Resurrection Appearances, on the ground that they were restricted to the circle of faith, involves large assumptions. It is perfectly easy to infer that

[1] Ag. Celsus, II., lxiv. Cf. lxvii. [2] *Ib.* lxviii.

they were therefore subjective. But the inference is mainly due to large and questionable presuppositions. What if an "almost irresistible" revelation would be a disastrous infringement of moral responsibility? What if religious history suggests that development is through the medium of the few? What if the experience of a Christophany requires receptiveness? What if no revelation whatever, not even of immortality, or of God's existence, is founded on evidence almost irresistible? Then these Resurrection Appearances are analogous in their limitation to the whole religious experience of mankind.

5. Very suggestive, again, is the infrequency of the Appearances. The recorded occasions were, at the most, eleven. Nor do the Apocryphal Gospels increase the occasions, whatever they may add to the details. Visions and revelations there were in abundance, but not Appearances of the distinctive Easter kind. The narrators are conscious of the difference.

The very infrequency of the Appearances was surely designed to instruct. It signified the difference between Christ's risen and earthly state. It taught that there was no resumption of the old companionship. Brief Appearances at rare intervals over a short period, then ceasing entirely, must have impressed upon the mind the fact of change and transition from one order of things into another.

II

The Appearances of the Risen Christ are reported also as appeals to the sense of touch.

We have already considered the Appearances of the Risen Lord as appeals to the sense of sight. We are now to consider them as related to the sense of touch and the sense of hearing.

As related to the sense of touch.

By far the most emphatic words in this respect are those in S. Luke: "Handle Me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold Me having" (xxiv. 39). Here it is that modern thought chiefly recoils. Flesh and bones! Here we have the Resurrection in its most realistic gross and

earthly form. And this is not all. For the passage continues that He asked for food. "And they gave Him a piece of a broiled fish. And He took it, and did eat before them."[1]

Many ancient authorities add His receiving also of a honeycomb. Westcott and Hort give an ancient addition: "and taking what was left He gave it to them."[2] This is suggestive of Acts x. 41, where S. Peter is reported as saying "to us who did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead."[3] It is observable that the Lucan writings are the only authority for the Risen Christ's reception of food. It was, therefore, not unnatural for criticism to ask whether there was anything in the Lucan point of view, or in the sources from which his narrative is derived, to account for these exceptional statements.

Recently, the suggestion has been made that these intensely materialistic utterances are the product of apologetic interests. It has been suggested that the peculiar emphasis laid by S. Luke on the solidity of the Risen Body as tested by the sense of touch may be a reply to gnostic and doketic tendencies around the Church, which denied the reality of our Lord's human body. A curious passage has been quoted[4] from the Apocryphal Johannine Acts, which states: "Sometimes when I would touch Him I encountered a solid and firm body; sometimes again His nature was bodiless and immaterial and as nothingness."

1. It must be remembered that if S. Luke gives to the material solidity of our Lord's Risen Body the most emphatic expression, the other Evangelists substantially corroborate his thought. It is S. Matthew who writes that when the women saw our Lord, "they came and took hold of His feet, and worshipped Him."[5] And it is the fourth Evangelist who, after recording that S. Mary Magdalene was

[1] S. Luke xxiv. 42, 43.

[2] Westcott and Hort, 'Notes on Selected Readings,' p. 72.

[3] Cf. S. John xxi. 12.

[4] A. Meyer, p. 203. See Henneke, 'Handbuch zu den Neutestamentlichen Apokryphen,' p. 524.

[5] S. Matt. xxviii. 9.

not permitted to hold Him, records the express invitation to S. Thomas, "reach hither thy hand, and put it into my side."[1]

Whether the Evangelist means us to understand that S. Thomas was convinced by sight alone, or whether also by the sense of touch, the passage itself appears to leave undetermined.[2] But the quotation which S. Ignatius gives from an early Christian writing, says "and straightway they touched Him and believed."[3] Considering that Ignatius wrote in A.D. 110, the original from which he quotes was probably other than S. John's Gospel.[4] And in accordance with this, perhaps, is the passage in S. John's first epistle: "that which we beheld and our hands handled concerning the Word of Life."[5] But whether this be so or not, what is certain is that the thought of the solidity and tangibility of the Risen Body pervades the Gospel narratives.[6]

2. If the invitation to touch Him is given in S. Luke and S. John, the actual touching is recorded in S. Matthew alone. Hence it cannot accurately be inferred that the evidence of sight is earlier than that of touch.

3. Opposing tendencies denying the reality of the body of Christ would certainly dispose the Christian Evangelist to emphasise the truths denied; but it is quite another thing to charge the Church with inventing the evidence required. And whatever tendencies may have arisen when the Gospels were written, we must remember the evidential needs of the disciples when the Lord was risen. For aught we can possibly know to the contrary, such appeals to the sense of touch were absolutely necessary to convince the apostles that the Resurrection was real. S. Luke may have selected the facts most calculated to refute doketic tendencies: he may none the less be true to the facts themselves.

4. The report is open to the interpretation that the evidences of touch, and of reception of food, were really necessary elements in producing the conviction of identity and reality. Wellhausen infers from the words "See My hands

[1] S. John xx. 27.
[2] Cf. S. Augustine, Tract cxxi. in 'S. John,' p. 5.
[3] Ep. Smyrna ii.
[4] See also S. Justin M. on the 'Resurrection,' ch. ix.
[5] 1 S. John i. 1.
[6] Cf. Horn, 'N. K. Zeitschrift,' 1902, 354.

and My feet, that it is I Myself" that the assurance was not derived from His features. "They supposed that they had seen a spirit." Consequently the reality of the appearance is endorsed by the marks of the wounds, identifying Him with the recent Passion; and by the sense of touch demonstrating His true humanity. But, even then, they still disbelieved for joy. Therefore a further proof is offered in the reception of food. And only so was their hesitation finally dispelled. Thus we have a progressive series of the appearances in face and form: the solidity and the scars of the hands and feet; the thoroughly human nature, in the reception of food.

All this is perfectly intelligible as a response to the disciples' bewilderment and incapacity.

5. To various types of the modern mind an appeal by the Risen Christ to the senses of hearing and of sight seems much more credible than an appeal to the sense of touch. This is not only the case with the sceptical mind, which, disbelieving that our Lord appeared at all, naturally finds it easier to account for appearances to the sight, as an effect of imagination, than for appearances which were also tested by the sense of touch. But the religious mind also at times finds it easier to believe that our Lord was merely seen and not touched. To suppose that His presence was verified by the sense of touch would require a material solidity, which some feel unable to assign to a being who appeared from the higher world. That the Risen Body of Christ could be ascertainable by the sense of touch is accordingly challenged in the supposed interests of true spirituality.

But this is a confusion of thought. For all the human senses are variations of the sense of touch. That is the primitive form out of which all the human senses originated. And every appeal to the senses is an appeal through the medium of material processes. Nothing but that which is material is verifiable by human organs of sight. The appeal to sight is, essentially, as material as the appeal to touch. If the person of the Risen Christ was verifiable by human sight, the form of its appearance was just as truly materialised as any solid body can be. The idea that what appeals to

sight is less material than what appeals to touch is a popular confusion of the ethereal with the spiritual. It is popular, but it is wholly unphilosophical.

Thus the ultimate problem is whether the self-manifestation of the Risen Lord should be through the human senses or not. The question, through which of the senses, is purely subordinate. There is no more philosophic justification for discrediting a revelation made through touch than for discrediting one made through sight. The only consistent alternatives are, either to disallow all external revelation through the senses, or to allow that such revelation may be through any of the senses.

And if it be correct that men naturally imagine that the sense of touch is less likely to be deceived than any other; if, moreover, its evidence is less easily explained away as a work of imagination than that of sight; these will be presumptions in favour of its use, on the supposition that Christ really did appear.[1]

III

The Appearances may be next criticised in relation to the sense of hearing.

1. Now, of course, it is easy to say that the words alleged to have been spoken during the forty days were subjective creations; that the message, given by the Lord to the women for the apostles, to go to Galilee, is but a repetition of the words spoken on the Mount of Olives; that the instructions ascribed to the forty days are reminiscences of utterances really spoken during the ministry. Or again, the general principles may be introduced that the suggestion of ideas does not necessitate bodily presence: or that ideas, although ascribed by those who expressed them to external occurrences, might really originate within; or that the words are only the interpretations of the visions. Thus S. Paul's companions only heard a sound, S. Paul alone understood the message. Or again, the criticism has been made that some of the sayings are of small account. Martineau, for

[1] Cf. 'Church Quarterly Review,' Jan. 1906, 335, and 'Camb. Theol. Essays,' pp. 338-9.

instance, considered that there was no need for Christ to speak if all He had to say was to repeat the message already given to go to Galilee. It is also urged that the various versions of those utterances differ so considerably as to throw uncertainty over the whole tradition; and that they are the creations of a later religious experience transferred by a pardonable anachronism to the great forty days.

2. The proper test of the value of these criticisms would be a searching analysis of all the words ascribed to the Risen Christ. Here it is to be observed that the invention of words for such occasions would be, to say the least, exceedingly venturesome. The Appearances of the Risen Lord are in no case silent manifestations. Now every such utterance offers itself as a test of reality. Here, above all, would invention fail; here self-identity would be manifest. The simple injunction to go to Galilee, which Martineau considered superfluous, is certainly commonplace enough, but is surely required by the disciples' practical refusal to assemble at the appointed place. The level of the utterance was determined by the disciples' want of faith. But if the general character of the sayings reported as heard during the forty days be considered, it is surely true that they are not only very real,[1] but they also fit, with singular appropriateness, into the circumstances. It is quite true to say of the whole series of Appearances that "the result is a series of pictures which are either direct transcripts from life, or the creations of a very high order of literary genius."[2] The historic situation is carried a further stage. Conversations interrupted by the Passion are now resumed. It is incredible that the conversation in which the restoration of S. Peter occurs is a fiction. Moreover, the instructions of the Resurrection period are in part the logical sequel to the instructions previously given, and, in part the addition of higher conceptions. The former element makes them the consummation of the past, the latter element explains the mighty historic development which unquestionably originated in that period. While some critics suggest that these instructions were composed at a later date, and read back into the primitive days, it ought

[1] *E.g.* S. John xx. [2] 'Cambridge Essays,' p. 337.

to be noticed how free these instructions are from the theological conceptions known to be prevalent at a later time.

But more than this, the sayings of the forty days are marked by the same qualities of *identity* and *difference* which has been already noticed in the Appearances themselves. They show identity of mind and purpose with the utterances of the Jesus of the ministry. There is the same searching, penetrating knowledge of the human heart, the same severity mixed with tender compassion, as in words spoken before He died. There is the same assumption of authority, only more lofty and unearthly than before. There is also a concentration into special commands of thoughts and teachings found in the previous period of the disciples' training. There is the conferring of new powers which nothing but the Resurrection can explain. The notion that these utterances were really spoken during the ministry, and were transferred to the interval after the death, is singularly refuted by their contents and by their implications. They belong to the period where the Evangelists have set them: to that period, and neither before it nor after it.

But together with this quality of identity, there is, equally conspicuous, the quality of *difference* in the whole bearing of the Risen Lord towards His disciples. There is an indescribable remoteness in the apparently simple but yet profound saying, "These are my words which I spake unto you, *while yet I was with you.*"[1] While I was yet with you: so simple is the phrase, we might easily miss its force. Was He not "with them" at the very moment when He uttered the phrase? He was no longer "with them" in the former terrestrial way. It is an express reminder that He has not returned to the old conditions. The earlier state of existence will never again be resumed. And, significantly, this was spoken at the very time of His most materialistic self-revealing;[2] even while He disclaimed a purely immaterial existence, and took food, and ate it before them. Hence also His words to Mary Magdalene, while gently disentangling Himself from her desire to detain Him: "touch Me not for

[1] S. Luke xxiv. 44. [2] *Ib.* 39-43.

I am not yet ascended ... I ascend," *There* is the dominant note of difference.

3. Now while every appeal to the human senses is an appeal to the mind and spirit, there is a higher appeal in words, because they are the more direct revelation of self. In His words the Risen Lord offers the highest proof of His identity. The recognition of a person is partly based on physical identity, but ultimately on spiritual identity. The testimony of the apostolic age is that they knew Him again not merely by sight and touch, but by the deeper evidence of personality.

IV

Whatever the advantages of an analysis, such as is here attempted, may be, there are corresponding drawbacks inseparable from such treatment. For that which is dissected and analysed conveys a very different impression from life. If the full force of these Appearances of the Risen Master is to reach us, they must be contemplated in their entirety, as well as in fragments and details. It is well after such an analysis to go direct to the Gospel narrative, and attempt to realise it as a whole. The life-like character of these Resurrection Appearances, the intense reality about them, seems to our judgment unmistakable.

CHAPTER VII

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE APPEARANCES

We now reach the momentous inquiry, What is the explanation of the apostles' assurance that they had seen the Risen Lord? What caused these Appearances? The ultimate answers are one of two: either these visions were self-generated, or they were brought about by the Risen Christ. This is the essential distinction between the Christian and the non-Christian explanations. Either they were the product of reflection, the natural issue of emotional strain and desire, projected unto transient reality; or else they were the action of the Risen Christ on the disciples.

I

The non-Christian explanation may be illustrated by the following account from a Jewish writer:

"That the movement did not end with the Crucifixion, but gave birth to that belief in the Risen Christ which brought the scattered adherents together and founded Christianity, is due to two psychic forces that never before had come so strongly into play: (1) the great personality of Jesus, which had so impressed itself upon the simple people of Galilee as to become a living power to them even after His death; and (2) the transcendentalism or other worldliness in which these penance-doing saintly men and women of the common classes, in their longing for godliness, live. In entranced visions they beheld their crucified Messiah expounding the Scriptures for them, or breaking the bread for them at their lovefeasts, or even assisting them when they

were out on the lake fishing. In an atmosphere of such perfect naiveté the miracle of the Resurrection seemed as natural as had been the miracle of healing the sick."[1]

Martineau's explanation is expressed with all the rich and imaginative eloquence of which he was so distinguished a master. But its substance is similar.[2]

Martineau endeavours to account for belief in the Resurrection as created by the disciples' enthusiasm, love, and gratitude. "Must they say that the divinest vision of their life was an illusion? that the priests were right and Calvary was just? No, it was impossible."[3] In this frame of mind they read again *the prophetic language*: Is He not led as a lamb to the slaughter, seemingly smitten of God and afflicted, despised and rejected of men? And yet is it not said that He shall still prolong His days and divide the spoil with the strong? Was it not written—Thou wilt not suffer thy Holy One to see corruption? Martineau thinks that "the utterance of trust and love, beaten back by the tragedy of Calvary, was sure to reassert its elasticity."[4] Accordingly by a perfectly natural and indeed inevitable process the disciples would be led to believe that "*Jesus still lives*," *and this*, says Martineau, *is the faith in His Resurrection.* They would come to be convinced that Jesus had not passed like other men into the great storehouse of souls in the underworld, but, like the two or three great spirits who had walked with God and followed Him, into the abodes of the immortals. "This exceptional assignment to the ranks of the blessed," says Martineau, "is the distinctive reward of reverence and gratitude to the divine lights of the world."[5] Accordingly he goes on to speak of "This dependence of their faith in immortality on the irresistible suasion of a single supreme and living personality"; describes how they "flung themselves with unreserved confidence on the faith that Jesus was in Heaven, to die no more; and accepted it as their mission to spread this faith among the nation and beyond." And here Martineau adds

[1] 'Jewish Encycl.,' v. 4, p. 51, Art. 'Christianity.'
[2] Martineau, 'Authority,' pp. 362-369.
[3] *Ib.* p. 362.
[4] *Ib.* p. 363.
[5] *Ib.* p. 364.

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most significantly: "In carrying out this mission they affected something more than their faith in the Resurrection of Christ; they declared that they had *seen* the Risen Christ." Martineau acknowledges that this declaration of having seen the Risen Christ was essential to the success of their labours. "Had they not been able to do so they could hardly have conveyed to others the profound assurance of His heavenly life, which in their own minds so largely depended on the impression of their personal experience."[1] But he maintains that the declaration of actual Christophanies was created by the demand for proof made upon them by their hearers. "Traditions were so moulded as to answer this demand."[2]

The German critic Wendt assures us[3] that modern belief in the exaltation of Jesus is independent of the question, What is the nature of the disciples' experience? Even if the Appearances of the Risen Lord were the means by which the disciples reached the higher conceptions, they are entirely separable from those higher conceptions. The conceptions themselves may be perfectly valid apart from all consideration of the value of the Appearances. A true conclusion may be reached through mistaken premises. The Appearances have the value which belongs to reported means through which faith in Christ's exaltation was gained. But the denial of their objectivity does not carry with it a denial of Christ's spiritual exaltation.

It must be remembered, argues Wendt, that the disciples did not believe in the exaltation without other grounds besides the reported Appearances. Without such ideas as the possibility of winning life through losing it, and the nature of eternal life, reports of Appearances after the death could only seem, and did seem, as idle tales. Among other grounds for their belief, Wendt places the fact that Jesus Himself had confidently predicted that He would rise. There was also the fact of the empty grave. Such reasons ought to have been sufficient without Appearances. And the narrative justly represents Jesus as rebuking the unbelief

[1] Martineau, 'Authority,' p. 361. [2] *Ib.* p. 369.
[3] 'System der Christlichen Lehre,' ii. 400 ff. (1907).

which could not credit His Resurrection without the aid of Appearances. And this belief in His Resurrection, apart from any objective Appearances, is just as possible for Christendom to-day as it was for the first disciples. It is a reprehensible want of faith to make belief in the Resurrection of Jesus dependent on the objectivity of the manifestations to the original disciples. The real ground of faith in the heavenly exaltation of Jesus after death lies in the character of His whole life on earth; in His Sonship; in His fulness of divine spiritual power. Those who discredit these conceptions do not believe in His Resurrection. But the Christian outlook on life requires that the historical Jesus was the perfect Son of God. Thus, for the Christian consciousness, the Resurrection of Jesus is independent of all criticism on the evidence for His Appearances.

Wendt, indeed, considers that the Appearances to the disciples can be psychologically explained as subjective consequences of reflection. It seems to him psychologically credible that, while the first shock of the death caused the disciples to lose all faith in the Christhood of their Master, yet subsequent reflection on the sublimity of His life not only cancelled the effect of the catastrophe, but led them to victorious assurance of His exaltation. The empty grave, and His confident prediction that He would rise again, combined with the influence of His personality to recreate Christian faith. And so the Appearances took place, and the Resurrection became established as a certainty in the primitive mind.

Wendt's theory, that the Appearances to the apostles are indifferent to modern belief in the Resurrection, suggests many criticisms.

1. We observe then, first, that while Wendt asserts that the disciples ought to have acquired faith in Jesus' Resurrection without any Appearances, he nevertheless recognises as subsidiary aids to such faith that the grave was really empty, and that our Lord had confidently predicted His Resurrection. Wendt, indeed, seems to vacillate between the opinion that faith is independent of such external aids, and that faith is supported by them. Manifestly this

vacillation is naturally caused by his theory. For if the higher convictions of the apostles as to the exaltation of their Master were assisted by the external fact of the empty grave, and the external fact of His predictions, then it is open to question whether they could have reached these higher convictions without such external aid. And it becomes further open to question whether other external aids were not also required. And in particular, whether it was possible to reach belief in His exaltation, as an inference from His character in the absence of objective Appearances of the Lord as risen. The remarkable stress which many modern critics place either on the empty grave or on our Lord's predictions, as largely accounting for the apostolic belief in the Resurrection, seems to show our instinctive sense that something more than a theological inference from a character was required to enable the apostles to reach this tremendous result.

2. But secondly, as to the proposition that the real ground for belief in the heavenly exaltation of Jesus after death lies in the character of His earthly life; this certainly strongly commends itself to the modern mind. But the question is whether this was the actual process in the apostolic age. Plainly it was not the case with S. Paul. His faith in the exaltation preceded his knowledge of the real character of the earthly life. Was it the case with the Twelve? The narratives which represent the Risen Jesus as rebuking their unbelief (Wendt adds "justly"), shows them unable to make the inferences from the character. And this inability was, from their standpoint, perfectly natural. For if His character suggested one conclusion, His death (to a Jew) suggested the opposite. The evidence conflicted. Modern thought sees things in the light of twenty Christian centuries. But for the Galilæan disciples, the character was compromised by the death. We have moved so far from the Galilæan position that it requires a resolute effort of historical imagination to appreciate fully what such a death involved to a pious Jew of the apostolic age.

This subject will be treated more fully when we discuss the conversion of S. Paul. Here it may suffice to quote two

distinguished writers as to the bearing of the death of Jesus on His Messianic claim :

"Within the compass of national expectation," writes Bishop Chase, "there was no room for a crucified Messiah. Three centuries of national sorrows had to elapse before the idea of a suffering Messiah became familiar to Jewish thought. If the Jewish author of the 2nd Book of Esdras speaks of the death of Messiah, it has no special significance attaching to it. The writer, in the deep melancholy of his views of human life and human destiny, conscious of the world as at last overwhelmed by a universal winter, in which all life withers and passes away. 'After these years shall My Son Christ die, and all that hath the breath of life. And the world shall be turned into the old silence seven days, like as in the first beginning: so that no man doth remain' (vii. 29, f.). . . . It was not the fact that Jesus Christ died, but that He died as He did, that seemed to give the lie to the Messianic claims which His followers made for Him."[1]

"Looked at from the later standpoint of the apostles," says Bernard Weiss, "the death of Jesus could easily be perceived to be salvation-bringing; but at first, even for the apostles, every hope in the Messianic consummation which was expected of Jesus, seemed to be borne to the grave along with Him.[2] It is the expression of the most immediate living experience when Peter says that they were begotten again unto a living hope by the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.[3] Not till it took place was the dead Jesus manifested with absolute certainty as the Messiah."[4]

Undoubtedly the impression of Christ's personality must have powerfully affected the Twelve, even immediately after His Crucifixion. But it is quite another thing to assert that it created faith that He was risen; that it established the certainty that He was the Messiah. His death must have seemed the usual reward of a prophet: the supreme illustration of national blindness, certifying more truly than ever the justice of the reproach—"Jerusalem that killest the prophets!" But it is difficult to see how their Messianic theories could

[1] Chase, 'Credibility of Acts,' p. 146.
[2] Luke xxiv. 21.
[3] 1 Peter i. 3.
[4] B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol. N.T.' i. 239.

lead them to an idea of His Resurrection which must inevitably revolutionise those very theories. It would require us to suppose that their belief in His Christhood created belief in His Resurrection, and then that belief in His Resurrection reacted upon and transfigured their belief in His Christhood.

It has been urged, indeed, that unless they won this conviction they must abandon all their hopes in Him. Undoubtedly this was so. But it has been truly answered, that you cannot win a conviction merely because failure to acquire it would be disastrous. Least of all could a conviction so triumphant, so powerful, so deeply-rooted, be acquired, merely from the wish that the thing was true.[1]

It is suggested that the general idea of Resurrection was among the familiar principles of Jewish faith; they believed in the general Resurrection at the last day, and had only to suppose its realisation anticipated in a particular instance; which as a fact was easy for them, as Herod's idea, that Jesus was John Baptist risen from the dead, plainly shows.

There is, however, this obvious distinction between Herod's idea and the disciples' belief. There was for Herod the concrete fact of John Baptist, alive and at work. Herod accounted for this fact by the theory of Resurrection. But in the case of the disciples there was, on the supposition of subjective visions, no concrete fact at all to be accounted for. If Herod's belief in the general idea of Resurrection had projected an otherwise invisible John Baptist into visible manifestations, then the vision theory might claim him as a supporter. But a fact which creates a theory is not parallel to a theory which creates a fact.

But it is said Jesus Himself had predicted His Resurrection. This must have conduced to create belief in it.

There is, however, no psychological necessity for this inference. Under the circumstances of overwhelming failure and death, it is surely not wonderful if reiterated predictions completely failed to take effect. The earliest tradition affirms that the very idea of Resurrection in the case of the Christ was foreign to the Galilæan accepted principles. And we

[1] Hermann Fichte, 'Vermischte Schriften,' ii. 150.

know how difficult it is for new ideas in such a case to penetrate and get themselves a recognition. Surely if ever men were under conditions which make bewilderment natural and collectedness almost impossible, it was the Galilæan disciples at their Master's death.

S. Paul surely represents contemporary thought when he describes the death of Jesus as to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness. And the moral excellence of Jesus, His life and work, however powerfully it impressed the men of Galilee, could not conceivably enable them to set aside a fact which was to them, necessarily, not a mere disaster, but a divine refutation of their future hopes. It is easy to imagine the disciples, as for instance Martineau does, recovering their equanimity under the pleasing associations of Galilee; but it wanted something more than speculative inferences from His character to convince them of Jesus' exaltation as Messiah, or to reverse the obvious judgment which His death declared, and the annihilation of all their hopes. Given an objective manifestation of the Risen Jesus, and everything is accounted for.

The endeavour of Wendt to maintain that belief in the exaltation of Jesus might be for the apostolic age an inference from the value of the character must be pronounced an anachronism. It is precisely the contrary which is the truth. The whole tradition of the apostolic age seems to show that belief in the redemptive nature of Christ's work was founded on the experience of His Appearances after He was risen. There is no trace of inferring His exaltation from his moral worth. This is not peculiar to any one strain of apostolic reflection. It pervades the whole.

The truth of this Strauss himself admitted. "The origin of that faith in the disciples is fully accounted for if we look upon the Resurrection of Jesus as the Evangelists describe it, as an external miraculous occurrence."[1]

The description of the disciples' actual state after the death, and without the Appearances, as given by Beyschlag,[2] seems thoroughly in accordance with the psychological and historic conditions.

[1] 'New Life,' i. 399.

[2] 'N. T. Theol.' i. 303.

"There continued in their hearts a love for Him, and with it a belief in Him also; their inner relation to Him, even without the Resurrection, *might not have given them anything to preach*, but it would have remained. They would have clung to His promise of returning, which would now first have truly come to life in them; and *living hope* rooting itself in that would have accompanied them through life. *But that would not have been a victorious hope*, a hope so energetic as to impel them to joyous activity; their life would have been passed in unfruitful longing and idle waiting, which would have gradually become more faint through hope deferred. The miracle of the Resurrection preserved them from this stunting of their inner life." "It is wasted effort trying to explain the Resurrection on purely subjective psychological or pathological grounds. Only as a truly objective supernatural event does it take its place in the historical and psychological conditions of the time."

It is, of course, quite true that Evangelists at a later date, long after the Appearances had ceased, laid stress on the beatitude of faith in the absence of Appearances. And so we reach the tabulated gradations of faith in the fourth Evangelist culminating in "blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed." But the obvious implication of the passage is that it maintains an unrealised ideal; that it was exactly in drawing true inferences that the first generation had failed; that they found it impossible to credit the exaltation of Jesus until it was demonstrated to them by His risen appearances. When the actual Appearances had created a circle of believers it was possible for their witness to extend belief to a wider circle which had not seen the manifestations.

3. Next, as to modern thought. Is faith in the Resurrection of Jesus possible for us, even if no Appearances ever happened? We are recipients of a tradition that He did appear. We find ourselves in a religious atmosphere which has been created by the belief that He appeared. No one doubts that the apostles believed as firmly that they saw Him after He was risen as that they saw Him before He died. Whether their belief corresponded with reality is the question. But their believing is not questioned. Suppose,

however, that this apostolic belief in His Appearances had never existed: suppose that no tradition of such Appearances had been transmitted down the centuries: suppose that we had found ourselves without that religious atmosphere in which we have always lived and thought: does it follow that, in the absence of such aids to faith, we should have been able for ourselves to infer the Resurrection and exaltation of Jesus? Is it so certain that belief in these things would have penetrated down the centuries, and held their own to this day, without the apostolic belief in the objectivity of those Appearances? Surely this is quite impossible for any man to prove. That which seems to a modern critical mind a simple inference from the moral data of a character may not seem so simple outside the religious environment which has actually created it. We owe more obligations to traditional religion than we are always aware. Is it not clear that the first existence of belief in Christ's exaltation, the expansion of that belief, and the continuance of that belief down to modern times, have all been founded, not simply on an inference from Christ's character, but on the asserted Appearances after He was risen?

It is, moreover, very significant that the inferences which Wendt considers the modern mind competent to draw from the character of Jesus are not those of historical Christianity. The heaven of exaltation, which modern thought would ascribe to Jesus in virtue of His excellence, is not at all the exaltation which the Apostolic Church ascribed to Him. The exaltation which the primitive Church believed to follow upon Christ's Resurrection was in character quite unique. It set Him at God's right hand; it demonstrated Him God's equal; it declared Him to be the judge of humanity. He would assign to each soul its destiny in the other world. But these ideas do not at all belong to the modern idea of the exaltation of a saintly prophet in the realm of the spirit.

4. No thorough discussion of these Appearances is possible without a closer consideration of self-generated visions.

It is said that religious history furnishes numerous illustrations of such phenomena; that the apostolic age in particular was fertile in producing them; that the men of

Galilee were, according to the Acts, liable to such experiences; that the borderline between inward vision and ordinary sight was neither defined nor understood; that S. Peter himself is reported as subject to such visions; that, if, on one occasion, when he experienced an actual deliverance from prison, he "wist not that it was true but thought he saw a vision," he may have formed a contrary inference on another occasion, and one equally mistaken.

The Gospel narratives represent the disciples as drawing clear distinctions between visions of a subjective and of an objective kind. The terminology of modern thought would not have been intelligible to the men of Galilee, yet their cautious practical discrimination between different kinds of impressions made upon the mind comes out very clearly in their behaviour at the Appearances of the Risen Christ. "They ... supposed that they had seen a spirit." [1] This manifests a fear of deception by shadowy unrealities.

When S. Thomas heard his fellow-disciples announce "We have seen the Lord," [2] their announcement aroused a similar suspicion. He did not doubt that they had seen some ghost-like appearance. What he doubted was that this shadow had any vital connection with the personality of Jesus. Hence his demand for a solid substantial organism, which might be subjected to a fuller test by the senses. The narrative affirms that his demand was satisfied. Men who deal with the subject of vision in such a manner as this are keenly alive to the practical distinction to which our expressions subjective and objective manifestations correspond. Critics often argue as if these distinctions were a modern discovery. Yet they were practically obvious to the Evangelists.

On this subject we can hardly do better than summarise the remarks of Strauss, together with the searching criticisms to which the theory was subjected by Keim. Although Keim's work appeared in 1872 no more penetrating discussion of the theory of self-generated visions has since been given us. Whatever were Keim's limitations, his was certainly the most learned work on the Resurrection; marked moreover by deep

[1] S. Luke xxiv. 37. [2] S. John xx. 25.

earnestness, which the consciousness of the approaching close of his life intensified.[1]

Strauss suggested[2] that the Appearances to the elder apostles were caused by the excitement due to the persecution of Jesus. The situation, Strauss admits, was critical. Certainly the Messiah ought not to die, at least until He had finished His work: and in no case ought He to experience a criminal execution. But "both had occurred to Jesus." If the disciples began now to study the Old Testament they might, Strauss thinks, have found materials for a theory in explanation. But the difficulty is, that "we have no trace that after the final departure of Jesus, it was a renewed search into the Scriptures which served to revive the faith of His disciples." Accordingly, Strauss postulates discussions after the decease of Jesus between the Jews and His adherents. In these discussions the disciples maintained that He had risen to a higher life.

This theory Keim pronounced entirely unconvincing. It does not render intelligible the existence of belief in the Resurrection at so early a date. It would require a lengthy interval for reflection. It does not account for the "infinite unquestioning joyousness."[3]

Indeed Strauss himself was not satisfied with this attempt. He acknowledged that such a process of reflection and discussion takes time; whereas the unanimous tradition is that the Resurrection took place on the Third Day.

"If," says Strauss, with his usual straightforwardness, "we look upon the Resurrection of Jesus as a miracle, it might take place as well on one day as another; a natural restoration to life must occur on some day soon after death, or it could not occur at all; on the other hand, the psychological revolution from which *we* suppose the visions of the apostles to have proceeded, appears to require a longer interval for its development. More than one day, it would seem, should intervene before the disciples could recover from their terror at the unlooked for result, before they could assemble together again after their first dispersion.

[1] Cf. Schweitzer, 'Von Reimarus zu Wrede.'
[2] 'New Life,' i. 421.
[3] Keim, vi. 333.

Supposing, in particular, that it was from renewed and profounder study of the sacred writings of the Old Testament that the certainty arose . . . for this also a longer time was required. It appears, therefore, if it is true that on the very first day after the death of Jesus, Appearances of His took place, not to be conceivable that these Appearances were merely subjective visions of the disciples; and our view of the origin of the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus appears to fall to pieces upon the impossibility of making that origin conceivable on the third day."[1]

Strauss accordingly substitutes another solution. "A purely logical method by the intervention of clear thoughts was not yet possible, and if it was not, and the reaction took place in the secret depths of the minds of the apostles, then it was a violent burst, a flash of lightning, in which the sultriness of the overloaded feelings relieved itself."[2] And, of course, if the first Appearances occurred in Galilee, then this violent burst need not have been so sudden after all. For this transference of the Appearances to Galilee "disengages us from the third day as the period for the commencement of them, the longer time thus gained makes the reaction in the minds of the disciples more conceivable."[3]

Yes. But can we "disengage" ourselves from the Third Day? It is deeply rooted, this simple detail, in the very heart of the primitive tradition. Whatever interpretation be put upon it, nothing can extort from it the idea of a lengthy period of time. Is it likely that this note of duration corresponds to nothing actual? Strauss feels the force of this acutely, and honestly owns it. "An unhistorical origin of the statement as to time, which lies at the foundation of the history of the Resurrection, will be more difficult to admit than in the case of the locality of the Appearances."[4] Strauss refers to Jonah[5] and Hosea;[6] but half-heartedly, and evidently, unconvinced.

Here, then, enter the criticisms of Keim. Keim gathers together, what is to be said in favour of the theory of subjective visions, and expresses it more learnedly and

[1] 'New Life,' i. 431. [2] *Ib.* 432. [3] *Ib.* 437.
[4] *Ib.* 430. [5] Jonah ii. 1-11. [6] Hosea vi. 2.

forcibly than Strauss. The theory appeals to him, as a critic, because it rids him of the "embarrassing" doctrine of physical Resurrection, and Appearances with solid flesh and bones.[1] That the picture of the living invincible Jesus should hover before the disciples most vividly during the first few days, Keim considers natural. "In reality He was not dead to them; nor to the women under the Cross; still less to the apostles, since they had seen Him only as living, as strong to the last moment, since they had not witnessed His passion, His disgrace, His dying, His burial, since, finally, they in Galilee, far from the disasters and the graves of Jerusalem, stood again entirely upon His ground and theirs, the ground of His successes, of His strength, of His triumphs." "In such a flood of unbounded excitement, intensified by abstention from food, and by the feverish moods of evening, it is quite in harmony with experience that the boundaries of the inner and the outer world should disappear."[2]

After the death of Mohamed, Omar swore to decapitate any who dared to say that the prophet was no more.[3] Visions recur throughout religious history. The Maid of Orleans and Savonarola are but leading instances of this faculty for projecting thought and emotion into form and appearances. Quite recently Arnold Meyer has devoted a lengthy essay to such illustrations. If the enthusiastic Peter had a vision, which is quite conceivable, such emotion would become contagious; and he would in this way strengthen his brethren. The communicable character of such experiences is indisputable. Excitement runs from man to man. It infects whole masses. Witness the Methodists, and the Irvingites. That five hundred and more were moved simultaneously is quite intelligible.

Keim puts the case for self-generated visions forcibly. But just at the very moment when he appears to have yielded assent to the theory, he directly withdraws it. "Yet, notwithstanding all these arguments in favour of the vision theory, it is by no means the writer's intention to adopt that theory."[4] The grounds upon which Keim rejects it are the following:

[1] Keim, 'Jesus of Nazara,' vi. 339. [2] *Ib.* 345. [3] *Ib.* p. 344. [4] *Ib.* p. 351.

1. In the first place, while the apostolic age "is full of more or less self-generated human visions . . . there is still more of calm consideration and sober reflection." Keim sees that the dominant characteristic of the primitive community is by no means emotion and excitement, but rather practical work. The early chapters of the Acts represent the beginnings of organisation, method, and attention to details of the common life. The ruling quality is not emotion but will.

2. In the second place, visions, which undoubtedly were numerous, are carefully distinguished by the apostolic writers from the Resurrection Appearances. "Otherwise it would have been impossible for the Apostle Paul to close his list with the fifth or sixth Appearance of Jesus."[1] There is a manifest belief that the visions and the appearances differed in character. Keim held that the later visions, "sprung from new motives and impulses of a richly inspired young religion, afford simply no evidence concerning the character and nature of these first Appearances."[2]

3. Thirdly, that the Appearances were self-generated is "at once contradicted by the evidently simple, solemn, almost lifeless, cold, unfamiliar character of the manifestations."[3] Keim is deeply impressed by the "reserve and reticence" of the disciples "in face of the strange phenomenon." "There is no trace of a happy, sweet, prolonged repose on the bosom of him who is again endowed with life and love." The objectivity suggested by the characteristics of the Risen Lord's Appearances is a subject only hinted at by Keim. It might be much more fully and forcibly stated.

4. Fourthly, there is the sudden cessation of the Appearances. Keim very justly observes that self-generated visions tend to become irregular and exuberant. They multiply. "The spirits that men call up are not so quickly laid."[4] "The visionary piety of the Montanists, A.D. 120, filled half a century with its multiform follies, notwithstanding all the moderating influences of the Church around."[5] Thus Renan speaks of a full year of uninterrupted visions or feverish intoxication.[6] Visions incessantly multiplied. Renan at-

[1] Keim, 'Jesus of Nazara,' p. 353. [2] *Ib.* [3] *Ib.* p. 354.
[4] *Ib.* p. 357. [5] *Ib.* p. 355. [6] 'Les Apôtres,' p. 25.

tempts to account for the sudden cessation by ascribing it to a command received within the visions to go and convert the world. Thus the self-generated vision developed a self-suppressing faculty, which negatived the emotions which produced it. This is a somewhat large demand. Keim rejects it, not without contempt. For, as he notes, not only did these appearances cease; they are replaced by a sudden transition to vigorous activity, self-possessing clearmindedness. What produced this "diametrically opposite mental current"?[1]

Here, then, Keim concludes his criticisms. "All these considerations," he writes, "compel us to admit that the theory, which has recently become the favourite one, is only an hypothesis which, while it explains something, leaves the main fact unexplained; and indeed subordinates what is historically attested to weak and untenable views."[2]

The practical result of the Appearances is no less significant. The apostolate imposed upon the Eleven, as afterwards on S. Paul. Thus the Appearances are distinguished by the activities which they originate. They are creative Appearances, not merely emotional results, but practical on an enormous scale, and permanent.

II

If the Christophanies were not self-generated, then they were the work of God. This is the other side of the alternative. The inadequate character of the theory of self-generated visions has led a number of thoughtful modern writers to acknowledge that the Appearances were created by the personal action of the glorified Jesus on the minds of His followers.

This is maintained from very different points of view, sometimes philosophic, sometimes religious, by Hermann Lotze,[3] Hermann Fichte,[4] Keim,[5] Riggenbach,[6] Fernand Ménégoz.[7]

[1] *Ib.* p. 356.
[2] *Ib.* 358.
[3] 'Microcosmus.'
[4] 'Vermischte Schriften,' ii. 152.
[5] 'Jesus of Nazara,' vi.
[6] 'Die Auferstehung Jesu,' p. 34.
[7] 'Certitude de la Foi.'

1. This conception of the Resurrection Appearances as created from without rather than from within, as corresponding to realities of the spiritual order, commended itself to no less philosophical a mind than that of Lotze.[1]

"Rationalism, in interpreting these circumstances, which are described to us as external facts, as visions of those who describe them, has overlooked the point which can here give more worth to visions than to actual external facts. Rationalism supposes that out of mere psychological trains of ideas there arose in excited minds fancies due to memory and subjective conditions, which had nothing objective corresponding to them; the very thing that it had to take account of was this spiritual world, which, though unseen, is everywhere, and in which that which has no corporeal existence is present and none the less real. Between this world and the world of sense actions and reactions might take place which are foreign to the ordinary course of nature; and from these, which are true, real, living impressions upon the soul of something divine and actually present, those visions might arise, being apparitions, not of the non-existent, but of something really existent, and (as the divine inward action of the Deity) not mediated by help of the course of physical nature, which has no independent worth, or by disturbances of that course which are incomprehensible to us. The significance of the Resurrection lies not in this, that the soul of the risen person now as heretofore inhabits a body which is visible to the eyes of men, but in this, that without any such mediation, his real, living person, and not the mere remembrance of him, takes hold of men's souls, and appears to them in a form which has greater strength and efficacy of influence than the restoration of the actual bodily presence would have."[2]

Gathering up the crucial sentences from this exposition, the Appearances of the Risen Christ are described as "true, real, living impressions upon the soul—of something divine and actually present"; "the direct inward action of Deity"; "His real living presence, and not the mere remembrance of Him, takes hold of men's souls." So Lotze.

[1] 'Microcosmus,' ii. 480, Engl. Edit. [2] p. 481.

2. "If," says Keim, "the visions are not something humanly generated or self-generated; if they are not blossoms and fruit of an illusion-producing over-excitement... if they are directly accompanied by astonishingly clear perceptions and resolves, then there still remains one originating source, hitherto unmentioned, namely, God and the glorified Christ."[1] This is Keim's own explanation. Jesus exalted, even if not risen, granted visions to His disciples, and revealed Himself to His community. The power that produced the vision came "entirely from without." "The subjective seeing is merely the reflex form of what is objective." Hence "the immediate cessation of the seeing and of the will to see, as soon as the operating power ceases to operate, becomes perfectly intelligible."[2] Keim is certain that the disciples' love and reverence could not convince them that Jesus lived as Messiah in the bosom of God "until this fact had from without, essentially from without, been again made clear within."[3] All the evidences go to prove that without this action of the glorified Jesus on the disciples, faith in Him would have died away. The evidence that Jesus was alive —"the telegram from heaven"—was necessary before the human race could be convinced. And therefore the evidence was given by the act of Jesus and by the will of God.

3. Ménégoz, in his 'Certitude de la Foi,' goes deeper than this, because he insists that Christianity is a religion which stands in a unique relation to history, seeing that it is bound up inseparably with the fortunes of Person. The separation of Christianity from history is acknowledged to be impossible. This is founded in the very nature and constitution of Christianity. There has never been, says Ménégoz, a serious conflict in any but the Christian religion between religious and historic certainty.[4] The explanation of this remarkable feature is that Buddha, Zoroaster, and other founders of religions drew their disciples to their principles but not to their persons.

Now the endeavour of certain theologians to base Christianity on a principle is according to Ménégoz a psychological mistake. We should say it was infinitely

[1] p. 361. [2] p. 362. [3] p. 364. [4] 'Certitude de la Foi,' p. 6.

more: being opposed to the essential nature of the Christian religion. It is, contends Ménégoz, a psychological mistake, because piety is not borne of abstract principles, neither can it be nourished by them. The finest theory is too barren and cold to warm the heart and invigorate the will. The austere majesty of abstract principles discourages us. It rebukes our weakness. But when an abstract theory of righteousness is replaced by the living personality of Jesus Christ, a love of the heart and energy of will are created which are otherwise impossible. The history of the Church shows that there is no evangelic piety without contact with the person of Jesus. The experience of Christians proves, in spite of assertions to the contrary, that the personality of Jesus has a unique and eternal worth.[1]

But if so, then the question has to be faced, does faith in the Resurrection of Jesus form part of the basis of our Christian religion?[2]

We believe, says Ménégoz, that there was an intervention, unexpected and sudden, of the Spirit of God in the soul of the disciples. This spiritual experience caused them to project externally the figure which formed itself within them.[3] He also suggests that the manifestations were telepathic phenomena, awakening the powers which the influence of Jesus had accumulated within them during His earthly ministry. God awakened their courage by a psychological phenomenon.

4. Professor Kirsopp Lake puts the view in the following terms: "The objective hypothesis is that the appearance was independent of the belief or feelings of the disciples. In other words, the disciples saw what they saw because there really was a spiritual being which had an existence independent of them, and produced the appearance. This view explains all the facts and agrees with the undoubted belief of the disciples."[4] Then, after explaining the adverse criticisms, he concludes that, while we must pass from historical evidence to doctrinal grounds to form any decision: "At the same time critical methods point just as clearly to the

[1] 'Certitude de la Foi,' p. 10. [2] p. 28. [3] p. 37.
[4] K. Lake, 'The Resurrection of Jesus Christ,' p. 267.

existence of a conviction among the disciples that the Lord had appeared to them, and neither criticism nor philosophy can give any explanation of this fact without admitting that these appearances were dependent on the personality of Jesus."[1]

These acknowledgements are very remarkable. They come from varied circles of modern thought. They vary in clearness of utterance. To say, for instance, that the Christophanies were "dependent on the personality of Jesus" may mean the personality acting by the influence of memory; or it may mean the direct action of the personality from the other world. To describe the Appearances as a "telegram from Heaven" sounds strange. But yet, whatever changes were desirable in the form of the expressions, these writers range themselves substantially on the Christian side of the alternative. Keim really means to say that the impressions received by the disciples were caused by a special miraculous Divine intervention.[2] And all these writers appear to acknowledge that the Christophanies cannot be explained by self-generated fancies, but require the personal action of the Risen Lord to account for them. And this acknowledgment is unquestionably on the Christian side. The position, it must be confessed, falls far short of the Christian theology. It evades assent to the externality of the phenomena, and declines belief in the bodily Resurrection. If it employs the word "Resurrection" it means "exaltation." And it reduces the Appearances of our Lord simply to certificates of the satisfactory condition of Jesus of Nazareth in the other world. It is, according to Keim, evidence that Jesus was alive, that He lived as Messiah in the bosom of God. This is certainly very far beneath the fulness of the conception as found in the theology of the apostles.

But at any rate it is profoundly religious; and it deliberately rejects the materialistic or pantheistic conceptions which underlay a great deal of the earlier denial of the Resurrection of Christ. If it is unsatisfying as a final stage, it

[1] *Ib.* p. 275.

[2] Cf. Prof. Margoliouth in 'Contemporary Review,' 1905, p. 719.

is exceedingly hopeful as a great progression upon the way.[1]

III

The full Christian belief goes further than the statement that the Appearances of the Divine Christ were the work of God. It maintains that they were real bodily Appearances. There are also modern critics that are prepared to acknowledge the force of this full Christian belief.

"So far as I can see," writes Schwartzkopff, "no one can maintain the impossibility of bodily Appearances of Christ."[2] "Human knowledge," he contends, "is too defective to be allowed to contest the possibility of supersensuous spirits being able to act upon our sensuous world. Our own supersensuous spirits constantly make themselves perceptible to one another by sensuous influences. But the spirits of the other world as such are similar to those of this world. As finite spirits, which they still remain, they would perhaps, like ourselves, require a special organic instrument for this purpose." Experience, however, he thinks, "furnishes us with no clearly proved analogy to the bodily Appearances of Christ."[3] But "since the possibility of a bodily Appearance of Christ can neither be called in question without hesitation, nor definitely affirmed, the question comes to be whether this Appearance can be regarded as having a sufficient historical guarantee." The critic thinks that "proof cannot be given with certainty." He balances the various considerations which can be supplied on either side. He holds as absolutely certain that the Appearances were divinely created. "If the belief in Christ is a truth, then it can only have been awakened in man's heart by the immediate intercourse of the living God or of Christ."[4] The rationalistic theory that the longing to see Jesus once again was strengthened by devotional reading of the Psalms,

[1] Ziegler ('Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,' 1896, p. 260) regards the Christophanies as direct divine creations in the minds of the apostles. Reischle, 'Zur Frage nach der leiblichen Auferstehung J. C.' 'Christl. Welt.' 1900, p. 3.

[2] Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 92. [3] *Ib.* p. 94. [4] *Ib.* p. 100.

and then intensified by abstinence from food, until it burst forth into enthusiasm, "not only denies the significance of the Lord, but also the inner truth of all prophetic revelation, according to which the living God does really enter directly into converse with the pious."[1] And to consider the early Church, with all its exemplary love and truth, as founded upon enthusiastic self-deception "is a historical absurdity." On the other hand, the prevalent idea of Resurrection as a relation of the soul to its body would dispose the disciples to regard any Appearances as in bodily reality. But that the Appearances did actually assume external bodily substance is a conclusion reached on religious and dogmatic grounds.

By revealing Himself externally in bodily form to His disciples "whose faith so much needed strengthening, He gave them not only a spiritual guarantee of His heavenly Messiahship, but also one that was corroborated by the senses. Love must have impelled their Lord to do this if He could; and it must, on the other hand, have moved God in any case to confer on Him the power of doing so. For it was in thorough harmony with God's gracious condescension to facilitate in this way the first genesis of belief in the Resurrection. Thus Jesus revealed Himself to His friends in a spiritual body, in order to root that conviction in their minds, and so found His Church on a basis that could not be moved. That is the dogmatic train of thought by which theology and Christianity reach the conclusion that the Appearance of Christ was a bodily one."[2]

That this dogmatic train of thought represents the truth is confirmed by the character of the resulting faith. It was a sober and a practical faith. In all their remarkably transparent sincerity we never find the slightest trace that these Appearances of the Risen Christ rested upon inference or imagination. "A product of fancy, even though its contents be true, has not in the long run the power of a real outer event."[3]

Moreover, the nature of God corroborates it. For God is not only immanent, He is also transcendent: and His

[1] *Ib.* p. 110, n. [2] *Ib.* p. 142. [3] *Ib.* p. 144.

activities partake of this double character. He not only relates Himself to the soul within, but also from without. External nature is part of His self-manifestation to the human soul. And external bodily Resurrection Appearances are in keeping with such analogies.

Then there is a religious superiority in a bodily Appearance of the Risen Lord over and above divinely-created objective visions. If the glorified Lord revealed Himself bodily to His disciples, "then this must appear to us as a glorious act of God, a jewel of universal history." It is the manifest triumph of Divine power and love in the region of death. It is the reappearance of the victor out of that imperishable world. There is all the difference between a signal given from a distance to certify survival and success and an actual personal reappearance of the Master in the midst of the disciples on the earth.[1]

This exposition by Schwartzkopff is particularly valuable for its consciousness of the goodness and yet inadequacy of the theory of Keim. It is a remarkable advance to the fuller Christian idea.

[1] Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 143.

BOOK II. THE WITNESS OF S. PAUL

CHAPTER VIII

S. PAUL'S LIST OF THE WITNESSES

IT would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the list of the witnesses of the Resurrection given by S. Paul in 1 Cor. xv. The passage is as follows: "And that He appeared to Cephas; then to the twelve; then He appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then He appeared to James; then to all the apostles; and last of all, as unto one born out of due time, He appeared to me also."[1]

I

We propose to analyse the passage at some length. And first, *the general character of the list.*

1. Its *genuineness* may be considered practically undisputed. With rare exceptions, this is recognised by critics of all schools.[2]

2. The passage is a *tradition*, received by S. Paul, and not original. "That which I also received."[1] It was not his own compilation. It is natural to compare this tradition with the Eucharistic tradition reported in 1 Cor. xi. 23. "I received of the Lord that which I also delivered unto you" is remarkably akin to "I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received." From what source were

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 5-8.

[2] Van Manen rejected it, but his successor at Leyden observes: "I am quite unable to share my predecessor's view on this point" (K. Lake, p. 37 n). Schmiedel accepts it even with enthusiasm.—Hastings, 'Dict. B.'

these traditions derived? There is no real ground in either case for assuming that they were received in any supernatural way; although this view has the support of writers of widely opposing schools.[1]

That S. Paul did not derive this by direct communication with the glorified Lord is, it is sometimes thought, suggested (1) by the simple parallel between "I received" and "I delivered unto you";[2] (2) by the absence of any words qualifying the expression "I received";[2] (3) by the distinction between this "I received" and the one Appearance of Christ to S. Paul."[2]

The channel from which S. Paul received this tradition must have been the elder apostles. It is natural to connect a tradition, in which S. Peter's name stands first, with S. Peter himself. S. Paul visited Jerusalem three years after his conversion, and went expressly to visit, or to "become acquainted with" (R.V. Margin) S. Peter. The word for visit is ἱστορῆσαι, which, says Edersheim, "implies a careful and searching inquiry on his part."[3] "Est-ce une conjecture trop hasardée de supposer que, durant cette visite de quinze jours qu'il fit à Pierre à Jérusalem, après sa conversion, il l'a soigneusement interrogé sur la vie de leur maître commun? Le terme du moins dont Paul se sert (Gal. i. 18, ἱστορῆσαι Κηφᾶν) ne le donne-t-il pas à penser?"[4] "Since S. Paul, as he assures us, undertook this journey for the express purpose of seeing Kephas, it is a reasonable conjecture that he earnestly desired to learn from him the details of the story of the Resurrection."[5]

We are not, indeed, told the subjects of their conversations; but it is incredible that they did not confer about the Resurrection. This is more than a precarious inference. For the whole situation requires that S. Paul or S. Peter conferred together on the main principles of the Christian

[1] *I.e.* Clemen ('Paulus,' i. 64), Pfleiderer and Cornely. The latter says: "Immediate a Domino, hominis ministerio non interveniente."

[2] Bachmann in Zahn's 'Kommentar.'

[3] 'Jesus the Messiah,' ii. 625; cf. Knowling, 'Testimony of S. Paul,' 222.

[4] Sabatier, 'L'Apôtre Paul,' p. 66.

[5] 'Cambridge Theol. Essays,' 392.

Religion.[1] Thus, Prof. K. Lake recognises that the passage probably represents, at least in part, "the tradition which" S. Paul "had found in the Church at his conversion, or at his first visit to Jerusalem."[2] It may confidently be said that the tradition summarises the experience of the community at Jerusalem. But the tradition is not connected only with S. Peter. At the same visit he saw S. James.[3] S. Paul had been in personal contact with several chief witnesses of the Resurrection, and with members of the Jerusalem circle of faith. He had visited Jerusalem again with Barnabas.[4] He knew S. Mark. He saw on this occasion not only S. James and S. Peter, but also S. John.[5] He must have seen many other of the original believers. When he writes "I laid before them the Gospel which I preach among the Gentiles, but privately before them who were of repute,"[6] he distinguishes between public conference and private consultation: both of these must have made him very familiar with the convictions of the Mother Church.[7] Thus, the tradition here given rests on very intimate knowledge of the witnesses of the elder apostles. We should also observe the strong similarity in tone and confidence between the tradition of the Eucharist and that of the Resurrection. As Dr. Sanday[8] remarks: "in the same precise and deliberate manner in which he had rehearsed the particulars of the Last Supper, S. Paul enumerates one by one the leading Appearances of the Lord after the Resurrection."

3. The passage is a summary and not a narrative.

It is difficult to see how this brief summary was ever mistaken for an exhaustive evidential account of the proofs of Christ's Resurrection. The bare list which S. Paul has given is totally insufficient for such a purpose, and no one would be more fully aware of this than himself. The traditional statement here given is almost as condensed as it possibly could be; it is nothing more than the headings of instructions on the witnesses of the Resurrection. Only

[1] Cf. Bp. Chase in 'Cambridge Theol. Essays,' p. 392.
[2] 'The Resurrection of Jesus Christ,' p. 41.
[3] Gal. i. 19.
[4] *Ib.* 1.
[5] *Ib.* 9.
[6] *Ib.* 2.
[7] Cf. Knowling, 'Testimony,' p. 222-3.
[8] 'Outlines,' p. 173-4.

their names or numbers are given. Neither place nor any detail is added. Surely there never existed a list with less claim to the title of exhaustive enumeration of the evidence, or full array of all the apostle knew.

4. Moreover, the tradition was *not* being now given to the Corinthians in this letter *for the first time*. "I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received." He is not now instructing them in facts and principles with which they are not already familiar. He is reminding them of a traditional list which they had already received. These were clearly the heads of instructions previously given. The Corinthians themselves would be able to fill up from memory the outline here repeated.[1] Indeed it is just this consideration which makes the list intelligible. If the Corinthians had never heard of it before, S. Paul must have expanded the information here condensed. Did he never tell his converts the story of his own conversion?

5. Again, the tradition is given rather for the sake of completeness than with an apologetic purpose.

The significance of the list of the Appearances depends partly upon the situation in the Church at Corinth. The apostle's argument shows that the Corinthian Christians did not deny the Resurrection of Christ. They committed themselves to the illogical combination of assent to Christ's Resurrection with rejection of the Resurrection of the dead. Accordingly, S. Paul's design was to demonstrate their inconsequence; which he does on the basis of their belief in Christ's Resurrection. There was, therefore, no necessity that he should give the evidence for Christ's Resurrection, as if he were endeavouring to secure belief in it. That he gives the evidence, in any form, at all, is rather due to the apostle's systematic mind, and his love of teaching fundamental principles. It was natural to summarise the names or numbers of the principal witnesses in the briefest possible manner before advancing to the doctrinal discussion which was the real purpose of this great chapter.

6. If, then, the passage be a tradition which S. Paul received and did not compose, inferences drawn from it as

[1] See Clemen, 'Paulus' i. 64.

to distinctions between his ideas and those of the Galilæan apostles, or as to the limits of his knowledge about the Appearances, or as to his intentions in omitting the evidence of the women, or in making no mention of the empty grave, are manifestly valueless. They all originate in misconceptions of the paragraph's nature.

7. But when was the list composed? The *date* is not hard to fix approximately. If we take Clemen's chronology of S. Paul's career, his conversion was in 31; his first visit to Jerusalem (to see Peter), 34; his first letter to Corinth, 56. If, as is highly probable, he obtained the list during his visit to S. Peter, then he had had it in his possession for twenty-two years, and it was compiled before the year 34; that is within three years of the Resurrection itself. So early a formation of the list is not at all unlikely; for it would naturally arise in mission preaching. The Resurrection must have been challenged from the very first. Even apart from the Petrine sermons in the Acts, it is self-evident that the Resurrection must have been the fundamental theme of the apostolic deliverances. Without it they could not conceivably gain attention to the assertion that one condemned and crucified was nevertheless the Christ. A summary, therefore, of the principal witnesses becomes one of the first requirements of the Christian Church.

8. The next inquiry concerns the *unity* of the passage. Did S. Paul receive the whole contents as a tradition? Certainly not the record of the Appearance to himself. Nor the description of the greater part of the 500 surviving. But whether the remainder, that is the five Appearances, is all part of the original tradition has been, and still is, disputed. On the one hand the construction of the passage is such that S. Paul does not actually assert that the entire list has been transmitted to him. "I delivered unto you first of all... that He appeared to Cephas; then to the Twelve." At this point comes a break. The words, "then He appeared to above five hundred brethren at once" (etc.), either begins a second list, or continues the old tradition. We cannot, some think, be certain whether S. Paul found

these later statements in the list, or himself appended them. On the other hand, the implied idea, although not the construction of the sentence, would seem to be that S. Paul is here appealing to the common tradition. And it seems unlikely that that tradition should only consist after all of two witnesses out of five. Moreover S. Paul distinctly asserts the identity of his statement with that of the senior apostles: "Whether it were I or they, so we preach, and so ye believe." This claim would seem to preclude the notion that S. Paul had added two-thirds of the list on his own authority. That he should add his own experience seems natural. It seems probable that all the other testimony is what he has received. It may be easy to lay too much stress on the break in the construction of the sentence. This is not so unusual in S. Paul. Or is it possible that the break in construction is intended to separate the Appearances on the Third Day from those at a later date?

That S. Luke only mentions, in addition to the Emmaus story, the Appearances to S. Peter and to the Eleven, is no real reason for inferring that the remainder of S. Paul's list formed no part of the ordinary catechetical instruction.[1] No doubt S. Luke would be familiar with S. Paul's list, but so he was also with the conclusion of S. Mark's Gospel, and yet, so critics tell us, he did not follow it.

II

From these general considerations on the list of witnesses we may advance to the doctrine of the passage.

1. The definite contents of the tradition which S. Paul delivered to the Corinthians are: Christ's Death and Burial and Resurrection.

The Christian message is formulated as follows: It was (*a*) received by S. Paul as the apostolic tradition; and (*b*) transmitted by him to the Corinthians[2] as of fundamental importance (first of all).

The substance of the message is threefold. (1) The death of Christ, as redemptive, and in accordance with

[1] Cf. Cornely.

[2] See Meyer, *in loc.*, and Heinrici.

Scripture. (2) The Burial of Christ. (3) The Resurrection, also in accordance with Scripture.

S. Paul further declares that his own proclamation on these matters is identical with those of the elder apostles. (verse 11).

Died—was buried—hath been raised—and appeared. It does not say that He appeared the third day; but it does say He was raised the third day. The implication is that He was known to have risen the third day because that was the day on which He appeared.

2. Both the Death and the Resurrection are here connected with the ancient Scriptures. Of the former it is said, that "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures"; of the latter, that "He hath been raised on the Third Day according to the Scriptures." Thus, the religious value of Jesus' death is described as an inference from Scripture. Is it meant, the question has been asked, that the Resurrection on the Third Day is similarly a Scriptural inference? But surely we have no right to say that the value of Christ's death was simply determined for the early Christians by the Old Testament. Its value was determined by the Resurrection. It was also confirmed by the Scripture. But the religious value could not be founded on the Scripture in the absence of the Resurrection. Similarly, the Resurrection on the Third Day is, as the subsequent list of Appearances suggests, primarily an apostolic testimony, and subordinately a Scriptural suggestion. Indeed the difficulty of ascertaining any evidence from the Old Testament upon which to base the Resurrection of the Messiah on the Third Day, of itself disposes critics to admit that the Third Day must rest upon some other foundation, and that the connection with prophecy was an afterthought.[1]

Moreover, S. Paul is here delivering a tradition: "I delivered unto you that which I also received." What he says of the Resurrection is not a Scriptural exposition, but a tradition from the witnesses; Scripture may confirm the tradition, but did not create it.[2]

Undoubtedly this relation of the Death and Resurrection

[1] K. Lake, p. 30. [2] Cf. Loofs, p. 10.

of Christ to the ancient Scriptures involves large principles as to the religious development of mankind. If Israel was providentially entrusted with certain religious conceptions which find their complete realisation in Christianity, it would be natural that hints, at least, of Redemption and Resurrection should occur in the sacred writings. It ought to be quite obvious that such hints can only be employed as an argument against the historic occurrences by those who maintain a rationalistic theory of Christian origins.

3. The mention of the Third Day can never be rightly considered as a bare inference from Scripture statements. The early date at which this tradition was produced is alone decisive of this point. A list published within three years of the event could scarcely invent the date and impose it on the tradition. It has been truly said that this mention of the Third Day suggests chronological security, and establishes a historical reality. It also leads us naturally to the list of the Appearances which confirm the same reality in another aspect.[1]

III

Our third division of this analysis is concerned with the witnesses.

1. And first as to *their order.* This is undoubtedly *chronological.* It is not said that the first Appearance among the apostles was to S. Peter; but he is mentioned first. And that the following Appearances are in order of time is shown by the language—"*then* to the Twelve; *then* he appeared to above 500 ... *then* ... to James; *then* to all the apostles." Compare verse 23—"each in his own order: Christ the *first fruits*; *then* they that are Christ's at His coming. *Then* cometh the end." S. Augustine indeed suggests that the reason why S. Paul does not say "He was seen first of Kephas" is because it would be inconsistent with the fact that our Lord appeared first to the women.[2] But whether S. Paul knew of the Appearance to the women we cannot tell.

2. Next, the *number* of the Appearances.

[1] Bachmann, p. 435.

[2] 'De Consensu Evv.' iii. 71 and 85.

It is remarkable that while S. Matthew only records two Appearances (that to the women and that to the Eleven), and S. Luke three (that to Peter, that to the two disciples, and that to the Eleven), and even S. John, including the Appendix, only four: St. Paul's summary gives five Appearances to the senior apostles besides that to himself.[1] And yet S. Paul's list is by many years the earlier. We remind ourselves that it was probably composed between 31 and 34; if we are correct in assuming the unity of the list. In any case a list, recorded at least some twenty years before the earliest of the Gospels, is more extensive than any of the later narratives. This is suggestive of later restraint.

3. Then again the list is evidently *official*. The character of the witnesses is that they are the apostolic representatives of the community. Is it fanciful to see a connection with S. Peter's idea of an apostle as fundamentally a witness of the Resurrection? We may safely say that the apostles were included within the 500. If so, the evidence is in every case official. This, in itself, would explain the omission of the women. They were not constituted official representatives of the community. Accordingly, S. John, who gives the Appearance to S. Mary Magdalene, does not include her in the enumeration.[2] It is, of course, quite possible that S. Paul had never heard of S. Mary Magdalene. But S. Peter would require no introduction to the Corinthian Church, or indeed anywhere in Christendom; but more especially when the claim "I am of Kephas" had been unduly emphatic.

And S. James, the Lord's brother, head of the Church at Jerusalem, stood in every way personally and officially, as one of the greatest authorities in Christendom.

An official record of the Mother Church would naturally make much of the testimony of S. Peter and S. James.

4. As to the *locality* where these five Appearances occurred, there is nothing in the list to help us. It is the record of the community at Jerusalem, but not necessarily of experiences happening exclusively there. That Jerusalem should be one of the localities is a natural suggestion for a

[1] Cf. Loofs. [2] Cf. S. John xxi. 14.

Jerusalem official record. But nothing can be said for certain, except that Galilæan experiences may quite naturally be included. The general belief is that the Appearance to the 500 happened there. This is the general belief, partly on the ground that the collection of so large a number of disciples would be easier in Galilee; but whatever be the probability of this suggestion, there is no certainty about it.[1] Beyschlag thinks that the Appearances to Peter and to the Twelve certainly, and apparently also that to all the apostles, are a Jerusalem series; while that to the 500 and more, and that to St. James are Galilæan; because our Lord had not probably so many disciples in Jerusalem, and S. James had his home in Galilee.[2]

IV

Next as to the five Appearances separately.

1. "He appeared to Cephas."

As S. Paul's list assigns to S. Peter the privilege of being the first apostle who received the Risen Lord, S. Luke's Gospel also does the same.

Whether the text in S. Luke be read in the ordinary form of an Appearance to the two disciples at Emmaus, and another separate Appearance to S. Peter;[3] or whether the text be read, as in Codex Bezæ, identifying the unnamed Emmaus disciple with S. Peter, in neither case is it conclusive that S. Paul did not know the Emmaus narrative. He may not have known of it. But the mention of S. Peter by himself is easily explicable from his official importance. If the ordinary reading of the text be accepted, is there anything in the narrative to show that the Appearance to S. Peter followed that at Emmaus? May it not have preceded?[4]

2. "Then to the Twelve." It is generally said that this was a technical phrase,[5] not designed to indicate the exact number present, but the body officially so-called. The official title of the apostolic body is still preserved, notwithstanding Judas' suicide: so that there was no need for the

[1] Cf. Bp. Chase in 'Camb. Theol. Essays,' p. 396.
[2] In 'Stud. und Krit.,' 1899, p. 529.
[3] S. Luke xxiv. 34.
[4] Resch, 'Paulinismus,' p. 366.
[5] *E.g.* Godet, *in loc.*

Vulgate correction, undecim. Nor is there any need to distinguish between the Appearance to the Ten, in the absence of S. Thomas, or to the Eleven a week later. Both these may well be included in the official designation of the Twelve. On the other hand, both the existing ending of S. Mark,[1] and S. Matthew,[2] and S. Luke,[3] speak of the Eleven disciples. S. John speaks of the Twelve, *e.g.* "Thomas, one of the Twelve."[4] S. Luke then agrees with S. Paul in setting together the Appearance to Peter and that to the apostolic body; but differs from S. Paul in calling them the Eleven (which, numerically, on that occasion, according to S. John, they were not) rather than the Twelve (which officially they were).

3. "Then He appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep."

Unless criticism is disposed to locate this Appearance in Jerusalem it ought never to have objected, against the five hundred, the one hundred and twenty of Acts i. 15. It seems almost certain that this Appearance must be located in Galilee. Is this the meeting anticipated in the promise that He would go before them into Galilee? If the gathering happened in the northern province no difficulty can exist from the numerical point of view. Our Lord may well have had a far greater number of adherents there. And certainly the manifestation to so large a number, in which the apostles must have been included, would place this occurrence in the front rank of the evidence.

Can this Appearance to the five hundred and more be identified with any Gospel narrative? This has been both affirmed and denied.

Its identity with the Appearance on a mountain in Galilee of S. Matthew (xxviii. 16-20) has been maintained by many. Bishop Chase holds that "though the identification of the two Appearances cannot be proved, there is much to be said in favour," "and nothing, so far as he can see, against the supposition."[5] Bishop Gore supports the identification.

[1] xvi. 14. [2] xxviii. 16. [3] xxiv. 33. [4] xx. 24.

[5] Bishop Chase, 'Cambridge Theological Essays,' p. 396-7. Resch thinks the identification "not impossible," 'Paulinismus,' p. 367.

On the other hand, among recent commentators on Corinthians, Cornely denies the identity, and Bachmann does the same.

We know too little, however, to feel quite secure. There are certainly difficulties. For while in S. Paul it is an appearance before more than five hundred persons; in S. Matthew we can only infer that any one was present besides the apostles from the sentence, "but some doubted." Moreover, S. Paul can appeal to more than five hundred who believed: S. Matthew admits the presence of some who doubted. But the appeal to five hundred believing, without acknowledging that some doubted, would perhaps be a scarcely accurate use of the evidence. The identification can probably never be more than a conjecture.[1]

The Appearance to the more than five hundred suggested to S. Paul the comment that the majority of these witnesses were still living when he incorporated the tradition in his Epistle. At the date of writing, the list was not a record of persons who could not be approached. The number of living witnesses was impressive. A German critic[2] has applied the methods of statistics to S. Paul's assertion, to ascertain whether "the greater part" of five hundred persons would on an average probably survive after such an interval. It does not appear that S. Paul's statement is disturbed by the calculations.

4. "Then He appeared to James." Considering the commonness of the name, the person here alluded to must have been a very distinguished individual. At the time when S. Paul was writing the one bearer of this name who stood out prominently in Christendom was James, the Lord's brother, head of the Church at Jerusalem. A special value attached to the testimony of S. James; owing to the fact that he was not one of the Twelve, and that the Lord's brethren, doubtless including S. James, were totally unable to realise the true character of Christ's personality and mission while He was on earth.[3] They habitually stood aloof, and occasionally even interfered. However, after the

[1] Bachmann rejects it. 1 Korintherbrief, p. 437 n. [2] Arnold Meyer.
[3] Cf. S. Mark iii. 21; S. John vii. 5.

Ascension, the historian groups together in the Christian community the apostles with the holy women, and the mother of the Lord, "and with His brethren." S. James in particular is found presiding over the Jerusalem Church within a few years of the Ascension; and there he continues during the whole course of the narrative. That which changed him from an opponent to a disciple is contained in the sentence "then He appeared to James." The whole history of a spiritual conflict and of an intellectual conversion lies behind these words. And if the history is not revealed to us, we may be certain it was known to the writer of this sentence. The facts were easily ascertainable by his contemporaries; and his long tenure of office in Jerusalem carried his living witness down to a still later generation.

S. Paul undoubtedly derived this information direct from S. James himself during the fortnight's visit to Jerusalem (Gal. i. 18). "It is surely impossible to doubt that during the fortnight spent at Jerusalem he received from those two primary witnesses Kephas and James, whom alone he mentions by name among those who had seen the Lord, the facts which he records as to the Resurrection itself."[1] There is quite especial significance in the testimony which S. Paul heard from S. James as to our Lord's Resurrection. James, as the brother of the Lord and as head of the Jerusalem Mother-Church, had for foreign Churches an authority not inferior to that of the Twelve. Moreover his testimony had especial value from the circumstances of his previous unbelief; while the deep sanctity of his character profoundly impressed his contemporaries.

The Appearance to S. James is mentioned here only in the N.T. There is, however, an extra-canonical account of it in the fragment of the Gospel of the Hebrews given by S. Jerome.[2] If the chronological order is observed and if the Appearance to the five hundred took place in Galilee, it would seem clear that the Appearance to S. James did not occur on Easter Day. Would it not naturally belong to Galilee?

[1] 'Cambridge Theol. Essays,' p. 392. [2] De Vir. Illust. 2.

5. "Then to all the apostles." The title apostle is here used in its wider meaning. "S. Paul never confines the term ἀπόστολοι to the Twelve (although this restricted meaning appears elsewhere in the N.T.), and he here distinguishes clearly an Appearance to Twelve from an Appearance to the apostles. The manifestations in this list being set down in chronological order, it is not fanciful to identify the incident to which S. Paul refers here with the manifestation of Christ before the Ascension."[1]

The Appearance to all the apostles is considered by some identical with that in the Acts which terminated in the Ascension.

6. It remains to compare the Appearance to S. Paul with those to the earlier apostles. It is clear that S. Paul considered the nature of his experience to be identical in character with the experience of the other apostles. Now this is a fact which it is obviously possible to utilise in opposite ways. Either it will be said that S. Paul's theology and the accounts of his conversion show that anything like material solidity of the Appearance at Damascus is incredible: and therefore it will be inferred that the Appearances to the earlier apostles must have been correspondingly shadowy and unsubstantial. Or else it will be possible to invert the argument, and to urge that since the Appearances to the earlier apostles were evidently of a solid and tangible nature, that to S. Paul near Damascus must have been of a similar kind.

No adequate answer to this can be given without a full discussion of S. Paul's conception of the Risen Body. But we do not believe the accounts of his conversion exclude the idea that S. Paul "saw anything of the nature of a material form."[2] Bachmann argues that the term "He appeared" (ὤφθη) can only signify actual assurance of bodily Resurrection.[3]

And finally it is important to note that S. Paul's list does not contain a single testimony to the actual Resurrection

[1] 'Church Q. Review,' Jan., 1906, p. 330. [2] K. Lake, p. 34.
[3] Bachmann, 1 Korintherbrief, p. 437.

from the grave. It is exclusively testimony to Appearances which took place after He was risen. Like the evangelists, S. Paul's list does not suggest that any human eye beheld Jesus rise. It was left for an Apocryphal Gospel to invent such a scene.[1]

[1] Cf. 'Cambridge Theological Essays,' p. 332.

CHAPTER IX

THE PERSONAL TESTIMONY OF S. PAUL TO CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

(*The Documents*)

WE now approach the most important because the most direct of all the evidence to the Resurrection. S. Paul has given us not only the list of the witness of other men: he adds his personal experience.

I

Before we come to the testimony of his own letters we must take the record of the historian. Of the three accounts of S. Paul's conversion which S. Luke has given in the Acts, the first is the historian's own narrative in the course of the events; the second is the report of a speech delivered by S. Paul in Hebrew (Acts xxi. 40) to the Jewish throng on the ascent to the Pretorium; the third is the report of another speech delivered by S. Paul in Greek (as is evident from Acts xxvi. 14: I heard a voice speaking unto me and saying in the Hebrew tongue) before his accusers.

1. The first account is connected by the historian with S. Stephen's death, at which S. Paul was present. Upon the martyrdom follow two results: the dispersion of believers, and the persecuting activity of Saul.[1] The latter is traced along the road toward Damascus. Then follow in order, suddenly the light from heaven, the fall to the ground, the heavenly voice, S. Paul's question and the reply, the

[1] Acts vii. 58; viii. 3, 4-40.

injunction to go into the city where his duty will be told him. The companions of S. Paul's journey are described as standing speechless, hearing the voice, but beholding no man. This last statement implies that S. Paul himself beheld our Lord;[1] an implication confirmed by the subsequent announcement of S. Barnabas to the Church at Jerusalem, that S. Paul "had seen the Lord in the way."[2] Upon this follows the mission of Ananias, and the baptism of S. Paul in Damascus.

2. The second account[3] is the speech, delivered in Aramaic, to the Jewish throng. Here, after a few details as to his antecedents, education, and zeal for Judaism, S. Paul describes how, on his persecuting mission, as he drew near to Damascus, about noon, suddenly there shone from heaven a great light. He fell to the ground, the voice, the words, are as in the first account; except that here S. Paul asks, "What shall I do, Lord?" The effect upon his companions is differently worded; "they that were with me beheld indeed the light, but they heard not the voice of Him that spake to me." The sending of Ananias is also described as in the first account; but his message to S. Paul is much fuller, including the announcement of a mission to the world, and an injunction to be baptised. It is important that S. Paul is represented in this speech as giving a much fuller account of Ananias' words than the historian himself records. The speech concludes with a reference to a vision experienced in Jerusalem, which is clearly distinguished as differing in kind from his experience at his conversion.[4]

3. The third account of the conversion is that given by S. Paul before Festus and Agrippa, evidently delivered in Greek.[5] Here he describes his Pharisaic training; and appeals to Agrippa to explain why a Jew should judge Resurrection incredible. He explains his own former antipathy to Christianity, and describes his treatment of Christians: how he voted for their death, strove to make them blaspheme against Jesus Christ and was "exceedingly mad against them." Then comes the Damascus journey, the light from heaven at mid-day, "above the

[1] Goguel. [2] Acts ix. 27. [3] *Ib.* xxii. [4] *Ib.* 17 ff. [5] *Ib.* xxvi.

brightness of the sun," experienced not only by himself, but also by his companions. Not only he but they also fell to the earth. The vision is described as his own experience. It is not said whether his companions heard it or not. It addressed him in the Hebrew language. The proverbial expression "it is hard for thee to kick against the goad" is recorded here only in the three accounts. But the sending of Ananias, mentioned in the first and second accounts, is altogether omitted here; and the words there ascribed to him are here ascribed to Christ, and are given in a form more matured, while nothing is said of S. Paul being baptised. Here only S. Paul adds that he was not disobedient to the heavenly vision. His speech continues with a brief account of his Gospel: that, in accordance with the Old Testament predictions, he announced "how that the Christ must suffer, and how that He first by the resurrection of the dead should proclaim light both to the people and to the Gentiles." At this point Festus interrupted him.

It is memorable that on neither occasion was S. Paul allowed to bring his speech to a natural end.

Possessing three accounts of the same event criticism naturally desires to know in what manner they are related.

There is a closer similarity between the first and second accounts than between any other two.[1] In both the first and second the manifestation is said to have come suddenly; (ix. 3; xxii. 6): in both the blinded convert is described as "led by the hand" (ix. 8; xxii. 11); in both the incident of Ananias is related (ix. 10 ff.; xxii. 12 ff.); in both S. Paul's baptism is told. In the first the historian connects the conversion with S. Stephen's death; in the second S. Paul himself mentions the same: while in the third account Ananias disappears and S. Stephen is not named.

1. The variations in detail in the three accounts have been forcibly indicated by many critics:[2] the only question is, admitting their existence, what is the reasonable inference to be drawn from them? The principal variations are:

(1) The effect of the Appearance upon S. Paul's companions. In the first account they are described as "hearing

[1] Cf. Goguel, p. 47. [2] *E.g.* Baur, Zeller, Pfleiderer.

the voice,[1] [ἀκούοντες μὲν τῆς φωνῆς] but beholding no man."[2] In the second S. Paul says "I . . . heard a voice saying unto me [ἤκουσα φωνῆς λεγούσης μοι] Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?" while of his companions S. Paul says they "beheld indeed the light, but they heard not the voice of Him that spake to me" [τὴν δὲ φωνὴν οὐκ ἤκουσαν τοῦ λαλοῦντός μοι].[3] They heard the voice: they heard not the voice. This is sometimes harmonised by the distinction observed by the historian between hearing the sound [ἀκούειν τῆς φωνῆς] and hearing the message conveyed [ἀκούειν τὴν φωνήν]. In the third account S. Paul says "I heard a voice [ἤκουσα φωνὴν][4] saying unto me . . . Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me?" Zeller's criticism on attempts to harmonise these is: "ἀκούειν is supposed to mean in ix. 'hearing'; in xxii. 'understanding'; whereas in ix. it is said ἀκούοντες τῆς φωνῆς, which in case of need might mean understanding the voice; on the contrary xxii., τὴν φωνὴν οὐκ ἤκουσαν which it is impossible to translate except as, they did not *hear*."[5] The real point however is, supposing a contradiction to exist, what is its bearing on the main issue of the narrative?

(2) The second variation is in the account of Ananias. In the first account Saul is bidden to arise and go into the city where it shall be told him what he must do. So also in the second account. The instruction is then left to be given by Ananias. But in the third account the instruction is given by the Lord Himself, and no mention is made of Ananias. The German classical scholar Blass[6] considers that the historic order is maintained in the first and second accounts: for S. Paul's astonishment would naturally suggest that expositions of his mission were given at a later time, and by other persons. But whatever may be thought of Blass' view, we may well agree with his conclusion that it really matters very little whether Ananias actually said these words, or whether they came to S. Paul another way. They do not affect the main issue. The whole incident of Ananias is separable from the main event, and is indeed omitted by

[1] R. V. Margin, *sound*. [2] Acts ix. [3] *Ib.* xxii. 9.
[4] *Ib.* xxvi. 14. [5] Zeller on Acts, i. 286. [6] 'Acta Apostolorum.'

S. Paul in the third account. At the same time this separability of the Ananias incident does not invalidate its historic character, or render it in the least degree uncertain. Although it is no part of the main event, in the sense that the Appearance of the glorified Christ was in itself complete, yet it cannot be omitted without detriment to the social aspect of religion. It has indeed been insinuated that the Ananias incident was invented to keep up appearances, and to prevent the excessive isolation of S. Paul from the older community. But this is a criticism which has no solid basis.

If S. Paul held, as many critics think, that the community rather than the individual is the subject of Justification,[1] then clearly his own conversion could only be completed by his incorporation into the Body of Christ. The work of Ananias for the converted Saul is but the social correlative to the individual experience. But yet, of course, whether both sides of his religion should always be mentioned whenever he told the story of his conversion is another matter.

Moreover, the work of Ananias, as representing the Christian community, gives exactly the necessary balance to S. Paul's isolated individuality: because it supports and confirms his personal experience by the tradition of the Church, and by its knowledge of the earthly ministry of our Lord.

(3) The variations as to the mention of S. Paul's mission to others are certainly curious. In the first account the mission of S. Paul is mentioned by our Lord in a dream to Ananias;[2] but not by Ananias, nor by our Lord, to S. Paul himself. In the second account Ananias makes the announcement to S. Paul.[3] In the third account[4] our Lord Himself imposes the mission upon S. Paul. Whichever of these three forms be regarded as closest to the original occurrence, it is clear that, in any case, S. Paul considered his Apostleship a direct commission from our Lord. It is not unnatural that many critics attach the highest value to the last account.[5]

Sabatier's judgment on these divergencies commends itself for its sobriety. Their explanation lies in their insignifi-

[1] Cf. Sanday and H., 'Romans.' [2] Acts ix. 15. [3] *Ib.* xxii. 15.
[4] *Ib.* xxvi. 16, 17. [5] Cf. Feine, 'N.T. Theol.' p. 261.

cance,[1] says Sabatier. They do not really affect the reality of the fact. They belong to the circumference of the narrative. They are concerned rather with the subjective impression which the fact is said to have made upon the bystanders than with anything else. And the report of these impressions on S. Paul's companions may easily have varied, because the impressions themselves may well have varied also. If there be any relationship between revelation and receptiveness, if apprehension varies from man to man, then these external differences, these diversities on the fringe of the central fact, are primarily what a true psychology would lead us to expect. So far from undermining the central assertion, they rather confirm it.

"The verbal agreements," says a critic, "are so close that the interdependence of the three is assumed by most scholars. The account in chap. xxvi. is the simplest of the three, and bears marks of originality over against the others; and as it occurs in a setting whose vividness and verisimilitude are unsurpassed, it is altogether likely that the author found it in his sources, and that it constituted the original upon which, with the help of oral tradition, he wrote the other accounts."[2]

It has been observed that "from a literary point of view the writer of the Acts is singularly bold in giving, within the brief compass of his book, three accounts of the conversion, two of them forming parts of the speeches of S. Paul. To tell and to re-tell a tale for the sake of doing so—that is, that it may be presented from different points of view—is a literary device on which none can venture but a writer conscious of great dramatic power. And no one will maintain that the repetition of this episode in the Acts is the *tour de force* of a consummate artist. Nor, again, does the supposition that the author wished to utilise the versions of the history given in different documents, even if on general grounds we accepted this account of his sources of information, explain the repetition. The fitness of the three accounts to the several occasions is a sufficient

[1] Sabatier, 'L'Apôtre P.' p. 42.

[2] McGiffert, 'Hist. Christianity Apost. Age,' p. 120.

refutation of the theory which regards them as excerpts from different writings. The simplest explanation is, I believe, confirmed by repeated study of these three chapters of the Acts. In the proper place in the Book S. Luke gives the circumstantial account; which he had received, perhaps, for the purpose of the history, from S. Paul himself. In the later chapters he reproduces his remembrances, aided doubtless by his own written memoranda."[1]

Bishop Chase urges that "the variations between different accounts contained in a single book are *pro tanto* the sign of a truthful record. The writer at least has not forced his materials into harmony. The really important divergences in this case are explained by the difference between a circumstantial narrative and a rhetorical appeal."[2]

It is hopeful to find one of the most recent critical writers fully recognising the relative unimportance of the variations; and speaking of the three accounts as "containing slightly varying details"; while "yet in the essential point there is the same impression throughout."[3]

A passage in the records of S. Paul's conversion much criticised of late is the verse in the third report: "I heard a voice saying unto me in the Hebrew language, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou Me? It is hard for thee to kick against the goad."[4] Some critics declare that the proverb is a Greek but not a Hebrew expression.[5] Clemen even thinks that the proverb was suppressed in the first and second accounts as being unintelligible to Hebrews. This does not explain why it was left in the third account.

There is an interesting note of Bengel on the passage. "Syriacum adagium notat Lightfoot."[6] This is only what we should expect. It would be strange if an agricultural people had no knowledge of such a proverb. An ox goad[7]

[1] Chase, 'Credibility of Acts,' p. 69. [2] *Ib.* p. 70.

[3] Weinel, 'S. Paul,' p. 77, 1906. [4] Acts xxvi. 14.

[5] Blass questions it; Arnold Meyer boldly rejects it.

[6] On Acts ix. 5. Lightfoot observes that the proverb would be, in Syriac, קשא הו לך למבעטו לועקסא. It is well known that בעט signifies to kick, cf. Deut. xxxii. 15, and 1 Sam. ii. 29. J. Lightfoot, 'Exercitations on Acts.' Works, Vol. viii. 431. Pitman's Edition, 1823.

[7] מַלְמָד.

is mentioned in the Hebrew Scripture (Judges iii. 31). It occurs again in Ecclus. xxxviii. 25 "How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough, and that glorieth in the goad, that driveth oxen . . . ." It was not a very large step from this to a proverbial utterance. And whether the use of it elsewhere among the Hebrews were discoverable or not, at any rate it could not be unintelligible to them.

Even if the Hebrew proverbial phrases contained no such expression, it is of course possible that S. Paul, who in the speech specially notes that the communication was made to him in the Hebrew tongue, is giving a Greek equivalent for the actual phrases of the voice from heaven. After all, does the message from heaven consist in the words or in the idea?

At any rate, this proverb stands in the third account, which is theologically the most mature.[1]

The saying, "it is hard for thee to kick against the goad," does not imply that S. Paul had suffered from misgivings,[2] still less that he consciously opposed the will of God. The ox which resents the goad has no misgivings as to the superiority of the course which it desires to pursue. S. Paul, like the ox, was resisting the better way; he, like the ox, did not know it to be the better way. That this interpretation is correct is confirmed by the whole drift of the Lucan narratives and by S. Paul's distinct assertions in his letters. His self-judgment was that he "did it ignorantly in unbelief." And the large majority of modern interpreters agree with this.[3]

The Lucan narratives leave no uncertainty as to S. Paul's psychological condition. The change is sudden, and wholly unexpected.[4] S. Paul has no idea who the heavenly Person manifested can be. The question, "Why persecutest thou Me?" has not rebuked an uneasy conscience already filled with grave suspicions. The heavenly Person is compelled to assert His identity with Jesus of Nazareth before S. Paul can understand. Moreover, the effect of the announcement

[1] Cf. Goguel, p. 51.
[2] Pfleiderer, 'Die Entstehung des Christenthums,' p. 135. 1905.
[3] Cf. Feine, 'Th. N.T.,' p. 262. [4] Acts ix. 3, xxii. 6.

is to leave him "trembling and astonished."[1] Thus the whole experience finds him unprepared. No single sentence can be fairly interpreted to contradict the general evidence of the narratives that the conversion was not the outcome of misgivings but wholly unexpected. "I verily thought within myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth:"[2] "it was my deliberate and conscientious conviction."[3]

2. Beyond the differences in these three accounts of S. Paul's conversion there are certain main statements in which their agreement is complete. The accounts agree that S. Paul fully approved the extermination of Christians;[4] that he did not find in the Holy City sufficient scope for his persecuting zeal, and therefore extended his efforts to other places;[5] that this was the outcome of his devotion to the law, without a shadow of a doubt or hesitation; that on the way to Damascus he believed himself to have heard the voice of the glorified Jesus;[6] that so far from anticipating the vision, he did not know who the speaker was, until it was explained to him;[7] in every passage S. Paul asks "Who art thou, Lord?"

The whole impression of the incident in the three narratives of the Acts is, suddenness, unexpectedness, objectivity, convincingness. Now, S. Luke was S. Paul's companion. It cannot be that this impression does not reflect S. Paul's own belief.[8]

The historian of S. Paul's conversion is perfectly clear in his view of the objective nature of the Appearance near Damascus. He reports a number of dreams and visions, but distinguishes them with remarkable clearness from this experience of S. Paul. And we can scarcely forget that as a physician S. Luke was necessarily a student of mental

[1] Acts ix. 6. [2] Acts xxvi. 9. [3] Stevens, 'Pauline Theology,' p. 17.

[4] Acts viii. 1, xxii. 4, xxvi. 10. [5] Acts ix. 1, xxii. 5, xxvi. 11.

[6] Acts ix. 4, xxii. 7, xxvi. 14. [7] Acts ix. 5, xxii. 8, xxvi. 15.

[8] On the three accounts in Acts of S. Paul's conversion see Blass, 'Acta Apostolorum'; Chase, 'Credibility'; Knowling, 'Testimony of S. Paul'; Wendt, 'Apostelgeschichte (1899); Clemen, 'Paulus'; Goguel, 'L'Apôtre Paul et Jésus-Christ' (1904).

states. He is well aware that there is an indefinable borderland in which the patient cannot distinguish accurately, at the time at least, between objective reality and subjective imagination. He could report of S. Peter an occasion when "he wist not that it was true what was done by the angel, but thought he saw a vision."[1] The objective nature of the Appearance was proved by the actual experience of escape from the prison. But there is no reason to suppose that S. Luke considered that S. Peter's vision when "he fell into a trance" and beheld "the heavens opened, and a certain vessel descending, as it were a great sheet let down by four corners upon the earth,"[2] was anything else than a subjective experience or a dream. Peter is represented as "much perplexed in himself what the vision which he had seen might mean."[3] "In a trance," he says, "I saw a vision."[4]

With similar care and penetration S. Luke evidently distinguishes between S. Stephen's vision of Christ, and Christ's appearance to S. Paul outside Damascus. The latter is clearly thought as external in a way that the former is not. No suggestion of impressions shared by bystanders occurs in S. Stephen's vision. So when S. Luke records of S. Paul that the "night following, the Lord stood by him, and said, be of good cheer,"[5] this again is clearly an example of a dream; not of an outward manifestation like the Damascus experience.

II

From the historian's report we pass to S. Paul's own letters. It must be owned that what we find is at first disappointing. In all the apostle's courageous self-revealing it is strange that he has not given us any account of his own conversion. That it must have held a frequent place in his mission preaching seems certain.

1. Its absence from the Epistles to the Corinthians seems only accountable on the supposition that they had heard it already from his own lips. It would have been so natural to introduce it in his great instruction on the

[1] Acts xii. 9. [2] Acts x. 11. [3] Acts x. 17.
[4] Acts xi. 5. [5] Acts xxiii. 11.

Resurrection. Introduce it, of course, he does: but only in the brief sentence, "Last of all He appeared to me also." It is really on reflection very striking to observe how S. Paul here subordinates his personal experience to the witness of the elder apostles; how clearly he sees things in proportion, and sets his own evidence in its historic place after theirs. There is nothing obtrusive or self-assertive. Only, behind this brief mention must lie his converts' familiarity with the facts.

2. Another reference is in the words "Am I not an apostle? have I not seen Jesus our Lord?"[1] It may be considered practically certain that whether S. Paul had seen Jesus during the ministry or not, that is not the experience contemplated here.[2] The appeal is certainly to a seeing in which the apostleship was conferred upon him.[3] The occasion must be the hour of his conversion. And the importance of this is considerable. It has been questioned whether the Acts describes S. Paul as seeing a visible manifestation of our Lord. That he saw a splendour of light, that he heard a voice, are both asserted. But that he saw a person can only be inferred indirectly from the experience of his companions who are described as "hearing the voice, but beholding no man" (Acts ix. 7).[4]

However, that this indirect inference is correct is clear from the passage under consideration: "Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?" And it is deeply significant that this "seeing" Jesus is to S. Paul the ground of his apostolic mission. It was a "seeing" as real and as objective as any seeing experienced by Peter and the other apostles. S. Paul has been as directly commissioned by our Lord in person as any other apostle. All this throws great light on S. Paul's conviction of the objective character of the Damascus Appearance of Christ.

3. There is a third reference in the Galatians, where the peculiar method of his reception of the Gospel is explained. "I make known to you, brethren, as touching the Gospel which was preached by me, that it is not after man. For

[1] 1 Cor. ix. 1.
[2] So Pfleiderer, 'Urchristentum,' i. 60.
[3] Sabatier, 'L'Apôtre P.,' p. 45.
[4] See p. 141.

neither did I receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but it came to me through revelation of Jesus Christ."[1]

S. Paul affirms that his doctrine is not "after man" (*κατὰ ἄνθρωπον*); not of merely human character. And the reason is that it is not of merely human origin. He did not receive it from man (*παρὰ ἀνθρώπου*). It came to him direct from the highest of sources, "through revelation of Jesus Christ." And to explain the circumstances under which he received it, S. Paul gives the Galatians a brief autobiographical account, describing his intellectual and religious condition at the period when this revelation came. "For ye have heard of my manner of life in time past in the Jews' religion; how that beyond measure I persecuted the Church of God, and made havock of it: and I advanced in the Jews' religion beyond many of mine own age among my countrymen, being more exceedingly zealous for the traditions of my fathers."[2]

S. Paul represents himself as surpassing his Jewish contemporaries in devotion to Judaism. His whole heart and energies were concentrated in loyal adherence to the traditions of his fathers. His view of the Church was that its suppression was a sacred duty. He opposed it with all his force, and was most successful in his destructive labours.

There is not the shadow of a hint that doubt or misgiving as to the nature of the Church, or the rectitude of his persecuting zeal, ever disturbed his mind during that critical period. On the contrary, the picture which he has drawn represents an undivided purpose, enthusiam for the one religion manifested in suppression of the other. Without hesitation, without uncertainty, he acts just as a man would act if convinced of the truth of Israel and the falsity of Christianity. "But," he continues, "when it was the good pleasure of God, Who... called me through His grace, to reveal His Son in me... I conferred not with flesh and blood."

The implication obviously is that he was absorbed in his activities against the Church until the hour of his conversion. The change from the one religion to the other was clearly abrupt. The notion of a long period of suspense and

[1] Gal. i. 11, 12. [2] Gal. i. 13, 14.

intellectual struggle, terminating ultimately in exchange of faith, is absolutely foreign to S. Paul's self-consciousness. His conversion was unforeseen; by himself above all. It was an act of God. The Divine grace which originally set him in the confines of Israel now transferred him to the Christian Church. The general drift of the passage conveys the idea of receptivity on the part of S. Paul, and action on the part of God. His conversion is the work of force exerted from without and from above.

That the reference is to his conversion is clear, and is indirectly confirmed by the closing words of the section: "And again I returned to Damascus." Thus S. Paul identifies the experience with a definite locality; one, moreover, which had not been previously mentioned in the letter. This casual allusion to Damascus suggests that the Galatians were familiar with the facts of S. Paul's conversion, and could fill in the details for themselves.

This Galatian passage includes indeed the statement, "When it was the good pleasure of God ... *to* reveal His Son *in* me"; and critics have at times inferred that the revelation to S. Paul was therefore purely inward and subjective.

Certainly S. Paul here asserts the inward character of the revelation of Christ. We ought not to explain "*in* me" as if it was "*to* me." The Damascus experience was an illumination within the innermost depths of his being. It would be indeed difficult to exaggerate the vastness of this inward revelation. But this inward character of Christ's revelation to S. Paul does not contradict the outward reality of the Appearances. Outward and inward revelations are correlative not contradictory. It was the outward which created the inward. The objective reality explains the subjective impression. The outward revelation was the condition of the inward; essential to it, yet valueless without it. The outer revelation separated from the inward would have left S. Paul much in the same spiritual state as the companions of his journey. But this does not mean that the revelation within can dispense with the appeal from without. It is gratifying to note that certain critics of the

negative school acknowledge that S. Paul's expression in this place "by no means necessarily contradicts the external character of the Appearances."[1] "It would be a serious mistake to infer from the passage," says another,[2] "that the Appearances of the Risen Christ constituted merely a psychological and subjective phenomenon."

So explained, the words "to reveal His Son *in* me," agree with the entire drift of the passage.

Indeed this Galatian passage ought never to have been adduced as if it emphasised inward reflection to the exclusion of outward revelation. Perception, as Mill pointed out long ago, consists in observation and inference. "In almost every act of our perceiving faculties, observation and inference are intimately blended. What we are said to observe is usually a compound result of which one-tenth may be observation and the remaining nine-tenths inference."[3]

S. Paul's Gospel was partly *revelation*, partly *reflection* on the same. The revelation was that Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ. This revelation was the experience at his conversion. But it does not follow that the entire system of his teaching was also at the same time reached. That was a matter of reflection.[4]

4. To these may be added a later utterance from the Pastoral Epistles where the apostle humbly expresses his thankfulness at having been allowed to work for Christ. "I thank Him that enabled me, even Christ Jesus our Lord, for that He counted me faithful, appointing me to His service; though I was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious: howbeit I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief."[5] Here the one extenuating feature in his opposition to the Church is that it was conscientious. Could S. Paul have written the words, "I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief," if he had been torn by dreadful doubts and divided in mind which religion was the true?

The sentiments of this passage harmonise completely

[1] Meyer, 'Auferstehung,' p. 186.
[2] Goguel, p. 82. Cf. Sabatier, p. 44.
[3] Mill's 'Logic,' ii. 182.
[4] Steven, 'Pauline Theol.,' 73.
[5] 1 Tim. i. 12-13.

with those ascribed to S. Paul in the third account of his conversion in the Acts. "I verily thought with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth."[1]

III

If the characteristics of S. Paul's conversion in the Acts and in his own Epistles be compared together, two considerations immediately strike us. The one is their general and substantial agreement; the other their complete independence. Certainly from whatever source the historian derived his narratives of the conversion, he could not have been much assisted by the fragmentary allusions of S. Paul's letters. Was S. Luke familiar with these letters? Sabatier thinks not. But even if he knew them, they could not tell him the details of the conversion. Yet the Epistles supplement what the Acts narrate. They confirm the general features of the conversion: its suddenness, its externality, the absence of misgiving and doubt, the inward illumination.

[1] Acts xxvi. 9.

CHAPTER X

NON-CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF S. PAUL'S CONVERSION

AT this point it may be advisable to recall in outline the history of non-Christian interpretation of the conversion of S. Paul.

1. It is natural to begin with Baur, the founder of the Tübingen critical school, whose influence was certainly second to none. Writing in 1845, Baur attacked the problem, Whether the appearance of Jesus to S. Paul is to be considered as an external or an internal occurrence?[1] Baur's main maxim is that S. Paul being the only witness for the objective reality of the Appearance, his testimony shows merely that he believed that he saw. But we cannot get beyond his subjective belief to an assurance of its objective reality. "However firmly the apostle may have believed that he saw the form of Jesus actually and, as it were, externally before him, his testimony extends merely to what he believed he saw."[2] What is certain is the apostle's belief that Jesus, after He had appeared to the apostles and the other believers, so at last had visibly manifested Himself to him. But if there is no certainty of the objective nature of the Appearance, is there any objective certainty about the words which S. Paul believed he heard spoken? To this question Baur replies that if we had only the first account in the Acts (ix.), which says that S. Paul's companions also heard the voice, we should answer in the affirmative; but since a later account (xxii. 9) says that they

[1] Baur, 'Paul,' i. 65. [2] *Ib.* p. 67.

did not hear it, our answer will not be on documentary but on psychological grounds. "Now," says Baur—passing from his assertion that the objective Appearance is critically uncertain to an assertion that it was certainly not objective—"there can be no doubt that, just as little as the Appearance of Jesus was a real and outward one, so little could the words which Paul thought he heard have been outwardly audible. As he believed that he saw Jesus without an outward visible objective form of Jesus being there, so he might believe that he heard words which were for him only and not for others, that is to say, not outwardly and objectively audible. This connection between seeing and hearing can be very well explained on psychological grounds."[1] Words, suggests Baur, what are they but the clothes of ideas? The imagined becomes the seen, and the seen becomes the heard. He then ventures on the further proposition that the historian's assertion that the Appearance had any effect on S. Paul's companions was a legendary inference from the experience of S. Paul. Since S. Paul himself was similarly affected, it was natural to suppose that an objective Appearance could not altogether be without effect on the companions of the person so affected.

In propounding this theory, Baur set aside the older rationalistic contention that a flash of lightning suddenly struck the apostle, and laid him and his companions senseless on the ground. This, says Baur decisively, "is really mere hypothesis; and as it not only has no foundation in the text, but is also in manifest contradiction with the meaning of the author, we shall make no further mention of it here."[2]

Baur's emphatic rejection of the rationalistic view undoubtedly, owing to his great influence, did much to render such theories obsolete.

It was the fortune of Baur to live sufficiently long to feel the hopeless inadequacy of his own subjective explanation of S. Paul's conversion. While in his earlier work[3] Baur wrote, "who can venture to say that such a change in the religious and spiritual life of the apostle may not have been developed

[1] Baur, 'Paul,' i. 67. [2] *Ib.* p. 68. [3] 1845.

from his inner life in a simply natural manner? or who will venture to make the assertion that even the most sudden transition from one extreme to another lies outside the pale of psychological possibility?"—in his later work[1] he wrote in a very different strain: "We cannot call his conversion, his sudden transformation from the most vehement opponent of Christianity into its boldest preacher, anything but a miracle; and the miracle appears all the greater when we remember that in this revulsion of his consciousness he broke through the barriers of Judaism, and ran out of the particularism of Judaism into the universal idea of Christianity. Yet, great as this miracle is, it can only be conceived as a spiritual process; and this implies that some step of transition was not wanting from the one extreme to the other. It is true that no analysis, either psychological or dialectical, can detect the inner secret of the act in which God revealed His Son in him."[2]

2. This last sentence of Baur created a perfect panic in the German critical circles. Did the head of the Tübingen school really mean to abandon the attempt to solve the problem of S. Paul's conversion? But to leave the problem unsolved was to leave an opening for the possible return of the supernatural. Accordingly many arose to achieve what Baur despaired of achieving. One of the ablest of these was Holsten, who wrote a very remarkable analysis, philosophical, psychological, critical, of the incident outside Damascus. It was far more searching and complete than the work of Baur. Taking Baur's admission of failure as his text, Holsten took refuge in Baur's earlier maxim that S. Paul's testimony is only proof of all he believed that he saw; and that we cannot pass from subjective certainty to objective reality. Then Holsten marshalled all the considerations of the apostle's temperament, education, contemporary notions, to support the theory of subjective vision.

Nevertheless Holsten admitted that S. Paul would not have accepted this explanation of his own experience. That S. Paul believed in the objective reality of his vision of Christ, is, says Holsten, indisputable. The critical problem

[1] 1853. [2] Baur, 'Ch. Hist. of the first three Centuries,' i. 47.

is whether S. Paul's own subjective belief was objectively true. Holsten also acknowledged that the Acts of the Apostles is fully aware of the distinction, indeed sharply distinguishes,[1] between physical and visionary reality: and while it considers all the later appearances of Christ to S. Paul as merely visions, it considers the appearance outside Damascus not as visionary but as physical reality.

3. The theories of Baur and Holsten were criticised again and rejected by the great expositor Meyer, on the ground of their complete departure from the data of the New Testament.

"*The conversion of Saul*," says Meyer, "does *not* appear (on an accurate consideration of the three narratives, which agree in the main points), *to have had the way psychologically prepared for it by scruples of conscience as to his persecuting proceedings.* On the contrary, Luke represents it in the history at one passage and Paul himself in his speeches[2] as in direct and immediate *contrast* to his vehement persecuting zeal, amidst which he was *all of a sudden* intellectually arrested by the miraculous fact from without....

"Moreover, previous scruples and increased struggles are *a priori* in the case of a character so pure (at this time only erring), firm, and ardently devoted as he also afterwards continued to be, extremely improbable: he saw in the destruction of the Christian Church only a fulfilment of duty and a meritorious service for the glory of Jehovah.[3]

Meyer further affirms that the critical school of Baur started from the postulates of pantheistic rationalism, and the negation of a miracle.

"In consequence of this, indeed, they cannot prove the conversion of Paul otherwise than under the notion of an immanent process of his individual mental life."[4]

4. After the criticisms of Baur and Holsten came the negative labours of Strauss.

Strauss's view of S. Paul's conversion is as follows: We

[1] 'Zum Evangelium des Paulus und der P.,' p. 33.

[2] xxii. and xxvi.; cf. Gal. i. 14, 15, Phil. iii. 12.

[3] xxii. 3; cf. Gal. i. 14, Phil. iii. 6; Meyer, Acts ix. ed. iv. tr.

[4] Meyer, Acts ix.

are asked to "think of the excitement into which he, the zealot for the hereditary institutions of Judaism (Gal. i. 14), must have been brought by the threatening progress of the growing Christianity. He saw, at that time, what he held most dear and most holy endangered; a spiritual tendency appeared to be spreading unchecked, making of secondary consideration precisely that which was to him the most important thing of all, the strict observance of all Jewish laws and customs, and which opposed in the most hostile manner that party especially to which he had attached himself with all the fiery zeal of his nature. Now we might indeed suppose that out of such mental emotions, a visionary Moses or Elias might at last have started rather than an Appearance of Christ; but only when the other side of the question is left out of consideration. The result showed that the satisfaction which Paul thought to find in his Pharisaic zeal for righteousness was not of a tranquilising character. This was evident, even at that time, from the passionate disquietude, the zealous precipitancy of his conduct. On the different occasions on which he came in contact with the new believers in the Messiah, when first, in the character, as we must suppose, of a disputatious dialectician as he was, he argued with them (cf. Acts ix. 29), then entered their assemblies, haled them away prisoners, and helped to bring them to trial, he could not fail to find himself on a disadvantageous footing with them in this respect. The fact on which they relied, on which they built the whole of their faith as differing from their hereditary Judaism, was the Resurrection of Jesus. Had he been a Sadducee it would have been easy for him to combat this asserted fact, for the Sadducees recognised no resurrection whatever (Acts xxiii. 7). But Paul was a Pharisee, believed therefore in the resurrection, not indeed to happen until the end of time; but that in a particular case, the case of a holy man, it might have happened exceptionally even earlier—this supposition from the point of view of Jewish notions at that time created no difficulty. He must, therefore, in the case of Jesus, have relied principally upon the fact that it could not be assumed to have happened to him, because he was not a holy man,

but on the contrary, a false teacher, an impostor. But in the presence of the believers in Jesus, this may have become every day more doubtful to him. They considered it not only publicly honourable to be as convinced of His resurrection as they were of their own life, but they showed also a state of mind, a quiet peace, a tranquil cheerfulness, even under suffering, which put to shame the restless and joyless zeal of their persecutor. Could *He* have been a false teacher, who had adherents such as these? could that have been a mendacious pretence which gave such rest and serenity? On the one hand he saw the new sect, in spite of all persecutions, nay, in consequence of them, extending their influence wider and wider around them; on the other, as their persecutor, he felt that inward tranquility growing less and less which he could observe in so many ways in the persecuted. We cannot therefore be surprised if in hours of despondency and inward unhappiness he put to himself the question: Who, after all, is right, thou or the crucified Galilæan, about whom these men are so enthusiastic? And when he had once got as far as this, the result, with his bodily and mental characteristics, naturally followed in an ecstasy in which the very same Christ, who up to this time he had so passionately persecuted, appeared to him in all the glory of which his adherents spoke so much, showed him the perversity and folly of his conduct, and called him to come over to His service."[1]

"In the passage 1 Cor. xv. 8 all that he says of himself is that the Risen Christ had appeared or been made visible to him. In another passage he asks, Did I not see Jesus Christ our Lord? (1 Cor. ix. 1), where without doubt he means the same appearance. "In that passage, lastly, in which he enters more fully than elsewhere upon the description of all that he has done and that had happened to him, he only says that it had pleased God (Gal. i. 13-17) to reveal His Son *in* him that he might preach Him among the heathen. Taking these different expressions together, we have on the one hand the conviction of the apostle that he had seen Jesus, and we may add this much from the narrative

[1] Strauss, 'New Life of Jesus,' i. 419, 420 (1865).

in the Acts, that he thought he had heard Him, heard words proceeding from His lips. Paul thought that on *other* occasions *also* it had been vouchsafed to him to hear words of this kind from the upper regions. *It cannot be the appearance we are now speaking of*, but must have been another subsequently, when in the 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians (xii. 1 ff.) he speaks of a man who fourteen years before was caught up into the third heaven....[1] "But when he adds whether in the Lord, he cannot tell ...we see that he was not without consciousness of the difficulty of establishing the real nature of the fact in appearances of the kind. And when, on the other hand, in ... Galatians he describes what he had seen and done as the effect of revelation of God *in* him, *he lays the main stress on the internal element*, conscious of the seeing and hearing of Christ as accompanied by the rising up within his mind of the true kinship of Him as the Son of God. *It is certain that in doing so he considered the ascended Christ as really and externally present, the appearance as in the full sense an objective one*; but he is far from saying anything to prevent us (as certain pictures in the narrative of the Acts might do, if we were obliged to take them in the strictly historical sense) from being of a different opinion, and considering the appearance as one merely subjective, as a part of the inward life of the soul."[2]

This theory of Strauss was rejected by Hermann Fichte[3] on the following grounds. First, that while S. Paul had certainly heard of the disciples' belief in our Lord's Resurrection, prior to his own conversion, and had witnessed the effect of their belief; yet even if these facts had awakened doubt, it is contrary to all the laws of psychology on the origin of visions, that they should develop out of a condition of doubtful misgivings. Secondly, that all the conditions were absent for producing a subjective vision of Christ. Such visions require a previous conception of Christ and also belief in Him. It is on the ground of existing faith, and not in its absence, that such visions could arise. But none

[1] Strauss, 'New Life,' i. 416. [2] *Ib.* 417.
[3] 'Vermischte Schriften,' ii. 164.

of this existed in the case of S. Paul. And, thirdly, the inferences of Strauss are in direct contradiction[1] to the self-consciousness of S. Paul as attested not only by the Acts, but by his own Epistles. His own representation of his mental state at the period is that of conscious rectitude; undisturbed by the least shadow of doubt that in suppressing the advocates of the Christian faith he is doing God's will.

Strauss's account of S. Paul's conversion moves with serene indifference over the fact of the Pauline Epistles. The clearness of the picture is indisputable; but it is wholly unrelated to history. The idea that S. Paul, being a Pharisee, could easily credit the accelerated resurrection of a particularly holy man, simply ignores the entire problem that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah; that S. Paul understood this; and that the reconciliation of that claim with the Crucifixion was for a Pharisee inconceivably difficult. The faith and firmness of the believers in Jesus was certainly equalled by the faith and firmness of S. Paul in the opposite belief. Their serenity was contrasted with his lack of peace; but the inference to a religious mind was not that the fault was in his religion but rather in himself. The annals of persecution do not suggest vacillation of the persecutor as a result of firmness in the persecuted.

Strauss provoked a fiercer opposition than other rationalising critics. This was probably due not only to his conclusions but also to his tone and style as a controversialist in religion. He deserves, however, the credit of having (1) demolished the older rationalistic explanation of the grave of Christ; (2) stated, with a frankness which leaves nothing to be desired, the alternative that the Resurrection must either be explained within the limits of the natural, or else the whole supernatural Christianity must be accepted; (3) pushed relentlessly to its final result the question whether he and the school to which he belongs had any claim whatever to the name of Christian, and acknowledged that they had not.[2]

5. Another interpretation may be mentioned here which, although far shallower than the efforts of Strauss, has its interest as being the conversion of S. Paul according to a

[1] 'Vermischte Schriften,' ii. 166. [2] See Strauss, 'Old Faith and New.'

modern Jew. "His nervous temperament and imaginative nature," says Graetz, "dispelled all doubts, and he believed firmly and truly that Jesus had made himself manifest to him.

"And later he said of the vision which had appeared. If it were in the flesh I know not, if it were supernatural I know not; God knoweth. He was carried up beyond the third Heaven. This is not very lucid evidence as to a fact which was actually supposed to have happened. Legend has adorned this conversion, which was of such great importance to Christianity, in a fitting manner. . . . With the certainty that he had actually beheld Jesus another doubt was banished from Saul's mind, or a different Messianic point of view was revealed to him. Jesus certainly died, or rather was crucified, but, as He appeared to Saul, He must have risen from the dead; He must be the first who had been brought to life again, and had therefore confirmed the fact that there would be a Resurrection, which fact had been a matter of contention between the various schools." [1]

6. Once more the problem was undertaken by Pfleiderer, who was, with distinct reservations, an independent disciple of Baur.[2] That S. Paul "was fully convinced of the objective reality of the Appearance of Christ with which he was favoured," was to Pfleiderer, "beyond doubt." [3] Yet he qualifies this by S. Paul's words, "it pleased God to reveal His Son *in* me" (Gal. i. 16). Pfleiderer does not appear to realise that inward and outward may well be supplementary and are not mutually exclusive. He says truly enough that "those who look upon the conversion of Paul as a miracle in the strictest sense of the word, are unable, nevertheless, to dispense altogether with a psychological preparation for it; inasmuch as otherwise the conversion would have to be regarded as a direct and immediate, that is, magical act of God, in which the soul of Paul would have succumbed to an alien force: which would be a view wholly opposed to the genius of Christianity, and in direct contradiction to the apostle's own definition of faith as an act of moral

[1] Graetz, 'Hist. of the Jews,' ii. 227.

[2] See 'Hibbert Lectures,' 1885, p. 8. ('Urchristenthum,' ed. 2, 1902.)

[3] *Ib.* p. 33.

obedience."[1] This is certainly true: but here again psychological preparation does not exclude objective appearances; nor can preparedness or receptiveness for a manifestation be made to do duty as a substitute for that manifestation. Pfleiderer's own theory may be called an elaboration of what he considers to be meant by the words "it is hard for thee to kick against the goad." This goad, what was it? Here is Pfleiderer's reply.

"In what else can it have consisted than in the painful doubt as to the lawfulness of his persecutions of the Christians—in the doubt, therefore, whether the truth was really on his side, and not rather, after all, on the side of the persecuted disciples of Christ? But how was it possible that a doubt like this should arise in the soul of the fanatical Pharisee?" Pfleiderer answers that the persecuted Christians supplied the incentive. Their joyful courage "necessarily affected favourably the tender soul of Paul, and pressed upon him the question whether men who could die so gladly for their faith could really be blasphemous; whether a faith which produced such heroism could be called a delusion." Moreover, he heard the theological defence made by Christians. And here Pfleiderer imagines how the persecuted answered S. Paul's objections. "If he urged 'cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree,' the crucified Jesus died under the curse of God; they met him with the passage of Isaiah in which there is said of the Servant of God... He was wounded for our transgressions and smitten for our sins; the punishment was laid on Him that we might have peace, and by His wounds we are healed. And that this significance of the death of Jesus as a vicarious means of propitiation did not fail to produce an impression on the Pharisee Paul, is in the highest degree probable, inasmuch as it certainly fell in with the prevailing view of the theology of the Pharisees, in which the unmerited sufferings of the righteous generally were regarded as an atonement for the sins of their families and their nation." Pfleiderer is, however, compelled by facts to follow this up with a very significant admission: "This theology, it is true, had not been in the theology of the

[1] Pfleiderer, 'Hibbert Lectures,' p. 34.

Pharisees applied to the Messiah, because the practice of bearing and suffering generally did not find a place in their ideal of the Messiah. But after the Christians had once given to the passages of Isaiah the Messianic interpretation, no valid objection could be brought against it from the Pharisaic standpoint." Thus S. Paul, as a Pharisee, is not only expected to accept the Christian interpretation of a text against his own deeply rooted conviction, to abandon an interpretation which, according to the Acts, he still retained after his conversion, but also to revise his theology into agreement with this new interpretation! And all this chiefly because he sees the courage of the persecuted. Is this the estimate of S. Paul's character which his letters suggest?

Pfleiderer then goes on to explain that S. Paul's doubts increased. "How heavily must this doubt weigh upon the tender conscience of Paul! If previously, in the excitement and commotion of action in Jerusalem, he succeeded in getting rid of his doubts, now on the lonely road to Damascus they would the more irresistibly await him, and penetrate as goads his soul. How he will have prayed for a solution of the enigma, for a satisfaction of his doubt!" Now we are constrained to interrupt the quotation to observe that if any importance is to be attached to the documents there is not the slightest trace of this state of mind. These prayers for the solution of the enigma are invented by the critic. They are assuredly not discoverable in the N.T. Pfleiderer continues: "That the crucified Jesus might be the Messiah was shown by the Scriptures; but by what sign should Paul know that he *really* was the Messiah? The faith of the disciples was based on the fact that they had seen Jesus as the risen Lord who had been raised to God's right hand; and Paul could perceive by the glorified countenance of the dying Stephen how sacred that conviction was to them. Could this conviction be a lie or a delusion? But if it was true, *then*—such must have been Paul's inference—God Himself had taken the side of the Crucified One...."[1] The next point is to assume that the image of

[1] *Ib.* p. 46.

the Crucified became more and more impressive in this particular aspect as possibly raised to God's right hand. "While his contending thoughts were being agitated concerning this crucial point, the image of the crucified Jesus, as Stephen had seen it at his death, presented itself with increasing distinctness prominently before Paul's inward vision." It is admitted that "that image might be very unlike the Pharisaic ideal of the Messiah," yet it is affirmed that "it had, nevertheless, unmistakable points of kinship with ideal creations of the Jewish and Hellenistic speculation, which were well known to the theologian Paul."[1]

Accordingly the conclusion is reached: "It appears to me that we are in a position to perceive fully the mental condition and circumstances from which the *vision* of Paul can be psychologically explained: an excitable nervous temperament, a soul which had been violently agitated and torn by the most terrible doubts;" [we can scarcely fail to observe here how the doubts have become intensified in process of description] "a most vivid phantasy, occupied with the awful scenes of persecution on the one hand, and on the other by the ideal image of the celestial Christ; in addition, the nearness of Damascus, with the urgency of a decision, the lonely stillness, the scorching and blinding heat of the desert—in fact, everything combined to produce one of those ecstatic states in which the soul believes that it sees those images and conceptions which profoundly agitate it, as if they were phenomena proceeding from the outward world."[2]

And yet, after all this imaginative work which seems to represent the conversion as caused by a self-generated vision, Pfleiderer ends with a quite unexpected and somewhat enigmatic reference to God as the real cause of the change: "However, whether we are satisfied with this psychologically explained vision, or prefer to regard an objective Christophany in addition as being necessary to explain the conversion of Paul, it remains in either case certain that it was God who in the soul of Paul caused a light to shine to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ."[3]

[1] Pfleiderer, 'Hibbert Lectures,' p. 40. [2] *Ib.* p. 43. [3] *Ib.* p. 43.

Does this mean that the vision was divinely created? If so, it opens out towards the whole apostolic interpretation of Christ's work. It transfers the matter from S. Paul's subjective belief to the realm of objective realities.

7. This series of criticisms, from Baur to Pfleiderer, with their attempt to establish a subjective vision theory, give peculiar interest to Sabatier's brilliant sketch, and show its especial importance. Sabatier drew the critics back to S. Paul's own statements. He had no difficulty in showing that these speculative accounts owed what plausibility they possessed chiefly to their systematic neglect of S. Paul's self-consciousness as revealed in his letters.

"It is a point," urged Sabatier, "of the utmost importance to observe that Paul knows absolutely nothing of any progressive stages or gradual process in his conversion to the Gospel. He looked back to it throughout his life as a sudden overwhelming event, which surprised him in the full tide of his Judaic career, and drove him, in spite of himself, into a new channel. He was vanquished and subdued by main force (Phil. iii. 12). He is a conquered rebel, whom God leads in triumph in face of the world (2 Cor. ii. 14). If he preaches the Gospel, he cannot make any boast of doing so; he was *compelled* to preach it, under a higher necessity which he had no power to resist. There he stands: a slave in chains! (1 Cor. ix. 15-18)."[1]

This, urged Sabatier, is the general impression. And this is enhanced by special passages. S. Paul "regards his conversion as a sudden occurrence, an event sharply defined and associated with certain external circumstances of time and place." The personal intervention of Jesus, the neighbourhood of Damascus, the association of the apostolic call with the manifestation of the Risen One, are all signs of the external and objective nature of the occurrence.

Perhaps it is needless to insist further upon this point, since Baur and others acknowledge that S. Paul believed firmly in the objective character of the Appearance. As to Baur's contention that we cannot deduce the objective reality

[1] Eng. transl., p. 61.

from the subjective belief in its reality, Sabatier replies: "Unquestionably criticism may push its demands in this way to a point at which of necessity any positive proof becomes impossible. This style of reasoning tends to nothing less than the destruction of all historical certainty; for, in point of fact, history depends on nothing else than subjective and individual testimony."

To Holsten's suggestion that S. Paul's conversion was only one of a series of ecstatic visions, such as he mentions in 2 Cor. xii. 1-9, Sabatier's reply is effective. He claims truly enough that the passage "shows that [S.] Paul, so far from comparing the manifestation of Christ to him at his conversion with the visions he afterwards enjoyed, laid down an essential difference between them." S. Paul "does violence to his feelings in making known this private aspect of his life. At the fifth verse he is checked by this repugnance, this sacred modesty, and suddenly takes quite the opposite course. Instead of glorying in his privileges, he will only glory in his infirmities. The visions referred to in this passage, it would seem, he had never previously related; and just as the insults of his enemies were on the point of compelling him to do so, he checks himself and again drops the veil over these mysteries of his spiritual life. His ecstasies and visions do not belong to his ministry, and are not for others, only for God and himself: *εἴτε γὰρ ἐξέστημεν, Θεῷ· εἴτε σωφρονοῦμεν ὑμῖν* (2 Cor. v. 13). But so far from speaking of his conversion in the manner in which he speaks of his visions, Paul shows neither reluctance nor embarrassment in describing it; it was one of the staple subjects of his preaching." Moreover, S. Paul had had many visions: but the Appearance at Damascus is distinctly marked off as different in kind. For when S. Paul in the list of the witnesses wrote "last of all He appeared to me also," this "last of all" terminates the series. Sabatier asks: "How could this marked distinction have arisen, except from the conviction that the Appearances of the Risen Lord had a real and objective character, such as the spiritual visions of ecstasy did not possess?"

The distinction here drawn by Sabatier between the Appearance near Damascus and the visions of S. Paul is, of

course, not new ;[1] but it is admirably expressed. It deserves more attention than it has received.

"These considerations," Sabatier concludes, "it seems to us, deprive the vision-hypothesis of all exegetical support. And we must not forget that the question of Saul's conversion is not to be explained as a mere isolated fact. It is attached to the question of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and bound up inseparably with it. The solution we give to the former of these remarks depends upon that of the latter. Anyone who accepts the Saviour's Resurrection would hardly find it worth while to question His appearance to this apostle. But the critic who, before entering on the question, is absolutely persuaded that there is no God, or that if there is, He never intervenes in human history, will doubtless set aside both facts, and would have recourse to the vision-hypothesis, were it ever so improbable. The problem is thus carried from the field of history into that of metaphysics, whither we must not pursue it."[2]

8. Another, a quite recent picture of S. Paul's conversion, is that by Weinel. To his mind the clue to the mystery is found in "Paul's uneasy conscience." "He, half a renegade, a frequent backslider, to whom the law was sin, was going to Damascus to slaughter more Christians. He was going to bind and slay in behalf of that same law that oppressed him, whose claim he doubted;" [?] "the law that sentenced him to death! Deeper and deeper the iron goad entered into his soul. What if the law were not given as a savour of life unto life? What if after all *they* were right, in whose torture-twisted faces he had seen the great triumphant joy he himself lacked, and which was evidently the fruit of faith in the risen Lord? Yes; he had experienced the 'power of His Resurrection' more than once in the case of these people. If it were true! Had the great deliverance really happened? These martyrs had said they saw the crucified Son of Man and the heavens opened! If only he could have positive proof of it: he with his bleeding heart sore! His soul cried aloud to God."

"According to the Acts it was mid-day when Saul

[1] Loofs, Beyschlag, 'Stud. und Krit.' [2] *Ib.* p. 67.

approached Damascus. The land lay outstretched, dazzling in a scorching heat which hovered over the plain. At this mysterious hour of a southern day there lay over all Nature a soft stillness which appealed strongly to the soul. Then, all at once, all this quivering, dazzling brilliance was outshone by a blinding light from heaven! A more than human countenance beams upon his entranced eye: everything around him is bathed in the supernatural radiance. Christ the Risen One is at his side! Terror, pain, and sorrow succeed one another in his soul, and a jubilant joy that such a vision is vouchsafed him. Suddenly he feels the great thing, the wonderful thing, coming to him: Christ has taken up His abode in his heart: a new and infinite sense of strength floods all his being. The man who a moment ago was under sentence of death, he lives, he lives for ever! 'I live, yet not I, but Christ lives in me! If a man is in Christ, he is a new creature. Old things are passed away, all things are become new.' The good in him had conquered. With a strong hand his God had snatched him from the way of persecution. His strong and truth-loving soul could not lose itself in lies and fanaticism."[1]

"What sort of vision was it in which Paul beheld the Son of God in the light out of heaven on the way to Damascus? The answer to the question will vary according to a man's conception of the universe."[2]

This description is infinitely less convincing than that for instance, of Pfleiderer. The analysis is more superficial. It starts on a misconception of S. Paul's relation to the law, and what he meant by law. Whatever criticism may say, S. Paul never doubted the claim of Law. His reverence for its moral ideals steadily deepened to the end of his days. Then the whole stress is laid on the emotional effect of the martyrdoms. But here again, neither the Acts nor the Epistles support the view that the martyrdoms awakened the least misgiving in his mind. Then the sentiment of the poetic description of the "soft stillness" which "lay over all nature" at "this mysterious hour," and "appealed strongly to the soul," is inadequate to account for a tremendous

[1] Weinel, 'S. Paul,' p. 84. [2] *Ib.* p. 80.

intellectual and theological change. S. Paul is reduced to a very inferior type of character. It seems quite forgotten—at least it could not be discovered from the picture—that we were contemplating the experience of one of the greatest intellects the world has seen. The picture is unconvincing because the intellect is not allowed its rights. The deeply rooted Jewish traditional beliefs, ingrained into his very constitution, about the Messiah, about Death, about Crucifixion, are here all simply ignored. The picture of S. Paul's soul crying aloud to God for positive proof of Christ's Resurrection: what claim has this to be viewed as history when it contradicts all the documentary evidence we possess? If it is permissible to rewrite the documents this way, there is surely no conclusion that ingenuity may not reach. On the other hand, Weinel distinctly recognises that this conversion was the work of God.

All these explanations are shipwrecked ultimately on S. Paul's own consciousness of the conversion as wrought upon him from without, and from above, independently of his wishes and against his prior convictions.


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CHAPTER XI

THE CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF S. PAUL'S CONVERSION

WE may now attempt to analyse for ourselves the religious experience known to us as S. Paul's conversion. Reaction from descriptions of it as simply accounted for by self-generated visions has led Christian apologists not infrequently to maintain that it was entirely due to an objective supernatural intervention for which S. Paul was totally unprepared. But this reaction is surely extreme. No objective manifestation can avail without subjective preparedness. Indeed this truth may partly explain why the occurrence meant one thing to S. Paul and another to the companions of his journey. The difference does not imply that the Appearance was only within. It implies that men differ in their receptiveness and capacity for interpretation. Preparedness then there must have been: and so far as critical writers demand it, their contention is just. The apologists have been one-sided as well as their opponents. There are many elements in the conversion to be considered.

1. First may be placed S. Paul's personal moral struggles. It has been very commonly assumed that we possess in Romans vii. an autobiographical account of S. Paul's moral experience in the period prior to his conversion. There are two inquiries which this assumption raises: first, whether the passage refers to an unregenerate or a regenerate condition; and secondly, whether it relates the personal experience of S. Paul. With regard to the first of these, the

great mass of Greek and Latin expositors[1] alike agree in viewing it as a description of the unregenerate condition, the state of the natural man. But if the reference be to the regenerate condition, it must in any case apply to the unregenerate also. For if the powerlessness of moral law to get itself obeyed by its own inherent forces is the experience of the converted, it must assuredly be the experience of the unconverted also. Indeed it may be said that since the ineffectiveness of moral law lies in the weakness of human nature, it cannot be confined to any period of human life but must apply throughout. But it must apply more especially to the period when the weakness existed without the corresponding Christian strength. With regard to the second inquiry, whether the passage related to S. Paul's own struggles, it is generally felt that the contrast drawn in Romans vii. between the demands of the law and man's inability to fulfil them is too pathetic, too searching, too personal, not to contain the utterance of personal experience. The exceeding bitter cry in it is evidently wrung from a personal anguish; the fervour of the closing thanksgiving is evidently the expression of a personal faith. It is generally felt that this must represent the apostle's own experience, and that it points to a time prior to his conversion.[2]

Here, then, it has been suggested, we find in S. Paul an inward dissatisfaction with his own religion which necessarily disposed him to look for aid elsewhere.

Before attempting to determine the value of this suggestion we must look closer into S. Paul's estimate of the law. His estimate is that through the moral law comes the knowledge of sin. It is the nature of moral injunctions that they do not strengthen the will. Nay, prohibition increases desire. This is not the fault of the moral ideal. The higher it is the more certainly it produces this result. It is a ministration of condemnation, a ministration of death. The moral ideal is holy and good and true; but the fault lies in the weakness of mankind. Thus the discrepancies between ideal and achievement increase. Deliverance is

[1] See Cornely, p. 356.

[2] On the other hand see Feine, 'Theologie d. N.T.,' 263.

impossible by mere command: for what human nature requires is not more knowledge but strength.

Thus S. Paul expresses the profoundest reverence for the moral law. If it does not succeed in getting itself realised, that is only because, under the existing conditions of human nature, the human response is so feeble. Clearly, he who thinks this way will be more disposed for self-condemnation than for rejection of a law which he reveres. It was not dissatisfaction with his religion that S. Paul felt as a Pharisee, but rather dissatisfaction with himself. Moreover the negative inability of moral commands to secure their own fulfilment is a very different thing from the truth and power of some other opposing system. It may dispose a man to listen: it cannot prove its worth. Indeed it has been said that "the apparent suddenness of S. Paul's conversion was due to the tenacity with which he held on to his Jewish faith, and his reluctance to yield to conclusions which were merely negative."[1] But although we cannot find in S. Paul's moral dissatisfaction the cause of his conversion to the Christian faith, it may contain a disposing element; it suggests an open mind. It may indicate that inward preparedness which would enable him to respond to an external appeal by a moral act of self-surrender.

2. A second point of view is the possible effect of intellectual reflection on the contents of Christianity. S. Paul must evidently have known a good deal of the Christian message before his conversion. His arguments with opponents could scarcely have been few. He must have heard their reasons, and listened to their self-defence. He did not become a persecutor of Christians without knowing what Christians taught. Saul the Pharisee knew that the followers of Jesus asserted His Resurrection. What effect the thought had upon him may be impossible to ascertain: it cannot be right to say, as some have done[2] that it had no effect whatever. That he did not believe the report of course is clear. But so active and systematic a mind could scarcely fail to consider, prior to his conversion, what the theological consequences of such

[1] Sanday and Headlam, 'Romans,' p. 187. [2] *E.g.* Beyschlag.

an assertion would be, supposing it to be true. He could hardly fail at least to realise that a Jesus who had risen awakened very different reflections from a Jesus who remained in the grave. Without supposing these thoughts to have exercised much conscious influence over him, they may have affected him more than he was aware. They may have contributed to prepare him, in some degree, for the crisis which was coming.[1] But whatever was his knowledge of Christianity prior to his conversion this cannot explain the origin of his gospel: for that would be "at variance with his own self-testimony, for the express aim of his account in Gal. i. is to show that his whole attitude to Christianity previous to the occurrence at Damascus excluded the possibility of any human influence in the forming of his gospel."[2]

3. Thirdly, there was the joyous courage, the religious peace of the persecuted, so strikingly contrasted with the persecutor's own unrest. The unearthly beauty of Stephen's dying face, the spirituality of it all produced a violent reaction in the persecutor's sensitive soul. It haunted him on the journey toward Damascus, and filled him with feelings of strong revulsion against the sickening scenes of persecution in which he would be soon once more engaged. Thus it rendered him a fit subject for the great experience.

Certainly the episode of Stephen cannot have been without effect. The moral impression upon Saul the Pharisee of Stephen's faith in Jesus' Resurrection and exaltation may be easily exaggerated. The Pharisee knew that sincerity may be mistaken. He was familiar with a zeal for God not according to knowledge. But still the fact remained that Stephen certainly possessed a serene assurance of peace with God to which the Pharisee, in spite of all his passionate yearnings and efforts, was a stranger. Whence came that peace? Was it illusion? The serenity of Stephen's faith, the unearthly dignity of his death, may have produced a deep impression on one so sensitive. But it did not prove the error of his own position nor the truth of the other. Nor was there anything in S. Stephen's speech to convince him. Since the aim of that speech was to show that Israel's

[1] Cf. Holsten, p. 48. [2] B. Weiss 'Bibl. Th. N.T.,' i. 278.

habitual rejection of light only received another and a crowning illustration in their rejection of Jesus, it must have seemed to Saul an assumption of the very matter which had to be proved. For where was the demonstration that Israel had done wrong in rejecting Jesus of Nazareth? To such an intellect as that of Saul so situated the attempted historic parallel must have been entirely ineffective. And S. Stephen gave no exposition of Christian principles, or grounds for their acceptance.

As to the revulsion of feeling produced by scenes of persecution, the annals of persecution do not endorse it. When did an inquisitor cease because of the horror of his work? A modern believer could say that an *auto-da-fé* would be the death of him, but modern antipathy to inflicting suffering cannot necessarily be read back into the Pharisee of the apostolic age.

In any case the witness of S. Paul's self-consciousness in the Acts and Epistles is that he did it ignorantly in unbelief; that he verily thought within himself that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth; that he was only zealous for the traditions of his fathers; that the only difference between himself and his Jewish contemporaries lay in the extra vehemence and firmness of his zeal. That he had misgivings and doubts caused by the martyr deaths—of this there is not in all his self-revealings the shadow of a hint.

4. The chief obstacle to S. Paul's conversion lay in his Jewish conception of the Christ. This is what many rationalistic explanations of the conversion fail to understand. They assume that transition from the Jewish to the Christian idea of Messiah could be easily made. It becomes important, therefore, to realise what the main characteristics of the Jewish conception were. There were numerous variations in the last two pre-Christian centuries, as the Apocalyptic Book of Enoch[1] shows. And distinction must be made between the Apocalyptic theories and the conceptions of the Prophets. But if we may take Schürer's[2] 'Analysis

[1] Cf. Charles' Edit. pp. 30, 31.

[2] 'Hist. of Jewish people in the time of Christ,' div. ii. vol. 2, p. 160. Cf. Stanton, 'Jewish and Christian Messiah.'

of the Messianic 'Hope,' the main features of Jewish belief appear as follows: "The Messiah was thought of as a human king and ruler, but as one endowed by God with special gifts and powers." The Messianic Kingdom is to be set up in the Holy Land.[1] For which purpose Jerusalem itself must first be renovated. The dispersed of Israel would share in the Messianic Kingdom, and for this purpose would return to Palestine.[2] Thus the kingdom of glory will be established in Palestine, and the Messiah will preside over it as King.[3] And when the heathen see the quiet and peace of God's people, they will of themselves come to reason; will praise and celebrate the only true God, and send gifts to His temple, and walk after His laws.[4] Thus the Kingdom will become universal. Wealth, prosperity, longevity will increase among men.[5] And these external blessings are but results of the increased sanctity of the Kingdom of Messiah.[6] Then the deceased Israelites will come forth out of their graves to enjoy with the living the happiness of Messiah's reign.[7]

Schürer raises the inquiry whether the Jewish conception included the idea of a suffering Messiah.[8] A prediction in the fourth book of Ezra affirmed that the Messiah would die after reigning 400 years; but this has evidently nothing in common with the idea of an atoning death. The whole drift of the Jewish conception would not appear to have much place for a suffering Messiah. Yet in early Christian times the Jews admitted that the Messiah must suffer;[9] but even then atoning suffering is not recognised, and his death by crucifixion is distinctly rejected.

Schürer's conclusion is: "In not one of the numerous works discovered by us have we found even the slightest allusion to an atoning suffering of Messiah. That the Jews were far from entertaining such an idea is abundantly proved by the conduct of both the disciples and opponents of Jesus. Accordingly it may well be said that it was on the whole quite foreign to Judaism in general."[10]

[1] Schürer, p. 168. [2] p. 169. [3] p. 170. [4] p. 172.
[5] p. 173. [6] p. 174. [7] p. 175.
[8] p. 184; iv. Ezra, vii. 28-29. [9] See Justin, 'M. Dial.' 68-89.
[10] Schürer, p. 187. Matt. xvi. 22, Luke xviii. 34, xxiv. 21, John xii. 34.

With this conclusion Prof. Stanton agrees: "The idea of the Messiah's sufferings is not found in any Jewish document up to the close of the first century."[1]

It is of course difficult to be sure that any general outline of the Jewish conception of Messiah accurately represents the opinion of an individual, more particularly of an individual so exceptional in his religious gifts: but if the main features of Schürer's view were entertained by S. Paul as a Pharisee, belief in the Crucified Jesus as the Messiah must have required the very strongest causes. However spiritual S. Paul's idea of the function of the Messiah might be, the kingdom of his belief must have been localised in Jerusalem. The political element, however subordinated to the higher, could not have been left out. His conception must have been that of a divinely appointed king of the dynasty of David, whose function was the establishment of a kingdom of glory in Palestine, having its capital at Jerusalem, no doubt religious in intention, but yet earthly in form. Over that kingdom so established it would be the function of the Messiah to preside, and Israel would flourish in perfect fulfilment of the temple services, and in obedience to the Hebrew law, a really sanctified and holy people; while all the world of powers would be reduced to respectful submission, and would then share the blessings and privileges of Israel's supremacy. No doubt this conception varied from mind to mind, in proportion to the spirituality and depth of the individual Jew who believed it: but the singular mixture of material advantages with spiritual blessings, of religious fervour with national fanaticisms, probably pervaded each individual view, from the most ignorant zealot up to the most cultivated member of the chosen race.

Now when, with these conceptions in his mind, Saul of Tarsus heard that Jesus of Nazareth was asserted to be the Christ, his whole soul revolted against the proposition.[2] The idea of a suffering Messiah, suffering even to death, was during the lifetime of Jesus an inconceivable representation even to His own disciples. It could not be accepted for an

[1] 'Jewish and Christian Messiah,' p. 123.

[2] Cf. Knowling, 'Testimony,' pp. 192-3.

instant without abandoning the entire orthodox conception of the Messiah's kingdom and rule. A Christ in failure and defeat, abandoned, helpless, dead, was thereby declared not to be the Christ at all. To the mind of S. Paul a claim that Jesus was the Christ was simply wrecked against the stubborn fact that He was dead.

But it was not only Jesus' death, it was the peculiar form of His death which must have been to the Pharisee unspeakably abhorrent. It stood in flat contradiction to his whole traditional religious outlook. We Christians have so long contemplated the Cross in the glory of the Resurrection that we easily fail to realise what that form of death must have implied to a devout and sincere Jew. To him it could only be the emblem of Divine rejection. The words,—"cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree"[1]—were not so easily dismissed, or held inapplicable, as certain rationalistic writers suppose. For Christians to persuade S. Paul that the passage did not include Jesus of Nazareth assumes a faith in Jesus which S. Paul did not possess. The Pharisee's estimate of such attempts has been very forcibly and truly described in the following terms:

"To a Jew the Cross was infinitely more than an earthly punishment of unutterable suffering and shame; it was a revelation that on the crucified there rested the extreme malediction of the wrath of God. The idea was no theological refinement. It could not but be present to the mind of every Jew who knew the Law."[2] It was this which led the Jew to formulate that dreadful expression, "Anathema to Jesus," 1 Cor. xii. 3. It was this which led the Jew to describe Him as תָּלוּי the hanged One—"Here was a public, an impressive, a final attestation of what Jesus of Nazareth was in the sight of God. Here was an end."[3] The death of Jesus appeared to Saul of Tarsus as a Divine retribution on a blasphemous claim. God had thereby rejected the daring assertion of the Nazarene.

No doubt Saul the Pharisee had heard the disciples of the Nazarene declare that their Master had risen from the

[1] Deut. xxi. 23. [2] Chase, 'Credibility of Acts,' p. 149. [3] *Ib.*

dead. But this he simply refused to believe. He discredited their story, no doubt largely because it would require so vast a revolution in his own ideas. An invisible Christ enthroned elsewhere regardless of Jerusalem was all too strange and foreign a conception to his education and personal convictions. He saw nothing but delusion in it all, and most dangerous menaces against the holy nation and its hopes.

Consequently there was only one attitude legitimate towards all who dared to propagate the fictions of this upstart faith. Saul turned upon them with all the fierceness and fanaticism of which a Jew is capable. As he says himself, "he was exceedingly mad against them."[1] But he did it with the utmost conscientiousness. He set himself on principle to stamp the heresy out. Extermination in Jerusalem was not sufficient to satisfy his zeal. He persecuted them even unto strange cities. He hunted out the refugees. And this was the spirit in which he started on that memorable journey to Damascus.

A vision of Jesus in glory could never arise out of a Pharisee's conception of the Christ. It could not be produced by reflection on the fact of a Jesus rejected, condemned, crucified, and buried. If, in the case of the elder apostles, there was the memory of Jesus' character and personality to help them, no such experiences sustained S. Paul. It is not really probable that S. Paul had ever seen Jesus during His ministry.[2] There was nothing to help S. Paul to abandon his inherited presuppositions. For a vision of Jesus in glory would mean a complete inversion of the Pharisee's messianic ideas. He would be required to forsake his expectation of Israel's earthly supremacy. He would have to substitute the notion of an invisible Messiah for a Messiah enthroned in Jerusalem.

5. We have found it repeatedly asserted that the idea of Resurrection, being familiar to a Pharisee, could be applied by S. Paul without difficulty to the case of Jesus Christ: all that would be necessary would be to anticipate, in the case of an exceptionally holy man, an experience destined to be

[1] Acts xxvi. 11. [2] Although Clemen and a few others maintain it.

universal at the end of the world. This assertion pays very small attention to the religious meaning which the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth must have for S. Paul, supposing him to accept it. It would not be the mere exceptional experience of an exceptional man: it would be the consummation of Israel's development, the experience of the Messiah. But the Resurrection of the Messiah formed no part of the orthodox tradition.

6. The elaborate description of S. Paul's doubts, in Pfleiderer's account, is quite impressive, as we watch them intensifying in volume, until at last the Pharisee is discovered praying to be delivered, and is in a sort of agony of despair. All this is impressive until we read S. Paul's Epistles. But then we are constrained to ask, Where in the world is the evidence? All that Pfleiderer has described depends on a questionable exposition of the words: "it is hard for thee to kick against the goads."[1] But even supposing the exposition were correct, that S. Paul was beset with painful doubts whether he was right in persecuting Christians, why should it follow that the persecutor should immediately imagine himself to deserve a vision of Jesus? and a vision placing him on a level with the highest officials of the Christian community. But, as we have already seen, this interpretation of the words is more than questionable.

7. As to the attempt to place S. Paul's conversion among his subjective visions Sabatier's reply is so admirable that there seems no need for further discussion. Yet the importance of the subject is so great, and the plausibility of the Vision theory so attractive, that it may be well to reconsider it. We have already considered the Visions in the Acts. We now consider those mentioned in S. Paul's Epistles. "I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord. I know a man in Christ, fourteen years ago (whether in the body, I know not; or whether out of the body, I know not; God knoweth), such a one caught up even to the third heaven. And I know such a man (whether in the body, or apart from the body, I know not; God knoweth), how that he was caught up into Paradise, and heard

[1] Acts xxvi. 14.

unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter."[1]

Now here we notice (1) that the reference to time—fourteen years—shows that it is not the conversion of which S. Paul is thinking.[2] The conversion was twenty years before.

(2) That S. Paul's religious experiences were of different kinds. He is conscious that this was so. He draws a distinction between them. Where he is not sure of their character he says so. This is a ground for confidence.

(3) That the substance of the visions and revelations was unutterable; personal, not for the world; an incommunicable experience; rapt, mystical. Thus it differs absolutely in character from the experience at the conversion, which was obviously not incommunicable, nor intended for himself exclusively. The experience at the conversion was personal, but yet official. The experience of these visions was not official.

(4) To be the recipient of such visions does not disqualify from being also recipient of external appearances.

(5) S. Paul treats the two classes of experiences in opposite ways. The Appearance at the conversion he proclaims, and bases upon it his apostolic authority: the visions he treasures in reserve and reticence. He also identifies the Appearance outside Damascus with the Appearance to the elder apostles; it is similar in kind. But he never sets his visions in such relationship.

The conclusion that the Appearance to S. Paul outside Damascus was objective and divinely created is justified by the impossibility of adequately accounting for the facts in any other way. We group together the critical statements of Baur, that "no analysis, either psychological or dialectical, can detect the inner secret of the act in which God revealed His Son to him"; and of Pfleiderer, that "it remains in either case certain that it was God who in the soul of Paul caused a light to shine"; and of Sabatier that "the critic who, before entering on the question, is absolutely persuaded that there is no God, or that if there is, He never intervenes in human history, will doubtless set aside both facts" [*i.e.* the

[1] 2 Cor. xii. 1-4. [2] On this point Holtzmann agrees with Meyer.

Resurrection of Christ and His Appearance to S. Paul], "and would have recourse to the vision-hypothesis, were it ever so improbable. The problem is thus carried from the field of history into that of metaphysics, whither we must not pursue it." It is acknowledged, then, that critical explanations are inadequate; that the religious explanation does account for all the facts; that the real ground of belief or denial of the objective character of the Appearance to S. Paul lies behind criticism in the fundamental presuppositions of men.

"What sort of vision was it," asks Weinel, "in which Paul beheld the Son of God in the light out of heaven on the way to Damascus? The answer to the question will vary according to a man's conception of the universe; I say conception of the universe, meaning nothing about faith or religion. The question has no existence for faith. Faith knows that what happened happened in any case, because God chose to work it then: whether Paul really beheld Jesus in the light, or whether it was merely a visionary sight. It is a question of our conception of the universe, in so far as it brings us face to face with the problem: Do we admit the possibility of appearances of persons from another world to the sensual vision? or do we uphold the theory of a world in unbroken conformity to law?"[1]

Here, then, belief in the external nature of S. Paul's conversion is said to depend on scientific principles. But Sabatier's remarks are none the less correct, that it must also depend on religious principles, or belief in God. Weinel—who writes as a convinced believer in God—is well aware of this. "Those who are unable to see the hand of God in the gift He makes us of such strong and truth-loving souls as this Pharisee, and in His dealings with body and soul in a man, let not such minds imagine they will discover the Divine in the Damascus miracle!"[2]

This is a suggestion which leads much further than Weinel himself sees his way to go. If God is responsible for S. Paul's conversion, certain tremendous inferences must of necessity follow as to the value of that Religion and that Resurrection to the belief in which God converted him.

[1] Weinel, 'S. Paul,' p. 80. [2] p. 84.

8.. After all these considerations it seems mere bathos to descend to discussions on peculiarities of S. Paul's temperament, emotional and physical. To make S. Paul's theology the product of excitable nerves and atmospheric effects is a view in which Renan did his best; but it is discredited. To account for S. Paul's conversion as an epileptic seizure seems absolutely to ignore the intellectual depth and systematic completeness of the whole theology connected with it.

The criticism of Professor James upon this theory, which he characterises as "medical materialism,"[1] is of particular value owing to its author's independent standpoint. He reminds its advocates that "scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are. The dependence of mind on body is as true of the sceptic as it is the believer." "To plead the organic causation of a religious state of mind, then, in refutation of its claim to possess superior spiritual value, is quite illogical and arbitrary, unless we have already worked out in advance some psycho-physical theory connecting spiritual values in general with determinate sorts of physiological change. Otherwise none of our thoughts and feelings, not even our scientific doctrines, not even our *dis*-beliefs, could retain any value as revelations of the truth, for every one of them without exception, flows from the state of their possessor's body at the time."[2] Professor James indeed himself speaks of "hallucinatory or pseudo-hallucinatory luminous phenomena, *phantasms*, to use the term of the psychologists": and goes on to declare his belief that "Saint Paul's blinding heavenly vision seems to have been a phenomenon of this sort."[3] But this by no means implies a denial of its heavenly origin. The suddenness of a conversion may be due, speaking within the purely human limits, to activities within the subliminal consciousness. And this accounts for elements otherwise inexplicable. This is Professor James's theory. But he is careful expressly to affirm that the Divine element is not at all thereby omitted, still less denied. "If you," he writes, "being orthodox Christians, ask me as a psychologist whether the reference of a phenomenon to a subliminal self

[1] 'Varieties of Religious Experience,' p. 13. [2] *Ib.* p 14. [3] *Ib.* p. 251.

does not exclude the notion of the divine presence of the Deity altogether, I have to say frankly that as a psychologist I do not see why it necessarily should. The lower manifestations of the subliminal, indeed fall within the resources of the personal subject; his ordinary sense-material, inattentively taken in and subconsciously remembered and combined, will account for all his visual automatisms. But just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch of things material, so it is logically conceivable that *if there be* higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so *might be* our possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to them. The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy subliminal might remain ajar or open." [1]

Thus, then, once more, the nature of S. Paul's conversion must depend ultimately on belief in God. Concede that a personal Deity exists, and the phenomenon outside Damascus, with its apostolic explanation, becomes scientifically admissible and perfectly credible.

"It seems to me," says Kaftan, "manifest that the historical tradition is simpler and more intelligible if we abide by the old conception which, agreeing with the consciousness of S. Paul, sees in his Conversion a miracle of God." [2]

[1] James, 'Varieties of Relig. Exp.,' p. 242.

[2] Kaftan, 'Zur Dogmatik, Zeitschrift für T. and K.,' 1904, p. 279.

CHAPTER XII

THE CHANGES IN S. PAUL'S THEOLOGY CAUSED BY HIS CONVERSION

THE changes in S. Paul's theology caused by the Appearance of the Risen Jesus outside Damascus were of course exceedingly great. We have already acknowledged that so penetrating and logical a mind must have seen even before his conversion what the theological consequences must be, at least in part, if the reported Resurrection of Jesus were really true. But in the period following his conversion S. Paul evidently thought these thoroughly out. The priceless autobiographical fragment preserved in the Galatian letter enables us to form a clear conception of the apostle in solitude.

"But when it was the good pleasure of God . . . to reveal His Son in me, that I might preach Him among the Gentiles, immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood; neither went I up to Jerusalem to them which were apostles before me, but went away into Arabia."[1]

The Appearance of the Risen Jesus to S. Paul was at once a revelation from without and a revelation within; an external revelation of a Being in heavenly glory, an inward revelation in the region of theological truth. While these two ought never to have been put in opposition as alternatives, the former being the cause of the latter, it is also true that the former is valueless without the latter, true also that the chief revelation was within; and that S. Paul's spiritual greatness lay in his power to interpret the Appearance granted to him. The statement "God revealed His Son

[1] Gal. i. 15.

in me," would not exclude the statement "God revealed His Son *to* me; any more than the inward excludes the outward, or enables man to dispense with it.

To enable S. Paul to reflect and realise and think out the implications of the Appearance of Jesus in glory the essential thing was solitude. That this was his own feeling his words make plain. He "conferred not with flesh and blood": took no counsel with other men. Nor did he go up to Jerusalem,[1] to the official representatives of the Church, those who were apostles before him. The implication is that his own apostleship rendered that superfluous. What he needed was silence and thought. Away in some solitude of Arabia he accustomed the eyes of his spirit to the glory of this new religious light.

I

We must of course be careful not to make psychological analysis a substitute for documentary evidence; but the main lines of S. Paul's reflection are obvious enough when the statement of his own epistles are compared with his pre-Christian standpoint as a Pharisee. The Appearance of Jesus in glory created, then, the following changes in S. Paul's theology:

1. In the first place it compelled him to recognise that Jesus was after all the Messiah. S. Paul knew well that this was what the Christian community claimed. But it conflicted with all the Pharisee's Messianic ideals, and with the best Jewish Scriptural exegesis of the period. Moreover, it must have seemed intrinsically worthless, because a Christ such as the Christians maintained was incapable of discharging the functions traditionally inseparable from the office of Messiah. Schürer's analysis of the contemporary Jewish Messianic hope has shown us conclusively how monstrous, and altogether incredible the identification of Jesus with the Christ must have been to a Pharisee of that time. But, nevertheless, this identification had now to be made. It was forced upon S. Paul by the Appearance

[1] On the reconciliation of S. Luke's statements with S. Paul's, see Stanton, 'The Gospels as Historical Documents,' ii. 243.

of Jesus in glory. But this identification required him to transfigure his whole conception of the Christ. Hitherto his Messianic ideal, like that of his contemporaries, had included political liberation, social success, national supremacy, and the visible establishment of a kingdom of glory in Jerusalem, over which the Christ was to preside in person, encircled by His chief officials. Whatever spiritual element the Messianic conception retained it was pervaded by elements of an inferior kind. For these half-nationalised notions he must now substitute the spiritual ideal of an invisible Christ; a Christ not resident in Jerusalem, or on the earth at all, but glorified in the heavenly sphere. Acceptance of this new transfigured conception of the Christ was nothing less than a revolution in S. Paul's thought. Hitherto he had regarded Jesus of Nazareth as self-convicted of failure, conclusively refuted by the facts of his own experience, cursed and abhorred of God as well as man, demonstrated by His crucifixion to be the very opposite of what He claimed. Now he reverences this same Jesus as God's chosen, God's exalted, God's Christ.

That S. Paul in after years was acutely conscious of the distance he had travelled from his Pharisaic conception of the Messiah is shown in the words: "Wherefore we henceforth know no man after the flesh: even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know Him so no more."[1] It is not the knowledge of Jesus of Nazareth which S. Paul has here in view, but as Neander reminded us, of the official Christ. The apostle's earlier Jewish half political ideal of Christ has been revolutionised into a purely spiritual conception of the glorified Lord. There is thus all the difference between the two ideals which lies in the contrast between after the flesh and after the spirit.

2. If S. Paul's identification of Jesus with the Christ was the first theological outcome of his solitary reflection, this conclusion could not stand alone. A second inquiry necessarily followed. In what relation does this glorified Jesus stand to the generality of men? What is the meaning of this His exaltation? Why is He in the heavenly sphere?

[1] 2 Cor. v. 16.

This inquiry obviously brought with it a moral revelation. The glory possessed by Jesus in the heavenly sphere could be no official splendour irrespective of personal moral worth. None could stand where S. Paul saw Jesus stand, unless possessing moral elevation over the sinful masses of mankind. Whether S. Paul had heard already from Christians of the sinless perfectness of Jesus we cannot tell. But in any case such uplifting out of earth's conditions must certify moral uniqueness. Here is one who, although He is human, can approach and enter and share the glory of God? He is human, yet held back by no moral infirmities such as shame and baffle the best of men. These reflections would have profound significance to S. Paul, with his overmastering sense of discord between ideal and achievement; between God's law and human will; rendering God's acceptance of him and his peace with God the unsolved problem of his religion. Here was One in whom these conflicts did not exist: One who, as revealed in glory, was manifested to be in such union with God as nothing but sinlessness can secure. The exalted Jesus is unique in humanity. S. Paul will describe Him afterwards as "Him who knew no sin":[1] as "the second Man" who is "of heaven";[2] which is to say, Sinless Perfection, and ideal of Humanity.

3. These great positions led to a third. S. Paul was compelled to inquire, What is the meaning of Jesus' death? Till now S. Paul explained it as a divine retribution on a blasphemous claim: it was God's refutation of the daring assertions of the Nazarene. Jesus had undoubtedly been to S. Paul as to the Pharisees generally, "that Deceiver." Old Testament precedent would suggest that sacrilegious hands had been laid by the Prophet of Galilee on the highest Jewish office; and that God had broken out upon Him, vindicating the sanctity of a mission which was not designed for Him. This interpretation was confirmed for the Pharisee by the peculiar horror of Jesus' death. The solemn imprecation had haunted S. Paul: "Cursed is every one that hangeth upon a tree."[3] It was an evildoer's death. From this conclusive evidence

[1] 2 Cor. v. 21. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 47. [3] Deut. xxi. 23., Gal. iii. 13.

there appeared to be no escape. But, satisfactory as this theory, and this exegesis, had seemed to S. Paul before his conversion, the Appearance of Jesus in glory had now swept these misconstructions away. S. Paul must find a new interpretation. Jesus could not be accepted as the Christ in spite of His death, on the ground that He rose. The death could not be a mere scandal and enigma, tolerated for the Resurrection's sake, and then ignored and buried in oblivion as soon as possible. It could not be hushed up. It could not be meaningless. It must have its own intrinsic worth. Jesus must be valued not only because He rose, but therefore also because He died. For this death was the death of God's Christ. An accident, therefore, it could not be. A mere victory of worldly force over religious excellence—that was hopelessly inadequate, simply because it left God out. The splendour of Divine approval manifestly rested upon that Cross: otherwise Jesus would not be where now He is. Somehow the Death of Jesus was God's will. The Resurrection of Jesus as related to His Death was the Divine response to the Death, and the explanation also to mankind of its meaning. The submission of Jesus to Death was now shown to be part of the Divine ministry of grace, an offering accepted by God. The Resurrection showed the death to possess a power and validity affecting the divine relations with mankind.[1]

But how? Death, as S. Paul and his contemporaries believed, was the wages of sin. But, in this case, whose sin? Certainly not that of Christ. The exalted Messiah in the heavenly glory manifestly knew no sin. What, then, could cause His death? The Crucifixion and the Death must have been on account of others.[2] The reality and the horror of it could not be, must not be explained away. They had a dreadful meaning commensurate with their mystery. "Him Who knew no sin," God "made to be sin on our behalf,"[3] He "became a curse for us."[4] The result being that "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law."

[1] Cf. Graetz in 'Stud. und Krit.,' 1895, 798.
[2] Cf. Immer, 'Theologie des Neuen Testamentes,' 209.
[3] 2 Cor. v. 21. [4] Gal. iii. 13.

Thus the profound reality of the death, the solemn denunciation of the prophet, and the sinless perfection of Jesus are blended in one harmonious synthesis: due recognition being given to each apparently conflicting element in the complex problem of the Death of the Messiah. It would greatly help us to understand the situation did we know when the conception of the suffering Messiah was first derived from Isaiah liii. We find it later in the Apostolic teaching.[1] The question we cannot answer is whether S. Paul realised it during his Arabian solitude. But we can clearly see how the Redemption doctrine of the chief Pauline letters developed on the foundation already described. The death of Jesus becomes understood as the divinely appointed means for the reconciliation of the world. The sacrificial conception is introduced. Jesus, the Christ, is also the Redeemer of Mankind.

4. One more and last inquiry lay before S. Paul. The supernatural glory of the exalted Christ compelled the apostle to lift his mind into the eternal sphere. It forced him to ask: In what relation does this exalted Being stand to the Father in Heaven? In relation to Israel Jesus is the Christ, that is to say, its religious consummation. In relation to the human ideal Jesus is its fulfilment. In relation to the union of God and Humanity, Jesus is the Redeemer, the Propitiation, the Reconciliation. Thus in each separate sphere as it is contemplated Jesus is the crown and realisation of the entire development. He is in each respect the consummation of God's eternal design. But what is He in relation to the Father in Heaven? Did He begin His existence here? Or did He not pre-exist? Did Heaven admit Him as a stranger? or acknowledge Him as its Lord? Was not the Christ, the Sinless, the Redeemer, first in the thoughts of God? And not merely first in God's *thoughts*, as all ideal anticipations precede their own actualised existence, but first in the real living proximity to the Father? Is He anything less than God's Son, and that in the highest of all senses? S. Paul's habitual use of the term Son of God is "not Messianic but metaphysical."[2] Thus he

[1] *E.g.* 1 S. Peter.

[2] Immer, 'Theologie des Neuen Testamentes,' p. 273; cf. Rom. i. 4, Rom. viii. 3, Gal. iv. 4.

reaches the ultimate conclusion of Christian thought. The glory in which S. Paul beheld Jesus was also His original estate. He was rich, and for our sakes became poor. He is nothing less than the essential equal of the Father.

Here then we have the outline of S. Paul's theology. Jesus is the Christ; the sinless ideal of Humanity; the Reconciler of God and Man; the equal of the Father. Four stupendous conclusions; stupendous indeed, yet required by the central fact: the Death of Jesus seen in the glory of His Resurrection. This is the basis of S. Paul's entire Christianity. What he knew was Jesus' death interpreted by the glory of His heavenly exaltation. Such was S. Paul's experience. That his thoughts developed is undoubtedly true. In his later letters they received matured expression. The solitary reflections in Arabia may have left ample room for further thought. But here was their foundation. Substantially his gospel was now already complete. It consisted of the Death interpreted by the Resurrection.

It is not suggested that this interpretation of the experience outside Damascus occupied the three years between the conversion and the visit to Jerusalem. No definite period can be assigned. Nor is it possible to determine such inner revelations by mere intervals of time. The point is not the duration, but that the conversion was followed by a period of reflection. Kaftan thinks that so far from requiring three years' solitary reflection, S. Paul was ready to begin to preach the very next day after his conversion:[1] meaning that the main points of his Gospel were instantaneously clear; that the subject was rather a religious experience than a theological scheme. That S. Paul did soon preach, and at Damascus, is what the Acts imply. But there is no necessary contradiction between this and the need for reflection. At any rate, that S. Paul did think out independently the theological consequences of the Resurrection of Jesus is abundantly certain.

Hence the Resurrection was not, and could not be, for S. Paul one among many dogmas, so much as the foundation

[1] 'Zeitschrift für T. and K.,' 1904, p. 287.

of his religious experience. The distinctively Christian truth was Jesus and the Resurrection.

One main result of S. Paul's conversion was intellectual: it changed his theology. It gave him new knowledge. But his condition after conversion would be wholly misunderstood were he conceived as the speculative theologian absorbed in systematic constructions, like a schoolman of the middle ages. It is true that he must have drawn the great dogmatic inferences from his experience outside Damascus. All the main conclusions already mentioned form fundamental portions of his Gospel. But at the same time his experience was by no means merely intellectual: it was also *personal* and *religious*. The great conceptions analysed were no mere abstractions; no mere dogmas applicable here or there to persons who might see their beauty and feel their force. They were directly applicable to himself. They were parts of a religion experimentally verified. He had not only thought but felt. The change was not merely in his theological ideas, but also in himself, in his inner religious state.

For of this man it is emphatically true that his mind was set on righteousness. Whether before his Damascus experience or after it, he had a passion for rectitude. Fulfilment of the law had been his one desire. If the main characteristic of his nature was neither philosophic nor aesthetic nor political, but religious, he embodied and concentrated that characteristic. He had consciously surpassed his colleagues in the effort to achieve the moral standard of the Pharisee: but, precisely through the depth of his moral sincerity, he had been unable to look with complaisance on the results of his endeavours. As we have already seen, the painful and irremovable contradiction between ideal and achievement made the notion of justification, or acceptance with God, on the ground of his merits, hopeless and impossible. And while this neither proved Judaism at fault, nor Christianity in the right, nor was able to create his faith, it undoubtedly formed part of his receptiveness for the new. And when the Resurrection forced him to believe the fact of Jesus' exaltation to Divine glory, then the personal religious value

of the great fact was felt to satisfy the deepest needs of his nature.

If we could by an effort of historical imagination throw ourselves back into the position of an unconverted Pharisee of the first century, surely a whole world of force and meaning would be created by the thought that the Messiah was come! It is hard to realise what that would mean for a Jew. And then, again, the sinless Christ! For us the terms are too familiar to be appreciated. But to S. Paul in solitude, immediately after the Appearance, the Resurrection revealed the sinless Christ as God's great gift to mankind. It was a new creation. It began the new era. Here was the ideal of humanity already realised. It signified achievement. It signified power. And together with achievement and power was promise. For this embodiment of perfection in humanity, this realisation of all that S. Paul had aspired to and failed to win, this manifested Sonship with God, and union with God, which the Pharisee's religious nature craved after, felt himself created for, yet unable to obtain—was a prophecy and an anticipation of a state to be formed by Christ in other men. The representative character of Christ's experience came home to S. Paul's soul with mystic significance. Christ was the firstfruits. Christ was the Second Man. Humanity itself was already mystically dead and risen with Christ. When Christ died humanity mystically died also; and when Christ rose humanity also mystically rose. And this mystic anticipation was now to become progressively and individually realised in mankind. The Messianic kingdom already existed on the earth. And those brought within its precincts experienced already the powers of the world to come. Old things had passed away. All things had become new. He found himself translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son. And this community was the special subject of the Divine love which was experienced individually by each admitted within it. In place of the proud Pharisaic reliance on his own merits for acceptance with God, the going about to establish his own righteousness, a task whose futility the painful yearning of the years had proved—there was substituted now the humble and

thankful reliance on acceptance already in Christ, conditionally on the Christ becoming ultimately formed in him. Thus justification was not the independent act of self-reliant individualism, but an acceptance in Christ, not for what man is, but for what by grace he is to become. The representative Man is to reproduce Himself in individual men. And S. Paul experiences within himself spiritual forces hitherto unknown. He is "in Christ"—that profound and Pauline phrase, although by no means exclusively Pauline, yet employed by him some hundred times more frequently than in all the remainder of the New Testament.[1]

The power of a new life invigorates him. It is the Spirit of Christ of which he is the conscious recipient. He is in Christ; and to be in Christ is to be a new creature. He has found the solution of the hitherto insoluble problem of his religious existence. He is justified. He is in union with God. The solution is not merely theoretical but experimental. Therefore the trouble of his soul is rolled away. Of himself he can do nothing: but he can do all things through Christ who strengthens him. He lives, yet no longer he: it is Christ who lives in him.

Thus he obtained in Christ that acceptance with God which was otherwise unobtainable. Doubtless the sense of sinfulness was still there: but it no longer obstructed justification. Discrepancy between ideal and achievement was also still there: but he was already accepted in anticipation of the Paul that was to be; and he already experienced the powers by which that anticipation would be actualised. Thus while his pre-Christian state extorted the despairing cry, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me?" his Christian experience found expression in exultation. The fervour of the first Christian joy still glows in the word "I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord." Thus the exalted Christ was the Divine solution of S. Paul's religious needs. It provided him with new moral force, and filled him with a profound sense of religious peace.

It is this conception of the death of Christ as deliverance, which caused the manifestation outside Damascus to become

[1] See Deissmann, 'Bible Studies.'

for S. Paul a ground of joy rather than of rebuke and terror. The mere sight of the exalted Christ whom he had rejected, whose followers he had attempted to suppress, whose Name he had vilified, was calculated to fill the persecutor's mind with every emotion of dread and consternation. To realise that he had fought against God, however ignorantly, and that the outcome of all his Jewish privilege and enlightenment had been failure to recognise the Messiah when He appeared, must have filled a sensitive spirit with bitter humiliation and shame. He must have condemned himself and believed that God condemned.[1]

And yet this is evidently not the emotion which predominates in his soul. There is an extraordinary confidence and joy. Partly, no doubt, because the revelation was itself reassuring: for the exalted Christ did not appear merely to condemn. Partly because the commission is entrusted him to go and proclaim the truth which he has received. But also, and perhaps above all, because this conception of justification by the death of the Christ corresponded with the deepest wants of his religious nature.

Thus S. Paul's theology was as remote as possible from a mere speculative system by which conceivably the life of the theologian might remain unaffected. It was, every bit of it, a personal religious experience. The biographical and the theological intertwine, interpenetrate. He could put no other construction than he did on the fact of the Resurrection. But it was no mere theory. He could not have written as he did, had he not personally felt and known. His theology was also his experience.

But to say that S. Paul's Arabian reflections were religious and personal is not to deny that they were also intellectual and theoretical.

The curious tendency of many critics[2] is to force into alternative explanations what are really correlative aspects of the case. If the obvious fact be remembered that S. Paul combines in marvellous degree profound spirituality with

[1] Cf. M'Giffert, 'Hist. Christ, Apost. Age,' p. 128.

[2] *E.g.* Kaftan in his reply to Holsten, see 'Zeitschrift für T. und K.' 1904, p. 285.

dialectic acuteness, the intellectual theory and the religious experience will no longer be set in opposition.

But S. Paul's experience outside Damascus had also a third, an *official* significance. Not only did it bring him within the sphere of the forces of the Risen Life, by incorporating him into the Body of Christ, and so making him recipient of the Spirit of Christ; but it gave him an authority and a commission within the same. It did not, as he conceived it, merely constitute him a humble member of the community; it conferred official function upon him. "Am I not an apostle?" he asks, "have I not seen Jesus Christ?" He is perfectly well aware that "all are not apostles." But he is of that number. And the authority bestowed has made him an official equal with the original Twelve. The Twelve themselves could confer no mission upon him which he did not already possess.

II

The process by which the elder apostles achieved their Christian principles was very different from that of S. Paul. Their doctrine was not an inference from a single fact. Their faith was not simply founded on the Resurrection; however important the aid which that central occurrence afforded them. Their convictions concerning Jesus of Nazareth were the outcome of companionship with Him. They arrived at their dogmatic conclusions through the influence of His personality. No doubt, when their faith was shaken by the Master's Death, the Resurrection rendered continued assurance in His assertions possible. But it did so not by creating the sole foundation, but rather by restoring the balance. Behind it, or beside it were the moral facts of the life and character of Jesus, and the whole impression of His work and His claim.

The striking essay of Du Bose on the Gospel in the Gospels suggests that the impression of the personality of Jesus on the apostolic circle may be described by an ascending scale of the possible meanings of the term Son of God. First, there is the lowest sense the term can bear.

Jesus is Son of God in a sense possible for every human being. In virtue of His pure humanity He is adopted into the relation of Sonship with the Father. He recognises in all other men their potential Sonship with God, and calls on them to make it actual. Jesus at first appears to His disciples as God's Son in this lowest sense: identical in kind with their own capabilities, however different in degree. But it is that difference in degree which grows upon them more and more. They come to realise that Jesus is God's Son, as the Sinless Man, the flawless ideal, the embodiment of perfect human sonship in word, work, and will to the Father in Heaven. This is the first circle of ideas in discipleship: the first stage in the self-revelation of Jesus to the Twelve. A very large element of the Gospel portraiture falls within this first circle.

But there is a considerable element left out. It is evident that the term Son of God is claimed and ascribed in a second and quite different meaning. Jesus is Son of God in an official, a Messianic sense. Where, for instance, the Marcan narrative makes S. Peter answer the question, "Whom do men say that I am," with the brief sentence, "Thou are the Christ;" the later Synoptic narrative is, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God."[1] Does the latter clause explain the former, or does it add a new idea? That is the question which criticism debates. If the Marcan narrative conveys the substance of S. Peter's reply, then "Son of God" is here equivalent to "the Christ." When the High Priest asks at the trial "Art Thou the Christ the Son of the Blessed," a similar criticism can be made. In any case a considerable circle of Gospel ideas is concerned with Sonship in the Messianic or official sense.

But here we reach the third and highest meaning of the term Son of God. Just as the adoptive sense includes a considerable element of the Gospels, yet leaves much of the evidence outside its range, so does the official sense minimise this residuum, yet by no means absorb it. There is another Gospel use of the term, neither adoptive nor official, but

[1] S. Matt. xvi. 16.

more penetrating than either, transcending both. This is illustrated in the great Synoptic passage :

> "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father :
> And no one knoweth the Son save the Father ;
> Neither doth any know the Father save the Son,
> And he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him."[1]

Here then we have the process by which the elder apostles reached their Creed. It is based on innumerable incidents. It is the outcome of a gradual self-revealing. Stage after stage the three great ascending conceptions of Sonship with God are slowly grasped and understood. From the adoptive sense to the official, from the official to the personal and essential, the disciples advance. First within the limits of the strictly human, and in a sense conceivable of all. Secondly, still within the limits of the strictly human, but in a sense unique. And finally, transcending all human limits, in a sense unique and incommunicable, in the very highest of all possible senses the term can bear.

III

We have indicated S. Paul's experience of the exalted Christ, and the original apostles' experience of the historical Jesus. The question next to be considered is, "What knowledge did S. Paul possess of the historical Jesus, and from what sources did he derive it ?"

1. It has been a common assertion that S. Paul's interest in the exalted Christ rendered him comparatively or altogether indifferent to the historical Jesus ; and that he knew exceedingly little of the biographical details. Recent study of the Epistles has, however, led to a different conclusion. Weinel indeed asserts that Jesus can scarcely be said to have existed for S. Paul as a human being.[2] But Weinel qualifies this assertion with the remark that S. Paul "became acquainted with the outlines of the life of Jesus from the disciples themselves ; and though his religion is everywhere in touch with the risen, living Lord, yet we find clear traces everywhere of his acquaintance with those memoirs of Jesus

[1] S. Matt. xi. 27. [2] Weinel, 'S. Paul,' p. 314.

which afterwards assumed a definite shape in our Gospels."[1] "There is," as has been truly said, "a vast amount of undeveloped biographical material in the background of S. Paul's thought." "He obviously took pains," says another, "to learn the utterances of Jesus on all important questions. When he had not this to go upon he says so openly."[2]

A recent critic has subjected S. Paul's epistles to a careful study from this point of view,[3] and shows how very considerable S. Paul's biographical knowledge of Jesus really was. S. Paul is eager to have the authority of the actual instructions of Jesus on matters of doctrinal and moral moment. "This we say unto you by the word of the Lord," introduces his doctrine of the future state.[4] The right of the ministry to be maintained by the Church is determined on the ground "even so did the Lord ordain."[5] In the problem of the marriage relationship S. Paul appeals to Jesus' utterance when such utterance can be found, and gives his own apostolic advice when it cannot.[6] "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give my judgment as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful." So, again, Feine points out how S. Paul insists on the observance of the traditions.[7] If S. Paul "knows and is persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean of itself,"[8] is not this a reminiscence of the saying given in S. Matt. xv. 11? If he rules that honour and obedience should be accorded in right proportion where they are due,[9] is not this derived from the saying, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's."[10] If S. Paul enjoins the Christian to mortify his members upon the earth,[11] is not this equivalent in thought, if varied in expression, to the Gospel idea of plucking out an eye and cutting off a hand?[12]

[1] Weinel, 'S. Paul,' p. 317.

[2] Hausrath, vol. iii. Cf. Holtzmann, 'Hand-Commentar,' i. 23.

[3] Feine, 'Jesus Christus und Paulus,' 1902, pp. 45, 93. All the following examples are from Feine.

[4] 1 Thess. iv. 15. [5] 1 Cor. ix. 14. [6] 1 Cor. vii. 10-12, contr. verse 25.

[7] 2 Thess. ii. 15, 1 Cor. xi. 2, 1 Thess. iv. 2. [8] Rom. xiv. 14.

[9] Rom. xiii. 1-7. [10] S. Matt. xxii. 22. [11] Col. iii. 5. [12] S. Mark v. 29.

But beyond these similarities in instructions is S. Paul's conception of the character of our Lord. The humility of Christ is for S. Paul overwhelmingly revealed in that supremest conceivable act of condescension whereby He came down to earth from heaven;[1] yet for S. Paul that humility was progressively revealed under human conditions, since Jesus "being found in fashion as a man, humbled Himself becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross."[2] Thus S. Paul estimates the characteristic humility of Jesus' earthly career. The apostle could appeal to "the meekness and gentleness of Christ;"[3] to the "sweet-reasonableness," as it has been interpreted, of Jesus' life among mankind. He can call upon his converts to follow his example so far as he follows the example of Christ. What else is the great ideal of love in 1 Cor. xiii. but a summary of the character and life of Jesus on earth?

In addition to all this S. Paul knew of Jesus' Davidic origin, and of His baptism. The command to baptise, he not only knew, but obeyed. He knew that our Lord proclaimed the Kingdom of God, and shows that this great conception had powerfully impressed him. He knew of the night in which the Lord was betrayed; of the institution of the Eucharist and what took place at it; of the principal witnesses of the Resurrection, their names, and the order in which their experience came. He knew of the mission of the apostles as direct from Christ in person.

The great critic Baur went so far as to affirm that "He who could speak so decidedly and in such detail about matters of fact in the Gospel history as the apostle does (1 Cor. xi. 23; xv. 8) could not have been unacquainted with the rest of its chief incidents."[4]

2. Such was S. Paul's knowledge of the historical Jesus. We have now to ask, from what sources was it derived? There are only three sources from which such knowledge of the biographical details could be derived: either it must

[1] Contrast Weinel's strange remarks in 'S. Paul,' p. 316.

[2] Phil. ii. 8. [3] 2 Cor. x. 1; cf. J. Weiss, 'Paulus und Jesus,' p. 10.

[4] Baur, 'Paul,' i. 94. With this statement quite recent writers agree, *e.g.* Jülicher, 'Paulus und Jesus,' p. 55; and J. Weiss, 'P. und J.' p. 12.

have come from personal experience, or from supernatural revelation, or from ordinary tradition and instruction.

(1) As to personal experience:

Whether S. Paul had ever seen our Lord during the ministry has been disputed. The critic Keim[1] maintained that it must have been the case. But the majority of recent writers maintain the contrary;[2] while others feel uncertain.[3] We may agree with Pfleiderer[4] that the question cannot be indisputably determined. The passage "even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know Him so no more,"[5] affords no suggestion either way. It is concerned with knowledge of Christ after the flesh, not in the flesh. And a knowledge of Christ after the flesh is possible to those who never saw him in the flesh. It is the antithesis to knowledge of Christ after the Spirit. What S. Paul contrasts is the estimate of Christ formed by the natural man and that formed by the spiritual. He is contrasting his own convictions in the period before and the period after his conversion.[6] If S. Paul had been present in Jerusalem during the trial of our Lord, it is difficult to suppose that he would not have taken part; and then some trace would surely remain, either in the historian's narrative, or in S. Paul's Epistles. Considering his penitent allusions to his persecution of Christians, and in particular his reference to S. Stephen, it seems incredible that there would be no confession of the fact had he been among those who condemned Jesus Christ. If he had had any connection with the crowd who shouted "Crucify" the self-reproach of after years would have left some trace upon his pages.[7] But even if S. Paul had known Jesus in the flesh, it seems certain that there was no prolonged and intimate knowledge.[8] For all practical purposes he had never known Him. He had no knowledge which could affect his theological conclusions.

[1] 'Jesus of Nazara' and J. Weiss, 'J. and P.'
[2] *E.g.* Feine, 'Jesus Christ and Paulus,' pp. 93 and 350.
[3] *E.g.* O. Holtzmann, 'Leben Jesu,' p. 6.
[4] 'Urchristentum,' i. 68.
[5] 2 Cor. v. 16. [6] Cf. Sabatier, 'L'Apôtre P.' p. 57.
[7] Batiffol, 'Revue du Clergé français,' 15 March, 1910, p. 660.
[8] Cf. Goguel, p. 14.

(2) That he derived it from supernatural revelation has been maintained; chiefly on the ground of 1 Cor. xi. 26, "I received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, how that the Lord Jesus in the night in which He was betrayed took bread" (etc.). But even those most inclined to this interpretation must admit that it can never be decisive. The passage must always be open to the opposite solution. There is no possibility of refuting those who affirm that "I have received of the Lord" does not mean by direct revelation.[1] We have no right to assume miracles when natural explanations suffice. The supernatural revelation of detailed historic incidents raises more problems than it solves. Nor does any one assert that this method accounts for all the biographical facts with which S. Paul was acquainted. And the theory is founded on a form of expression which need not imply what is deduced from it.

(3) We come then to the third alternative: S. Paul acquired this knowledge from tradition. He derived it from the Christian Community. S. Paul distinctly asserts that his apostolic authority was not derived through the elder apostles but direct from Jesus Christ; that the elder apostles, "imparted nothing" to him in the way of apostolic mission; and that as to the substance of his Gospel he neither received it from men nor was he taught it, but it came to him through revelation of Jesus Christ.[2] But these assertions of independence, alike as to his apostolic commission and as to the substance of his message, are perfectly compatible with deriving instruction as to the historical details of the Lord's life in the ordinary way.[3]

S. Paul's Christian knowledge at this period was not confined to his experience near Damascus. We do not know what first roused his opposition against the Church, or when it began; but he must have had his reasons, and those reasons imply some knowledge of Christian doctrines. He must have heard much of Christian facts and principles during his arguments with believers in them, during his opposition at the trials of Christians, during the persecutions

[1] *E.g.* Beyschlag, 'N.T. Theol.' i. 19.
[2] Gal. i. 12. [3] Cf. Feine, 'Jesus Christus und Paulus,' p. 60.

which he inflicted upon them. If he consented to Stephen's death the implication is that he disapproved his teaching,[1] and had listened to his defence. And although he would not gather much Christian doctrine from S. Stephen's speech yet the strenuousness of his opposition shows that he realised the fatal character of Christianity as seen from a Jewish point of view. So eager and impetuous a mind would certainly avail itself of its opportunities of acquiring information. In truth it is not too much to say that his argumentative disposition must have provoked retort, and have elicited further details on Christian ideas. He was also now himself a recipient of baptism at the hands of Ananias. He had continued "certain days with the disciples which were at Damascus."[2] And it is natural to suppose that he must have conversed with them. Would he not hear some facts of the life of Christ, some practices of Christian religion? Would he not find the Eucharist enacted? Would he not himself be called to participation?

To this must be added that three years after his conversion S. Paul went up to Jerusalem and spent a fortnight with S. Peter. It is natural to suppose that the conversations between them included details of the life of Christ. It has been said, indeed, that this was not the purpose of S. Paul's visit, and that a fortnight was not very long for detailed information. At the same time it seems morally impossible that the words and works of Jesus were excluded from the conversation. S. Peter must have been eager to explain his own religious experience. S. Paul must have been eager to hear it. The very word he uses in describing his visit—ἱστορῆσαι Κηφᾶν—is suggestive of conference,[3] of the interchange of ideas. That S. Paul on this occasion obtained the list of witnesses of the Resurrection, which he afterwards taught his converts, and incorporated still later in his first letter to the Corinthians possesses a very high degree of probability. When he wrote that the Risen Lord "appeared

[1] Batiffol, 'Revue du Clergé français,' 1910, p. 655.

[2] Acts ix. 19.

[3] Batiffol, 'Revue du Clergé français,' 1910, p. 654. See above on S. Paul's list of the witnesses.

to Cephas, then to the Twelve," he is surely recording facts from S. Peter himself during this visit to Jerusalem.

That such converse happened seems a necessity of the historical imagination. S. Peter and S. Paul have met. They are both recipients of a marvellous and different experience. Both of them declared the fact fully in public to crowds of people. And neither of them spoke of it to each other! Is that credible? Yet S. Paul afterwards produced a list with S. Peter's name at the head.

Thus S. Paul's visit to Jerusalem, and his acquaintance with the original community, must have immensely enriched his knowledge of the historical Jesus. It is, of course, also possible that S. Paul derived information either then or afterwards from written sources as to the teaching of our Lord.[1]

3. But while the senior apostles and the community at Jerusalem were able to enrich S. Paul with precious gifts of detail as to the earthly character and words and doings of Jesus, they were unable to impart to his gospel any fundamental principle, or doctrine of salvation which he did not already grasp and hold as firmly as themselves. His essential Christianity was not their gift to him, nor was it received from any human tradition. "I neither received it from men, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ." It was immediate, personal, direct. It was the outcome of his own unique experience, and the product of his spiritual insight on the data of the exalted Nazarene.

Thus the conference between S. Paul and S. Peter manifested profound agreement in the fundamental principles of the Christian Faith. That there were practical diversities of opinion the subsequent history shows; but these diversities had nothing to do with their Christology. "Paul's doctrine of the nature of Christ," says Weizsäcker, "was not afterwards, so far as we know, attacked or disputed." There was substantial identity between the Petrine and Pauline Churches.

[1] So Batiffol.

IV

This fundamental agreement between S. Peter and S. Paul on the substance of Christianity is profoundly important in more directions than one.

1. It possesses an obvious essential significance. Some recent critics consider that S. Paul was afflicted with a weak sense of historic reality.[1] His speculative tendencies led him to idealise without the restraint of sober fact. They wish that he had exhibited less confidence in the validity of his spiritual intuitions, and a greater interest in historic detail. It would be better, they say, if after his conversion he had conferred with flesh and blood, and "got the older apostles to give him exact information."

Now, if S. Paul had complied with these conditions, he would have destroyed precisely that which gives him individual worth. He would have become merged as a subordinate in the older school, possessing no distinct individuality of testimony apart from theirs. But what he did was to mature his thoughts alone, after his unique experience, and then compared his independent conclusions with those of the Twelve. And the whole point is that their conclusions and his agreed. The validity of his spiritual intuitions may be disputed in Germany to-day, but it was acknowledged in Jerusalem by the very men who possessed the exact detailed information. If "Paul's doctrine of the nature of Christ was not afterwards so far as we know attacked or disputed,"[2] this is a fact of enormous significance. The exact historical information was certainly given to S. Paul, as the knowledge implied and suggested in his Epistles shows. But it was not given until his speculative intellect had thought his own experience out. This was not a drawback: it was a positive gain. It means that S. Peter and S. Paul represent two methods of approaching truth: the method of induction from innumerable instances; and the method of inference from a single central fact. The one had reached his conclusions through the details of the earthly life; the other from the heavenly

[1] Pfleiderer's 'Primitive Christianity,' i. 109.

[2] Weizsäcker.

glory reflected back upon the death.[1] Two lines of experience conveyed, and yielded the same conclusions. The "exact information" was given; but so far from correcting the spiritual intuitions, it confirmed them.

The method of induction from multiplied facts may be more congenial to minds of a certain training than the method of inference from a central incident. But surely S. Paul was right. For if the crucified Jesus was the exalted Christ, then the very secret of the Divine will must be involved in this experience. "Here then," as a critic[2] said long ago, "the true secret of human salvation was to be sought, not in the teaching of Jesus but in His death."

And thus it is not loss, but gain, when the two methods are found to issue in the same result. So far from complaining because S. Paul worked out his conclusions alone, it would be well to be grateful for the contributions of another method in an independent and powerful mind. If their methods differed, their conclusions agreed; and S. Paul knew that he had the solid weight of a united Christendom behind him when he wrote, "So, then, whether it were I or they, so we preach, and so ye believed."

Moreover, it may be asked whether disparagement of spiritual intuition is wise on the part of any believer in a personal Deity? Does not all such belief involve a venture of faith which partakes of the nature of spiritual intuition? Are there not certain experts in religion as well as in other spheres? Men of whose power to see it may be truly said that they "are worth ten thousand of us."[3] Was not S. Paul such a one? If speculative theology is at a discount to-day, and the historical critical school dominant over the metaphysical, as a quite natural but probably temporary reaction from over-confidence in human reason, yet it is impossible for any truly balanced religious theory to ignore the function of spiritual intuition. Disparagement of its worth can only be regarded as an exaggeration and as an extreme. The

[1] Thus for instance, "with the Twelve the sinlessness of Jesus is an induction from the facts of His life: with S. Paul a deduction from the exalted glory. B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.' i. 403.

[2] Hausrath, iii. 78.

[3] 2 Sam. xviii. 3.

avenues to truth are more than one. And they who believe that the Almighty spake sometime in visions unto His saints must also believe that it is not largeness of mind which disparages spiritual intuition.

Spiritual intuitions may indeed require to be confirmed. They must be based on real foundations. But S. Paul's intuitions do not stand alone. The possession of the historical knowledge did but confirm him.

To say that "the Jesus of Paul is a subjective construction, a combination of logic and pharisaic metaphysics applied to certain actual facts,"[1] is only to make a criticism to which every religious belief without exception is liable. S. Paul's inferences may be called a subjective construction in the same sense that any belief in God may be so described. All religious belief is due to human thought applied to certain actual facts. If such subjective construction is invariably incapable of reaching truth, then, of course, S. Paul's inferences and all other religious inferences fail. But if this assumption prove too much, if we are not prepared for universal scepticism, then the validity of S. Paul's inferences must be determined on other grounds—whether the description of them as "pharisaic metaphysics" is adequate or conclusive of their worthlessness will obviously depend on very large assumptions.

Thus if S. Paul is occasionally presented in an extreme modern school as a speculative theologian unconcerned with facts, and elaborating an ideal of a heavenly Messiah quite apart from historical reality and concrete earthly existence, this is entirely to misconceive his spirit. S. Paul is no Greek philosopher; he is Jewish to the core of his nature. He is no metaphysician concerned with ideas, but a Jew concerned with facts and persons. He possessed a philosophy of history, and had no conception of religion as disengaged from history: much the contrary. He built his inferences on the foundation of historic occurrences, in the absence of which his whole conceptions disappear.[2]

[1] Guignebert, 'Manuel,' p. 344.

[2] Cf. Windisch, 'Der Geschichtliche Jesu. Theologische Rundschau,' 1910, p. 172.

Everything shows, it has been said,[1] that his Hellenic instruction did not advance beyond an elementary stage. Nothing about him suggests the learned man. His qualities for literature are proverbial phrases. He shows no acquaintance with Greek philosophy. He writes in Greek, but he thinks in Aramaic.

2. The fact is that many of the modern criticisms on S. Paul's method proceed on a different conception of the essence of Christianity. If Christianity consists merely in repetition of the teaching of Jesus then S. Paul's method of speculative inference from the exalted Christ to a whole series of dogmatic conceptions about Him would be wholly indefensible. And in this case the elder apostles must have treated S. Paul as apostles had to be treated. They must have taken him unto them, "and expounded unto him the way of God more carefully." In which case he never could have said about his gospel, "I neither received it from man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ." To assert his independence of other men's instructions would then have been impossible. He would in fact have been constrained to acknowledge that the chief contents of his Gospel were derived from the community at Jerusalem. That he did not receive his doctrine from men, that he was not taught it by the ordinary channels of human instruction, means that Christianity does not consist in the details of Christ's career. It has been said reproachfully that "hardly anything remains in S. Paul of the actual Jesus whose charm had attracted peaceful Galilee,"[2] and that "such inquiries as: Where was He born, how long did He live, what did He preach, find no answer in S. Paul."[3] Perfectly true. But this only shows that S. Paul's conception of the essence of Christianity was not that accepted by some of his modern critics. Hints and implications scattered throughout his letters prove a knowledge of the historic Jesus possessed yet left unutilised. He manifestly knew far more than he repeated. If he never appeals to the miracles of our Lord; never relates one parable, not even that of the Prodigal Son,

[1] Guignebert, 'Manuel,' 287. [2] *Ib.* 344.
[3] Holtzmann, 'Hand-Commentar,' i. 16.

wherein some of our contemporaries affirm all Christianity can be found; never, with a few significant exceptions, quotes one of Christ's sayings: these omissions are certainly deliberate. It cannot be because he did not know. He knew many details, yet he did not build his Christianity upon them. The solution plainly is that he did not consider our Lord as a teacher like one of the Prophets. He did not consider the Gospel to consist in anything that Jesus said. If the Crucified Jesus was the exalted Christ, the whole interest must centre in His exaltation, and in His death seen in the glory of the same. The Messiah was to S. Paul no mere instructor: He was the Mediator between God and man. Christianity was to him the religion of redemption. It was inseparable from a definite Christology.

If the Pauline theology is not a development of the words of Jesus, but an inference from the fact of a crucified and exalted Messiah; it is because these central facts determined Jesus not as a teacher merely or chiefly: but, above all this, as the Mediator between God and man.[1] To complain that the rich contents of the life of Christ are by S. Paul entirely sacrificed to two facts, namely the Cross and the Resurrection,[2] is to assume that Jesus is not the redeemer of the world. Such regrets are perfectly natural to those who occupy this ground. But then S. Paul believed in the Resurrection. Does it not occur to a critic that, like S. Paul, he too would make much of this event if he believed in it. Can it really be said that if the Resurrection is true S. Paul laid too much stress upon it? Is it fair, after denying what he believed, to reproach him for realising its importance?

Thus it is true, and wonderfully significant, that S. Paul nowhere founds the main principles of his theology on a saying of Jesus Christ.[3] He nowhere appeals for his conception of Jesus' Christhood, or His sinlessness, or His redemptive work, or His divinity, to any verbal claim which the Son of Man made during His ministry. All this is perfectly natural. They did not lie within his own experience. He had arrived at the dogmatic conclusions another way.

[1] Cf. Hausrath, iii. 79. [2] Wernle, 'Beginnings,' i. 187. [3] Goguel, p. 98.

He could determine, therefore, not to know anything among his hearers save Jesus Christ and Him crucified; and this, not because he was afflicted with a weak sense of historical reality, but because he had a strong sense of relative value and religious proportion.

It has been observed that S. Paul comparatively seldom designates our Lord by the earthly name of "Jesus"; the usual designation being "Christ." Whereas the former word appears less than 20 times, the latter appears more than 200.[1] The two words are also often combined together. For S. Paul, Jesus is the Exalted Christ; and his thoughts dwelt on the existence before and after the earthly career, rather than on the earthly career itself, which indeed derives its whole value and meaning as seen in the aspect of eternity. This was a natural result of the circumstances of S. Paul's conversion. The Appearance of the Heavenly Christ gave a boundless amplitude to his theology, and led him to dwell on these earthly aspects, the Passion, the Death, the Resurrection, which had in the deepest sense, a universal meaning. The Eternal Christ,—the Pre-existent, the Post-existent, with the interval of the earthly experience illumined and rendered significant by the descending from and returning to the heavenly realm—this is the object of S. Paul's devotion. "S. Paul," says Dean Robinson,[2] "had a message peculiarly his own—and that message dealt not with the earthly Jesus so much as with the heavenly Christ. In the heavenly sphere his message lies. "Henceforth," he says, "know we no man after the flesh: yea, if we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him (so) no more." The Death, the Resurrection, the Ascension—these are to him the important moments of the life of Christ; they are the ladder that leads upwards from "Christ after the flesh" to "Christ in the heavenly sphere—the exalted, the glorified, the reigning Christ; the Christ yet to be manifested as the consummation of the purpose of God. And if S. Paul looked beyond the earthly life of the Lord in one direction, he looked beyond it also in another. To

[1] Cf. Feine, 'Theologie des Neuen Testaments,' 1910, p. 344.

[2] 'Commentary on Ephesians,' p. 23.

his thought "the Christ" does not begin with the historical "Jesus." The Christ is eternal in the past as well as in the future. The earthly life of Jesus is a kind of middle point, a stage of humiliation, for a time. "Being rich, He became poor"; "being in the form of God . . . He humbled Himself, taking the form of a servant, coming to be in the likeness of men." That stage of humiliation is past: "God hath highly exalted Him": we fix our gaze now on "Jesus Christ, ascended and enthroned."

CHAPTER XIII

THE HISTORICAL JESUS AND THE PAULINE CHRIST

THE recent controversy in Germany on the relation of S. Paul to Jesus of Nazareth has produced a remarkable series of works by Wrede, Kaftan, Jülicher, and Johannes Weiss. They are, for the believer in our Lord's Divinity, painful reading. But they show some consequences of the attempt to explain S. Paul's conversion and theology within the limits of the purely natural. The peculiarity of this series of works is that, unlike the ordinary German productions, they are thrown into eminently readable and popular form, and have circulated by thousands.

Wrede[1] asks how the Pauline conception of the Christ originated. For those who, like S. Paul himself, see in Jesus an unearthly Divine Being there is, Wrede admits, no problem at all. But for those who regard Jesus as a purely human historical personality, the contrast between such a Jesus and the Pauline Divine Son of God is hopelessly inconceivable. The interval between the death of Jesus and this creation of S. Paul was very brief. There was not time for the purely earthly figure of the Nazarene to assume Divine proportions. That this Christ-conception should be the impression made by Jesus of Nazareth, Wrede admits has been often said, but he cannot credit it. S. Paul had never seen Jesus during his earthly career. His sole interest in the life of Jesus was in that which put an end to it, namely the Death.

Indeed the Jesus in whom S. Paul is interested is not

[1] Wrede, 'Paulus,' p. 84.

a historical person but a super-historical conception of the other world. The ideal which S. Paul has drawn is not the apotheosis of the earthly Jesus. The submission, humility, obedience, which he ascribes to the Christ is not the conduct of a person on earth ; but the quality manifested in the other world, by consent to incarnation. Thus it does not originate in the impression produced by the character of Jesus of Nazareth. This heavenly ideal of the Christ is, Wrede declares, a speculative theory accepted by S. Paul prior to his conversion. His conversion consisted in his fusing that speculative theory into union with the Jesus of history. Wrede insinuates that this identification of the heavenly Christ with the earthly Jesus was only possible precisely because of S. Paul's ignorance of the Jesus of the Galilæan days. If he had sat at table with Jesus in Capernaum he could never have identified Him with the creation of the world.

These daring assertions, unhappily the last utterances of an able critic, are too much for Julius Kaftan, who replied in a work entitled, 'Jesus and Paul.' Kaftan submitted that while no critic can altogether escape from subjectivity, we must broadly distinguish between that which is historic and that which commends itself to the modern mind. This distinction he complains that Wrede has not observed. Now, urges Kaftan, the tendency of the modern mind is to emphasise by means of comparative religions the similarities and analogies between Christianity and earlier forms of faith, until scarcely anything is left as distinctively Christian and original. This method is to Kaftan an abuse. Valuable as the comparative study of religions is, such an employment of it calls attention to superficial resemblances while it misses the deep and fundamental differences. After all, says Kaftan, the primitive form of Christianity is original. It is no mere confluence of pre-existing elements. Attach what importance we will to analogies, influences, and likenesses, yet, when all is said, they do not constitute Christianity, nor can it be explained by them. Beneath all these is the substance and the spirit of the religion. Kaftan allows that the form of S. Paul's expression is necessarily character-

ised by his antecedents and his age, which may be called the variable robe of an unchanging truth; there is a mythological element in all human speech: but beneath these are the distinctive principles. And Kaftan contends that Wrede has not understood what in the historical Jesus those distinctive principles are; and consequently that the contradictions which he sees between the ideals of Jesus and those of S. Paul are the product of his own misleading applications.

The fundamental principle of S. Paul is the inability of simple man to secure communion with God. That can only come as a gift, and not as a reward. It can only come through our relation with Jesus Christ. This is the meaning of his doctrine of Justification. To this must be added that such communion so received as a gift must be by grace morally maintained.

But this fundamental principle of S. Paul is also the fundamental principle of Jesus Christ. Kaftan declares that, if the identity between the parable of the Prodigal Son and the Pauline doctrine of Justification by faith appears a paradox, that is merely because critics regard S. Paul as a speculative theologian concerned for knowledge, rather than one personally concerned in the religious realisation of peace between the sinner and his God.

That the apostolic preaching of the Crucified and Risen Christ goes beyond the simple contents of the preaching of Jesus is due, urges Kaftan, simply to the fact that between the two lay the Death and the Resurrection. The danger which beset the infant community was lest it should waste its force in fantastic apocalyptic expectations of the speedy return of the Lord; and, although sharing in that belief, no one so completely advanced the work of Jesus, on the Master's own lines, as the great apostle S. Paul. And that he did this was a consequence of the Death and Resurrection, and not of abstract speculations on heavenly ideals. Thus, through S. Paul the Gospel of Jesus acquired a world-position, in true development, and not in contradiction to its spirit.

Kaftan's reply was followed by a criticism from the pen of Jülicher.[1] Jülicher contended that Wrede was right in

[1] Jülicher, 'Paulus und Jesus.'

method, but wrong in his use of it. Undoubtedly the sum and substance of the Gospel of S. Paul was the message of the Cross; the Death of the Christ, in union with His Resurrection. And Jülicher agrees with Wrede that the Pauline heavenly Christ is not to be discovered in the teaching of Jesus: although at the same time he considers that Wrede has exaggerated. The historical Jesus according to Jülicher, who, of course, excludes the fourth Gospel from the discussion, never mentioned His own pre-existence, nor the substitutional effectiveness of His sacrificial Death. On the other hand, Jülicher recognises that the first Christian community must have substantially agreed with S. Paul's doctrine of acceptance through Christ; for we find no protest raised by other believers against the Pauline ideal of the Messiah. Nor is it true, according to Jülicher, that S. Paul confines himself to speculation on a heavenly ideal of the Christ. His whole doctrine originates in the Resurrection of the Man of Golgotha. And the whole outcome of his vision near Damascus is the identification of the crucified Jesus with the Heavenly Christ. Moreover, urges Jülicher, the Gospel of S. Matthew shows that the primitive community accepted the idea of the universal authority of the exalted Christ. The words "all authority is given unto Me in heaven and earth" are identical in thought with the Pauline doctrine of the heavenly Christ. Nor was S. Paul so indifferent to the earthly career of Jesus as some have imagined.

His doctrine of the gift by grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, his contrast between the one man's disobedience and the obedience of the one,[1] "leaves room for the whole contents of the Gospel history." And S. Paul must have reached the thought of the exalted Christ's pre-existence, even though it had never crossed his mind as a Jew. If the Almighty permitted the death of the Messiah, His Son: then must this death be an essential element in the world's redemption. And it would not be easy to explain it as anything else than a ransom for many. The passage which the first Evangelist considers as the final utterance of

[1] Rom. v. 15, 18, 19.

Jesus to His disciples, "Lo, I am with you always even unto the end of the world," is the clearest statement of the indissoluble communion of life between the risen Son of God, and those who believe in Him; but it agrees with the Pauline thought that believers are dead with Christ and risen with Him; that they live in Christ, and are justified by the power of the blood of Christ. It is undeniable that we find astonishingly little in S. Paul of the actual sayings and actions of Jesus of Nazareth. Everything in S. Paul is about the Christ and His redemptive work. Probably, thinks Jülicher, S. Paul knew very little during his persecuting period of the words of Jesus, or of the majesty of His character. The Appearance to him outside Damascus was wholly unexpected. It is childish to ask how S. Paul recognised Jesus in the exalted Christ. Jülicher considers that the recognition was the necessary product of S. Paul's own thoughts. This assertion, however, has not carried conviction. It is part of that ill-fated endeavour to explain S. Paul's conversion without any real act of Christ. Jülicher is on safer ground when he urges that the historic Jesus could not be an indifferent matter to the mind of S. Paul. An apostle of Christ, who was not interested in the earthly career of the Messiah, is, says Jülicher, a purely modern conception; it is not the S. Paul of history. S. Paul's co-operation with other evangelists, such as Barnabas and Mark, excludes the possibility that he could have continued ignorant of the Gospel incidents. The Christianity of S. Paul developed on the ground of the primitive community at Jerusalem. He himself calls attention to their substantial identity.[1] There is indeed a fundamental difference, says Jülicher, between Jesus and S. Paul. Jesus is the lawgiver: S. Paul only an interpreter. Between the work of the two lay the death on the Cross. This, says Jülicher, did not belong to the Gospel of Jesus, but it was the whole substance of the Gospel of S. Paul. Here then Jülicher recognises a contradiction. He agrees with Wrede. According then to Jülicher, Jesus Himself forms no part of the substance of the Gospel. It is a message of the kingdom of God. That Jesus Himself is

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 11.

the King escapes Jülicher's attention. Did not Jesus then claim to be the Messiah? Jülicher considers that the point of interest had changed between the days of Jesus' ministry and the days of S. Paul's conversion. [An interval of at the most a very few years.] No longer were the absorbing questions, Whether it was lawful to pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, or whether a sympathetic Samaritan was better than a self-centred Pharisee. Now the question was whether the crucified Jesus was the Messiah. This S. Paul now affirmed; and worked out to its final results, with all his logical power and energy of character. What then is, according to Jülicher, the conclusion of the whole matter? It is this. Jesus proclaimed the kingdom of God. But this kingdom of God is not to be identified with the Church, which Jesus did not found. The Church is rather founded on the Pauline doctrine that the death of Jesus is the redemption of man. Jülicher then suggests that it is useless to speculate whether, if Jesus had not been crucified, but died in old age some thirty or forty years later, the religion of Jesus would have taken the place now occupied by the theology of the Cross. Very likely, thinks Jülicher, Jesus Himself would have severed His religion from Judaism, and the name of S. Paul would have become lost in the multitude of individuals who endeavoured to extend it. History, however, has gone another way: apparently to Jülicher's regret. And Jesus owes His world-historical significance to His martyr-death.

Has, then, S. Paul pushed the religion of Jesus out, and substituted for it the religion of the Christ? He has certainly made a new beginning. But Jülicher will not allow that S. Paul's work replaced the other. S. Paul has not set his theology in the place of the religion of Jesus, but surrounded it with his own.

Upon this series followed the discussion by Johannes Weiss. Weiss does not consider that the difference between the teaching of Jesus and that of S. Paul is explained by saying with Kaftan that the Death and Resurrection lay between. In the religion of S. Paul Jesus Himself is the central object of veneration. But Weiss acknowledges with

Kaftan and Jülicher that this was also the standpoint of the primitive Christian community. He thinks that Wrede would have answered that in that case the alteration in the religion of Jesus began before the conversion of S. Paul. And here Weiss adds a very remarkable statement. Primitive Christianity was, at any rate in part, a Christ-religion, that is, a religion whose central object was the exalted Christ. This type of religion, he adds, has prevailed down the centuries as the essentially Christian : and there are countless Christians to-day who neither know nor desire any other form of faith. They live in intimate communion with "the Lord"; and He is the object of their prayers. But there are also in modern German Christianity those who pass beyond Jesus and centre their devotion in the Father. Both these types of religions coexist in the German Church. It were to be wished, adds Weiss, that they tolerated one another more. His private hope, however, is that the newer theology will ultimately prevail over the traditional. "But as a historian," Weiss admits, "I am bound to say that it is far remote from the dominant early Christian outlook, and from the doctrine of S. Paul."

Thus then, according to Weiss, the religion which devotes itself to the exalted Christ is not created by S. Paul. This conception of Christianity began in the primitive community before S. Paul was converted. And to dispel it from the modern mind it is necessary to postulate two assumptions : first, that the whole historic development of Christianity started from a wrong central object ; and secondly, that both S. Paul and the primitive community misinterpreted Jesus, and that in an interpretation in which they were both agreed.

Weiss, however, is sure that Wrede is wrong in regarding Christianity as a collection of ideas already in vogue whether in Jewish, Hellenic, or Oriental circles. There may have been a pre-Christian Christology as well as a pre-Christian eschatology. But, at any rate, whatever previously prevailing ideas Christianity has adopted, it has reset them, and, so to say, crystallised them in a system of its own. It has reformed them on the ground that the fullness of the time was come.

It has gathered them on the basis of a certain event; and that event is the Resurrection of Jesus.

But according to Weiss the disciples' belief in the Resurrection was the product of the impress of Jesus' personality upon them. But, if this is the explanation, what is to be said of the case of S. Paul? How can his faith in the exalted Christ be the outcome of personal influence which he never experienced? Here is, as Weiss perceives, the central difficulty. Are we to talk of a spiritual influence of Jesus upon S. Paul? Here are the difficulties attendant upon the naturalistic explanations of S. Paul's experience outside Damascus. How, asks Weiss,[1] did S. Paul know that the Appearance outside Damascus represented Jesus of Nazareth? Weiss disagrees entirely with Jülicher. The question Jülicher pronounced childish. It still only sounds childish, answers Weiss, from the standpoint of a supernatural faith. The answer, of course, of religion is that of the Acts; that the Form which appeared explained His own identity. "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest." No difficulty exists. But from the purely naturalistic point of view, to give a psychologically intelligible account of the experience is very difficult indeed. If the Appearance which he saw assumed the guise of a superhuman form in heavenly glory, what possible connection could it have with the earthly circumstances of the Nazarene? In the case of S. Peter, says Weiss, the experience of visions of the Risen Master was quite different; for it was founded on intimate knowledge of the features of Jesus. A self-generated vision of those features, constructed by means of the past, and projected into the present, is for one of S. Peter's antecedents psychologically conceivable within the limits of the purely natural. But for S. Paul, if he had never seen Jesus or known Him personally, the materials for such psychological reconstruction were wanting. How could he possibly identify the vision of a glorified Figure with the Jesus whom he had never known? S. Paul could not recognise features which he had never seen. Are we to assume that the marks of the Passion existed in the glorified Figure, identifying

[1] J. Weiss, 'Paulus and Jesus,' 1909, p. 16.

this superhuman unearthly Being with the Jesus of history? Weiss thinks the suggestion desperate. Whether Weiss's difficulty will be a difficulty or not to others, and whatever solution they may profess, is not for the moment our concern. The interest is that according to one of the ablest of modern critics the explanation of the Damascus-incident within the limits of the merely "historical" seems impossible. His own solution is that S. Paul must have seen Jesus during the earthly ministry. Pages accordingly are devoted to maintaining what, on the whole, modern critics reject, that S. Paul did actually see Him and that he says as much.[1]

I

These are notable instances of the trend of much recent German critical theology.

1. The first and most obvious remark is their agreement that if the orthodox belief in the Person of Jesus is held there is no critical problem left. S. Paul's interpretation and the historical Jesus in that case agree. But it is assumed that this belief cannot be true. It is asserted, for instance, that if S. Paul had sat at table with the Jesus of the Galilæan Lake he could not possibly have depicted Him as the heavenly Christ. Now that assertion is pure assumption. It is not justified by historical criticism. The business of criticism cannot be to form *a priori* decisions on the inferences which an individual might have drawn if he had experienced something which did not occur. This is speculation and not history. Indeed it is clear that procedures of this kind are really the outcome of the critics' theological presuppositions. For it is obviously open to any man to assert that if S. Paul had sat at table with Jesus of Nazareth he would still have formed substantially the same conclusions about Him that he did. And this assertion may be confirmed by the fact that Galilæan disciples who had that experience placed substantially the same interpretation upon Jesus as did S. Paul. Primitive history does not show us two contradictory religions: one in which the Father

[1] This is rested on a wholly debatable exposition of 2 Cor. v. 16.

alone was worshipped; another in which the Son shared in that worship; a Theocentric and a Christocentric religion, struggling for supremacy. There is no such conflict seen. S. Paul's interpretation and that by the community of Jerusalem were substantially the same. S. Paul received from the Church the tradition that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures. He did not invent this conception; he received it. And in it is contained the essential difference between a Prophet and a Redeemer.

2. A second reflection on the foregoing discussion is that it raises the question: What is meant by the historical Jesus? What are precisely the documents to which critical attention is confined? For, of course, it must make all the difference what are accepted as the credible sources of information. Now the whole Johannine literature is ruled out. The Synoptic literature is by no means accepted: the extent of its acceptance varying in different cases. Even the earliest tradition, the Marcan narrative, is criticised by Johannes Weiss, and rejected in some important passages; as when our Lord says that He came to give his life a ransom for many. This is rejected as influenced by the Pauline conception. The only thing suggested in support of this is that the Gospel was composed later than the Pauline letters. But that this passage was influenced by Pauline teaching there is literally no proof whatever. There is every reason to suppose, precisely from the vagueness of its form, that S. Mark found it in the sources from which his Gospel was composed. And at any rate criticism is bound to allow full room for this possibility. A theory is easily proved by discrediting passages which point the other way. But the process is not conducive to historic truth.

3. Again, if the historic Jesus made no exceptional claims, did not draw the faith of individuals to Himself, or assert Himself to be the Christ and the Judge of mankind, then there is nothing to account for the disciples' belief in His Resurrection, or for their assent to the Pauline doctrine of the exalted Christ as a faithful presentation of His personality. The more the historical Jesus is depressed and reduced to the levels of ordinary mankind, or even of mere

prophetic supereminence, the more impossible it is to explain the origin of the disproportionate and portentous apotheosis to which the men who knew Him best consented and contributed. A German critic[1] naturally observes that the excellence of John Baptist and his prophetic sublimity never moved his disciples to affirm his exaltation to the right hand of God, or that he would judge mankind. Although King Herod himself prompted the idea that John Baptist had risen from the dead, it was not possible to induce his disciples to accept this interpretation of his disastrous death. To the oldest disciples, says Feine, the Jesus Whom they accompanied along the villages of Galilee, and the heavenly Being exalted at God's right hand, were one and the same. Therefore it will never satisfy fact to say with Wrede that S. Paul's conception of the exalted Christ was due to his ignorance. Jülicher's reminder that the words, "all authority is given unto Me in heaven and earth," are part of the Synoptic tradition, and identical in substance with the Pauline interpretation, is most opportune. Negative criticism is therefore entangled in the following difficulties; if moral excellence made its possessor the centre of the religion, how did S. John Baptist escape a similar treatment? If the moral excellence of Jesus was infinitely superior than that of the unworldly prophet, then this superiority is itself a phenomenon which requires to be explained. Either Jesus claimed to be the Messiah or He did not. If He did not, their ascription of the office to Him is unaccountable: if He did, the disaster of His death must have seemed to refute it. There is nothing in these opinions to induce in the disciples a belief in His Resurrection, or that His death was the ground of the Salvation of man. Faith in His teaching is not so easily convertible into faith in His Person. Between the idea that Jesus taught the truth about the Father, and the idea that Jesus Himself by His death is the reconciliation of the world, there lies an abyss: which, however, the primitive community as well as S. Paul found the means to cross. Unless the elements of the doctrine of the redemptive nature of His work lay in the

[1] Feine, 'Theol. N.T.,' 202.

teaching of Jesus, this transition is psychologically inexplicable.

4. If we may take the first Epistle of S. Peter as substantially representing S. Peter's mind, and that of the primitive community with him, we find that the personality of Jesus has led the disciple to a Christology and a Soteriology. The striking features of this Epistle are that it adopts a standpoint peculiarly appropriate to S. Peter's personal experience, suggests lines of thought independent of S. Paul, yet demonstrates substantial agreement in placing a redemptive value on Jesus' death. It has often been observed[1] how peculiarly appropriate to the experience of an original apostle it is to describe himself as "begotten again unto a living hope by the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead."[2] Certainly no terms could better express the contrast between the apostolic condition before and after it. It transferred them out of a state of depression and despair into a state of living hope. This is the utterance of one to whom the Resurrection was not a speculative inference from the character of a dead person, but an unexpected fact which showed the past in a different light.

Christ then, according to this Epistle, works for humanity not so much by what He said as by what He is. His value is rested upon His sinless character.[3] That is the basis of His redemptive work. He is compared with the suffering servant of Isaiah liii. "Who His own self bare our sins in His Body upon the tree," and "by Whose stripes ye were healed."[4] This suffering of Christ was "for sins"; it was once for all; it was vicarious, "the righteous for the unrighteous"; and the purpose of it was "that He might bring us to God."[5] Thus the Christian who, prior to conversion, was "going astray like sheep,"[6] "unrighteous,"[7] and in "darkness,"[8] is now "redeemed with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot; even the blood of Christ";[9] is now "sprinkled with the blood"[10] of this sacri-

[1] Cf. *e.g.* B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.' [2] 1 Peter i. 3; cf. v. 1.
[3] ii. 22. ii. 24. Cf. Titius, 'Seligkeit,' iv. 165.
[5] iii. 18. [6] ii. 25. [7] iii. 18. [8] i. 9.
[9] i. 18, 19. [10] i. 2.

ficial offering; is now in God's "marvellous light,"[1] and in a condition described as "Salvation."[2]

And this Redeemer Himself has experienced resurrection, which is the work of God,[3] and includes exaltation to God's right hand. And here significantly, as in his sermon in the Acts, S. Peter views the rejection of Christ by men and His exaltation by the Father as the fulfilment of the prophetic words: "the stone which the builders rejected, the same was made the head of the corner."[4]

Here, then, all through the Epistle, it is the person, and it is the work: Christology and Redemption are the writer's two main themes. If this letter bears any real relation to S. Peter's mind, then this interpretation of the significance of Jesus of Nazareth must imply some teaching heard during the ministry supporting and confirming it.

5. Of course there is a difference, a very great and startling difference, between the Jesus of the earliest Gospel tradition and the Pauline Christ.

Most significant, as illustrating that difference, is S. Paul's infrequent use of the earthly name Jesus (some 17 times), contrasted with his constant use of the heavenly title Christ, (some 200 times), together with the title "the Lord" (some 130 times).[5]

It is also startling at first to reflect that Christendom owes the doctrine of Redemption to S. Paul rather than to the words of Jesus.

These facts are not disputed. The question is, What is the true explanation? Recognising the facts, do they require the rationalistic solution?

II

Assuming the Pauline interpretation of Jesus to be true, it may be said at once that the differences between the teaching of our Lord and that of S. Paul must have exhibited precisely the general characteristics which we actually find.

For on the assumption that the historical Jesus is what S. Paul declared Him to be, it is obvious that the teaching

[1] ii. 9. [2] i. 5, 9, 10. [3] i. 21; iii. 21.
[4] ii. 7. [5] Cf. Feine, 'Th. N.T.,' 344.

of Jesus during His ministry would be beset with the gravest difficulties.

1. There would be the difficulties caused by His hearers. For they were not, at any rate at first, in a receptive state. All the prevailing religious terminology required to be detached from inferior meanings, to be cleansed and refined, and filled with deeper contents, before it could become an adequate vehicle for His instructions. Otherwise His words would be spoken in one sense, and understood in another. The great terms, the Messiah, the Son of Man, the Son of David, the Son of God, were all liable to serious misconstruction, until His hearers came to realise that He did not utter them in the popular sense. Hence the embarrassment, the reticence and reserve, which are obvious features of the Master's teaching. Hence the half-sad, half-reproachful question: How is it that ye do not understand?

We find, moreover, on their side a very evident reluctance to abandon their old conceptions in favour of the new thoughts which He gave them. His announcement of unpalatable truths were met sometimes with open remonstrance, at others with bewilderment, at others with silent dislike. All this complicated the work of instruction very seriously. On their own confession they were constantly in an unteachable frame of mind. Now it is impossible for criticism to say to what extent the disciples' unreceptiveness put restraint upon Christ's self-revelation, and limited His teaching. As it was, He clearly said many things which were unintelligible at the time. How many things were left unsaid, because to say them would do more harm than good? If He could not do many mighty works in certain places because of the local unbelief, a similar obstruction must have thwarted His words.

Moreover the disciples' unreceptiveness at the time must have crippled Him in another way. For if, as S. Paul's conception of Him implies, our Lord was engaged in a process of self-revelation, we have to remember that self-revelation is not achieved merely by words. This is exactly what criticisms of the difference between Jesus' teaching and S. Paul's teaching constantly ignore. They

assume that everything He has to reveal about Himself can be revealed in so many sentences. But self is revealed by silence just as truly as by speech; by what a man does not say just as truly as by what he says. Self is declared or betrayed in a thousand subtle indefinable ways. A man may be known by his look, by his attire, his laughter, his gait, by his changeful bearing under the perpetually varying conditions of the daily career. The man himself cannot put all these into words. They would not give the same impression if he did. It was impossible even for Jesus Christ to reveal Himself exclusively by His utterances. The cast of His character was manifested through a far more subtle way than any mere verbal process.

2. There was a second restraint on the teaching of Jesus caused by the nature of His mission: if He is what S. Paul believed Him to be, then the mission of Jesus was not merely to give instruction either about Himself or about His work. His mission was not so much to enlighten as to redeem. If "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself," then Christ came not so much to preach the Gospel as so to live that there might be a Gospel to preach.[1]

Now those who consider the teaching of Jesus irreconcilable with that of S. Paul do so on the assumption that Jesus was a prophet and nothing more. But this is a dogmatic interpretation of His Person, which, of course, necessitates the result reached, because it virtually assumes it in its presuppositions. It ought, however, to be self-evident that if the main function of our Lord was redemption, then the difference between the historical Jesus and the Pauline Christ is explained. If Jesus had come to work rather than to talk, to save by self-sacrifice rather than to enlighten by prophetic instruction, the phenomena fall at once into natural position.

3. A third restraint on the teaching of Jesus was caused by the fact that He spoke in anticipation of events not yet achieved. If critics are found who even doubt whether our Lord could speak of the Church before it existed, they

[1] Dr. Dale, of Birmingham.

ought not to demand our Lord, at the same time, to deliver, before the event, everything He had to teach.

It is quite true that the teaching on Redemption which the Gospels ascribe to our Lord is meagre compared with that of S. Paul. But it is one thing to explain the Death after it has occurred; it is another thing to explain it beforehand, and to men who rebelled against the idea that it could ever happen. Is not the difference in the teaching precisely what we might expect, if our Lord was what S. Paul maintained?

It was naturally left for the apostolic age, after the Death was achieved, to place the true interpretation on its meaning. And this was chiefly wrought through the spiritual insight of S. Paul.

The objection that if Jesus of Nazareth was what S. Paul believed, He must have declared Himself substantially in the terms of the Pauline Christology and Soteriology, is an objection which fails to realise the historic situation. Such completed self-declaration was not possible. The unreceptiveness of the disciples, the nature of Christ's mission, the very period of incompleteness in which the instructions were given, all alike combine to render such a demand unreasonable.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RESURRECTION IN THE ACTS

HAVING traced the process by which the elder apostles and S. Paul came independently to their belief in our Lord's Resurrection, having also followed them where their fundamental agreement was ascertained, the next step is to analyse their teaching on the Resurrection in their early mission instructions. Examples both of the preaching of S. Peter and also of S. Paul on critical occasions are given in the Acts of the Apostles at considerable length. Our purpose is to analyse these instructions separately. First those of S. Peter, and then those of S. Paul.

A

The mission instructions of S. Peter may be grouped in four main sections: the Whitsuntide Sermon, the addresses connected with healing the cripple at the beautiful gate, the speech before the Sanhedrim at his second arrest, and the instruction of Cornelius.

I

S. Peter's teaching on our Lord in the Whitsuntide Sermon falls at once into easily marked divisions.

1. First, as to Jesus life. His mission was Divine. This was attested by his works, which are triply characterised, as manifestations of power, as objects of attention, and as symbols of great ideas. Appeal is made to the Jews themselves to acknowledge the justice of this account. But Jesus of Nazareth was dead. It might, therefore, seem useless to reopen the question now.

2. Accordingly, S. Peter advances, secondly, to give his

interpretation of that Death. He declared it to be at once divinely ordained, and also a national crime. Jesus of Nazareth was "delivered up," that is, to death, "by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." S. Peter has come to understand that suffering and death are part of the mission of the Messiah; and that what he deprecated, as a horrible disaster, was nevertheless the will of God. The disciple has spiritualised his Messianic ideas. The death of Jesus was not the mere triumph of worldly force over moral worth. It was providentially designed. But, on the other hand, it was a national crime. The Jewish nation availed themselves of pagan instruments to secure this brutal and appalling result.

This interpretation of the Death, as an act of Providence, and a human sin, is given by S. Peter in a sentence of extraordinarily pictorial vividness and force. But it certainly required to be supported by the strongest proof.

3. What, then, is the proof that this interpretation of the Death is true? S. Peter's answer is, the Resurrection. "Whom God raised up." It was this alone which rendered such an interpretation possible: which indeed compelled this interpretation to be made. S. Peter himself would clearly have been unable, like his contemporaries, to place such construction upon the Death in the absence of this certifying fact of the Resurrection.

But if the Resurrection explained the Death, upon what foundation did the Resurrection itself repose? Where was the proof of it?

4. "Because," answered S. Peter, "it was not possible that He should be holden of Death." This impossibility of our Lord's continuance in death might have been founded on His moral perfection, or on His Divine personality.[1] But the reason which S. Peter gave is because it was predicted. He appeals to Scripture. The familiar language of the sixteenth Psalm,

> "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades.
> Neither wilt Thou give Thy Holy One to see corruption."

was certainly not fulfilled in David's case. His tomb was

[1] Cf. S. John v. 26.

there among the sepulchres of the Kings. His body assuredly saw corruption. But, urged S. Peter, this prophetic anticipation, unverified in the experience of David, was in reality a reference to the experience of the Messiah. Accordingly the Resurrection of the Messiah was a conception required by Old Testament teaching. S. Peter set this exposition first. For if his hearers can be convinced that Scripture postulates the Resurrection of Messiah, they will be prepared to be reconciled with the historic application.

5. Now such Resurrection, S. Peter affirmed, has been experienced by Jesus of Nazareth. The language of the Psalmist, inapplicable to David, is an accurate description of what has happened in Jesus' case. His soul was not left in Hades. His flesh did not see corruption. That this Resurrection of Jesus is an actual fact is the witness of the entire apostolic community: "whereof we *all* are witnesses." They can certify it, individually and collectively, from their own experience. If S. Peter alone formulates this testimony, he does so in the consciousness that it would be endorsed by the whole body of his associates.

6. Hereupon follow, finally, the conclusions which the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus entails. They are three. First, that Jesus is by the right hand of God exalted. Resurrection does not merely certify survival of the experience of death. It is life in a glorified state. And, secondly, with this idea of exaltation, goes the idea of power. The exalted Jesus is the recipient of the promised Spirit, and the source of the new spiritual powers bestowed upon mankind. And, thirdly, the great conclusion is reached that the Jesus whom the Jews had crucified was divinely constituted to the dignity of Christhood, and of Lordship or dominion over men.

This is further emphasised when, in response to his hearers' inquiry what they ought to do, S. Peter implores them to "repent and to be baptised in the name of Jesus Christ." Here the personal and official names are, for the first time, blended in the familiar Christian way.

This first Christian Sermon suggests the following important considerations.

1. It is wholly and entirely founded on the Resurrection. Not merely is the Resurrection its principal theme, but if that doctrine were removed there would be no doctrine left. For the Resurrection is propounded as being (1) the explanation of Jesus' death; (2) prophetically anticipated as the Messianic experience; (3) apostolically witnessed; (4) cause of the outpouring of the Spirit, and thus accounting for religious phenomena otherwise inexplicable; and (5) certifying the Messianic and Kingly position of Jesus of Nazareth. Thus the whole series of arguments and conclusions depends for stability entirely upon the Resurrection. Without the Resurrection the Messianic and Kingly position of Jesus could not be convincingly established. Without it the new outpouring of the Spirit would continue a mystery unexplained. Without it the substance of the apostolic witness would have disappeared. All that would be left of this instruction would be the Messianic exposition of Psalm xvi.: and that, only as a future experience of a Messiah who had not yet appeared. The Divine Approval of Jesus as certified by His works would also remain: but apparently as an approval extended only to His life; a life ending like that of any other prophet whom the nation refused to tolerate any longer. Thus the first Christian sermon is founded on the position of Jesus as determined by His Resurrection.

2. Secondly, S. Peter's proof of the Lord's Resurrection is not strictly founded upon prophecy, but on the evidence of fact, which came within his own apostolic experience. His argument from the Prophetic Psalm was designed to convince the Jews that Resurrection was a scripturally predicted portion of the Messiah's experience. But whether any such Resurrection had actually taken place was not a question of prophecy at all: it was a question of fact; and entirely separable. It would be perfectly possible to accept S. Peter's interpretation of the Psalm, and yet to deny that it had been actually fulfilled. Whether Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah must depend upon the question whether the Messiah's experiences had been fulfilled in Him; whether, above all, He had or had not risen from the dead. S. Peter's

exposition of the Psalm suggests that he is propounding a new idea, not that he is repeating an accepted exegetical commonplace. His personal faith in Jesus' Resurrection did not begin with the prophecy, and advance thence to the fact. Its fulfilment in Jesus was the thing to be demonstrated, not assumed. Indeed it seems quite clear that the fact of Jesus' Resurrection created this interpretation of the Psalm. It is an exposition after the event and not before it. The object of his exposition is to show that apostolic experience is in conformity with Scriptural anticipation of the Messiah.

3. In the third place, it ought to be noted that the dogmatic limitations of this first sermon are very remarkable. Not a word is said of our Lord's Divinity: indeed nothing which transcends the strictly Messianic. And perhaps more significant still: this first apostolic sermon contains no reference to Redemption. The exalted Jesus is described as recipient of the Spirit, and the cause of the new spiritual endowments of the Apostolic circle; He is assigned dominion over men, although whether that dominion is national or world-wide is not asserted: but no further distinctively Christian doctrine is proclaimed. That is to say, that the Sermon is confined to the most primitive circle of Christian ideas. It manifestly belongs to the earliest type of development. It does not reproduce the stage of Christian thought which had been reached when the Acts was written. It is a sermon which would have been difficult to invent by one familiar with the Pauline conceptions. It is peculiarly appropriate to the circumstances, and bears the mark of intrinsic probability. It suggests that the author of the Acts is here incorporating an early report. Its dogmatic limitations are evidential.

II

Next to the Whitsuntide Sermon are grouped the instructions connected with the healing of the cripple at the Beautiful Gate.[1]

A. In his speech to the people S. Peter diverts attention from himself to the true source of the miracle.

[1] Acts iii. and iv.

1. He then condemns in a few severe sentences the attitude of the Jews toward our Lord, as perpetrated in spite alike of the heathen magistrate's protest, and His own moral character. They "denied the Holy and Righteous One." This appeal to the sinlessness of Our Lord is absent from the Whitsuntide Discourse, but is exactly what we should expect to find from a companion of the days of the Son of Man. One may almost wonder that the appeal to the moral evidence does not occupy a larger space in S. Peter's mission instructions. But even here it is rather an appeal to notorious facts than a testimony to the influence of the personality of Jesus upon himself. To say "Ye denied the Holy and Righteous One, and asked for a murderer to be granted unto you, and killed the Prince of Life," is doubtless primarily a contrast between the character of Jesus and the treatment He received:[1] but it is far more than a contrast between innocence and guilt. Its emphatic completeness means the ascription of actual sinlessness to the Person so described.

2. In solemn contrast with this conduct of the Jews, S. Peter sets the act of God in the Resurrection of Jesus; which he affirms to be attested by the apostolic evidence, and also by the miracle confronting them.

3. He then discovers some extenuation for the Jewish treatment of Jesus, as an act of ignorance both on their part, and on that of their rulers. But he nevertheless claims that in all this the Messianic predictions have been divinely fulfilled.

4. He appeals to them, accordingly, to repent of their conduct towards our Lord, as he had also appealed at Whitsuntide: adding, however, the new and remarkable thought that such repentance will conduce to the speedy return of the Messiah, "that so there may come seasons of refreshing from the presence of our Lord; and that He may send the Christ who hath been appointed for you, even Jesus: Whom the heaven must receive until the times of restoration of all things."

5. Accordingly S. Peter claims that they stand at the

[1] Cf. B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.' i. 175.

beginning of a new era. The prophets "told of these days." And he concludes with the assurance that "unto your first God, having raised up His Servant, sent Him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from your iniquities."

1. Here, again, in this sermon, as at Whitsuntide, the whole discourse is founded on our Lord's Resurrection. It is true that the fact of the Resurrection is here greatly condensed, and rested exclusively on the apostolic witness, and that its consequences are differently drawn out; but it is the Resurrection which really dominates all. "The God of our fathers hath glorified His Servant Jesus" (13); "Whom God raised from the dead" (15); of which fact the apostles are the witnesses (15): here is the substance of the announcement.

2. On the other hand, together with this central Christian deliverance, the general limitations of the apostle are very remarkable.

Most striking is S. Peter's appeal to the Jews to repent of their treatment of Jesus "that so there may come seasons of refreshing from the presence of the Lord, and that He may send the Christ." This expectation of the speedy return of the Messiah, evidently to be hoped for as likely within a brief interval, conditionally on the Jews' repentance, is deeply significant. It is a view which no one writing after the fall of Jerusalem would have invented. Like the Whitsuntide Sermon the passage belongs distinctly to an undeveloped stage of Christian thought. On reflection it is felt to be peculiarly appropriate to the circumstances of S. Peter's experience; and it may be confidently asserted that it is not the way in which he would have expressed himself at a later time.

Equally remarkable is the sentence "Unto you *first*, God having raised up His Servant sent Him to bless you." Bengel called this phrase "prævium indicium de vocatione gentium." But Peter shared the standpoint of his nation. On this passage Bishop Chase observes: "In the speeches which S. Peter is represented in the earlier chapters of the Acts as addressing to the people and to the rulers the great

destiny of the Gospel is barely hinted at.... There is nothing to show that his horizon is wider than the horizon of the prophets....[1] Once and once only in those earlier speeches of S. Peter does a sense of the wider field of blessing certainly appear; and it appears in the form of insistence on the prerogative of the Jew. The promise of the blessing through Abraham's seed to all the world prefaces the assurance: 'Unto you *first*, God having raised up His Servant sent Him to bless you.'"[2]

These theological limitations Bishop Chase considers "signs of a true and faithful portraiture."

This popular address in Solomon's portico ended in the apostle's arrest by Sadducæan influence. The Sadducees were pained at hearing men "proclaim in Jesus the resurrection from the dead." Thus the hearers are deeply conscious that the Resurrection is the centre of S. Peter's teaching.

B. Hereupon the apostolic witness is transferred from the crowd to the great Council of the nation; before which S. Peter reiterates the same principal ideas:[3]

1. The Crucifixion of Jesus by the Jews;
2. His Resurrection by God;
3. His power manifested in the miracle of healing;
4. His exaltation to supreme authority in spite of His rejection by the Jewish builders;
5. His unique relation to men as the source of their salvation.

Two reflections are suggested by this teaching:

1. It should be noticed here that, as at Whitsuntide, the Resurrection is not viewed merely as a past event, but as the solution of present religious phenomena. It is the Resurrection which accounts for the cripple's restoration to health; just as it is the Resurrection which explained the spiritual gifts at Whitsuntide. Christ's Resurrection does not appear to the apostles in the aspect of a completed fact so much as of a power extended into the present, and pervading the whole religious experiences of the Church.

[1] Chase, 'Credibility of the Acts,' p. 59.
[2] *Ib.* p. 60. Acts iii. 26; cf. S. Mark vii. 27.
[3] Acts iv. 10 ff.

2. What did S. Peter mean when he told the Jewish ruler that "*in* none other is there Salvation"?[1] To this question the reply has been given that "The word *salvation* as S. Peter uses it is still coloured by the lower associations of national aspiration—deliverance, restoration, unity; it is the divine gift of perfect soundness, vouchsafed to a nation wearied by disaster, and torn by internal strife. Such salvation, such deliverance, Messiah was to bring. But on the other hand, the word, as S. Peter uses it, is already being transplanted into the spiritual sphere; already it speaks of blessings corresponding to the needs of every part of our nature, the full sum of all the divine activities and gifts which meet the case of the sinful man."[2]

III

The third main incident in the preaching of S. Peter is his address before the Sanhedrim when he was arrested after his escape from prison.[3]

1. Here S. Peter insists on the supreme obligation of obedience to God, in spite of human orders to the contrary;

2. Obedience to that God which had caused the Resurrection of Jesus, whom the Jews "slew hanging Him on a tree";

3. Who by Resurrection had also effected the exaltation of Jesus "to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel and remission of sins."

4. And this doctrine and fact S. Peter rests on the double witness of the Apostolic Community, and of the Holy Spirit "Whom God hath given to them that obey Him."

The address is brief; possessing its own characteristics; rising out of the circumstances; exhibiting the same fundamental message, and similar Jewish limitations. At the basis of all is the Resurrection, which has three results: (1) it condemns the conduct of the Jew towards Jesus; (2) it exalts Jesus Himself to supreme authority and redemptive power; (3) it imposes the duty of obedience to the God of their fathers

[1] Acts iv. 12. [2] Chase, 'Credibility of Acts,' p. 132.
[3] Acts v. 30-32.

Who has wrought this exaltation. But the scope of this redemptive work is only extended by S. Peter here to Israel. No hint is given of the Gentile world. And while obedience to this revelation is rewarded by the gift of the Holy Spirit, the solemn implication is that this gift is withheld from those who disobey. The great thought is here expressed that the Community of the Resurrection is the sphere of the Spirit's activity.

IV

To these instructions by S. Peter must be added, finally, his teaching of Cornelius.[1]

Here S. Peter for the first time places the title "Jesus Christ" in the forefront of his message. At Whitsuntide it was the conclusion of his speech that Jesus was the Christ.[2] Elsewhere it was mentioned in connection with baptism,[3] and in a formula of healing.[4] But here S. Peter begins with it. It is significant that this should be the case where he is addressing, by invitation, a friendly and well-disposed circle of hearers, who are in a teachable frame of mind. Here also S. Peter announces at once that the subject of his message is "Lord of all." Thus he propounds the great doctrines which form the substance of his instruction. If this method of procedure had been adopted at Whitsuntide the instruction might have came to an untimely end. On that occasion S. Peter reserved the great dogmatic announcement to the end; and slowly built up step by step his teaching. Each method was adapted to the circumstances. There is an air of historic veracity in both.

After this introduction of his conclusions, the apostle then falls back, as he did in the Whitsuntide Sermon, on the earthly name, Jesus of Nazareth, and gives a brief summary of His activity from the purely human point of view: "how that God anointed Him with the Holy Ghost and with power; Who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed with the devil; for God was with Him."[5] This is the superficial first aspect of the life as it appeared

[1] Acts x. 38-43. [2] Cf. Acts v. 42 and iii. 20. [3] Acts ii. 38, x. 48.
[4] Acts iii. 6, iv. 10. [5] Acts x. 38.

to any ordinarily observant Jew or pagan. S. Peter claims also to possess personal knowledge of the whole public career. Then came the Death: "Whom also they slew, hanging Him on a tree."[1]

And here S. Peter begins his proclamation of the Resurrection.

1. "Him God raised up on the third day." Here, for the first time, the third day is mentioned in the apostolic preaching. It is noteworthy that the third day is greatly emphasised in the Gospel of S. Luke,[2] which is connected with the Jerusalem appearances; and also that S. Luke ascribes this announcement to the head of the Jerusalem Community.

2. To this S. Peter adds that the manifestations of the Risen Lord were not granted to the entire people, but only to divinely selected apostolic witnesses.

3. Further, that these witnesses not only saw Him but "did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead." It is worthy of notice that S. Luke, who ascribes this most materialistic evidence of physical identity to S. Peter in the Acts, gives the account of the incident in the Gospel,[3] and is the only Evangelist who does so.

4. Further, that the Lord, clearly after He was risen, gave the apostles instructions to proclaim Him as Judge of mankind. Meyer considers that this is a saying of the Risen Master not elsewhere recorded.[4]

5. Finally, that this announcement of forgiveness of sins through Jesus of Nazareth is supported by the teaching of "all the prophets." This offer is to "everyone" that accepts Him. The universality of the Gospel message is here perhaps suggested.[5]

The instruction of Cornelius consists of two pictures, or rather a background and a foreground of the same, remarkably contrasted. In the background is the earthly Jesus, in the foreground the heavenly Christ. This contrast is habitual with S. Peter. He sets elsewhere the sharp antithesis: "Whom ye crucified, Whom God raised."[6] But

[1] Cf. Acts v. 30. [2] S. Luke xxiv. 21-46. [3] S. Luke xxiv. 41-43.
[4] *In loc.* S. Matt. xxviii. 20 and Acts i. 8 are quite different.
[5] Cf. Acts x. 34. [6] Acts iv. 10; cf. Acts iii. 14, 15.

here in the instruction of Cornelius this contrast is developed with unexampled vividness. There is first the background of Jesus of Nazareth, with His beneficent ministrations to human needs, going about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed;[1] ending in His death, by hanging on a tree. Then, secondly, on this background, which could only suggest a divinely gifted Prophet, not in the least the promised and expected Messiah, is set the glorious announcement of Resurrection. This includes exaltation to authority over the consciences of men, the final judgeship of human character, the prerogative of the forgiveness of sins. The lowliness of the former, the grandeur and unearthliness of the latter, makes this contrast exceedingly powerful and awakening. If the thought is virtually the same as in previous sermons it is differently presented. But of course that which makes the contrast possible, that which is the sum and substance of the message, is the Resurrection.

B

The Pauline series of instructions in the Acts include first the sermon in the Synagogue of Pisidian Antioch; secondly the speech at Athens, and thirdly the addresses in Palestine. In addition are the two accounts of his own conversion, which will be omitted here, having been already treated separately.

I

The main lines of S. Paul's address in the Synagogue of Pisidian Antioch were as follows:

1. After tracing the history of Israel from Moses to the time of David, he affirms that the promises made to David were fulfilled in his line, namely, in Jesus, who was also the subject of S. John Baptist's Mission (16-25).

2. He then appealed to his hearers to realise the momentous value of the person of Jesus. Being far remote from the sacred soil, he described the conduct of these "dwellers in Jerusalem": their ignorant want of penetration; listening periodically to the language of their prophets, yet

[1] Acts x. 38.

incapable of understanding them; blindly fulfilling their sacred books by condemning Him. This S. Paul enforced with historic detail. Their inability to find an adequate pretext for His death; their request to Pilate, who is mentioned by name; the taking down from the Cross; the burial: all these are recorded by S. Paul, almost with the precision of an Evangelist (16-29).

3. Then comes the distinctive declaration: the Resurrection. They "laid Him in a tomb; but God raised Him from the dead." This is the antithesis already familiar in the sermons of S. Peter. "Ye... killed the Prince of life: Whom God raised from the dead."[1] "Whom ye crucified, Whom God raised."[2] "The God of our fathers raised up Jesus, Whom ye slew."[3] "Whom they also slew, hanging Him on a tree, Him God raised up the third day."[4] These are S. Peter's witness. That of S. Paul propounds a similar antithesis.

4. This assertion of the Resurrection is then rested on the Apostolic evidence. And this with remarkable peculiarities. S. Paul omits all reference to his own experience. He appeals exclusively to the testimony of the elder disciples.

(*a*) S. Paul mentions the *period* during which the apostolic experience lasted: it was extended over "many days." The form of the statement is striking. It looks original. For the historian himself described the period as "forty days:"[5] yet here he leaves the less definite expression. Surely because he found it in the record of the speech.

(*b*) S. Paul also mentions the *place* where the experience occurred. It was the testimony of "those who came up with Him from Galilee to Jerusalem." The speaker seems to confine attention here to experiences in Jerusalem. It is noteworthy that S. Luke also in his Gospel does the same. We remember that the list of witnesses in 1 Cor. xv. is derived from the community in Jerusalem. The suggestion is that S. Paul locates the Easter Appearances in that neighbourhood.[6]

(*c*) Consequently the recipients of this experience are naturally now constituted "His witnesses unto the people."

[1] Acts iii. 15. [2] Acts iv. 10. [3] Acts v. 30. [4] Acts x. 39-40.
[5] Acts i. 3. [6] Resch confirms this, 'Paulinismus,' p. 368.

Why S. Paul omits his own experience we may not be able to determine. Certainly it was not for the strange reason assigned by Paley that "the testimony of those who had conversed with Jesus after His Resurrection in the ordinary and natural way of human perception" was "the most direct and satisfactory proof."[1] As if S. Paul disparaged the method of his own experience, or thought it other in kind from theirs! Considering also that he made it the subject of two mission sermons in the Acts, and set it in the same list with the elder apostles' experience in the first Corinthian letter.

5. To strengthen the apostolic evidence, S. Paul next appeals to Scripture evidence (32-37). The Divine constitution of Jesus (to the Messianic office) "that He raised up Jesus"—raised up, in the sense of appointed or ordained, is founded on the 2nd Psalm, "Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee." And the Divine upraising of Jesus from the dead, involving as it does perpetuity of life, "Now no more to return to corruption," is founded on the 16th Psalm: "Thou wilt not suffer Thy Holy One to see corruption." The contrast between the experience of David and that of Jesus is clearly shown.

6. And finally the conclusion is reached, in an application of the doctrinal results involved in this fact of the Resurrection. This is expressed under the terms of forgiveness and of justification. The Resurrection here, as with S. Peter, is not merely historic and past, but involving present spiritual results of the most momentous character. Especially remarkable are the words: "And by Him every one that believeth is justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." And then S. Paul finishes with a solemn warning against the danger of rejecting Divine announcements.

This report of S. Paul's sermon in the synagogue has been criticised as "plainly an imitation of that of Stephen, and of the Petrine discourses in the first part of the Acts, and therefore scarcely derived from the tradition of a hearer."[2]

[1] Paley, Sermon vi.; works, iv. 304. [2] B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.' i. 280.

1. So far as concerns S. Stephen's speech, a resemblance in S. Paul's utterances would only show that the incidents of that trial and martyrdom made a profound impression on the persecutor. There is a marked tendency in men to repeat, perhaps half unconsciously, phrases and arguments heard in their more impressionable hours. It is not uncommon in preachers to betray an influence which some of their hearers may be able to trace. If the resemblance between these two discourses were great, it might just as reasonably represent the fact and not the historian's fancy.

But is the resemblance more than superficial? "Both sermons," says Bishop Chase, "open with a review of the ancient history of Israel. But here all similarity between the two speeches ends. The range and the motive of the reference to the past in the two utterances are wholly different. S. Stephen was mainly concerned to insist that the earliest crises of revelation were concerned with places outside the sacred soil of the Holy Land, and to show that the rejection of Jesus the Messiah and of His witnesses had its prototype in Israel's rejection of Moses, the divinely-appointed deliverer and law-giver. S. Paul traces the outline of the history in order to prove that in earlier deliverances, as now in the redemption wrought by Jesus the Messiah, all was the direct outcome of the divine working."[1]

2. Secondly, as to the resemblance between this synagogue sermon and the Petrine discourses. It is a curious feature in S. Paul's sermon, and certainly unexpected, that it should include so remarkable a quantity of biographical detail. His mention of John the Baptist, and report of his teaching; his reference to Pilate, and the Jewish influence over him; the taking down from the Cross, the laying in a tomb: all these could only be traditional for S. Paul; they would come more naturally from S. Peter's personal experience. A careful analysis, however, seems to show that S. Peter's knowledge of the details of our Lord's life, as reported in the Acts, is more varied than that of S. Paul. It is nevertheless unexpected. Bishop Chase indeed argues that S. Paul in this sermon ascribes the burial of our Lord to His enemies;[2]

[1] Chase, 'Credibility,' p. 182. [2] Acts xiii. 29.

that possibly S. Paul did not know the facts; and that we should be startled if the statement occurred in a sermon by S. Peter. But this is a question of interpretation which, to say the least, is uncertain. We can scarcely wonder that criticism expresses surprise at this Pauline elaboration of biographical detail, so different as it is to the practice of his Epistles.

But it should be noticed that the description of the Jewish treatment of our Lord is in S. Paul's sermon much more critical than in S. Peter's, and also tinged with a truly Pauline irony.[1] It is further marked by a frankness and unreserve natural in criticisms delivered at a distance from the scene of the events. We can hardly imagine that S. Paul would have delivered it in Jerusalem. It contains details omitted by S. Peter, and unnecessary in a speech delivered in Jerusalem, but quite naturally inserted by one speaking in another country. Thus S. Peter in Jerusalem does not mention the duration of the apostolic experiences of the Resurrection; nor does he give any hint of the locality where the Risen Lord appeared. S. Paul does both: the Risen Lord "was seen for many days," and by those who "came up with Him from Galilee to Jerusalem." These touches show either very remarkable historic imagination on the part of S. Luke in thus transferring material and adapting it from one speaker and set of circumstances to another—or else, fidelity to the records in his possession.

3. Then comes the fact that both S. Paul and S. Peter appeal to the passage, "Thou wilt not give Thy Holy One to see corruption." Their treatment of it is, however, different. S. Paul places the apostolic witness to the fact of the Resurrection first, and the exposition of Scripture afterwards: in S. Peter this order is reversed. S. Peter's speech is in manner more tentative, conciliatory, and cautious:[2] whereas S. Paul's speech is somewhat characteristically aggressive, solemn, menacing.[3] S. Paul adds also a passage from the 2nd Psalm, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten Thee," giving a characteristically

[1] Acts xiii. 27: "fulfilled them by condemning Him."

[2] Cf. Acts ii. 29.

[3] Cf. Acts xiii. 40, 41, 27, 28.

mystic reference to the Divine mission of Jesus Christ. S. Peter says nothing of this. S. Paul's exposition of the 16th Psalm is confined to the sentence, "Thou wilt not give Thy Holy One to see corruption"; referring it conclusively to the body of Christ: whereas S. Peter quotes the passage at considerable length, referring to the soul in Hades, as well as to the body in the grave.[1] S. Paul confines attention to the parallel between the Psalmist's language and the bodily experience of our Lord; S. Peter goes much further, and ascribes to David a prophetic insight into the future experiences of his greater Son. S. Paul again states quite definitely what S. Peter only implies (although, of course, this whole argument requires the implication) that David "was laid with his fathers and saw corruption." So Peter dwells on the exaltation and the power of the Risen Lord "Whose flesh did not see corruption." S. Paul dwells on the thought of the Risen Lord's continued life; He was "no more to return to corruption."[2] Bishop Chase suggests that S. Paul's idea, in this last phrase, is precisely the same as that in Romans vi. 9: "Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death no more hath dominion over Him."

4. The conclusions drawn from the Resurrection are characteristically different in the sermons of S. Peter and of S. Paul. S. Peter's conclusions are that the exaltation of Jesus accounts for the recent outpouring of spiritual gifts, and that Jesus is enthroned in Messianic dignity and dominion. S. Paul's conclusion is to the manward results of forgiveness and justification; including an eminently Pauline statement of justification through Christ, contrasted with the powerlessness of the Mosaic Law to secure such blessed gifts. "Peter never spoke like this," said Chrysostom long ago. And recent German criticism practically acknowledges as much. "Such discourses," says Harnack, "can only have been composed by a missionary practised in the work of evangelisation... Whether S. Paul's doctrine is here correctly reproduced, or whether theologoumena are to be found in the book which differ from those of the Pauline theology,

[1] Cf. 1 S. Peter iii. 18, 19. [2] Acts ii. 31-32, and xiii. 34.

is a matter of indifference—he who wrote this passage was a near disciple of S. Paul."[1]

Doubtless many will go much further and affirm that the Pauline doctrine is here correctly reproduced. But, even were it otherwise, the passage which ascribes such thought to him is evidently the work of one conscious of S. Paul's distinctive ideas.

Attention should also be paid to the note of warning and of menace which runs through the sermons of S. Paul while it is absent from those of S. Peter. S. Peter's tone is gentler.[2] He finds extenuating circumstances for the behaviour of the Jews.[3] He pleads and entreats.[4] He indicates the blessings of belief rather than the penalties of rejection.[5]

But S. Paul in the Synagogue[6] ends with a downright threat, "Beware therefore, lest that come upon you which is spoken in the prophets; behold, ye despisers, and wonder and perish." So again it is to the Athenians. He proclaims "the approaching judgment of the world, supported by the fact that God has already appointed a man who will execute this judgment, and that He has given the strongest reason to believe in it by raising Him up from the dead. Upon this message S. Paul bases his demand that they will repent.... Their fate in the judgment will depend upon their attitude to this demand; for God is willing to overlook the past as the time of ignorance."[7] Thus, says Bernhard Weiss, it was not the promising but only the threatening aspect of the work of Christ which could, in the first place, be set before the Gentiles if they were to be startled out of their sinful life. But it is not the Gentile only, it is also the Jew, whom S. Paul treats in this appallingly solemn way. His latest utterance in Rome is similar.[8]

Thus S. Luke maintains consistently throughout his entire series of reports the distinctive character of the two apostles.

It is difficult not to be impressed with a sense that we have here a historian's fidelity to the facts, and a profound appreciation of the peculiarities of S. Peter and S. Paul.

[1] Harnack, 'Luke the Physician,' p. 19 n. [2] Acts x. 28, 29, 34, 35.
[3] Acts ii. 17. [4] Acts ii. 23, 25, 26. [5] Acts v. 32. [6] Acts xiii. 40, 41.
[7] B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theology,' i. 293. [8] Acts xxviii. 25 ff.

While the invention of speeches for their principal personages was an ordinary proceeding among ancient historians, such inventions, even if escaping manifest anachronisms, do not attain such psychological and religious distinctness as to be consistently appropriate throughout to each individual character, and to that alone. There is something very impressive in the absence of Pauline qualities from S. Peter's sermon, and their presence in the speeches assigned to S. Paul. Surely here we are confronted with a genuine reporter.

Note that S. Paul in his address in the Synagogue of Pisidian Antioch (Acts xiii.) appeals, like S. Peter, to the 16th Psalm, but in describing the Resurrection does not appeal to his own experience outside Damascus, but to the witness of the original apostles (verse 31). "He was seen many days of them which came up with Him from Galilee to Jerusalem, who are His witnesses unto the people."

"S. Paul here allows to those who were apostles before him an office in which he could not himself share. They were the primary witnesses of the Resurrection; for they, unlike S. Paul, held converse with the Risen Lord among the familiar scenes of earth."[1]

With the Synagogue address in Antioch may be grouped the very brief report of the Synagogue address in Thessalonica,[2] that S. Paul "reasoned with them from the Scriptures, opening and alleging (1) that it behoved the Christ to suffer; (2) and to rise again from the dead; and (3) that this Jesus, whom, said he, I proclaim unto you is the Christ."[3] The reminiscence of our Lord's words on the Emmaus road is evident:[4] "Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into His glory?" The Divine necessity of the Passion and of the Resurrection and Exaltation are the theme in both. To this S. Paul adds the identification of Jesus of Nazareth with the Christ.

II

The second reference to the Resurrection in S. Paul's Mission addresses was at Athens (Acts xvii.). The reference

[1] Chase, 'Credibility of Acts,' p. 185.
[2] Acts xvii. 1.
[3] Acts xvii. 3.
[4] S. Luke xxiv. 26.

is exceedingly brief. But it is the culmination of his teaching there. He declared that God "hath appointed a day in which He will judge the world in righteousness by the Man whom He hath ordained; whereof He hath given assurance unto all men, in that He hath raised Him from the dead" (31).

A new conception makes its appearance here. Our Lord is certified by the Resurrection to be the Judge of the human race. The inferences drawn from the fact before a Jewish audience would of course have been quite unintelligible here. And there is a remarkable contrast between the systematic and coherent speeches of S. Peter in Jerusalem or of S. Paul in Pisidian Antioch, and this address before the pagan circle in Athens. There is something tentative and inconsequent about the latter. The Resurrection is introduced at the end of the speech; but it cannot be said to be a natural, still less an inevitable conclusion. It is additional, not inferential. And the statement produced apparently but little conciliating effect.

Yet there is something very significant in the mere mention of this doctrine at Athens. S. Paul was not unaware that no doctrine would be less acceptable to the philosophic mind; and he might, for prudential reasons, have selected another theme. The introduction of such a doctrine into circumstances eminently unfavourable, might seem to be a failure of that insight and versatility with which we know the apostle was usually endowed to a most exceptional degree. His deliberate selection in this instance of a theme unfavourable to his design surely illustrates remarkably his sense of its fundamental character. It could not, consistently with faithfulness to his message, be possibly left out. Bearing in mind what he said about the Resurrection of Christ in 1 Cor. xv., we can well understand why he taught it even in Athens. The fact was that S. Paul had no message without it. He had nothing else to teach. He founded Christianity upon it.

At the same time it is clear that S. Paul was not allowed sufficient time to develop his doctrine of the Resurrection of Jesus before the men of Athens. We have an interrupted

speech, terminated by manifest impatience and ridicule. Consequently the announcement of the fact is left suspended in air without the support of the reasons on which the apostolic witness reposed. We cannot tell how the instruction would have finished: or whether he would have given an account of his own experience.

III

We now reach the series of instructions given by S. Paul in Palestine.[1] Before the Sanhedrim he claims that the whole charge against him is really due to his advocacy of the doctrine of the Resurrection of the dead. Doubtless this statement was at that crisis diplomatic. It divided his opponents hopelessly, and drew the entire force of the Pharisees on his side. But the statement must not be adduced as a mere instance of apostolic versatility. It indicated a basis of unity for the larger portion of the nation; and sought to insist on truth which Jews and Christians held to a considerable degree in common. Doubtless the Jewish and the Christian ideas of Resurrection greatly differed, and yet there was agreement within the difference. And upon this S. Paul insisted.

The same doctrine is repeated before Felix at Cæsarea.[2] But here, before Felix, the general doctrine of Resurrection is brought forward, while no reference is made to the Resurrection of our Lord. This was made inevitable by the course which events had taken. The dispute had assumed the form of Pharisee versus Sadducee at Jerusalem; and S. Paul claimed acquittal at Cæsarea on the ground that to condemn his doctrine of Resurrection would be virtually to condemn the whole body of the Pharisees.

At the same time it is quite clear that the distinctively Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of our Lord was not left out by S. Paul during his judicial examinations. For when Felix' successor, Festus, described the fact to Agrippa, he summarised the case as connected with certain questions

[1] Acts xxii., xxiii., 6-8; xxiv. 15-21. The accounts of his conversion are here omitted, having been separately considered.

[2] Acts xxiv. 15-21.

of the Jews' religion, "and of one Jesus, who was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive" (Acts xxv. 19). Evidently, therefore, Festus was aware that S. Paul taught our Lord's Resurrection, and not only taught it, but made it so central in his religion, that this was the only doctrine which impressed itself on the Roman official's mind. This group of S. Paul's Palestinian instructions on the Resurrection of Christ ends with the recital before Agrippa of the incident near Damascus.[1] Here S. Paul appeals to the Jewish belief in Resurrection in general: as calculated to remove antecedent prejudice against belief in the Resurrection of Christ in particular. "Why is it judged incredible with you, if God doth raise the dead?" (8). And this last recorded instruction of S. Paul ends with the most graphic statement of his position: "Having therefore obtained the help that is from God, I stand unto this day testifying both to small and great, saying nothing but what the prophets and Moses did say should come; how that the Christ must suffer, and how that He first by the Resurrection of the dead should proclaim light both to the people and to the Gentiles" (23).

In coupling together the Passion with the Resurrection, S. Paul removes the stumbling block of the Cross from the way of his Jewish hearers. The Passion and Death of the Messiah would be for them the insuperable difficulty, as it was originally for S. Paul himself. He here declares that the progress of the Christ through suffering to glory is the real teaching of the prophets. The popular interpretation was imperfect: being founded exclusively on those passages which made for the Christ's glory, while ignoring those which spoke of His humiliation and sufferings.

And here, with this statement of Resurrection doctrine within Jewish limits, well calculated to conciliate Jewish thought, S. Paul's witness in the Acts concludes.

If we attempt to summarise his doctrine of Christ's Resurrection and its results, we may say that S. Luke represents him as teaching that:

1. Christ's Resurrection was the work of God (Acts xiii. 30).

[1] Acts xxvi.

2. It was certified by the apostles who saw Him during a considerable period after His Resurrection in Jerusalem (Acts xiii. 31).

3. It was endorsed by the Psalms (Acts xiii. 33 ff., xxvi. 22, 23).

4. It is the means of man's forgiveness and justification (Acts xiii. 38, 39).

5. It certifies the position of our Lord as Judge of the human race (Acts xvii. 31).

6. It is a doctrine which harmonises with Jewish belief in Resurrection (Acts xxiii. 6), and ought not to be incredible to believers in a living God (Acts xxvi. 8).

7. It throws light on the dealings of God with mankind (Acts xxvi. 23).

C

Our analysis of the mission preaching of S. Peter and S. Paul leads to several observations on their unity and their difference.

1. The speeches of S. Peter and S. Paul in the Acts show characteristic differences, corresponding to the differences in the process by which they came to believe. There must, of course, necessarily be general similarity in first announcements given to the uninstructed. The main object both for S. Peter and for S. Paul was to demonstrate to the Jews the Messiahship of Jesus. The Resurrection was necessarily the main proof of this position. But yet there are differences in their respective points of view. There are thoughts in S. Peter's speeches which could scarcely be found in S. Paul's. To say that Jesus of Nazareth was "a man approved of God" to the Jews, "by mighty works and wonders and signs,"[1] was natural for S. Peter: it would not have been so natural for S. Paul. To describe Jesus as "the Holy and Righteous One"[2] is evidently to witness to personal impressions gathered during the period of companionship. It is a direct judgment upon Christ's character; not an inference from His Resurrection. This also suits S. Peter's experience, but not S. Paul's. To describe Jesus as One

[1] Acts ii. 22. [2] Acts iii. 14.

Whom "God anointed" "with the Holy Ghost and with power"; as One "Who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil,"[1] is another direct reminiscence of the earthly ministry. For S. Paul such a statement could only be indirect and traditional.

It is further instructive to notice the constant historic allusion, and biographical detail, as to our Lord's earthly career, found in the Sermons of S. Peter: that Jesus was given over by the Jews into pagan hands and crucified through their instrumentality;[2] that He was divinely attested by His works of power;[3] that Pilate disapproved the Jewish treatment of our Lord and had determined to release Him;[4] that the Jews brought pressure to bear on Pilate, "denied the Holy and Righteous One, and asked for a murderer to be granted"[5] them; that Jesus was sinless and perfect;[6] that the Jewish nation and rulers alike acted under moral blindness;[7] that Jesus was the Stone which the builders rejected and yet divinely constituted the Head Stone of the Corner;[8] that the immediate preparation for Jesus was the baptism of S. John;[9] that Jesus of Nazareth "went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed with the devil";[10] that they ate and drank with Him after His Resurrection;[11] that He charged them to proclaim Him as the Judge of mankind.[12]

2. The Sermons of S. Peter betray no Pauline tendencies. Yet the historian S. Luke was a disciple of S. Paul. His own Pauline tendencies are unmistakable: however true it may be that he did not penetrate into the depth of the mind of the Apostle to the Gentiles. Now this absence of Pauline phrase and thought in the Sermon of S. Peter has led a critic to observe: "we are drawn to consider that these discourses formed part of an early Jerusalem chronicle, and that even if they do not reproduce S. Peter's actual words, they reflect throughout the main lines of the first apostles' preaching."[13]

[1] Acts x. 38. [2] Acts ii. 23. [3] Acts ii. 22. [4] Acts iii. 13.
[5] Acts iii. 14. [6] *Ib.* [7] Acts iii. 17. [8] Acts iv. 11.
[9] Acts x. 37. [10] Acts x. 38. [11] Acts x. 41. [12] Acts x. 42.
[13] M. Goguel, 'L'Apôtre Paul et J. C.,' p. 24.

3. While the significance of the Resurrection is drawn out in various directions, the significance of the Death of Jesus is left comparatively undeveloped.

The death of Jesus is viewed as a Jewish crime.[1] It was a work of Jewish ignorance. But this is not a theological explanation. It was part of the eternal design.[2] This is theology. But no account is given of its redemptive effect. It was divinely predicted that the Christ would suffer.[3] But why these sufferings should occur, and what their results would be, S. Peter leaves among the unsolved mysteries.

These early apostolic instructions quickly pass from the horror of the death to the splendour of the Resurrection. This was natural for two reasons; partly for the scandal which the death created in the ordinary Jewish hearer; and partly because it was the Resurrection which endowed our Lord with new powers for aiding mankind. Without the theology of the Resurrection there could be no theology of the Death.

4. We have absolutely no right to say that this comparatively meagre instruction on the meaning of the death of Christ represents the existing stage of the apostles' own development. It was surely rather due to the exigencies of their work; to the unpreparedness of their hearers; to the necessity of establishing the claim of Jesus; to the necessity of removing the impression which the death itself must create until understood in the light of the Resurrection. These were mission sermons: elementary thoughts for the uninstructed. We should expect to find that the difference would be very great between these sermons and S. Paul's Epistles. We may fully accept the statement of Bernhard Weiss that "the fuller knowledge which S. Paul had received is reserved for the more thorough instruction of believers. His initiatory mission preaching did not require it; nor could he communicate it, seeing that its presuppositions were still awanting in the case of his hearers."[4] We must remember that the doctrine that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures is a truth which S. Paul tells the Corinthians

[1] Acts ii. 23, iii. 13-15, v. 30.
[2] Acts ii. 23.
[3] Acts iii. 18.
[4] B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.' i. 299.

he has received: received that is, as a tradition from the community over which S. Peter presided. "The inference," says Weizsäcker, "is indisputable; the primitive Church already taught and proved from Scripture that the death of Jesus exerted a saving influence in the forgiveness of sins."[1] It was left for the matured reflection of S. Paul to enlighten the Christian Church with the deeper aspect of redemptive truth. It was not in the mission preaching but within the precincts of the community of faith that S. Paul declared that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself";[2] "being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; Whom God set forth to be a propitiation through faith by His blood."[3] This profound elaborated conception of the truth was appropriate to the circle of belief: it would be no proper passage for the discourses in the Acts.

5. From the standpoint of historical evidence it must be confessed that the primitive instructions in the Acts are disappointing. They are indeed highly satisfactory in the fact that they show no tendency whatever to embroider, or invent narratives about the Resurrection. But they can in the nature of things only represent a very small part of the apostolic teaching. The inquiries of Jewish hearers must have led to lengthy explanations of historic evidence which lies behind such a phrase as "we are witnesses of these things." The instructions in the Acts can only be outlines highly condensed. Such a phrase as "to Him bear all the prophets witness" (Acts x. 43) must surely have raised inquiries; or itself represents further instructions. More especially such a sentence as "gave Him to be manifest not to all the people, but unto witnesses that were chosen before of God, even to us, who did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead" (Acts x. 40, 41), must have provoked such interest in the first hearers, as it does in ourselves, to ask the apostle, if only we could be answered, to tell us more. That such details were given may be considered certain.

More especially when it is remembered that, as they

[1] Weizsäcker, 'Apost. Age,' i. 131. [2] 2 Cor. v. [3] Rom. iii. 24, 25.

stand, S. Peter's instructions on the Resurrection seem more concerned with the theological importance than with the establishment of the fact. No announcement is made by S. Peter of the details either of his own or of any other apostle's experience of the Risen Lord. S. Paul, on the other hand, twice over relates the whole story of the Lord's appearing to him.

No list of the Appearances is given in the speeches in the Acts, nor is there one in the speeches of S. Paul. Yet we know that he was in possession of such a list. And it is quite natural that the exigencies of teaching which led very early to the composition of such a list should have led also to its public mention in instructions. Or was it intended rather for the use of those within the Church?

Thus the recorded evidence of the Resurrection is much less than the evidence actually received. But the unrecorded evidence was not really lost. It went to form the primitive community, and was stamped upon the mind of the Church of Jerusalem. The evidence for Christ's Resurrection is by no means exclusively documentary. It is also institutional. It was embodied in the convictions and constitution of the Universal Church.

According to the Acts, the Resurrection is the substance of the preaching both of S. Peter and of S. Paul. Notwithstanding the intimate knowledge possessed by the former of the parables and sayings of Jesus, it is not these which constitute the message of the Galilæan apostle any more than of the apostle of the Gentiles.

6. The genuineness of the Pauline utterances in the Acts was challenged more than half a century ago in the amazing statement of Baur [1] that the Paul of the Acts of the Apostles was an entirely different person from the Paul of the Epistles. This opinion, the critic Resch has recently pronounced an extravagant judgment.[2] Resch reminds us that S. Paul's contemporaries were conscious of a marked distinction between his letters and his speeches. "His letters, they say, are weighty and strong; but his bodily presence is weak, and his speech of no account."[3] At the end of a most

[1] 'Paulus.' [2] Resch, 'Paulinismus,' p. 500, 1904. [3] 2 Cor. x. 10.

exhaustive word-study in the Pauline letters and speeches, Resch's conclusion is that the deeper we penetrate into the Acts of the Apostles the more impressive becomes the identity of the S. Paul therein depicted with the S. Paul of the Epistles.[1] Resch collects nearly sixty resemblances in word or phrase between the Pauline speeches in the Acts, and S. Paul's Epistles. Of these, six are words not found elsewhere in the New Testament. Many of the resemblances taken separately may not seem particularly convincing. But when we read in the Acts "it was necessary that the word of God should first be spoken to you" (Acts xiii. 46), and in the Epistles "to the Jew first" (Rom. i. 16); or, "gold and silver and stone" (Acts xvii. 29) compared with "gold, silver, costly stones" (1 Cor. iii. 12); or, "serving the Lord with all lowliness of mind" (Acts xx. 19) compared with "doing service as unto the Lord" (Eph. vi. 7), and "with all lowliness" (Eph. iv. 2); or, "the defence which I now make unto you" (Acts xxii. 1) compared with "my defence to them that examine me is this" (1 Cor. ix. 3); or, "far hence unto the Gentiles" (Acts xxii. 21) compared with "ye that once were far off" (Eph. ii. 13); or, "I am a Pharisee" (Acts xxiii. 6) compared with "as touching the law, a Pharisee" (Phil. iii. 5); or, "so serve I the God of our fathers" (Acts xxiv. 14) compared with "God whom I serve from my forefathers" (2 Tim. i. 3); we may feel the force of Resch's conclusions.

[1] 'Paulinismus,' p. 500.

BOOK III. THE THEOLOGY OF THE RESURRECTION

CHAPTER XV

THE TEACHING OF THE RISEN LORD (IN S. MATTHEW)

S. MATTHEW reports one single Appearance of the Risen Lord to the Eleven. The occurrence is placed in Galilee, upon "the mountain where Jesus had appointed them." With characteristic brevity S. Matthew omits to mention when this appointment was made, or where the mountain was. His real interest is manifestly in the sayings uttered on this occasion by the Risen Lord. They fall into three clearly marked divisions: a claim, a commission, and a promise.

I

First comes the claim: "all Authority hath been given unto Me in Heaven and on earth."

1. Authority signifies at once the right and the power. It is the term employed by Pilate to express his conscious possession of imperial power over another human being to condemn or release. That was in the political sphere. The authority here claimed is in the sphere of things spiritual. Already during the ministry our Lord had made partial claims to such authority. He claimed "authority on earth to forgive sins" (S. Matt. ix. 6); and "authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of Man" (S. John v. 27). He asserted, "all things have been delivered unto Me of my Father" (S. Matt. xi. 27), words which seemed to denote

anticipation rather than actual possession. But now, in this Resurrection-utterance, we hear no longer partial claims, or anticipations: the plenitude of authority is asserted, and that not as a future endowment but as a present possession. *All* authority in the realm of the spirit is now actually His. That the words can mean no less is shown by the following commission. He could not confer upon others a commission on the ground of a power which was not yet actually His own. A commission cannot be bestowed in anticipation of an authority not yet acquired. Thus the context requires that of the spiritual authority He is already now in full possession. Such then is the authority claimed.

2. Then next comes the sphere of its operation. Over what realm does this authority of the Risen Lord extend? It is "in heaven and on earth." It embraces the entire intelligent creation.

3. Then, thirdly, there is the recipient of this authority. Of this authority, co-extensive with responsible beings, He, the Risen Jesus, is the recipient. From what source, it is not said, nor was there need. The Giver of this authority is manifestly the Father in heaven, Who has bestowed all this dominion upon the perfect Man. There is nothing here which militates against perfect equality with the Father. The Divine personality of our Lord is not here the object of contemplation. It is as human that Jesus is the recipient of power.

And this authority has become His human possession at His Resurrection. He enters upon universal dominion at the period of His heavenly exaltation which the Resurrection inaugurates.

This claim of the Risen Jesus is evidently the completion of the great Voice in Daniel vii. 13, 14.

It is, as Zahn truly observes, a majestic saying.[1] It seems to lie at the foundation of S. Paul's sublime description in Ephesians, where he speaks of the strength of God's might "which He wrought in Christ, when He raised Him from the dead, and made Him to sit at His right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule, and authority, and power,

[1] 'Das Evangelium des M.,' p. 710.

and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come: and He put all things in subjection under His feet, and gave Him to be head over all things to the Church which is His body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all."[1]

II

On the ground of this universal spiritual authority is based a corresponding world-wide *Commission*: "Go ye therefore."

"Go ye." The Commission is imposed upon the apostles in their corporate capacity, not as isolated individuals. This is evidently the Evangelist's view when he describes them as "the Eleven." The corporate character of the Eleven is the necessary result of the training which, according to the Evangelist, they have received from the Master.

And their mission extends to "all the nations." Although in Scripture "the nations" are commonly contrasted with the chosen race, such contrast cannot be intended here. The idea that S. Matthew here reports Christ's rejection of Israel as the penalty of Israel's rejection of Christ is certainly foreign to the context and intention. For if He is the recipient of all authority in Heaven and on earth, Israel cannot be conceived as excluded from its operation. The whole intention of the passage is world-wide range of power. It does not contemplate the heathen as contrasted with the Jew, but mankind including Israel. The thought is not exclusive but comprehensive.[2] The parable relating the exclusion of the wicked husbandmen from the vineyard, which S. Matthew reports,[3] cannot be utilised to confirm the idea that this saying of the Risen Lord is a sentence of excommunication pronounced against Israel; for the same parable is reported also by S. Luke,[4] who nevertheless makes the Risen Master speak of "preaching in His name unto all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem";[5] an idea which is also repeated in Acts i. 8. Indeed, the exclusion of Israel from the apostolic mission contradicts all the documents we

[1] Eph. i. 20, 21.

[2] Cf. Zahn, 'Das Ev. Matt.' p. 712. Stier Reden, J., vii. 267.

[3] S. Matt. xxi. 41. [4] S. Luke xx. 16. [5] S. Luke xxiv. 47.

possess. It is true that S. Paul received the command of the Risen Lord "get thee quickly out of Jerusalem, because they will not receive of thee testimony concerning me";[1] as also the commission "I will send thee far hence unto the Gentiles"; but the same historian shows no less certainly S. Paul's profound consciousness that the offer of the Gospel must first be made to Israel. Thus the exclusive interpretation of the saying in S. Matthew has all probability against it.

"Make disciples." It is a comprehensive expression. Like all the great religious terms so much depends on the depth of contents assigned to it. A disciple may be simply a learner in religion. Disciples of John Baptist, of the Pharisees, of Moses, are all mentioned in New Testament. A disciple of Jesus is one who takes Jesus as his teacher. Yet, how inadequate that statement is by itself, our Lord's own use of the term elsewhere shows conclusively. A disciple of Jesus was originally any Jew who followed Him. But discipleship was found to involve increasing claims. It involved submission,[2] unreserved devotion,[3] acceptance of the Cross,[4] assent to the Master's authority.[5] And in the Acts discipleship involves a personal relationship to Jesus as the Christ, and as the exalted Saviour: a relationship transcending altogether what was meant by discipleship of John Baptist or of Moses.

The Eleven therefore are to make disciples of all the nations. This is vastly more than to teach. To teach is comparatively easy: to make disciples, in the sense which our Lord's previous utterances require, is supremely difficult. The rendering with which English people have been so long familiar is the Authorised Version, "go teach all nations," is not only quite inadequate, but has led to serious misconceptions as to the real nature of the commission here imposed. It has set in the primary place the thought of giving instruction; whereas this is exactly what the original passage does not suggest.

1. How are the Eleven to make disciples of all the nations?

[1] Acts xxii. 18-21. [2] S. Luke vi. 40. [3] S. Luke xiv. 26.
[4] S. Luke xiv. 27. [5] S. John vi. 39-44.

In the original passage the comprehensive command, "make disciples," is immediately explained by the enumeration of two of its leading methods. The Eleven are to baptise and also to instruct. And, in the order of enumeration, baptism is set first and teaching afterwards. This priority does not mean that baptism would precede instruction, but it certainly gives striking emphasis to the sacramental ministration in the process of making disciples. The Eleven are here enjoined to make disciples by baptising. The obvious reason for this connection of baptism with discipleship is that baptism is incorporation with the body of disciples of which Jesus is the Head.[1] Or rather, as it is here expressed, "baptising them in the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." Clearly this baptism "into the Name" is profoundly mystical. It denotes neither the formula nor the doctrine, but the sphere or element into which the individual is merged.

2. As baptism, being incorporation into the Christian community, is one very vital aspect of discipleship, so instruction is another. Thus disciples are matured by "teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I command you." This covers the whole field of religious teaching, whether dogmatic or moral. And the aspect emphasised is not the purely intellectual. Discipleship is here regarded as a response and obedience to known truth. The disciple must be, in this sense also, as his Lord. The Eleven are to instruct the incorporated disciples to observe the whole range of our Lord's teaching, whether given before His Passion or during the great Forty Days.[1]

III

If the force of this commission to the Eleven and its sequel is to be fully appreciated, it is essential to throw ourselves back by an effort of historical imagination into the circumstances in which the Eleven were placed. We read the passage through the realisation of nineteen centuries. But to feel the force of it upon the Eleven we have to remember that the actual development of Christianity had

[1] Cf. Loisy, 'Les Evang. Synopt.' ii. 753.

not begun. In their situation the commission imposed must have seemed stupendous. Whether they considered the world which they were ordered to convert, or their own capacities for the undertaking, especially as illustrated by their recent weakness during the Passion, the command must have sounded appalling. Whatever strength they felt in the fact of the Resurrection, the intermittent character of the manifestations proved that His continued visible presence was an experience of the past. Now the note of reluctance to undertake spiritual responsibilities is the general characteristic in the commission of the Old Testament messengers. Human nature shrinks from the burden exactly in proportion to its realisation. It is inconceivable that the apostolic experience was the one exception to this universal rule. The injunction, "go make disciples of all the nations," was a larger call, both in the message to convey, and in the extent of humanity to be won, than was ever imposed on the prophets of the old regime. The Evangelist means us to understand that the Eleven profoundly felt the weight of the great commission. If he records no syllable or sign of hesitation, yet the sequel in the words of our Lord contains the acknowledgment that He is indeed placing upon them an awful task. For the commission is immediately followed by a promise: "And lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

"*With* you": in what sense? It has been taken to signify moral concurrence, or personal presence. Now it seems sufficiently obvious which of these two the situation requires. The promise must correspond to the task. Otherwise it would be inadequate. Now the magnitude of the duty imposed, and the incompetence of the men of Galilee to discharge it, require the promise of something more than divine approval of their endeavours. A promise of moral concurrence, He in heaven and they on earth, He in security and they in the conflict, is too remote to satisfy their needs. Just as in the mission of Moses, his sense of powerlessness is relieved by the promise, "Certainly I will be with thee";[1] and the promise was realised, as the entire history shows, not

[1] Exod. iii. 12.

by distant approval, but by personal presence; so it must be in the promise to the Eleven.

"With you": that is with you collectively, in your corporate capacity. For the promise is given to the Eleven; and the Eleven are, as we have already seen, welded into a community by the previous action of Christ.

"With you always even unto the end of the world." His presence is not transient, but abiding in perpetuity to the consummation of the age. With you always, and therefore with your successors, is an inference which could not be apparent at the time the promise was spoken, although it may well have become apparent at the time when the Gospel was written. The expectation of the speedy return of Christ would render such inferences impossible so long as the expectation endured; but, in proportion as it faded, the fuller contents of the promise would become increasingly obvious. It is undoubtedly true that the inference was the result of Christian experience; but to say that it was not in the Speaker's mind is indefensible, except on humanitarian presuppositions. No Christian will imagine that the Risen Lord knew no more than His hearers could at the moment understand.

CHAPTER XVI

THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE RISEN LORD'S COMMISSION

THE passage in S. Matt. xxviii. 16-20 suggests by its contents and character that it is not the first manifestation of the Risen Lord to the apostles, although it is the first and only manifestation to them which the Evangelist has recorded. For there is not the slightest attempt at evidential demonstrations of His identity. We read that "when they [*i.e.* the Eleven] saw Him "they worshipped Him, but some doubted." It is incredible that this "some" included any of the Eleven. The Eleven clearly have no hesitation. They have seen Him before since He rose. The doubters are not assisted. The entire discourse is an instruction on the apostolic mission. It presupposes the evidential work accomplished. Thus the contents of the passage suggest that it comes at the end of a series and not at the beginning. It requires the interpolation of other Appearances before verse 16. Thus S. Matthew is not, as is often asserted, evidence for an exclusively Galilæan series.

The entire discourse is *remarkably systematic*: there is the triple division, the claim, the commission, the promise. The sections of each division follow a natural sequence of thought. In the first division is treated the authority claimed, its extent, its sphere of operation, its recipient. In the second, discipleship in the aspects of incorporation and instruction. In the last, the promise of presence and its permanence. The question naturally rises whether we possess here a summary, an outline of the Risen Lord's instructions; or whether this condensation was original. The passage does

not read at all like a summary of words given on different occasions. Their logical sequence shows them to represent one unbroken instruction.

I

Harnack expressly rejects this saying of the Risen Lord, because it contains the idea of *a universal mission*.[1] He points out that (1) the selection and commission of the Twelve is described without any reference to a world-wide sphere of operation; (2) that the apostolic mission is expressly limited to Palestine;[2] (3) that Christ Himself definitely affirms His mission to be limited to the House of Israel; (4) that the disciples are to judge the twelve tribes of Israel.

On the other hand, (1) S. Mark xiii. 10, "the gospel must first be preached to all the nations," is set aside by Harnack as a passage which "hardly came from Jesus in its present wording." Again (2), "Wherever the gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world" (Mark xiv.) is disregarded as an "excusable *hysteron proteron*," an anachronism due to the facts of later Christian experience in the world-wide expansion of Christianity; (3) the Parable of the Vineyard taken from the wicked husbandmen and given to the nation bringing forth the fruits thereof (S. Matt. xxi. 43) is said to refer to the Jewish nation as opposed to the official Israel.

After this clearance of the ground, this discourse of the Risen Jesus is criticised in the following strange sentence: "There is a cunning subtlety, of which one would fain believe the evangelist was incapable, in keeping his Gentile Christian readers, as it were, upon the rack with sayings which confined the gospel to Israel, just in order to let them off in the closing paragraph"[3] He thinks it "advisable . . . to credit the writer with a remarkable historical sense, which made him adhere almost invariably to the traditional framework of Christ's preaching, in order to break it open at the very close of his work."

He accounts for this deviation from historical fidelity on

[1] Harnack, 'Expansion of Christianity,' i. 40-45.
[2] Matt. x. 5, 6, and x. 22. [3] p. 44.

the ground that while "Jesus never issued such a command at all,"[1] "a Lord and Saviour who had confined His preaching to the Jewish people, without even issuing a single command to prosecute the universal mission, was an utter impossibility at the time when the Gospels were written."[2]

Harnack would apparently agree with Loisy, who holds it as evident that this instruction was not addressed to the Eleven. The admission of the Gentiles was not an idea realised by the apostles until long afterwards. The entire discourse is the product of Christian reflection on Jesus glorified. It is a religious philosophy of the earthly mission of Christ and of the Church.

II

What first will strike the reader of Harnack's criticism is the amazing fashion in which every passage ascribing to Jesus Christ the conception of universality is dismissed. On the ground that the disciples' mission is in S. Matt. x. 5 definitely restricted within the limits of Israel ("go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not"), it is inferred that the mission to the heathen cannot have lain within the horizon of our Lord. But to get this result passages which indicate our Lord's possession of such a conception are simply, without further reason, set aside as anachronisms. But, as Dr. Knowling says,[3] "If we are referred to such passages as Matt. xv. 24 ('I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel') they are fairly interpreted as meaning that our Lord's purpose was to confine Himself to His own people during His earthly ministry: but this in no way invalidates the proof that He foresaw a world-wide preaching of the Gospel, a prescience which may be inferred from so many passages in the Gospels."

Harnack's attempt to eliminate the conception of universality from the teaching of our Lord leads him to do extraordinary violence to the prediction "ye shall be brought before governors and kings for My sake, for a testimony to them and to the Gentiles."[4] We are asked

[1] p. 45. [2] p. 44. [3] 'Testimony of S. Paul,' p. 343. [4] S. Matt. x. 18.

to believe that the kings and governors need not mean Gentiles, and that the clause "for a testimony to the Gentiles" is an addition to the words of Christ. Certainly, as Dr. Knowling says, this is criticism run riot.[1] Zahn's criticism on Harnack's theory of the limited mental horizon of Jesus is surely not undeserved, that it manifests neither breadth of outlook nor penetration of insight.[2]

A singularly valuable discussion of this limitation of Christ's personal ministry to Israel is given in the pages of Wendt.[3] He points out that Jesus devoted His Messianic activity only to the people of Israel because He saw this limitation to be a personal necessity. And if He primarily confined His disciples to a similar restriction,[4] yet "that they were to confine their preaching of the Kingdom of God in all the future to the Jews in Palestine was by no means enjoined upon them."[5]

The prophetic anticipations themselves contained a universalistic widening of the work of the Messiah. And our Lord's conception of the Kingdom of God "contained in it the presuppositions out of which the idea of the universal distinction of the blessedness of the kingdom for all mankind must follow as a consequence."[6] All that is required therefore, according to Wendt, is that our Lord Himself should have realised this necessary inference. "And that Jesus Himself must consciously have drawn this consequence," adds Wendt, "is plainly discernible from some of His utterances." Accordingly the great saying reported of Him when Risen, "Go ye into all the world..." is merely the expression by Christ of the necessary inference which He consciously realised. Thus it is the culmination of His previous teaching. It is also the beginning of larger thought for the apostolic circle.

III

But why does Harnack assume that the idea of universality which was forced upon the primitive community by the logic of events could not previously have occurred to the

[1] 'Testimony of S. Paul,' p. 343.
[2] Zahn, 'Evang. Matt.' See also Wohlenberg in 'T.L.Z.' 1903. N. 9.
[3] 'Teaching of Jesus,' ii. 197. [4] *Ib.* 197. [5] *Ib.* 198. [6] *Ib.* p. 199.

mind of Jesus? Plainly because of his dogmatic presuppositions as to the nature of Christianity. "The Gospel," according to Harnack, "is the glad message of the government of the world and of every individual soul by the Almighty and Holy God, the Father and Judge."[1] The question, therefore, is whether Jesus conceived Himself as occupying a permanent place in His own Gospel, or whether the Gospel consists in a message from which Jesus Christ may be left out. If the former, surely His universality is implied. Harnack says that "Jesus Christ has by no express statement thrust this connection of His Gospel with His Person into the foreground."[2] Yet he writes that Jesus "in a solemn hour at the close of His life, as well as on special occasions at an earlier period, referred to the fact that the surrender to His Person which induced them to leave all and follow Him, was no passing element in the new position they had gained towards God the Father."[3] The Gospel is also described as "inseparably connected with Jesus Christ; for in preaching this Gospel Jesus Christ everywhere calls men to Himself."[4] Is it really meant that this Gospel was only designed by Jesus Christ for the Jews; that He had not contemplated its further extension to the world; that He was held back under narrow national restrictions from the sympathy necessary to concern Himself with mankind; that the extension of the Gospel to humanity at large was not His intention, but an idea ascribed to Him, by a happy anachronism, among His disciples who held a larger conception of His mission than He did Himself? If this be what is meant in Harnack's view, then, to say nothing of the hopeless impossibility of reconciling it with any form of the Christian tradition, there is the further difficulty, how is it possible to maintain, as Hermann in his 'Communion with God' maintains, that in contemplating Jesus we realise God? If the historical Jesus were the narrow-minded Jew whose sympathies never extended beyond the confines of Israel, how is it reasonable to say that His moral character is a revelation of God? But Harnack and Hermann are both members of

[1] 'Hist. Dogm.' i. 58.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 59.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 60.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 59.

of the same Ritschlian school. We must clearly either advance upon this position, or else recede from it. Retain it we cannot. If the self-consciousness of Jesus saw no universal relationship between Himself and humanity, why should we? If the conception of universality was forced into the Gospel, in spite of the ignorance of Jesus about it, then surely the Galilæans and the converted Pharisees who achieved this revolution from the national to the world-wide became the real makers of Christianity. But whence was this conception of universality derived? Surely it was the outcome of the impression of the personality of Jesus upon them? And was He Himself unconscious of the virtue which went out of Him?

IV

There is another form in which the objection to this saying of the Risen Lord is stated, which we should not have thought it necessary to notice, except that it is still repeated. "Is it in any case conceivable that Jesus gave the apostles express command to preach to all nations, and that long afterwards they were still debating whether or not the mission to the Gentiles was to be recognised?"[1]

This objection is surely founded on a misconception of the facts. The question in debate among the Jerusalem community was not whether the mission to the Gentiles was to be recognised, but whether the entrance of the Gentiles into the Church was or was not to be through the medium of Israel. And considering that it was Israel in which the primitive Church arose, and Israel to whom the promises had been made; considering also the veneration necessarily accorded by the Jewish disciples to the ancient people of God; considering also their extreme reluctance to sever themselves from Israel: it was inevitable that their very foremost thoughts would be that Israel would be the instrument for the general ingathering. In the disciples' desire to work through Israel, there is nothing inconsistent with their having received a command to make disciples of every creature.

[1] Macan, 'Resurr.' p. 64.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BAPTISMAL FORMULA

SOME critical writers have suggested that the phrase commonly known as the Baptismal Formula was not spoken by our Lord, but is the product of Christian reflection interpolated into the saying of Christ. The grounds upon which this criticism is urged are chiefly three: the patristic use, the Biblical method of baptism, and the dogmatic peculiarities of the phrase.

A criticism upon the Formula was made by Thomas Burnet[1] in a work published in 1727. Burnet did not discuss the question, but observed that variations had existed in the Baptismal phrases.

Harnack discredits the whole passage: not merely the Baptismal Formula.

"It cannot be directly proved that Jesus instituted baptism, for Matt. xxviii. 19 is not a saying of the Lord. The reasons for this assertion are: (1) It is only a later stage of the tradition that represents the Risen Christ as delivering speeches and giving commandments. Paul knows nothing of it. (2) The Trinitarian formula is foreign to the mouth of Jesus and has not the authority in the apostolic age which it must have had if it had descended from Jesus himself."[2]

[1] T. Burnet, 'de fide et officiis Christianorum.' Ed. 2, 1728. Burnet was Master of the Charterhouse, and author of the 'Treatise de Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium,' see below, p. 385. See also Riggenbach, 'Trinitarische Taufbefehl,' p. 7. Riggenbach reports Burnet as saying that the Trinitarian Baptismal Formula was absent from the Aramaic original of S. Matthew. All, however, that the present writer can find in Burnet is, 'In formulis et verbis baptizantis, et in tempore, serius aut citius, baptismi recipiendi non minus variatum est,' p. 207.

[2] 'Hist. Dogm.' i. 79 n.

But the writer who has adversely criticised the passage more exhaustively than any other is Mr. Conybeare.[1]

Mr. Conybeare begins with assuring us that "Until the middle of the 19th century the text of the three witnesses in 1 John v. 7-8 shared with Matt. xxviii. 19 the onerous task of furnishing scriptural evidence of the doctrine of the Trinity."[2] The passage in 1 S. John is, he says, "now abandoned by all authorities except the Pope of Rome." "By consequence the entire weight of proving the Trinity has of late come to rest on Matt. xxviii. 19." "There had been," Mr. Conybeare adds, "no general inclination on the part of divines to inquire soberly into the authenticity of a text on which they builded superstructures so huge. Nevertheless, an enlightened minority had their doubts." Mr. Conybeare's contention is that Eusebius, the historian, who "lived in the greatest Christian library of that age, that, namely, which Origen and Pamphilus had collected," must have habitually handled MSS. of the Gospels older by two hundred years than any which we now possess. Now Eusebius quotes eighteen times over the verse in S. Matt. xxviii. 19, always in the following form: "Go ye and make disciples of all nations in my name, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you." The inference is that Eusebius "had never heard" of any other form of the text until he visited Constantinople, and attended the Council of Nicæa. "Then in two controversial works written in his extreme old age... he used the common reading." "The conversion of Eusebius to the longer text after the Council of Nice indicates that it was at that time being introduced as a Shibboleth of orthodoxy into all codices."[3] "A text so invaluable to the dominant party could not but make its way into every codex irrespective of its textual affinities."[4]

A number of other writers have accepted Mr. Conybeare's conclusions, without, however, adding any force to his arguments. Wellhausen, for instance,[5] merely states the view and leaves it.

[1] 'Hibbert J.' Oct., 1902.

[2] 'Hibbert J.' Oct., 1902, p. 102.

[3] 'Hibbert J.' Oct., 1902, pp. 104, 105.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 108.

[5] 'Das Ev. Matt.' p. 152.

I

The Patristic quotations referred to are chiefly those of Eusebius, who repeats the passage many times without the Baptismal Formula. Eusebius' position as Bishop of Cæsarea, with the great library at his disposal, makes this omission exceedingly significant. And it is suggested that the Baptismal Formula was interpolated at an earlier period into the original text of S. Matthew, but did not secure undisputed possession until after the Council of Nicæa.

Eusebius quotes the passage about thirty times,[1] but in differing forms. Sometimes he simply quotes it without the Baptismal Formula. At other times with the substituted phrase, "in My Name" (this latter at least twelve times). These variations show at any rate that Eusebius quoted with considerable freedom.[2] It is suggested also that seven of the passages containing the phrase "in My Name" were written after the Council of Nicæa.[3]

Bishop Chase[4] would explain the variations, (1) partly by the fact that theological writers, whether ancient or modern, habitually omit from quotations clauses irrelevant to the subject in hand; more particularly if the clauses omitted are important and therefore likely to divert attention from the subject under consideration. S. Chrysostom, for instance, whose text is known to have contained the Baptismal Formula, nevertheless, like Eusebius, omits it when irrelevant to his special teaching.[5]

(2) The form of the passage "make disciples of all nations in My Name" may be an addition to the genuine text of the clause,[6] assimilated perhaps from the passage in S. Mark xvi. 17. Eusebius may have found this combination in some MSS. in the library of Cæsarea,[7] or it may be a harmonising effort of his own.[8]

(3) The omission of the Baptismal Formula may be due to that instinct of reserve and reticence (the *disciplina arcani*) which was elevated into a principle by the early

[1] Riggenbach. [2] Riggenbach, p. 22. [3] Riggenbach, p. 25.
[4] 'J.T.S.' July, 1905, p. 485, 6. [5] *Ib.* p. 487. [6] *Ib.* p. 488.
[7] *Ib.* p. 489. [8] *Ib.* p. 491.

Fathers of the Church.[1] Certain critics have treated this explanation with contempt, but it is sufficient to read S. Cyril of Jerusalem to see that such contempt is entirely out of place. Cyril of Jerusalem says, "To a heathen we do not expound the mysteries concerning Father, Son and Holy Spirit, nor do we speak plainly of the things touching the mysteries in the presence of catechumens; but we often say many things in a hidden fashion, in order that the faithful who know may understand, and that 'those who know not may not suffer harm.'"[2]

(4) Eusebius does actually quote the Baptismal Formula no less than three times. These quotations belong to writings after the Council of Nicæa: but, on the other hand, one is a letter to the Church of Cæsarea, intended only for the faithful; and another, the Theophaneia, a distinctively theological treatise.[3] That is to say, they are precisely the sort of documents in which, according to the previous argument, the Baptismal Formula should occur, if it occurred at all.

The MS. evidence for the passage is overwhelming. Bishop Chase describes it as follows: "The command to baptise, in Matthew xxviii. 19, is found in every known MS. (uncial and cursive) in which this portion of S. Matthew is extant, and in every known version in which this portion of S. Matthew is extant."[4] It occurs in Tatian's Diatessaron. It is quoted as early as Irenæus.[5] It is found in Tertullian. "The reference in the Didache may reasonably be regarded as a quotation."[6] Bishop Chase accordingly concludes that the verdict of scientific criticism must be that "The whole evidence... establishes without a shadow of doubt or uncertainty the genuineness"[7] of the passage.

The history of the Church is not without disputes on the proper formula for administering Baptism, although such disputes cannot be said to have held an important place. S. Cyprian,[8] in discussing the value of Baptism conferred outside the Church, strongly condemns the opinion that the

[1] Riggenbach holds this.
[2] S. Cyril of Jerusalem, 'Catech.' vi. 29.
[3] Bp. Chase, p. 496.
[4] p. 498.
[5] Hæres, iii. 171.
[6] Chase, *ib.* p. 491.
[7] *Ib.* p. 499.
[8] Ep. 73, 18.

name of Christ is a sufficient formula in place of that of the Holy Trinity. "For," he argues,[1] "whereas in the Gospels, and in the epistles of the apostles, the name of Christ is alleged for the remission of sins, it is not in such a way as that the Son alone, without the Father, or against the Father, can be of advantage to anybody; but that it might be shown to the Jews, who boasted as to their having the Father, that the Father would profit them nothing, unless they believed on the Son whom He had sent." Cyprian then quotes: "This is life eternal that they might know Thee, the only true GOD, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent." The inference is: "Since, therefore, from the preaching and testimony of Christ Himself, the Father who sent must be first known, then afterwards Christ, who was sent, and there cannot be a hope of salvation except by knowing the two together; how, when God the Father is not known, nay, is even blasphemed, can they who among the heretics are said to be baptised in the name of Christ, be judged to have obtained remission of sins?" For the case of the Jews under the apostle was one, but the condition of the Gentiles is another. The former, because they had already gained the most ancient Baptism of the Law and Moses, were to be baptised also in the name of Jesus Christ, in conformity with what Peter tells them in the Acts. Cyprian then quotes Acts ii. 38-39, and interprets that "Peter makes mention of Jesus Christ, not as though the Father should be omitted, but that the Son also might be joined to the Father."

"Finally," continues Cyprian, "when after the Resurrection the apostles are sent by the Lord to the heathen, they are bidden to baptise in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, How then do some say that a Gentile, baptised without, outside the Church, yea, and in opposition to the Church, so that it be only in the name of Jesus Christ, everywhere and in whatever manner can obtain remission of sins, when Christ Himself commands the heathen to be baptised in the full and united Trinity?"[2]

Cyprian's theory appears to be that Baptism could be validly administered to Jews with the formula "in the name

[1] § 17. [2] § 18.

of the Lord Jesus," because they were already in possession of the Father; but could not be so administered to the Gentiles, because they were not already in possession of the Father. For the Gentile world there could be no valid Baptism without the formula of the Trinity; and this Cyprian considers proved by the Risen Lord's injunction to baptise in the triple Name.

S. Basil[1] pleads: "Let no one be misled by the fact of the apostle's frequently omitting the name of the Father and of the Holy Spirit when making mention of Baptism, or on this account imagine that the invocation of the names is not observed." For, urges Basil, "the naming of Christ is the confession of the whole." And the promise, "He shall baptise you with the Holy Ghost," supports his contention. "No one on this account would be justified in calling that Baptism a perfect Baptism wherein only the name of the Spirit was invoked. For the tradition that has been given us by the quickening grace must remain for ever inviolate."

S. Ambrose, speaking of the recipients of S. John Baptist's Baptism, whom S. Paul encountered at Ephesus, says: "They knew not the Spirit, because in the form in which John baptised they had not received Baptism in the Name of Christ." "So," adds Ambrose, "they were baptised in the name of Jesus Christ, and Baptism was not repeated in their case, but administered differently, for there is but one Baptism."[2]

S. Ambrose is plainly arguing here on the form of Baptism—"the form in which John baptised"—and not on the recipient's confession of faith. His question is, What constitutes valid Christian Baptism? The Baptism of these disciples of S. John Baptist required to be supplemented by Baptism in the name of Jesus Christ. This formula was adequate, because it implied the Trinity. "Baptism," says Ambrose, "is complete if one confesses the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. If you deny One you overthrow the whole. And just as if you mention in words One only, either the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, and in

[1] S. Basil on the Spirit, ch. xii.

[2] S. Ambrose on the Holy Spirit, i. III. 41.

your belief do not deny either the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit, the mystery of the faith is complete; so, too, although you name the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and lessen the power of either the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit, the whole mystery is made empty." Ambrose clearly refers to the formula and intention of the Church, and not to the recipient's faith. He does not mean that the validity of Baptism varies with the integrity of the candidate's theological ideas. His meaning is made still clearer when he proceeds: "Let us now consider whether, as we read that the Sacrament of Baptism in the Name of Christ was complete, so, too, when the Holy Spirit alone is named, anything is wanting to the completeness of the mystery." Naturally, from his previous principles, he argues that Baptism, when the Holy Spirit alone is named, is as valid as Baptism in the name of the Lord Jesus.

This is the sense in which Ambrose was understood by the Venerable Bede—"Since it is the rule of the Church," wrote Bede, "that believers should be baptised in the name of the Holy Trinity, it may be wondered why S. Luke throughout this book witnesses that Baptism was not otherwise given than in the name of Jesus Christ. The blessed Ambrose solves this problem by the principle that the mystery is fulfilled by the unity of the name."[1] Thus the sole invocation of Christ includes the Trinity; and similarly the sole invocation of the Father, or of the Holy Spirit.

Pope Nicholas the First, when consulted in 866 by the Bulgarians, what was to be done in the case of a number of persons baptised by a Jew, replied: "if they have been baptised in the name of the Trinity, or in the name of Christ, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles, they are baptised; for it is one and the same thing, as Ambrose testifies."[2]

This view of the validity of Baptism when conferred with exclusive mention of our Lord evidently prevailed widely

[1] Ven. Bede, 'Expositio in Acta Apost.' ch. x. Giles' Edition, vol. xii. pp. 54, 55.

[2] Nicholas I., 'Respons. ad consult. Bulgar.' c. 104.

through the scholastic period: for it is maintained without hesitation by no less a person than Peter Lombard.[1] He founds himself partly on the letter of Pope Nicholas to the Bulgarians, but derives his arguments almost entirely from the teaching of S. Ambrose. He maintains that, provided that the implicit faith of the Baptiser is Trinitarian, the explicit mention of the triple name in Baptism is indifferent, since the mention of Father or Son or Holy Spirit alone carries with it the implication of all Three.

An elaborate discussion of the question was made by the Jesuit theologian Bellarmine.[2] He is not at all satisfied with the teaching of S. Ambrose; although Pope Nicholas I. approved it. "The Pope," says Bellarmine, "did not define anything: he referred to the authority of Ambrose and seems to approve it." Bellarmine himself maintains that the question whether the formula of S. Matt. xxviii. 19 is the essential Baptismal Formula cannot be conclusively inferred from the Evangelist alone, but requires the support of tradition and the practice of the Church. For the Gospel words alone may be explained of the faith in the Trinity, which is the basis of the Church's work; or of the authority from whom Baptism is derived. What the practice and tradition of the Church makes certain is the meaning of the use of the Triple Name.

As to the practice in the Acts of the Apostles some scholastic writers urged that this was done by a special Divine dispensation. But Bellarmine sets this opinion aside as pure conjecture. Personally he is convinced that the real answer is that the apostles never did baptise except with the Trinitarian formula. He considers that the question of S. Paul, "into what then were ye baptised?"[3] indicates the use of a formula in which the Holy Ghost was named. And since the early Fathers, such as Justin Martyr, present the Trinitarian formula, he cannot think it credible that the apostles did not do the same.

As for the phrase, "Baptise in the name of the Lord

[1] Sentent. Lit. iv. Dist. iii. § 2, 3, 4, 5.

[2] 'De Baptismo,' I. iii. Ed. Fèvre, 1870. T. iii. p. 516.

[3] Acts xix. 3.

Jesus,"[1] it can be understood in many ways. It may signify the Christian faith; or the authority of Jesus Christ; or the name not taken by itself but together with that of the Father and of the Spirit.

II

The Biblical argument against the Baptismal Formula is that we never find it in use in the Acts of the Apostles. What we invariably find is Baptism in the name of Jesus Christ.[2] "Be baptised every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ" is S. Peter's counsel at Whitsuntide. "To be baptised in the name of Jesus Christ" is his order for the converts at Cæsarea. "They were baptised into the name of the Lord Jesus" was the result of S. Paul's instructions at Ephesus.

1. But what does the language of the Acts precisely mean by Baptism in the name of Jesus Christ? Clearly not invariably the same thing, for the prepositions in the original differ.[3] The passage interpolated at the Baptism of the Ethiopian, "And Philip said, if thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God," indicates that the name of Jesus Christ formed the candidate's confession of faith. S. Peter's command to the converts at Whitsuntide to be baptised in the name of Jesus Christ is interpreted by Alford to mean "on confession of that which the Name implies." So understood, the passage would contain no reference to the phrase employed by S. Peter in administering the Sacrament, but only to the convert's profession of faith.

2. There is another explanation. Baptism in the name of the Lord Jesus may refer not to any Baptismal Formula, but to the chief contents of the Christian religion. Christianity, being the religion of which Jesus Christ is the object, is naturally denoted by His Name: and assent to Christianity is relationship to Him. In this case the language of the Acts would tell us nothing of the formula which the apostles employed.

[1] Acts ii., x., xix.

[2] Acts ii. 38, x. 48, xix. 5.

[3] *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι*, Acts ii. 38, x. 48; *εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*, xix. 5.

That the use of the phrase, "baptised in the name of the Lord," does not necessarily mean ignorance of the baptismal formula in the triple Name is certain from the occurrence of both expressions in the Didache. While the Didache expressly enjoins that men are to be baptised "unto the name of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost,"[1] yet it can afterwards speak of "such as have been baptised in the name of the Lord."[2]

3. The conversation in the Acts between S. Paul and the disciples at Ephesus[3] leaves the reader in some uncertainty whether the reference is to the Trinitarian doctrine or to the Baptismal Formula. To the inquiry whether they received the Holy Ghost when they believed, the disciples reply with an admission of their ignorance "whether the Holy Ghost was given" (R.V.) or whether there is a Holy Ghost (margin). S. Paul thereupon inquires, "Into what, then, were ye baptised?" The implication is that ignorance of the Holy Ghost was inexcusable on the part of recipients of Christian Baptism: either because this was an essential element of Christian doctrine, or else because it was part of the Baptismal Formula. Since the passage is open to both interpretations, no conclusive evidence can be derived from it. The practical result, "they were baptised into the Name of the Lord Jesus," is equally ambiguous. It may simply refer to the sphere into which they were admitted. In which case it tells us nothing of the formula employed.

4. But again, although the words which S. Matthew here ascribes to our Lord are habitually termed the Baptismal Formula, and naturally so from the Church's immemorial use, the question still remains whether the phrase was originally a sacramental formula or a doctrinal statement. Certainly the phrase itself does not compel the inference that this is the injunction of a formula. Many expositors[4] maintain that the title "the Baptismal Formula," which the phrase first received apparently from Tertullian,[5] is incorrect if applied to the Biblical text, however accurate in reference to traditional use. And as we have seen, this is no new idea. The Jesuit

[1] Ch. vii. [2] Ch. ix. [3] Acts xix. 1-5.
[4] *E.g.* Meyer. [5] 'De Bapt.' 13.

Bellarmine held that the use of the phrase must be ascertained from tradition, and not merely from the passage itself. If this interpretation be accepted, it removes a difficulty. Thus it has been recently said, "it can scarcely have been meant or at first understood to prescribe a form of words for use in the ministration of Christian Baptism, although our familiarity with this employment of the words may tempt us to take this view."[1] "When we consider," says Bishop Chase, "the words of Christ recorded by S. Matthew as revealing a spiritual fact about Baptism, then the question ceases to be one of rival formulas and becomes one of Christian theology."[2]

III

To the arguments of the Baptismal Formula derived from Patristic quotations, and from Scripture practice recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, some have added a third, a doctrinal argument from the substance of the formula. Thus, Harnack argues that "the Trinitarian formula is foreign to the mouth of Jesus."[3] Harnack contends that "from the Epistles of Paul we perceive that the formula Father, Son, and Spirit could not yet have been customary, especially in baptism. But," he admits, "it was approaching (2 Cor. xiii. 13)."[4]

1. Now, here, in the first place, it must be admitted that the doctrinal difference between the Baptismal Formula and the Pauline grace (2 Cor. xiii.) is very considerable. There is between them all the difference between the abstract and the experimental, between the systematic theologian and the devotional writer. Considered simply as theological expressions, there is a marked distinction between saying "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost," and saying, "the grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost." It is a distinction which will probably most impress those who have been accustomed to the study of dogmatic formulas. If the former words are truly interpreted as "revealing once for all decisively and

[1] Swete, 'H. Sp. in the N.T.' p. 124.
[2] 'J. T. S.' July, 1905, p. 508.
[3] 'Hist. Dogm.' i. 79 n.
[4] *Ib.* p. 80 n.

distinctly His relation to the Father as One with Him in Essential Deity; and further disclosing the distinct but equally Divine Personality of the Holy Ghost"[1]—they certainly mark a condition of mature development.

The difference between the Baptismal Formula and the Pauline grace has greatly impressed modern theological writers. Dorner, for instance, held that "the word Father in the Baptismal Formula does not express a relation to men; but the co-ordination of Father and Son requires us to regard the Father as the Father of the Son, and the Son as the Son of the Father: and therefore does not signify a paternal relation to the world in general, but to the Son; Who, standing between the Father and the Spirit, must be somehow thought as pertaining to the Divine sphere; and therefore denotes a distinction in the sphere of the Divine itself, and thus a relation of God to Himself."[2]

Thus the Baptismal Formula does not express a Trinity of work, or a Trinity of redemptive effort for man, but an essential Trinity, a Trinity in the inner constitution of Deity. It is not God revealed as Father of mankind, as Redeemer of mankind, as Sanctifier of mankind, but God as He is in Himself, prior to, apart from, all self-manifestation: this is the amazing character of the phrase. Or, as another modern writer puts it: the Pauline phrase is perfectly informal. "It has none of the qualities of a doctrinal formula, and it does not seem to imply any formula of the Trinity present in the author's mind. It does not appear to be based upon what we call the Baptismal Formula,... The names do not correspond, for instead of the Father we here have God, and instead of the Son we have the Lord Jesus Christ. Nor does the order correspond, for here the Second of the Baptismal Formula stands first, and the First stands second. Moreover, the titles that are given to the Second instead of Son—namely, Jesus, Christ and Lord—are not derived from relations in the Godhead, but all come from his human history and relations."[3]

[1] Medd, 'Bampton Lecture,' p. 335.
[2] Dorner, 'System of Christian Doctrine,' i. 351.
[3] Newton Clarke, 'Christian Doctrine of God,' p. 229.

2. On the other hand, much must here depend on the Johannine evidence. Harnack himself declares of the farewell discourses in S. John that their fundamental ideas are, in his opinion, genuine; that is, they proceed from Jesus.[1] We presume that their fundamental ideas include their doctrine of God. If these last discourses before the Passion were substantially uttered by our Lord, then the Trinitarian language of the Resurrection command to baptise is not unnatural. There seem to be three stages discernible in a doctrinal progress. First, the Synoptic report of the ministry, in which we find already the more abstract and dogmatic terms, "the Father" and "the Son" combined: as in the sentence,

> "No one knoweth the Son save the Father;
> neither doth any know the Father save the Son."[2]

This blending together in a single sentence of the Father and the Son certainly prepares the way to the Baptismal expression, and goes a considerable distance along it.

Next to the Synoptic report of the ministry comes the Johannine report of the last discourses. If Jesus spoke at that period of "the Father," "the Son," "the Spirit of Truth";[3] if He not only named them distinctly but blended them in a single phrase; if He really uttered the verses in S. John xiv. 26 and xv. 26; then He made a very definite advance to a second stage beyond the instructions of the earlier ministry. That, after these, a third and final stage was reached in the period of the great forty days, as reported by S. Matthew, is a true theological sequence. It would mean that our Lord thus gathered up into one final expression the substance of His previous instructions.

3. Very much in this question, as in so many other New Testament problems, must depend on our doctrine of the Person of our Lord. Could He not be in advance of His Galilæan contemporaries? Could He not teach more than subsequent reflection at first appreciated? If we compare the Pauline doctrine with that of the Apostolic Fathers, are we not conscious of the enormous extent to which he is in

[1] 'Hist. Dogm.' i. 65 n. 2. [2] S. Matt. xi. 27. [3] S. John xiv. 13-16.

advance of the age which followed him? Is it incredible that something similar should occur in the last utterances of Jesus Christ compared with those of His disciples? Are we prepared to deny Him an insight into divine truth capable of anticipating the results of His disciples' matured reflection? Or is it only the form of the Baptismal utterance and not the substance which constitutes a difficulty? Can we agree that Jesus substantially taught ideas to which the Evangelist has given something of a contemporary expression? The words of the Risen Lord, like all His other sayings, come to us through the medium of His reporters' minds. They may conceivably owe somewhat in their form to the medium through which they came, without thereby losing their substantial accuracy. Thus Dean Robinson suggests that S. Matthew "does not here report the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, but transfers to Him the familiar language of the Church of the Evangelist's own time and locality."[1] This assumes S. Matthew to be the author of the form though not of the substance. This would make the actual form of the language subsequent to the Pauline phrase. And certainly there is force in the view that if S. Paul had known the Matthæan form of the words of the Risen Lord, the knowledge might be found impressed upon his writings. But yet at the same time the indirect influence may be really there. For the apostles' constant Trinitarian phraseology may be partly accounted for by the knowledge of such a formula.

IV

Finally, there remains the question, What would be the dogmatic consequence if the Baptismal Formula were demonstrated to be no saying of our Lord? Mr. Conybeare says that since the omission of 1 S. John v. 7-8 from the revised text "the entire weight of proving the Trinity has of late come to rest on Matt. xxviii. 19."[2] No statement could well be more misleading. The doctrine of the Trinity does not depend on any single text, however important that text may be. The explicit declaration of the doctrine would, if the Baptismal Formula was absent, be less definite; but the

[1] 'Encycl. Biblica,' i. 474.

[2] 'Hibbert J.' Oct. 1902, p. 103.

doctrine itself would be none the less the necessary inference from the apostolic data. Mr. Conybeare quotes Dean Robinson's view that S. Matthew "does not here report the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, but transfers to him the familiar language of the Church of the Evangelist's own time and locality." But Mr. Conybeare would not therefore ascribe to Dean Robinson the opinion that the foundation for the proof of the doctrine of the Trinity is thereby destroyed. We should not have thought that anyone would rest the entire weight of proving the Trinity upon the Baptismal words: for the simple reason that the Baptismal Formula is, from any point of view, the consummation of a development, the final expression in which previous instruction is condensed and consolidated. The Baptismal Formula is not the foundation. It presupposes instruction as to the Son and the Spirit. The doctrine of the Trinity must rest ultimately on the Person of Christ and His relation to the Father. It must be confirmed by religious experience of redemption through the Son, and of sanctification through the Spirit. It cannot rest entirely on a phrase, whoever the author of that phrase may be. All this is, we should have thought, a commonplace of modern theology. But if the doctrine rests on the entire data of apostolic experience, it cannot be destroyed, or even vitally disturbed, by the question whether a particular sentence represents a saying of Christ, or an exposition of the mind of Christ by the primitive Church. One has only to read the "Thesaurus" of S. Cyril, of Alexandria, to see that the patristic Trinitarianism was founded on a very wide range of conceptions, and not exclusively on the Baptismal Formula, or indeed upon any individual text. We are, therefore, able to separate the critical inquiry from the fundamental dogmatic interests. We cannot but feel that, as a matter of dispassionate criticism, Mr. Conybeare's method is mistaken in prefacing what ought to be a purely historical inquiry with dogmatical considerations on the bearing of this text in "proving the Trinity"; and in assuming that if the text is cancelled the proof is gone; and in asserting that "there has been no general inclination on the part of divines to inquire soberly

into the authenticity of a text on which they builded superstructures so huge. Nevertheless an enlightened minority had their doubts."[1] Nor is the prophecy beyond dispute that "in future the most conservative divines will shrink from resting on it any dogmatic fabric at all, while the more enlightened will discard it as completely as they have its fellow-text of the three witnesses."[2] What if after all "the more enlightened" may reach another conclusion? There is another consideration which deserves to be taken into account. If the supposed adoption by Eusebius of the Trinitarian formula after the Council of Nicæa were correct, it would not at all follow, as is sometimes implied, that the phrase was interpolated by Churchmen during the Arian struggle as a refutation of the Arian view. For S. Athanasius tells us that the Arians themselves employed the formula in administering Baptism, only, of course, placing upon the terms a wrong construction. "If," says Athanasius, "the consecration" [or initiation] "is given to us into the Name of Father and Son, and they do not confess a true Father, because they deny what is from Him and like His substance, and deny also the true Son, and name another of their own framing as created out of nothing, is not the rite administered by them altogether empty and unprofitable, making a show, but in reality being no help towards religion? For the Arians do not baptise into Father and Son, but into Creator and creature, and into Maker and work. And as a creature is other than the Son, so the Baptism, which is supposed to be given by them, is other than the truth, though they pretend to name the Name of the Father and the Son, because of the words of Scripture."[3]

Thus Athanasius did not regard the Trinitarian formula as necessarily safeguarding the Trinitarian faith. He saw in concrete instances how true it is that no form of words exists which cannot be eluded by the subtlety and ingenuity of men.

Athanasius also affirms that the use of the orthodox

[1] 'Hibbert J.' Oct. 1902, p. 103. [2] *Ib.* 104.

[3] S. Athan. 'Orat.' ii.; 'Ag. Arians,' § 42; Migne, P.G. Athanasius, T. ii. p. 238.

formula was common among the sects opposing the Church. "There are many other heresies too," he says, "which use the words only, but without orthodoxy... and in consequence the water which they administer is unprofitable, as deficient in religious meaning."

Among these Athanasius includes the followers of Paul of Samosata, who was nominated bishop of Antioch in 260.[1] Now it is not likely that the followers of this unorthodox person originally baptised in some other formula, and adopted the Trinitarian formula after their separation from the Church. They appear to be independent witnesses to the use of the formula as far back as 260. Surely they used it because they found it in their Bibles, just as Athanasius says that the Arians named the Father and the Son "because of the words of Scripture."

Augustine found it possible to say that in his time "ye will more easily find heretics who do not baptise at all than any who baptise without those words."[2]

On the Baptismal Formula, see Conybeare, 'Hibbert Journal,' Oct. 1902; Riggenbach, 'Der Trinitarische Taufbefehl' ('Beiträge zur Förderung der Christlichen Theologie,' 1905); Bp. Chase, 'J. Th. S.,' July 1905; Rendtorff, 'Die Taufe im Urchristentum,' 1905; Swete, 'Appearances'; Swete, 'Holy Spirit,' 1909.

[1] Cf. Hefele, 'Concilien-geschichte,' Bd. i. 411.

[2] S. Aug., 'De Baptismo,' vi. 47.

CHAPTER XVIII

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION AN EVIDENCE OF HIS DIVINITY

THAT the Resurrection of Christ is evidential to S. Paul has been repeatedly seen. We are concerned here with the highest truth of all for which the apostles find it evidential: namely, the relation in which Christ stands to the Father. The passage is the opening of the Epistle to the Romans,[1] "Concerning his Son who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead; even Jesus Christ our Lord" (R.V.).

I

S. Paul here indicates the central feature of "the Gospel of God concerning His Son."

1. First, the Son is regarded "according to the flesh." By flesh is not here intended the body of our Lord and its material substance, excluding the soul. Nor does it denote the lower animal life as contrasted with the higher moral and spiritual. There is no moral suggestion in the statement that Christ was born of the seed of David according to the flesh. Flesh is rather the synonym for our common human nature; soul and body included.[2] Christ then is, according to the flesh, Son of David, recipient of human nature in the princely Jewish line.

2. But, secondly, S. Paul describes what Christ is according to the spirit. Or, rather, this is what S. Paul

[1] Rom. i. 3, 4. [2] Cf. Rom. iv. 1, ix. 3-5.

does not say: not according to the spirit, but according to the spirit of holiness. If the former expression had been used, the antithesis between flesh and spirit would indisputably appear as a reference to the two sides of individual human nature, the body and the soul. But the expression "spirit of holiness" suggested to the ancient interpreters as a whole,[1] and to some modern interpreters also,[2] that the reference is not so much to the human soul as to the Divine side of Christ's nature. The expression "spirit of holiness" is one of deep solemnity. It appears to show that it is not a human spirit but a Divine which is here attributed to Christ: a spirit of which the essential quality is holiness.[3] "Spirit," it must be remembered, "denotes the essential nature of God,[4] and that is the sense in which the term is here employed. It must denote its original character of Christ's personality."[5]

While, then, in reference to His human nature Christ was made or became Son of David, in reference to His Divine nature He was designated "Son of God." The great term is here in the highest of meanings. For this is S. Paul's habitual use.[6] This was the substance of the revelation as it came in S. Paul's personal experience.[7] Hence he can speak of the pre-existence and the mission of the Son.[8] It is the meaning peculiarly necessitated here by the opening words: "the gospel of God concerning the Son." This interpretation is recognised by a large number of recent expositors. It is Sonship "in the metaphysical sense."[9] "On ne saurait douter que ce passage affirme le fait de ce double élément dans l'individualité tout exceptionelle du Sauveur, sa nature à la fois humaine et divine, que nous reconnaîtrons ainsi comme positivement enseignée par l'apôtre."[10]

"S. Paul," says Gifford,[11] "seems never to have applied the title 'Son of Man' to Christ in any other than the highest

[1] Origen, Tertull. Adv. Prax. xxvii., Ambrosiaster. Aug. Inchoata Expositio.

[2] Liddon's Analysis, Gess, 'Bibelstunden, Römer.' [3] Alford.

[4] S. John iv. 24. [5] Beyschlag, 'N.T. Theol.' ii. 68. [6] Rom. viii. 32.

[7] Gal. i. 16. [8] Gal. iv. 4; Phil. ii. 6 ff.

[9] Meyer *in loc.* cf. Immer, 'Theologie des Neuen Testamentes,' p. 273. Beyschlag, 'N.T. Theol.' ii. 67.

[10] Edouard Reuss. [11] p. 54. See also Liddon's 'Analysis.'

sense, certainly not here, where the Son of God is declared to be the one great subject of the Gospel and of prophecy."

Jesus Christ then, S. Paul affirms, was "declared to be the Son of God . . . by the Resurrection of the dead."

The term translated both in A.V. and R.V. "declared' has been understood in two main senses: either "indicated" or "constituted." That is, either asserted to be, or appointed. The latter sense is that which agrees with New Testament use.[1] But to many this meaning has appeared inconsistent with the apostles' belief in the metaphysical Sonship of Christ. To indicate Christ as being what He was already, seemed more consistent than to designate or appoint Him what He was already. How could Christ be constituted to a Sonship already essentially His?[2] But the difficulty vanishes on a fuller exposition. Chrysostom indeed held that the term ὁρισθέντος signified "indicated, manifested, estimated, confirmed by the opinion and vote of all." But Pearson did not hesitate to write, "thus was He defined or constituted and appointed the Son of God."[3]

How then was Jesus designated the Son of God? S. Paul's answer is: by the Resurrection of the dead. He was Son of God throughout; but the reality of His Sonship was concealed by His human infirmities. For to be a Son of God in weakness appears a contradiction in terms. At least it so appeared to the age in which Christ lived. The inferences which men were constrained to draw from His moral uniqueness were compromised, disordered, frustrated, by His apparent failure. If it be said that men ought to have seen through this; the ideal may be granted, yet the fact remains. They did not see the divinity of weakness. Consequently some revelation of the Son of God in power was necessary to contradict the misleading impression of His overthrow. This S. Paul asserts to have been done in Resurrection.[4]

Resurrection did this because it is the physical sphere, a

[1] Acts x. 42, xvii. 31, Gifford *in loc.*

[2] Cf. Beyschlag, 'N.T. Theol.' ii. 67.

[3] 'Exposition of the Creed,' Art. ii. p. 201.

[4] See on this Zahn, and Sabatier, 'L'Apôtre Paul,' p. 359.

manifestation of Divine power exactly where mortal man is altogether most helpless. Moreover, the Resurrection divinely endorsed all that Christ had said and done and claimed. Thus it gave a new and Divine support to the inferences which the character itself had already suggested, and to the "self-assertion" of Jesus in His relation to the Father. It removed misgivings, because it cancelled the misleading impressions created by a Son of God in weakness.

Moreover, although Christ was the Son of God all through, yet He was constituted to the prerogatives and exercise of His Sonship, in a higher larger sphere from the Resurrection onwards.[1] In this sense also He was actually constituted Son of God in power. We cannot separate Christ into two persons, one divine and the other human. His humanity is the instrument of His Deity. And towards mankind the larger exercise of His power dates from the Resurrection. Of course this is part of the mysteriousness of the Incarnation. The human experiences are the experiences of a Divine Person. But it is strictly true, paradox as it sounds, that the Son of God is definitely constituted by His exaltation that which He was before. Thus the Epistle to the Hebrews represents the Father as saying in reference to a distinct crisis in time the words of the Psalm: "Thou art My Son; this day have I begotten Thee." Just as these words are consistent with the Eternal Sonship of Him to whom they were addressed, so is the language "constituted" or "designated Son of God in power by the Resurrection," consistent with the same.

II

This Pauline conception of the Divinity of Jesus Christ, as being attested by His Resurrection, has been challenged on the ground that Resurrection would not necessarily demonstrate the divinity of the person raised.

Certainly it is true that Resurrection as such, apart from all other considerations, and in the case of a person otherwise unknown, would not demonstrate his divinity; since any individual mortal might be raised, and it is part of

[1] Cornely.

the Christian faith that Resurrection will be a universal experience.

Belief in Christ's Resurrection is theoretically separable from belief in His Divinity, and has been held without it. The earlier school of English Unitarians represented by Priestley and Channing were prepared to accept the Resurrection without the Divinity. Channing argued that God might be expected, considering the importance of Immortality, to prove its reality by a human illustration. "Miracles," said Channing, "are the appropriate, and would seem to be the only, mode of placing beyond doubt man's future and immortal being; and no miracles can be conceived so peculiarly adapted to this end as the very ones which held the highest place in Christianity: I mean the resurrection of Lazarus, and, still more, the resurrection of Jesus. No man will deny that, of all truths, a future state is most strengthening to virtue and consoling to humanity. Is it, then, unworthy of God to employ miracles for the awakening or the confirmation of this hope? May they not even be expected, if nature, as we have seen, sheds but a faint light on this most interesting of all verities?"[1]

The Unitarian writer Priestley wrote in still more decided terms his belief in Jesus' Resurrection. "If there be any truth in history," he wrote in his Essay on the Inspiration of Christ, "Christ wrought unquestionable miracles, as a proof of his mission from God; he preached the great doctrine of the Resurrection from the dead, he raised several persons from a state of death, and, what is more, he himself died and rose again in confirmation of his doctrine. The belief of these facts I call the belief of Christianity."[2]

Priestley's line of argument was that reason can at best only suggest the probability of a future state and not its certainty; that nothing less than a positive assurance from Deity could be conclusive; that such assurance in the shape of a concrete instance would be all the evidence that the most exacting of mankind could have desired. Now,

[1] Channing, 'Evidences of Christianity'; works, vol. iii. 383.

[2] In Goblet d'Alviella, 'The Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought,' p. 86.

"Jesus rested the evidence of his divine mission, and consequently his authority to preach the doctrine of a future life, in a more particular manner upon his own resurrection from the dead; and as, in all cases, examples have the greatest weight with mankind," Priestley proposed to show that the circumstances of Jesus' Death and Resurrection were "such as to render these important events in the highest degree credible, both at the time when they took place, and, what is of much more importance, in all future time."

Priestley accordingly devoted an entire essay to the proof of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, which he considered perfectly convincing.[1]

But Priestley apparently failed to carry conviction even in the circle of his own pupils. "He was constitutionally incapable of doubt," says a contemporary. "He could never perceive any mischief or danger in the fullest exposure of any doctrine which he believed." "His own faith in a future state" was "fixed on gospel promises," . . . "and he expected, I say not how wisely, to enhance the value of Christianity, and compel, as it were, the deist to accept of it, by proving that there was no hope of immortality without it."[2]

The successors of Priestley and Channing have not been able to retain belief in Christ's Resurrection while rejecting His Divinity. Channing's argument had no value for Martineau.

Indeed, this estimate of the Resurrection as only (1) a miraculous certificate of the truth of the instructions given by the Prophet of Nazareth, and (2) a certificate of human immortality by means of a solitary illustration, was an obvious legacy from the theology of the 18th century. It belongs to a period which considered Christianity as "a republication of natural religion": natural religion being supposed to consist of the doctrines of God and Immortality. It was a belief in Christ's Resurrection without any belief in Christ's Person. It made the fact of the Resurrection the all important matter, while it regarded with indifference the Person who rose. It did not matter essentially to such a

[1] Priestley, 'Discourse on the Resurrection of Jesus.'

[2] 'Memoirs, Miscellanies, and Letters of L. Aikin,' 1864, p. 237.

theory that it was Jesus Christ who rose. Any other person might have done as well, provided he had risen. For any other person might be utilised as a certificate of human immortality. Thus while an external resemblance to the apostolic faith was retained, there was an absolute departure from its essential spirit. For apostolic belief in the Resurrection of Christ was but a preliminary to devotion and self-surrender to Christ as Risen.

The failure of this Unitarian effort to establish Christ's Resurrection without His Divinity, seems to show that belief in the former will not be retained unless it becomes the ground for belief in His Person. This seems altogether natural and right. When Christ's Resurrection is reduced to a mere miraculous certificate of immortality not only are the distinctive glories of Christianity lost, but the conception remaining repels by its purely external, non-moral and unspiritual character. Unless belief in Christ's Resurrection advances to belief in His Divinity it will forfeit even that which it seems to have.

While the Resurrection of any chance individual would assuredly not justify the inference that he was divine, what S. Paul was contemplating was not the Resurrection of any chance individual, but the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. To appreciate S. Paul's idea we must remember his experience. To S. Paul, the Resurrection, of Christ included the exaltation to heavenly glory. This was an essential part of the Resurrection. It was this which S. Paul had seen. The Resurrection of Christ was not to S. Paul a mere sample of the future Resurrection of men. It contained within it elements entirely unique. The exaltation was to a glory which none could share. The Resurrection placed Christ alone in absolute splendour at God's right hand. Hence the inference from His Resurrection to His Divinity was anything rather than an illogical venture, refuted by the single remark that all other men will have the same experience, and yet none of them are divine. We may be sure that S. Paul's dialectic acuteness was not the victim of so obvious a fallacy. To his mind all men will not share the same experience as Jesus Christ. Their Resurrection differs

essentially in its aspect of exaltation from His. S. Paul never supposed that he or any one else would one day stand in that same exaltation wherein he saw the Risen Christ.

III

While, however, S. Paul drew the inference from the Resurrection to the Divinity, it is true that the ordinary modern experience would reverse the process, and argue from the Divinity to the Resurrection.

If Jesus Christ is a human being and nothing more, the evidence that He rose from the dead will appear comparatively weak, perhaps incredible. Regarded apart from His Divinity His Resurrection is intrinsically different, profoundly different, from what it is to those who believe Him to be divine. A believer in Christ's Divinity is deeply conscious that the Divine must be victorious in the sphere of death. The whole conception of Incarnation requires the triumph of the Incarnate over all obstruction to the full development of man. Otherwise, Incarnation itself would become meaningless and incredible. The Divinity of Christ is precisely the fact which demands and necessitates Resurrection. Thus, whenever men have sincerely believed in Him as their Divine Redeemer they have exhibited a genuine faith in Him as their Risen Lord.

CHAPTER XIX

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION INSTRUMENTAL IN HIS EXALTATION

THE fact that the Resurrection of Christ is evidential has occupied an enormous place in Christian thought. It may be said to have occupied a disproportionate place. For, after all, the evidential value of the Resurrection is only a portion of the truth. While it is, of course, most true that the Resurrection is evidential, yet if attention be exclusively concentrated upon this aspect, not only are other profoundly important aspects disregarded, but also the very aspect emphasised becomes purely external, and in a sense almost unspiritual. It is therefore essential to insist that Christ's Resurrection is not only evidential in attesting ideas, but instrumental in imparting powers. The instrumental aspects of the Resurrection have been at times comparatively overlooked, or at least insufficiently emphasised. And yet they are the most distinctively Christian.

The aspect before us for contemplation in the present chapter is the effect of His Resurrection upon our Lord Himself. This was an aspect dear to the apostolic mind.

I

No one has expressed more strikingly than S. Paul the thought that Christ's Resurrection was instrumental in His exaltation.

This is fully brought out in the first chapter of the Ephesians: "That ye may know . . . what is the exceeding greatness of His power to us-ward who believe

according to that working of the strength of His might which He wrought in Christ, when He raised Him from the dead, and made Him to sit at His right hand in the heavenly places, far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come: and He put all things in subjection under His feet, and gave Him to be Head over all things to the Church, which is His Body. . . ."

The Resurrection of Christ is here regarded by St. Paul, and indicated to the Ephesians, as a supreme manifestation of Divine power. The apostle accumulates synonyms for power in his effort to describe it. First he calls it "power" (*δύναμις*). Then he enhances this term by epithets, the "exceeding greatness" of His power. Then he expands the idea with three more terms: "That working of the strength of His might."

This Divine power is designated "might" (*ἰσχύς*): that is, the inner potentialities, the Divine capabilities and resources. It is also strength (*κράτος*): this denotes the Divine power put forth in meeting and overcoming resistance. The term is almost exclusively confined to the power of God.[1] It is also working (*ἐνέργεια*): that is, Divine power considered in the aspect of activity.[2]

Thus the Power of God, whether regarded in its aspect of inner resource, or outward effort, or boundless activity, is for S. Paul chiefly displayed in the Resurrection of Christ. And the Resurrection includes exaltation. God has not only raised Him from the dead. But this supreme exercise of power has carried with it the enthronement of Christ, in unique authority, above all conceivable dominions in the whole universe, of whatever sort they may be: whether of this natural sphere, or of the higher sphere of the spiritual. This wondrous Divine power has uplifted the Christ, out of the lowest humiliation of death to the loftiest height of being. We can see how deeply this thought of power revealed in the Resurrection of Christ has impressed itself upon the apostle's imagination, how the glow of religious

[1] Cf. Dean Robinson, *in loc.* [2] Cf. Meyer.

devotion, and the rush of feeling are behind these accumulated words.

1. And this exaltation of Christ by the Divine power is in the heavenly sphere.[1] It is in the sphere of spiritual activities, "that immaterial region, the unseen universe, which lies behind the world of sense."[2]

2. And the position of the exalted Christ in the heavenly sphere is above all other: "above all rule and authority and power and dominion." Moreover, as S. Chrysostom notes, it is "far" above them. All other rule and dominion sink into relative insignificance beside His.

3. Nor is this all. Not only are all other spiritual powers beside His insignificant, but they are subordinated to His. Not only in power is He preferred above them, but they are made His servants and subjected to His will.[3]

4. Then, after this magnificent flight, the apostle returns manward. The Divine power has constituted the exalted Christ the Head of the Church; the redeemed humanity which is His Body. But yet it is clear how much this suggests and leaves unsaid: what vistas of hope for the spiritual development of mankind are here implied.

This passage is a splendid illustration of S. Paul's conception of the value of the Resurrection relatively to the exaltation of Christ.

II

S. Paul's doctrine of the Resurrection as instrumental in the human exaltation of Christ is, of course, the doctrine of the entire New Testament. S. Luke's Gospel reports our Lord as describing the divine appropriateness that the Christ after his death should "enter into His glory."[4] According to S. Peter in the Acts, Christ is through His Resurrection "at the right hand of God exalted."[5] In the Revelation the announcement is: "I am the first and the last, and the living one; and I was dead, and behold I am alive for evermore, and I have the keys of death and of Hades."[6] Here the doctrine goes much further than the Pauline statement that

[1] Cf. Dean Robinson, pp. 20, 21. [2] *Ib.* [3] Cf. S. John Chrysostom, *in loc.*
[4] S. Luke xxiv. 26. [5] Acts ii. [6] Revel. i. 17-18.

"death hath no more dominion over Him";[1] it is a splendid ascription to Him of dominion over death and over the dead. His Resurrection is His conquest over forces to us invincible.

III

The exaltation of Jesus Christ entailed in His Resurrection necessarily affects all His functions as Man.

The Resurrection is the perfecting of His human nature. It freed Him from the relatively incomplete and restricted sphere, and enthroned Him in the sphere of full-grown human energies. In His Resurrection human nature achieves for the first time the ideal state. Its perfection is consummated.

The Resurrection confers upon His manhood further powers. Whatever functions He discharged on earth are enhanced; are rendered effective towards mankind; in a manner unknown before.

If on earth He wrought a prophetic, a priestly, and a kingly work, He now, as risen and exalted, exercises those offices in a perfected degree.

1. The extent to which the priestly work of Christ is matured by the Resurrection is shown throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. If the Resurrection of Christ is not explicitly named, it is everywhere presupposed.[2] The priesthood of Christ transcends all other because it is exercised in the heavenly sphere. It is a permanent priesthood. It possesses all the value and effectiveness which only such conditions can give. As high priest in the heavenly sphere, the exalted Christ exercises a twofold function in behalf of His redeemed community on earth: towards God He intercedes; towards man He confers help and strength.[3] These functions acquire their effectiveness through Christ's Resurrection and exaltation in the heavenly sphere. It is as exalted that "He is able to succour them that are tempted."[4] If His earthly experience has matured the human sympathy, it is His heavenly exaltation which bestows the power. Hence it is that in Him we "may find grace to help us in the time of need."[5] For "He is able to

[1] Rom. vi. 9. [2] Cf. Ménégoz, p. 100. [3] Cf. Riehm. p. 612.
[4] Heb. ii. 28. [5] Heb. iv. 16.

save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through Him."[1] And the ground of this ability to save is the inalienable priesthood which Christ possesses in the heavenly sphere.

This is the fundamental thought of the Epistle. So S. Peter claims that the Resurrection accounts for the increase of new spiritual power on earth. "Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, He hath poured forth this which ye see and hear."[2]

2. The Resurrection of our Lord endowed His prophetic office also with fuller power. For the whole substance of the Gospel acquires its force in virtue of His exaltation. His teaching obtains a new significance when related to His personal glory at God's right hand. His teaching does not depend merely on the intrinsic value of His utterances; it is endorsed by the personal authority of One uniquely related to the Father.

3. And once again, His Resurrection endowed our Lord with Kingly power in the spiritual sphere. He is not only described by S. Paul as enthroned in the heavenly sphere, "far above all rule and authority and power and dominion," but He is, in virtue of this exaltation, "Head over all things to the Church which is His Body." This spiritual dominion could only be realised after His Resurrection. The contrast between the Kingship of Christ during His ministry, and His Kingship after His Resurrection, is as striking as it is possible to conceive. It is only after the Resurrection that such utterances are possible as the great commission to the apostles. The words "all authority hath been given unto Me in heaven and on earth" may be the original from which S. Paul's doctrinal statement is derived. The conception in both is at any rate the same.

[1] Heb. vii. 25. [2] Acts ii. 33.

CHAPTER XX

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION THE MEANS OF OUR JUSTIFICATION

THAT Christ's Resurrection is instrumental in effecting man's justification is taught by S. Paul in the conclusion of the fourth chapter of the Romans. Faith, he says, will be reckoned unto us for righteousness "who believe on Him that raised Jesus our Lord from the dead, who was delivered up for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification. Here the Death and the Resurrection are the two facts emphasised. And at first sight our sin appears the reason for Christ's Death, and our justification the reason for His Resurrection. But this antithesis cannot mean that Redemption is ascribed to the Death and Justification to the Resurrection. Not at least as if Redemption was not completed by the Death, or required supplementing by the Resurrection. The whole redemptive work was ideally consummated in the Death. We were reconciled to God by the death of His Son. What then does the Resurrection effect? It realises the justification of the individual. This does not mean, says Beyschlag,[1] that our justification does not depend upon the Death, but rather that being rendered possible by the Death it is actualised for us through His Resurrection. Redemption was ideally consummated by the Death: it is individually appropriated by the Resurrection.

Sabatier observes that the Death and the Resurrection of Christ are not only logically united in the thought of S. Paul; they may even be described as one and the same act, expres-

[1] Beyschlag, 'N.T. Th.' ii. 164.

sing the two successive aspects of justification. The Death denotes the negative deliverance from guilt and annihilation of the power of sin: the Resurrection the positive creation of the spiritual life.[1] The new era begins with the Saviour's Resurrection.[2]

It will aid our thoughts to illustrate from other passages in S. Paul. He writes, for instance (Rom. viii. 34):

> "It is God that justifieth;
> Who is he that shall condemn?
> It is Christ Jesus that died,
> Yea rather, that was raised from the dead,
> Who is at the right hand of God,
> Who also maketh intercession for us."

The passage sounds like a fragment of the Creed: Death, Resurrection, Exaltation, Intercession. It shows most impressively the basis on which S. Paul's sense of his own justification reposed. First it is founded on the Death, which has had a redemptive effect. But he instantly passes to the Resurrection without which the Death is ineffective.[3] And on the Resurrection he founds the heavenly exaltation. And on the exaltation the thought of the powerful advocate. Thus S. Paul's object of religious reliance is the heavenly work of the now exalted Being Who once was crucified.

So again elsewhere S. Paul has written: "For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life."[4] That is to say, if the death of Jesus effected our reconciliation, much more must His glorified life complete our deliverance.[5] The antithesis here between reconciled by His death and saved by His life recalls and illustrates the passage under consideration: "delivered for our trespasses and raised for our justification."

Now the question is, How does the Resurrection of Christ produce our justification?

1. Partly because justification is secured by faith; and faith in the death of Christ as the redemptive sacri-

[1] 'L'Apôtre Paul,' p. 323 [2] *Ib.* 339. [3] Cf. Rom. iv. 25.
[4] Rom. v. 10. [5] Liddon's 'Analysis.'

fice is founded on the Resurrection. Therefore, says Pfleiderer, the Resurrection was the necessary means for securing the individual's justification. It was "the intermediate cause of subjective justification, while the Death was the direct cause of the objective cancelling of sins." Accordingly we have here not two co-ordinate causes of salvation, each with its separate effect, but one and the same effect of salvation, which has in the death of Christ its real cause, and in His Resurrection the logical ground of the possibility of its subjective appropriation by faith."[1] The exposition of the passage by Bernard Weiss is somewhat similar: according to him, "The objective atonement was accomplished by means of the death of Christ, but the appropriation of it in justification is only possible if we believe in this saving significance of His death, and we can attain to faith in that only if it is sealed by means of the Resurrection." Weiss compares Phil. iii. 10, "that I may know Him and the power of His Resurrection": his conclusion being that the relation between Christ's Death and Resurrection is that "the former was the means of procuring salvation, the latter the means of appropriating it."[2] So regarded, Christ's Resurrection becomes reduced to "a divine declaration that we are accepted with God."[3] It is little more than a certificate or testimonial to the validity of the Death.

And, so regarded, the question raised by Pfleiderer becomes quite natural, whether the Resurrection has any permanent dogmatic significance in human justification.[4] That it was an essential aid to faith to contemporary Judaism Pfleiderer fully allows. But supposing assent to the work of Christ, and faith in His Person, were founded on His character; while the Resurrection, instead of promoting faith, was rather viewed as an obstruction and a difficulty; then the thought that Christ rose again for our justification would represent an ancient but not a modern requirement. The Resurrection would have no necessary connection with justification, but one purely external and contingent. And

[1] Pfleiderer, 'Paulinismus,' i. 119.
[2] B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.,' i. 437.
[3] Stevens, 'Pauline Theology,' p. 254.
[4] 'Paulinismus,' i. p. 119 n.

this is substantially what Pfleiderer pleads. He claims that if apologetic writers represent faith in Christ as inseparable from faith in His Resurrection, they are confusing a Jewish postulate with the permanent elements of the Christian religion. It is, of course, quite clear that Pfleiderer does not mean by faith in Christ what Christendom means by the same. But the question raised, that of the Resurrection as a permanent element in justification, is perfectly reasonable; supposing the value of the Resurrection to be merely that of a certificate to the Passion, and faith in the value of the Death to be acquired in some other way.

According to Zahn,[1] Christ was raised for our justification; but although our redemption was wrought once for all by the Death, yet this only becomes appropriated by faith, and faith is an individual affair. But faith and trust in God cannot be founded on one who continues dead. If men did not know that Christ Himself had been restored to life, much less would faith in Him as bringing life to others be possible. Thus Christ's Resurrection is the basis of faith in Christ as Redeemer; of faith in the reality and effectiveness of His work for the sins of men. Therefore justification depends on Christ's Resurrection.

2. The question therefore is, Did S. Paul mean that the Resurrection was merely related to justification as an aid to faith? He was raised for our justification. It has been said that here "the Resurrection is associated with the completion of salvation in such a way as to be made an essential factor."[2] But in what way? Did S. Paul really mean to teach that the Resurrection itself possessed a power beyond its evidential usefulness? Or does the Resurrection confer upon every individual that with which no individual can dispense? Is it really right to contrast in this antithesis the Death and the Resurrection, as that which redeems and that which certifies? Is not Christ's Resurrection instrumental in conveying something more than intellectual assurance? Does it not effect something for Christ Himself? Is it not the process of the glorifying and perfecting of His humanity?

[1] Zahn on Romans iv. 25, p. 240.

[2] Stevens, 'Pauline Theol.' 17, p. 255.

And does not this mean that His Resurrection actually contributes to realising our justification? Compare Rom. viii. 34: "It is God that justifieth; who is he that condemneth? It is Christ Jesus that died, yea rather, that was raised from the dead, Who is at the right hand of God, Who also maketh intercession for us." Does not this throw light on the meaning of the sentence, "was raised for our justification"? S. Paul rapidly passes on from the Death to the Resurrection; thence again to the Exaltation; and thence again to the working of the glorified Christ. And this suggests a deeper conception of its relation to justification. It is only by His Risen Life that Christ becomes the new life-principle for humanity. Now if the Resurrection becomes the medium through which the glorified life of Jesus is infused into the individual believer, then this must be included in the significance of the passage, "He was raised again for our justification." And surely this is a thoroughly Pauline idea.

"Who was delivered up for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification." S. Augustine observed that S. Paul did not write: "Who was delivered up for our justification and was raised for our trespasses." There was a distinct appropriateness in the selected terms: a theological significance, not a rhetorical balance. In the "delivering up" sin is denoted, in the "Resurrection" righteousness.[1]

Thus Liddon in his analysis of the passage explains as follows: He was delivered up to death for the sake of, on account of, our offences. But there is needed some means whereby we may appropriate the results of His Death. For this purpose, He was raised again for the sake of, on account of, our justification: to make it possible. Not merely as warranting faith in the atoning value of His Death, but also as making Him, in His risen life, a new life-principle for us, by union with Whom our justification is secured.[2]

"Christ's work of mercy," wrote Newman, "has two chief parts, as specified in the text (Rom. iv. 25); what He did for all men, what He does for each; what He did once for all, what He does for one by one continually; what He did externally to us, what He does within us; what He did on

[1] S. Aug., Sermon 236, p. 1444.

[2] Liddon's 'Analysis of Romans.'

earth, what He does in heaven; ... His meritorious sufferings, and the various gifts thereby purchased, of pardon, grace, reconciliation, renewal, holiness, spiritual communion; that is, His Atonement and the application of His Atonement, or His Atonement and our justification ..."[1] "As in God's counsels it was necessary for the Atonement that there should be a material, local sacrifice of the Son once for all: so for our individual justification there must be a spiritual, omnipresent communication of that sacrifice continually."[2] "And thus His rising was the necessary condition of His applying to His elect the virtue of that Atonement which His dying wrought for all men. While He was on the Cross, while in the tomb ... the treasure existed, the precious gift was perfected, but it lay hid; it was not yet available for its gracious ends; it was not diffused, communicated, shared in, enjoyed. Thus He died to purchase what He rose again to apply."[3] Accordingly, in Newman's exposition the Resurrection is the means by which the Atonement is applied to each of us. It is our justification. In it are conveyed all the gifts of grace and glory which Christ has purchased for us. It is the commencement of His giving Himself to us for a spiritual sustenance. "It is that very doctrine which is most immediate to us, in which Christ most closely approaches us, from which we gain life, and out of which issue our hopes and our duties."[4]

It will be noted that these two interpretations are not mutually exclusive, but supplementary. There is no reason why both should not be in the apostle's design. And if the latter be included, the permanent value of Christ's Resurrection in Christian justification is indisputable. The Resurrection can no longer conceivably be regarded as merely an aid to those whose standpoint enables it to strengthen their faith. It is the means by which they are made recipients of the gifts which the Death secured.

[1] J. H. Newman, 'Lectures on Justification,' Lect. ix. 'Christ's Resurrection the Source of our Justification,' p. 232.

[2] *Ib.* p. 234. [3] *Ib.* p. 235. [4] *Ib.* p. 252.

CHAPTER XXI

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION INSTRUMENTAL IN THE MORAL RESURRECTION OF CHRISTIANS

THE Resurrection of Christ finds its counterpart, according to S. Paul, in the experiences of Christians. All the great experiences of Christ, Crucifixion, Death, Burial, Resurrection, are paralleled by the apostle with the experiences of the individual believer. Thus Christians are "crucified with Him";[1] they are "dead with Him";[2] they are "buried with Him";[3] they are "risen with Him."[4] This parallel of experiences is fully developed in Romans vi. 3-11, in Ephesians ii. 4-6, and in Philippians iii. 10. We propose to consider these three passages.

I

And first, the passage in the Roman Epistle.[5]

"We who died to sin, how shall we any longer live therein? Or are ye ignorant that all we who were baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised into His death? We were buried therefore with Him through baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. For if we have become united with Him by the likeness of His death, we shall be also by the likeness of His Resurrection; knowing this, that our old man was crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin; for he that hath died is justified from

[1] Rom. vi. 6; Gal. ii. 20. [2] Rom. vi. 3-4. [3] Rom. vi. 4.
[4] Eph. ii. 6. [5] Rom. vi. 3-11.

sin. But if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death no more hath dominion over Him. For the death that He died, He died unto sin once: but the life that He liveth, He liveth to God. Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus."

This parallel drawn by S. Paul, between the experiences of Christ and those of the Christian, is no mere external disconnected resemblance. It is not two series of separated events bearing a striking similarity. They are connected in the deepest and most intimate way. The experiences of Christ and of the Christian are alike because Christ and the Christian are one. The Christian is in Christ Jesus. There is a mystical union between them:[1] most intimate, most profound. This is the fundamental idea upon which the entire conception of this passage is based.

The apostle's argument is, first, that "all who were baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised into His death." So intimate the mystical union is that Christians are made sharers in a moral sense with the death which Christ experienced. This mystical union is realised in their Baptism. The plunge into the baptismal water, the immersion of the convert therein, corresponds in the spiritual sphere to the death, and to the burial, which is the death's certificate and full expression. Here, then, the parallel between the experience of Christ and the experience of the Christian is so far complete. "We were buried with Him through baptism into death."

But this correspondence is carried through into the Resurrection, "that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life." The Resurrection of Christ, which was an act of Divine power, and demonstration of Divine glory, must also have its counterpart in the immediate spiritual Resurrection of Christians in the present world. They are men to whom new life has been imparted. "For," urges S. Paul, "if we have become united with Him by

[1] *σύμφυτοι.*

the likeness of His death, we shall be also by the likeness of His Resurrection." The parallel between Christ's experience and that of Christians cannot apply merely to the death: it must equally hold good on its more glorious side. This assumes, of course, the mystical union between Christ and Christians as its explanation and its cause. The Resurrection of believers must ensue through their union with their Lord. The very meaning of the Christian experience already achieved demonstrates this. We know, says the apostle, that our former unregenerate self was crucified with Christ: mystically identified with His Passion in a manner so real as even to deserve the name of crucifixion. We know the purpose of this is "that the body of sin might be done away"; that is to say, that the human body,[1] so far as it is under the servitude of sin (not the body as such, but so far as instrumental to sinful desires), might be put to death, with a view to liberate us from the tyranny of sin: sin being personified as a slave-owner who forces the body to his will. "For he that hath died is justified from sin." For the dead slave is out of the sphere of its former master's control. He has no further claim upon it. But the mystical union of the believer with Christ will in the future issue in a completed parallel of experience, physical as well as moral. "But if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him." Life and death take larger meaning here: neither the moral nor the physical can be excluded. The parallel of the Christian's moral death with Christ, already experienced, will lead to a further parallel of physical Resurrection and life with Christ. On what assurance is this founded? It is based on Christ's physical Resurrection. "Knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over Him. For the death that He died, He died unto sin once: but the life that He liveth, He liveth unto God."

The deep significance of this passage is that S. Paul regards the Death and Resurrection of our Lord as being not merely physical facts, but also mystic experiences. He does not for a single instant undervalue the historic

[1] Cf. Origen.

realities. They are to him the whole foundation of his argument. There could be no such thing as a conformity of the Christian experiences to those of Christ unless Christ actually died and rose again. But yet the important point is that, while giving full appreciation to the literal historical occurrences, S. Paul absolutely refuses to regard Christ's Death and Resurrection mainly on the physical side. They are moral experiences through and through. The Death of Christ is not merely nor chiefly a physical incident. It is an experience in the moral sphere: "He died unto sin once for all." His entire relation to evil was as one dead to it. This represented His constant habitual unvarying state. This mystic death to sin issued in death, the physical experience. That was what sin required. But although the physical death was inevitable on moral grounds, it was the moral determination which gave it any worth. Thus the Death of Christ is to S. Paul profoundly mystical. And the Resurrection is mystical also. "Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over Him."

II

The second passage is Ephesians ii. 4-6: "But God being rich in mercy, for His great love wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead through our trespasses, quickened us together with Christ (by grace have ye been saved), and raised us up with Him, and made us to sit with Him in the heavenly places, in Christ Jesus."

The thought in this passage is the sequel to that which precedes it. S. Paul had just dwelt on the supreme manifestation of Divine power which had effected Christ's Resurrection, and Christ's enthronement in the heavenly sphere. The apostle now advances to the further thought that the same Divine power had also and at the same time effected corresponding privileges in the case of Christians. Christ had been dead: dead in the physical sense. God raised Him and enthroned Him. Christians also had been dead: not in the physical sense but in the moral; dead through their trespasses. God quickened them together with

Christ. This idea is explained by two phrases, corresponding to the two experiences of Christ in His Resurrection and Enthronement. God raised Christ and enthroned Him. God also raised Christians with Christ, and enthroned them with Christ. For the original compound verbs we possess no English equivalents. In the Vulgate they are, *convivificavit, conresuscitavit, consedere fecit.* But what is precisely meant by "quickened us together with Christ"? (*convivificavit*). God is said to have given us life together with Christ. The life which He gave must clearly correspond to the death which we suffered. This death was moral. The life, therefore, must be moral also. The apostle expressly asserts a difference between the nature of our death and that of Christ. We were dead through our trespasses. He gave us life: restored us to a higher moral and spiritual condition.

But in what sense does this quickening take place in us "*with Christ*"? Certainly not merely after the example of what God wrought for Christ: not a mere historic parallel, or illustration of a similar working of Divine power. This is not adequate. The relation between Christ and Christians is immeasurably more intimate. "Together with Christ" (σύν) means more. Elsewhere S. Paul writes, "If so be that we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him" (Rom. viii. 17). And again: "If we died with Him, we shall also live with Him; if we endure we shall also reign with Him" (2 Tim. ii. 12). These passages suggest a very intimate union and mystical identification of the Christian with Christ. That God "quickened us together with Christ," or that He gave us life together with Christ, must signify that God produces in the Christian certain moral and spiritual effects in virtue of the union of the Christian with Christ.

It is essential here to notice that S. Paul describes that Christian experience as already achieved. The Christian's Resurrection, the Christian's enthronement in the spiritual sphere, are divine acts once accomplished. They do not lie for S. Paul in the future so much as in the past. Thus they are ideal acts of God. They are "contemporaneous with the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ."[1] They are "wholly

[1] Dean A. Robinson, p. 52

independent of any human action." They are products of Divine grace. They originate entirely in the Divine love and compassion. If Christ be viewed as humanity, humanity embodied in its one concrete instance of achieved perfection, then with Christ all humanity is ideally raised and exalted into the heavenly sphere. Raised with Christ, enthroned in heavenly places with Christ, will then denote a real identification between mankind and Christ.

It is not probable that S. Paul confined his thoughts to the existing Church of the moment when he was writing. The ideal outlook is also in perfect keeping with the general character of the Ephesian letter.

III

The relation of the Resurrection of Christ to the Resurrection of Christians is again emphasised, and very personally, in Philippians, "That I may know Him, and the power of His resurrection, and the fellowship of His sufferings, becoming conformed unto His death; if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead."[1]

Now the knowledge to which S. Paul here aspires ("that I may know Him and the power of His resurrection") is not of a mere speculative theoretical kind; it is personal and experimental. It is the knowledge which nothing but religious experience can bring.[2] It is not the knowledge of the intellect alone, such as assent to certain dogmatic propositions, although of course it includes them.

S. Paul then proceeds to speak of such experimental knowledge of Christ: and this first, in reference to His Resurrection, and secondly, to His sufferings.[3] The two great words in which the sacred writer characterises these are "power" and "fellowship": power of His Resurrection, and fellowship with His sufferings. It will be observed how characteristically here, as always, S. Paul bases his theology on the Resurrection and on the Death.

His theme then is experimental knowledge of Christ: "That I may know Him." As it has been said, "with an

[1] Phil. iii. 10.

[2] Cf. Meyer, *in loc.*

[3] Cf. Lipsius in the 'Handcommentar.'

intuition possible only to the soul which accepts Him."[1] And first, experimental knowledge of the power of Christ's Resurrection. To "know Him and the power of His Resurrection" is not a reference to the power by which Christ Himself was raised, but to the power which Christ Himself exerts as risen.[2] The power of Christ's Resurrection is undoubtedly exhibited in authenticating Christ's own assertions, and in certifying His work. But the knowledge to which S. Paul aspires, is much more intimate and personal than mere intellectual incentives to faith. S. Paul in his conversion received a very direct and personal experience of the power of Christ's Resurrection. But that upon which he is dwelling here is the moral and spiritual power of the same.[3] It is the effectiveness of that power upon the believing will and heart. The power of Christ's Resurrection is shown in justifying and renewal. Thus to know the power of His Resurrection is to have experience of the fruits of His redemptive work. S. Paul, indeed, sums up the principal gifts of Christ by a reference to His Resurrection.

Secondly, S. Paul speaks of experimental knowledge derived by fellowship or participation in Christ's sufferings. This signifies a mystical union with Christ's self-surrender. "That deep experience of union with Him which comes through daily taking up the cross, in His steps, for His sake, in His strength."[4] This experience naturally comes after experience of the spiritual power of Christ's Resurrection: for it is only through that power that human nature is strengthened for such mystical union and self-surrender. No exposition of this passage can possibly be adequate which fails to be profoundly conscious of the apostle's mystic intensity. Thus the apostle's conception of discipleship is a "becoming conformed unto His death." S. Paul aspires to a process of growing into conformity with the death of Christ: always of course with the conscious underthought of His Resurrection, and of the power which flows therefrom. The death of Christ is clearly here conceived as a physical fact, but infused with all the

[1] Bp. Moule, 'Philippian Studies,' p. 165.
[2] Cf. Meyer, *in loc.*
[3] See also Liddon's 'Easter Sermons,' i. 175-177.
[4] Moule, *ib.* p. 165.

reality of its spiritual meaning. It is physical but at the same time it is moral. Hence S. Paul in this life aspires to be "drawn evermore into spiritual harmony with Him who wrought his salvation by an ineffable self-surrender." [1] Then S. Paul concludes his aspirations with the hope "if by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead." This resurrection to which S. Paul aspires is plainly physical. And this transition from the spiritual to the physical effects of Christ's Resurrection, its power over both sides of human nature, is eminently characteristic of S. Paul.

[1] Bp. Moule, *ib.* p. 165.

CHAPTER XXII

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION INSTRUMENTAL IN THE PHYSICAL RESURRECTION OF CHRISTIANS

I

THE Resurrection of Christ as the cause of the Resurrection of Christians is wonderfully expressed in Romans viii. 10-11. "And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, He that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies through His Spirit that dwelleth in you."

In this great passage S. Paul lays emphasis successively on the moral and physical Resurrection of Christian people. "If Christ be in you;" that is to say, not challenging the fact of the indwelling of Christ in the believer, but on the assumption of the reality of the experience; if Christ has actually entered into the believer's inmost personality, then according to the apostle, two consequences follow. First, that although their human body is virtually dead already, through the effect of sin (dead, *νεκρόν*; not mortal, *θνητόν*), being not merely liable to the experience of physical dissolution, but consigned to it inevitably; belonging as it does to the category of dead things: yet the spirit, the human spirit of the believer, is life (not merely living, but life *ζωή*), on account of the righteousness of Christ; of which Christ's indwelling makes it the recipient. Thus on the spiritual side of the believer's nature the Resurrection has already taken place. The Christian is already risen with

Christ, in the region of personal renewal, in moral regeneration, because the righteousness of Christ is in the believer, already imparted to him.

It is a most striking feature of S. Paul's doctrine of Resurrection that his teaching does not stop here, and is not confined to one side of our complex nature. For, in the second place, continues the apostle, "if the spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you," and the Resurrection has become realised already within you on the spiritual side of your nature, the new vitality shall in process of time pervade the physical also. "He that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies," as well as your spirit; shall give new life to the physically mortal frame, which being now subject to mortality shall deserve that epithet no longer. And this will be brought about "through His Spirit," through the Holy Spirit, "that dwelleth in you."

With this may be compared the later verses in the same chapter of Romans: "In hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only so, but ourselves also, which have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body."

The drift of this passage is that we Christians are already in possession of the firstfruits of the Spirit, so far as the soul is concerned, since we are recipients of redemptive grace; but so far as the body is concerned, it waits, as the whole creation waits, to be delivered from the bondage of corruption; and this will take place in the Resurrection of the body. We still on the physical side of our nature await an adoption which consists in the redemption of our body.

II

Matthew Arnold[1] contended that in S. Paul's ideas the expression "resurrection from the dead" "has no essential

[1] 'St. Paul and Protestantism,' p. 81.

connection with physical death." Arnold complains that "popular theology connects it with this almost exclusively, and regards any other use of it as purely figurative and secondary. For popular theology, Christ's Resurrection is his bodily Resurrection on earth after his physical death on the cross." "But whoever has carefully followed Paul's line of thought... will see that in his mature theology, as the Epistle to the Romans exhibits it, it cannot be this physical and miraculous aspect of the Resurrection which holds the first place in his mind; for under this aspect the Resurrection does not fit in with the ideas which he is developing."[1]

Matthew Arnold indeed admits that this statement requires qualification: "Not for a moment do we deny that in Paul's earlier theology, and notably in the Epistles to the Thessalonians and Corinthians, the physical and miraculous aspect of the Resurrection, both Christ's and the believers', is primary and predominant. Not for a moment do we deny that to the very end of his life, after the Epistle to the Romans, after the Epistle to the Philippians, if he had been asked whether he held the doctrine of the Resurrection in its physical and miraculous sense, as well as in his own spiritual and mystical sense, he would have replied with entire conviction that he did. Very likely it would have been impossible to him to imagine his theology without it."[2]

Nevertheless Matthew Arnold could imagine S. Paul's theology without it: because below what we *say* we feel and *think* we feel, is what we feel indeed. And what S. Paul felt indeed was the mystical and spiritual resurrection and not the physical.

"Paul's conception of life and death inevitably came to govern his conception of resurrection." And what did he mean by life, and what by death? "Not the ordinary physical life and death; death, for him, is living after the flesh, obedience to sin; life is mortifying by the spirit the deeds of the flesh, obedience to righteousness. Resurrection, in its essential sense, is therefore for Paul, the rising, within the sphere of our visible earthly existence, from death in this sense to life in this sense." "Christ's physical resurrection

[1] 'St. Paul and Protestantism,' p. 82. [2] *Ib.* p. 83.

after He was crucified is neither in point of time nor in point of character the resurrection on which Paul, following his essential line of thought, wanted to fix the believer's mind. The resurrection Paul was striving after for himself and others was a resurrection *now*, and a resurrection to *righteousness*."[1]

Matthew Arnold's criticism on the onesidedness of popular theology, its confinement of the idea of Christ's Resurrection to His bodily resurrection on earth, is very vigorous and well deserved. The mystical resurrection, both of Christ and of the Christian, has been practically effaced in much popular religion in favour of the more easily grasped idea of bodily resurrection after physical death. That this effacement is very serious loss is unquestionably true. Modern religion requires the restatement in its proper position of the sublime conception of mystical correspondence between the spiritual experiences of our Lord and those of any true disciple. So far as he insisted on this, Matthew Arnold has done us real service.

But when this brilliant critic insisted that mystical resurrection is the essential element in St. Paul's conception; essential in such a way that bodily resurrection can be excluded without detriment to Christianity, although it is admitted that it would very likely have been impossible for S. Paul to imagine his theology without it—Matthew Arnold is even more one-sided and exclusive than the popular religion which he condemns. It is a curious procedure to eliminate from apostolic Christianity that without which St. Paul declared his preaching vain, and then to affirm that no essential alteration in the religion has been made.

S. Paul's conception of resurrection is undoubtedly profoundly spiritual; but it does not create a false antithesis between soul and body; nor does it leave one side of our double nature untouched by the work of Christ. It does not confine resurrection to the soul any more than it does to the body. It recognises a spiritual force derived from Christ, overcoming death of every kind, on whatever side of our nature that death exists. After all, death of the body is

[1] *Ib.* p. 85.

as real in its way as death of the soul. And the glory of Christianity is that it refuses the onesidedness whether it be popular or whether it be critical of confining the operation of Christ's spirit to either part of the double nature of man.

This truth has been very ably expressed by Fr. Waggett in an essay on the Resurrection.[1] S. Paul connects the Resurrection of Jesus with our own lives in two ways: "First the Lord's rising is the cause of our own inward rising with Him, now, by faith. Secondly, it is the promise of our future rising from the death of the body.

"This resurrection of the body is sometimes called 'the physical resurrection,' but the phrase is one likely to discredit the fact it points to. The Resurrection is a victory of spirit in the region which death now rules. We are not asked to believe in a reconstruction of the body after the fashion which belongs to the reign of death, but to believe that the death of the body as well as that of the spirit meets its conqueror in Christ. The death we die is a real event, as real on its lower level of importance as the sin which is its counterpart in the spirit. And this real event of death—so serious, so tyrannous, so much unworthy to be the conclusion of the body's story—finds its cure in Christ. This cure lies in the victory of Christ over bodily death in His own person, and will be accomplished in His members by the extension of the same victory. 'God both raised the Lord, and will raise us through His power.'"[2]

To confine resurrection to one part of human nature is, the author contends, a false spirituality. It "is false, not by making an excessive claim, for we can never push too far the claim of the inward and unseen; it is false precisely through timidity, and by failing to invade in the name of Spirit the regions of sensible experience."[3]

"This very sharing of the Lord's Resurrection, which the Christian at once possesses and expects, provides a means to distinguish the statements made concerning our Lord Himself. The Christian, according to S. Paul, 'is risen,' 'was raised' with Christ. This is the inward spiritual fact, the presence of the new and heavenly life; the life which in

[1] 'The Holy Eucharist,' pp. 198-208, 1906. [2] p. 199. [3] p. 200.

Christ has passed through death and already invigorates the Christian. The soul which has been invaded by this heavenly life is thereby risen in Christ, and must seek those things that are above, above mortal nature, above dying reason. But there is a sense in which the believer is not yet risen. He must not 'say that the Resurrection is past already,' that there is nothing more to hope for. On the contrary, this heavenly life, now purifying a mortal and dying body, is one day to revive, almost to recreate, the bodily presence.... This is the redemption of the body, this is the cure. This, if you like, is physical resurrection. But in S. Paul it is clearly distinguished from, and it accompanies in thought, the inward moral fact which has already taken place.

It is precisely the concomitance of the two ideas which shows that the one is not the substitute of the other, the physical travesty of the first pure spiritual belief.... Certainly in S. Paul the moral and the bodily resurrection appear in deliberate succession and in an ordered whole."[1]

[1] p. 203.

CHAPTER XXIII

S. PAUL'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE DOGMATIC VALUE OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

IT so happened, a believer will add, providentially, that the needs of the Corinthian Church led S. Paul not only to give positive expression to the theological consequences which flow from Christ's Resurrection, but also to describe negatively the consequences which must follow to Christianity if Christ be not risen.

There ought to be no doubt that in the Christian community at Corinth the Resurrection of Christ Himself was nowhere called in question. For the Apostle makes no attempt to prove it; and while he carries out the logical consequences of its denial to their last results, he does it manifestly with absolute confidence that the victorious force of truth will save his readers from taking the wrong alternative in the dilemma. He has not the slightest fear that they will deny that Christ is risen. He is quite certain that what they will do is precisely what men unassailably convinced of Christ's Resurrection must do; namely, believe also in the Resurrection of Christians.

The confused thinkers at Corinth saw no difficulty hitherto in combining belief in the Resurrection of Christ with denial of that of Christians. They accepted an individual instance and denied the universal. They evidently considered the Resurrection of Christ as an exceptional case:[1] and they laid down the universal negative; that there is no such thing as resurrection of dead persons. They had no conception of

[1] Cf. Kennedy, 'S. Paul's Conception of the Last Things,' p. 225.

the far-reaching consequences upon the entire believing community of the Resurrection of their Lord. And they imprudently committed themselves to that most unscientific position—a universal negative.

This confused condition of a religion not thought out was intolerable to S. Paul's systematic mind. He presses with remorseless logic upon the Corinthian inconsistencies of thought.

The Resurrection of Christ was proclaimed by the Apostle and accepted by the Corinthians (verse 12). Then urges S. Paul: If the Resurrection of Christ be true, "how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?" A denial of the Resurrection in general, combined with an assent to it in particular, was illogical. If there is no such thing at all as Resurrection, then, plainly, what is thus universally refuted cannot be true in the solitary instance of Jesus Christ (13).

Accordingly, S. Paul pushes out to the furthest the conclusions which must follow on the assumption that Jesus Christ is not risen.

1. First, the consequences to the Christian religion itself: "then is our preaching vain."

If Christ's Resurrection has not happened, Christianity is emptied of its truth and vitality. To realise how profoundly this must be so for S. Paul, we have but to remember that the whole dogmatic structure of his Christianity was founded on the Death of our Lord seen in the light of His Resurrection. Therefore, every one of the main Christian truths about the Person and Work of Christ disappears, if Christ be not risen. If Christ were not risen, then the ground on which S. Paul came to believe in His Divinity, in His redemptive work, in His sinless perfection, and in His priesthood, would be entirely destroyed.

On the relation between the Resurrection and His redemptive work, Beyschlag[1] observes that it is commonly asserted that without the Resurrection of Jesus we should not have known that His Death was redemptive, and therefore could have had no faith in the same. The faith of the

[1] Beyschlag, 'N.T. Th.' ii. 162.

centurion at the Cross, and of the penitent thief, show the possibility of faith in Jesus, without a knowledge of His Resurrection on the ground of His behaviour in death. Our knowledge of His life and death could surely produce the same. Yes, perhaps, the same: but the faith neither of the centurion nor of the dying malefactor was the full faith of the Christian. Faith of a kind might undoubtedly still be produced, but not justifying faith.

Justification can only be conferred by the risen and glorified Christ. It is through His Resurrection that Jesus in His manhood becomes a life-giving spirit. The whole life of S. Paul consists in living communion with the risen and exalted Christ. The redemptive sanctifying power of the death of Christ is reached and applied through His Resurrection. Our justification is not merely wrought by the Death and Resurrection of Jesus, as acts past and completed, but through His present activity as exalted.[1]

Of course, if the apostolic conception of redemption and of the infusion of life from Christ be rejected, it is true that His Resurrection need no longer be retained. If redemption be reduced to the higher instruction and holy example which Jesus has given to men, then certainly in such a scheme of His work Resurrection finds no necessary place. There seems no particular theological reason why in the discharge of such a mission He should not have seen corruption. But then this only means that Christ has been lowered to the level of a mere prophet or founder of a religion. But this is to surrender the earlier apostolic conception of Himself and His work. It is exceedingly important to realise that the Resurrection takes its place in one self-consistent conception of Christ's work to which it is absolutely essential.

2. Now clearly if the religion itself is reduced to nothingness by a denial of Christ's Resurrection, the results which follow to every class of persons connected with it are obvious enough. These S. Paul proceeds to summarise.

The consequences to his *converts* are disastrous: "Your faith also is vain" (κενή).[2] If Christ is not risen, there are no

[1] Cf. Rom. viii. 34.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 14.

real contents in the doctrine on which the Corinthians have set their belief. There is no real object corresponding to their subjective devotion. They have concentrated their faith on Jesus as Messiah, Redeemer, and Son of God. All these are illusions, without the Resurrection. Thus, moreover, their faith is vain (*ματαία*): that is misdirected, fruitless of effect: "Ye are yet in your sins."[1] The reconciliation with God, the justification in which you fondly believed, are not effected.

When therefore it is said that "even apart from Jesus' bodily Resurrection there still remains objectively the whole religious significance of His saving work,"[2] this is exactly what S. Paul denies.

What S. Paul says to his converts, in effect, is this: You have hitherto assured yourselves that your sins were forgiven and removed by the Blood of Christ. But upon what foundation does that conviction rest? How do you know that the Death of Christ is what you assert it to be? Where is the demonstration that what Christ wrought on earth is accepted in Heaven? That is an urgent inquiry: it cannot be avoided. Your answer is, and must be, for it is the only answer possible: the Death of Christ is certified as all-prevailing by His Resurrection. By His Resurrection also are the gifts confirmed which His Death obtained. If then you cast uncertainty upon this historic fact by your universal negative, realise the insecurity, the baselessness to which your whole faith and hope are instantly reduced. Without Christ's Resurrection you do not know that this Passion and Death prevail in Heaven. And if you do not know that, neither can you know that your sins are forgiven for His Name's sake. Neither can you be recipients of that justification which depends upon His rising. Contemplate yourselves then as thrown back into the old pagan state. The redemptive effects of Christianity upon you are destfoyed.

3. Thirdly, S. Paul reveals the consequences of such denial to himself, as a witness of the Resurrection. For more than twenty years he has proclaimed it everywhere. Jesus and the Resurrection: that was the substance of his teaching.

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 17. [2] Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 135.

He has been irretrievably committed to it, and identified with it. But, if Christ be not risen: what then? Then, "we are found false witnesses of God." S. Paul does not say "we are," but "we are found." The idea is, we are detected. False witnesses: the reference is not to the character of the messenger, but to that of the message.[1] "Because we witnessed of God that He raised up Christ: whom He raised not up, if so be that the dead are not raised." S. Paul steadily faces this bearing of the denial upon his message as a preacher. If Christ has not risen then S. Paul is calmly aware that he has misrepresented the Almighty to His creatures; described Him as being what He is not; and attributed to Him actions in which He had no share; and which, in point of fact, never took place.

We are for you, he seems to say, in that case, no longer messengers of truth, but of illusions. We came to you as ambassadors, as though God did beseech you by us; we have described as a Divine achievement what is no better than a fiction; we have taught as a historic fact what is nothing more than our own imagination.

4. These applications might seem enough, even more than enough, to make the Corinthians reconsider: but S. Paul traces the consequence of a Christianity without the Resurrection into one further province; namely, that of the faithful departed. If Christ be not risen, "then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ have perished."[2] The meaning is not that they have ceased to exist.[3] S. Paul does not contemplate annihilation. The thought is that whereas the Resurrection of Christ meant for the faithful departed their union with Him, and their share in His triumph: if Christ be not risen, the departed are still detained in Hades in the same condition as the Jews who died before His coming, or apart from union with Him. Whereas the believer in Christ's Resurrection could say "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord" (Rev. xiv. 13): if Christ be not risen, that would be no longer possible to say.[4] It would in that case be necessary to view the faithful departed in a very different light. They all died trusting for salvation in Christ,

[1] Heinrici. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 18. [3] Meyer. [4] Heinrici.

and they are all deceived. They thought themselves forgiven through Him and justified by His Resurrection: but they find themselves in the other world to be nothing of the kind. They have lost precisely that upon which their eternal hopes were fixed.

Nay, Christ Himself, instead of being their deliverer, is, in that case, Himself sharing that joyless state in Hades, remote from the presence of God.

If in this life we have had nothing in Him but a hope to which no reality corresponds, if our hope is a mere unsubstantial delusion, then we of all men are most to be pitied. S. Paul is not thinking of loss of future reward, but loss of present strength and grace. It is that his hope is deprived of correspondence with reality. He is in a most miserable position: having substituted shadow for substance, and set his hope on that which is in reality hopeless.[1]

II

S. Paul in his argument here might seem to consider Resurrection and Immortality as equivalents. It is scarcely conceivable that the Corinthian Christians, who affirmed that there was no such thing as resurrection from the dead, intended to deny entirely the soul's survival in a future state, for such denial must have rendered any acceptance of Christianity repugnant and impossible.

They must have meant to distinguish between spiritual survival and physical resurrection. It has been thought that if they belonged, as they probably did, to one of the four parties into which the Corinthian Church was divided, it could not have been the party of Kephas, or of S. Paul, or of Christ, since the known teaching of all three contradicted them: it must have been therefore the party of Apollos whose Alexandrian antecedents would easily involve the influence of Greek ideas of immortality rather than Resurrection.[2] In any case they were almost certainly converts of pagan origin. Pagan conceptions did not advance beyond the hope of the immor-

[1] See also Liddon's 'Easter Sermons,' iii. and iv., on 'Christianity without the Resurrection.'

[2] Meyer and Heinrici.

tality of the soul. Pagan antecedents would naturally predispose to disbelief in a general resurrection of the body. The dualistic antagonism of matter and spirit would make acceptance of the physical resurrection extremely difficult.

But if the unorthodox of Corinth were really rejecting physical resurrection while accepting spiritual survival, it is obvious to inquire why S. Paul fails to distinguish between the two: why he appears to regard denial of resurrection as denial of immortality? The reason probably is that, for S. Paul, man is not merely soul, but soul and body. For S. Paul, the hope of a better life after death is inseparably bound up with the thought of existence in a body:[1] not indeed in the sense of reproduction of the present physical conditions, but still existence in a body. For S. Paul, survival of death in a bodiless state would be a maimed and shadowy existence. It would be the existence in Hades which the Jew deprecated rather than desired. Thus the characteristically Christian thought, that for which S. Paul cared most to contend, was resurrection of the body; meaning thereby human perfection in both parts of our nature.

Thus the idea represented by Justin Martyr in the words—"If you have fallen in with some who are called Christians, but who... say there is no resurrection of the dead, and that their souls, when they die, are taken to heaven; do not imagine that they are Christians"[2]—corresponds closely to S. Paul's criticism on the unorthodox of Corinth.

The distinction between survival and Resurrection is very familiar to the early theologians. S. Irenæus, for example, wrote: "For as the Lord went away in the midst of the shadow of death, where the souls of the dead were, yet afterwards arose in the body, and after the resurrection was taken up [into Heaven], it is manifest that the souls of His disciples also, upon whose account the Lord underwent these things, shall go away into the invisible place allotted to them by God, and there remain until the resurrection, awaiting that event; then receiving their bodies, and rising in their

[1] Heinrici. [2] J. M., 'Dial. with Trypho,' ch. 80.

entirety, that is bodily, just as the Lord arose, they shall come thus into the presence of God." [1]

III

Such is S. Paul's account of the consequences of eliminating Christ's Resurrection from Christianity. He has traced it along four directions. He has shown the result to the Religion, to the Believer, to the Preacher, to the faithful Departed. What effect this fearless analysis had upon the Corinthians is unknown. Men have an almost endless faculty for ignoring the results of their own accepted principles. But there is something deeply steadying and consoling in the fact that this negative argument, instead of being the product of later apologists, was wrought out by one of the apostles. This calm contemplation of the full consequences to Christianity if Christ never rose, combined with lifelong incessant self-surrender to the work of proclaiming that He did arise, is surely most impressive. To many minds the negative argument, the dilemma relentlessly forced upon them is bewildering and repulsive. Nevertheless we have cause to be profoundly thankful that an apostle has faced it and thought it out.

[1] S. Irenæus, on Heresies, v. xxxi. 2.

CHAPTER XXIV

S. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION BODY

S. PAUL'S doctrine of the Resurrection Body is principally given in three great passages: the 15th of 1 Corinthians, the 5th of 2 Corinthians, and the third chapter of the Philippians.

I

Christian attention has been chiefly fixed on the first of these.[1]

The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the body presented great difficulties to certain members of the Corinthian Church. This was due to their pagan antecedents, and to the influences of Greek thought. Their difficulties confronted S. Paul in his instructions of that Church, and occasioned the magnificent exposition of the Christian doctrine contained in his First Epistle. The difficulties were apparently two. First, that the Resurrection was impossible; *How* are the dead raised? Secondly, that the Resurrection was incredible: with what manner of body do they come? The former difficulty consisted in the thought that no power could recall the buried element into life again: the second in the logical inconsistencies presented by the conception of a resurrection state.

[1] On 1 Cor. xv. the following expositions may be mentioned: S. John Chrysostom, S. Augustine (Ep. 205), S. Cyril Alex., S. Thomas, Calvin, Estius, Hodge, Drummond, Godet, Cornely; the German comments of Flatt, Kling, Meyer, Heinrici, Schmiedel, Bachmann, Schnedermann (in Strack und Zökler), Pfleiderer ('Paulinismus,' i. 260), Horn ('N.K.Z.,' 1902, 266 ff.).

To this whole condition of mind S. Paul proceeds to reply.[1]

i

He does this by setting before the Corinthians *some analogies of nature*—the illustration of the seed. "Thou foolish one, that which thou thyself sowest is not quickened, except it die." Your own experience, contends the apostle, is a refutation of your objection. You yourself, in the common act of planting a seed, illustrate the unreasonableness of your challenge against the idea of Resurrection. For, urges S. Paul, the natural process ensuing upon the planting of a seed yields the following ideas:

1. Its death is the condition of its life. It "is not quickened except it die." The process of dissolution sets free the germ of life which the seed contains. The apparent destruction is the beginning of a higher vitality. The paradox is true that death is the condition of life.

The suggestion of this first natural analogy is that something corresponding would occur in the experience of man.

2. The second idea which the planted seed conveys is that its future body is not that which is planted in the earth. "Thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain." What is planted in the earth is not the future perfected organism. It is nothing more than bare grain: bare, that is undeveloped; possibly with the idea of poorness and want of strength.

And if in the natural order thou sowest not the body that shall be, the suggestion is that the present body of man is not the body which he will hereafter possess. The analogy of nature suggests transition from a lower to a higher form.

3. A third idea suggested by the seed is that its future body is a product of Divine creative power. "God giveth it a body, even as it pleased Him." That which determines the future form is God's will. The new appearance is entirely independent of the planter's wishes: it depends altogether on Divine creative power. And this is not as it

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 35 ff.

"pleases" God, but as it "pleased" Him: it is the eternally determined order, the natural law.

Here then the analogy would be that as upon the seed a body is divinely bestowed, so also it will happen in the case of man. As in the divinely determined order of things a body is bestowed upon the grain, so will a body be bestowed on man. And the cause of both is the Divine power. If then the Corinthian doubters ask, How are the dead raised? the answer is by the power of God.

4. A fourth idea suggested by the planted seed is that its future body possesses the character of individuality and appropriateness, "to each seed a body of its own." There are varieties of future organisms divinely designed to correspond with the distinctiveness of the different kinds of seed.

Here again the analogy is that a corresponding individuality and appropriateness will appear in the future body of man. Here, moreover, is the answer to the Corinthian's second inquiry about the departed: with what manner of body do they come? The answer is with such body as corresponds to the intrinsic nature and individuality of man.

These analogies of nature received further illustration in the following verses (39-41), where S. Paul indicates the different kinds of bodies, and their differences in degrees of glory. The thought which he impresses is that just as in the limits of our experience, in the natural order, body is not confined to one form, we certainly have no ground to say what is possible or impossible as to the human body hereafter.

If justice is to be done to S. Paul's illustrations from nature they must obviously not be pressed beyond the purpose for which he employs them. There is a criticism which draws unfair inferences from these analogies, just as there is a criticism which similarly misuses the parables of our Lord. Of course anyone can see the weak points of an illustration. All illustrations of great truths are in the nature of things inadequate. They illustrate at one point: at others they would mislead. Of course it may be urged that the seed, strictly speaking, does not die; that the material

masses, the heavenly bodies, to which S. Paul assigns a unity, cannot strictly illustrate the experience of personality. Or again it may be asked whether S. Paul's analogy between the seed and plant is meant to affirm a very intimate relationship of substantial identity between the human body which is buried and the body which will rise? Whether any of these ideas are misuses of the illustration must depend upon the purpose for which S. Paul adduced it. We are secure of S. Paul's intention so long as we confine ourselves to the four main inferences which he drew from the planting of the seed. We may be right or wrong in other inferences: but we cannot be equally secure, from the illustration itself, apart from other reasons, whether we accurately present the apostle's thoughts.

"Thou sowest not the body that shall be." Clearly these words are open to more than one construction. Does S. Paul mean that no relation exists between the seed sown and the perfected plant? Or does he rather mean to emphasise the difference? The seed is the germ of the perfected form. There is an essential connection of principle between them. Certainly, no seed, no perfected plant. The plant is in a sense identical with the seed: in a sense it is not. We are confronted with the problem, what constitutes identity? So far as S. Paul's illustration goes, it does not suggest that there is no connection between the buried and the risen: on the contrary, however contrasted the appearance, the identity is very real indeed.

ii

After clearing the way by his illustrations from nature, S. Paul then explains his conception of the Resurrection body. "It is sown ... it is raised." There are two interpretations of these words. The one confines attention to the corpse: "sown" being equivalent to "buried" in the earth. The other takes a larger outlook, and considers "sown" as equivalent to placed in terrestrial conditions. It seems more probable on the whole that the more comprehensive sense best conveys the essential thought. The contrast is between the earthly and the heavenly estate.

"It is sown . . . it is raised." S. Paul's doctrine is shown in four contrasts between the earthly and the risen state.

1. In the first place, "it is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption." Corruptibility is characteristic of the earthly body throughout its whole career, and is consummated in death. Conversely, a characteristic of the body in the future life will be superiority to corruption.

2. Secondly, "it is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory." The present physical constitution is notable for the lowliness of its origin, and is subject to humiliations which are consummated in dissolution. The characteristic of the future body will be its glory, which surely cannot refer merely to external appearances, but to the dignity consequent upon its higher endowments.

3. Thirdly, "it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power." In contrast with the narrow limits of man's physical strength, characteristic of his whole earthly career, and eminently descriptive of the corpse, is indicated the quality of the Resurrection body.

Thus over against the present body's corruption, dishonour, and weakness, S. Paul sets the future body's incorruption, glory, and power. Then comes the last and grandest statement of all.

4. "It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body." Here S. Paul penetrates beneath the manifest differences between the human body on earth and the human body hereafter, down to the fundamental cause and reason for the differences. If the characteristics of the present body are corruption, dishonour, and weakness, this is due to its being a natural body. If incorruption, glory, and power are characteristics of the future body, this is due to its being a spiritual body. Here then we are at the root of the whole matter.

The natural, or psychical, body, is a body whose formative principle is the soul. The soul is regarded as principle of the animal life. All the animal functions are its products. The constituents of the natural body are flesh and blood. The natural body is designed for the terrestrial sphere.

The spiritual or pneumatical body is a body whose

formative principle is the spirit. The spirit is the principle of the intellectual, moral, and religious life of man. The spiritual body is a body corresponding to the innermost personality. It is the self's perfected expression. Its constituents are not flesh and blood. What they are is not described. It is a real body. Just as the psychical body does not consist of soul, neither does the pneumatical body consist of spirit.[1] The pneumatical body is a phrase not intended to deny the distinctiveness of the body, nor to merge it into or identify it with spirit, nor to deny its materiality, but to affirm its entire subordination to the purposes of spirit. It is a body which "has no longer anything of this earthly materiality"[2] in the sense of the gross solid flesh and bones; but it still possesses materiality in a manner inconceivably changed and refined. It will not do to say that "this glorified body no longer forms any antithesis to the spirit,"[3] if by that is meant that it ceases to be body.

1. That this spiritual body must exist is to S. Paul a logical necessity. He states it in the form of an argument *a fortiori*. "If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual." If, that is to say, there exists a body vitalised by the inferior principle, the soul; much more will there be a body vitalised by the higher principle, the spirit (44 b).

2. The spiritual body is also for S. Paul a Scripture inference. "So also it is written, The first man Adam became a living soul. The last Adam became a life-giving spirit" (45). Here, whatever preliminary contrasts may be suggested between the origin and the development of Adam and of Christ, the whole point of the passage is, as Augustine[4] said, that in the former case there was a natural body and in the latter a spiritual.

3. In the historic order of their development, the natural body pervades the spiritual. But S. Paul claims that the recipients of the lower are divinely intended to become, in due process, recipients of the higher also (46-49).

4. Moreover, to S. Paul, a spiritual body is necessitated

[1] Cf. S. Aug. Ep. 205.
[2] B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.' i. 397.
[3] B. Weiss, *ib.*
[4] Ep. 205, § 11.

by the conditions under which the future life will be lived (50). "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." It is impossible for the present body to share the life of the heavenly kingdom: for it would be out of harmony with the environment. "Flesh and blood" is an expression whose meaning must greatly depend upon its context. In one passage it may signify human insight (as in S. Matt. xvi. 17, "flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee"); in another, human nature (as in Heb. ii. 14, "Since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner partook of the same"). Or again, it might denote moral unworthiness. But in the present place the whole drift of the chapter requires the phrase to receive a physical meaning. Flesh and blood must mean here neither more nor less than the animal constitution of man.[1] This is expressed by S. Paul, first in a concrete and then in an abstract form: first, "flesh and blood," and then "corruption." Both these in the present use are physical. The argument is that whatever the Resurrection body may be, it cannot be the present body of flesh. It cannot be the existing solid animal constitution, for the reason already given, that such constitution is inadaptable to heavenly conditions. If the existing animal body could adapt itself to the conditions of the future life, then the bodies of those who survive to the Second Advent would require no change. And this is exactly what S. Paul proceeds to deny.[2] "We shall not all sleep" (that is, die physically), "but we shall all be changed." "The dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we" (that is the survivors at the Second Advent) "shall be changed." This resurrection will be the experience of the Departed, and change the experience of the Surviving. But in both cases there is the same absolute necessity to transmute the animal body into the spiritual. Only on that condition can man be adjusted to the higher heavenly world.

II

S. Paul returns to the subject of the future body in 2 Cor. v.: but under different figures. The present body is there described as "the earthly house of our tabernacle" (verse 1). The "tabernacle" conveys the thought of the transitional character of the present body. It is earthly; that is localised, bound to terrestrial conditions. S. Paul contemplates its dissolution: "If the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved." If its destruction occur, that is in death, "we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens." We possess, that is to say, another body, which is contrasted with the existing body in various ways. (1) It is, in a special sense, Divinely bestowed. The present body is of course from God. But the future body suggests to S. Paul a peculiarly Divine creative energy. (2) It is "not made with hands": that is to say, it is of superhuman origin. (3) It is "eternal": contrasted with the transient character of the present tent or tabernacle. (4) It is "in the heavens." Meyer thinks that S. Paul here speaks as if he considered the future body already existing in a heavenly treasure-house. We have it, as a man is said to have treasure in heaven. The whole description certainly suggests that the future body is independent of the present body, both in its source and in its nature. The contrasts are very striking between them. The present body is earthly, transient, dissoluble: the future body is Divinely bestowed, superhuman in origin, eternal in duration, heavenly in character. The question naturally arises, What connection, if any, did the apostle see between them? The distinctiveness of the two is more strongly emphasised here than it is in 1 Cor. xv.

But then S. Paul suddenly changes the figure.[1] The present body, so far regarded as a tent, or dwelling-place, of the soul, is now described as the clothing of the soul. The present body is the vesture in which the soul is wrapped and covered. "For verily in this [body] we groan, longing to be clothed upon with our habitation

[1] Verse 2.

which is from heaven." The burdensomeness and weaknesses of the present earthly body (cf. iv. 16) is to S. Paul a proof that his anticipation of the future body is true. The infirmities of the existing frame are only explicable on the assumption that the earthly body will be replaced by a body of a glorious kind.

It should be noted here how very different S. Paul's inference is from that of much popular modern theology. The modern inference from the burdensomeness of the existing body is the anticipation of a bodiless state: the deliverance of the soul from its earthly prison. But S. Paul could never have described the body as "a worn-out fetter which the soul had broken and cast away," without making it perfectly clear that the soul's transition was not to a bodiless state, but from an earthly tent to an eternal and heavenly body.

In the view of S. Paul, the burdensomeness of the existing body, in which we groan, ought not to prompt the desire of physical death, but rather of the superaddition of the prerogatives of the higher life. "For indeed we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we would be unclothed" [that is to say, deprived of the existing body by death], "but that we would be clothed upon" [made recipients in addition of the virtues of the heavenly body], "that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life."[1]

S. Paul is contemplating the experience of those who will be still living on earth at the Second Coming of Christ, among whom he and other Christians desired to be included.

The various metaphors which S. Paul employs in describing the body that shall be, whether the bare grain, the tent, or the clothing, suggests that none of these figures is adequate; and that none of them must be pressed beyond the special purpose for which it is utilised.

III

The third main passage in S. Paul's instructions on the Resurrection body is in Philippians iii. 21, where he speaks of "the Lord Jesus Christ . . . who shall fashion anew the body

[1] 2 Cor. v. 4.

of our humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of His glory." "The body of our humiliation" is the human body as it now exists. It is a notable expression of disparagement. Elsewhere the apostle says more of the body's dignity. Here we find the necessary balancing statement of its lowliness. In view of the gnostic contempt for the body, or identification of it with evil, this recognition of the indignities attendant on an animal constitution is all the more remarkable. Similar is the thought in 1 Corinthians: "it is sown in dishonour." But while it is the body of our humiliation, S. Paul would never have called it vile. The change from the Authorised to the Revised translation is unmixed gain.

Set in strong antithesis to the body of our humiliation is the body of Christ's glory. Glory is here contrasted with humiliation, as in 1 Corinthians it is with dishonour. The body of Christ was formerly a body of humiliation: it is now a body of glory.

S. Paul affirms that Christ will effect a similar change in the human body of the Christian individual. Christ will fashion it anew (*μετασχηματίσει*): will transfigure the external appearance of it. The fashion conveys the thought of transitoriness. The fashion is the existing externality which is the subject of the change. Christ will conform it or fix it permanently in the inner form of the body of His glory. Will transfigure it: which implies that its essence is to be retained, not cast away. For the essential basis of the body is not evil but good. The disparagement is of its present conditions, not of its inner potentialities.[1]

IV

The important question arises out of S. Paul's exposition of the Resurrection body, What relation does S. Paul conceive to exist between the natural and the spiritual body? Is the spiritual body something completely new, having no relation to the old? Or is it only the old body in a new and a higher form? Is the spiritual derived from the natural, or from other sources altogether?

A number of modern writers have maintained that no

[1] Cf. Lightfoot, pp. 131-156. Trench, 'Synonyms'; Alford, Bp. Moule.

substantial relation exists between the two bodies in the doctrine of S. Paul. There is undoubtedly a series of Pauline statements which, if isolated, conveys that impression: as, "Thou sowest not the body that shall be"; "God giveth it a body as it pleased Him"; "flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God."

But on the other hand, the analogy of the seed; the statements, it is sown, it is raised; the intimate connection between the seed and the perfected plant; convey the opposite impression. Moreover, the teaching of all the three great passages should be grouped together. The variations of the metaphors, as has been already suggested, go far to neutralise misleading inferences from the one. The description of the survivors at the Second Advent as "changed" in bodily state, suggests bodily identity under altered conditions. And if the suggestions of 2 Corinthians v. are rather towards difference between the earthly and risen body than identity, it must be remembered that this Epistle is scarcely likely to contain a different doctrine from that to the Romans, when S. Paul could write "shall quicken your mortal bodies":[1] a statement undoubtedly teaching bodily Resurrection and identity.

Surely the truth is that S. Paul is giving paradoxical utterance to both sides of the truth: the vast distinction between the two bodies, together with their substantial or underlying identity. Pfleiderer considered that the relation between the natural body and the spiritual was "supported by the analogy of the Resurrection body of Christ," which S. Paul conceived "not as an entirely new one, having no relation to the old (which would then have remained in the grave) but as identical, at least in form if not also in its material, with the Body which was put to death, inasmuch as it came into being from that Body, by being reanimated and at the same time changed; for on no other supposition could such terms as 'resurrection' and 'rising from the dead' have been appropriately used."[2]

Similarly Kaftan[3] considers S. Paul's teaching to affirm

[1] Rom. viii. 11. [2] Pfleiderer, 'Paulinismus,' i. 260.
[3] 'Dogmatik,' 1897, p. 632.

an "inner organic connection" between the old body and the new.

The words, "That Christ died ... and that He was buried, and that He hath been raised on the third day," are, says Feine, susceptible of no other interpretation than that the same individual who was laid in the grave, on the third day went forth out of the same.[1]

V

It is a deeply interesting inquiry, Whence was this doctrine of S. Paul derived?

A very careful critic[2] has recently pointed out the significant similarities in word and thought between our Lord's instruction to the Sadducees in Jerusalem[3] and S. Paul's instruction to the Corinthians.

If our Lord says, "ye therefore do greatly err," S. Paul says, "be not deceived." If the Gospel speaks of "Sadducees which say there is no Resurrection," S. Paul says, "how say some among you that there is no Resurrection?" If our Lord says, "ye know not ... the power of God," S. Paul says, "some have not the knowledge of God." But not only are there similarities of expression between the Gospel and the Epistle; there are also similarities of idea. For our Lord says, "when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven";[4] while S. Paul says, "as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly."[5]

Thus, argues Feine, the apostle is dependent on the Master. S. Paul maintains neither the fleshly materiality of the Pharisaic Resurrection theory, nor the bodiless condition of the Greek theory, but an intermediate conception of a spiritual body. And this idea he has derived from Christ. It surely should be added that S. Paul's conception is also determined by S. Paul's experience. It is the Appearance of Christ to him in glory which underlies the apostle's analysis of the Resurrection state.[6]

[1] Feine, 'Theologie des N.T.,' p. 362.
[2] Feine, 'Jesus Christus und Paulus,' 181-182. [3] S. Mark xii.
[4] S. Mark xii. 25. [5] 1 Cor. xv. 49. [6] Cf. also B. Weiss, 'Bibl. Theol.,' i. 90 n.

CHAPTER XXV

PATRISTIC TEACHING OF THE RESURRECTION-BODY

NEXT to Christology, the Resurrection is undoubtedly the doctrine which held the chief place in early Christian literature.[1]

The sub-apostolic age presents many references, but the second century yields treatises exclusively devoted to it; as, for instance, Athenagoras, and the work ascribed to Justin Martyr.

We propose to trace in outline the course of Christian thought on the Resurrection-body through the Patristic period down to the middle ages.

In the Epistle of S. Clement to the Corinthians, which was probably written in the closing years of the first century (? 96 A.D.), it is said that God "made the Lord Jesus Christ to be the first fruits when He raised Him from the dead."[2] But, after this somewhat concise reference to the Christian doctrine, Clement is satisfied by pointing to natural and other analogies to Resurrection: such as the succession of night and day; the sowing and the fruit; which he regards as divinely ordered symbols of the Christian truth. The fabulous story of the Phœnix is appealed to as a further illustration.[3] He also says that "life in immortality" is one of the gifts of God. He adds that the apostles, who derive their mission from Christ, "having received His instructions, and being finally established through the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ... went forth."[4] Thus

[1] Cf. Turmel, 'Hist. de la Théologie Positive,' p. 180.
[2] Ch. xxiv.
[3] Ch. xxv.
[4] Ch. xlii.

the two main thoughts which S. Clement connects with the Resurrection are that it is the basis of the apostolic mission, and the promise of the Resurrection of Christians, and that perpetual reminders of the doctrine are providentially provided in the ordinary constitution of nature. This is all that Clement tells us, and considering the purpose of his letter we could scarcely expect him to tell us more. There seems no consciousness of any defective belief at Corinth as there was in the time of S. Paul, such as would require fuller instruction on the Resurrection.

Clement indeed quotes the words of Job, "Thou shalt raise up this flesh of mine that has suffered all these things":[1] where we appear to find the first trace of the expression, Resurrection of the flesh.

The substance of Ignatius' Gospel is Jesus Christ, and the Christian religion consists in "faith in Him and love toward Him, in His Passion and Resurrection."[2] He enjoins upon Christians to "be fully convinced of the birth and passion and resurrection."[3]

Jesus Christ is described as "our hope through the Resurrection."[4] The Resurrection of Jesus is the promise of our Resurrection also.[5]

Ignatius further declares that the Church "rejoices in the Passion of our Lord and in His Resurrection without wavering."[6] The main facts upon which he dwells are Christ's "Cross and Death and Resurrection."[7] These he groups together. Speaking of certain heretics, he says: "They withhold themselves from Eucharist and prayer, because they confess not that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which flesh suffered for our sins, and which in His lovingkindness the Father raised up."[8] Again, he says that the Resurrection "was both of the flesh and the spirit."[9]

The teaching of S. Ignatius on the Resurrection was greatly influenced by the Docetic heresy, which confronted

[1] Ch. xxvi. Cf. Titius, 'Die vulgäre Anschauung von der Seligkeit,' p. 40.
[2] 'Ep. Ephes.' xx. [3] 'Ep. Magn.' xi. [4] 'Trall.' Introd.
[5] 'Trall.' ix. [6] 'Philad.' Introd. [7] 'Philad.' viii. and ix.
[8] 'Ep. Smyrn.' vi. [9] 'Ep. Smyrn.' xi.

him with its denial of the reality of the human nature of our Lord. The Docetist denial of the Incarnation required its advocates consistently to deny the reality of our Lord's sufferings, and the reality of His Resurrection. In opposition to these speculations, which undermined the very basis of Christianity, Ignatius affirmed "He truly suffered, as also He truly raised Himself up."[1] "For I know and believe," wrote Ignatius, "that He was in the flesh even after the Resurrection. And when He came to Peter and those who were with him, He said to them, 'Take, handle me and see that I am not a spirit without body.' And straightway they touched Him and believed, being united with His flesh and spirit.... Moreover after His Resurrection He ate and drank with them, as living in the flesh, although spiritually united with the Father."[2]

The words here ascribed to our Lord are quoted from Ignatius by the historian Eusebius, with the remark that he does not know whence they are derived.[3] S. Jerome, however, quoting the passage, says that it comes from the Gospel which he had recently translated,[4] that is, the Gospel of the Nazarenes, or the Gospel according to the Hebrews.[5] But Origen says that it comes from the teaching of Peter.[6] It has been argued that since Eusebius shows by quotations he knew the Gospel of the Hebrews, it is impossible, remembering his great thoroughness, to suppose that the passage could have been in his copy. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the passage was interpolated into the Gospel of the Hebrews either from the teaching of Peter, in which Origen found it, or from some common source or oral tradition.[7]

The passage bears a strong resemblance to S. Luke xxiv. 36-42. But yet the differences are remarkable. It is generally agreed that it comes from a different source. It has been suggested that the words "appear to represent a later tradition than the simpler and more natural words of S. Luke."[8]

[1] 'Ep. Smyrn.' ii. [2] 'Ep. Smyrn.' iii. [3] 'H. E.' iii. 36. 11.
[4] 'De Viris illustr.' xvi. [5] Cf. Jerome, 'Comment. in Isa.' Bk. viii. introd.
[6] 'De Princip.' pref. 8. [7] McGiffert, ed. of 'Eusebius,' p. 168.
[8] Srawley, 'Epistles of S. Ignatius,' ii. 36 n.

In the Epistle of S. Polycarp to the Philippians (about A.D. 110) the writer speaks of our Lord Jesus Christ having "endured to come so far as to death for our sins, Whom God raised, having loosed the pains of death"[1] He says that God "raised our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead and gave Him glory[2] and a throne on His right hand, to Whom were subjected all things in heaven and on earth."[3] The Risen Jesus "is coming as Judge of quick and dead."[4] And "He that raised Him from the dead will raise us also, if we do His will and walk in His commandments." To S. Polycarp the exalted Jesus is "the Eternal High Priest."[5] And the saintly bishop's final prayer before his martyrdom was that he "might take a portion in the number of the martyrs in the cup of Christ, to the resurrection of eternal life both of soul and body in the incorruption of the Holy Ghost."[6]

The work of Athenagoras[7] is an essay on the general question of the resurrection of the dead; and is evidently designed as a preliminary to Christianity, and not as an exposition of Christian principles. It is concerned rather with contemporary philosophy and science. Athenagoras himself distinguishes between a defensive method suitable for the sceptical and an expository method suitable for the religiously disposed. His own method is the former. His arguments are that a resurrection is not impossible. The separable particles of the dissolved bodies cannot escape the Divine knowledge or power.[8] The objection that former bodies have become incorporated into others is answered by a theory that since human flesh is not the proper food of man, it cannot be assimilated into the human constitution.[9]

Whether resurrection will occur must be dependent on the Divine Will: and there is nothing incredible in the idea that He should will it. After this negative argument, Athenagoras proceeds to the positive defence of resurrection. It is (1) involved in the purpose of man's creation;[10] (2) in the double

[1] Ch. i. (cf. Acts ii. 24). [2] Cf. 1 S. P. i. 21. [3] Ch. ii.
[4] Cf. Acts x. 42. [5] Ch. xii. [6] 'Ep. Smyrna,' ch. xiv.
[7] Written before A.D. 180. Cf. Kruger, 'Geschichte der Altchristlichen Litteratur,' 1895, p. 81.
[8] Ch. ii. [9] Ch. iii.-viii. [10] Ch. xii., xiii., xiv.

constitution of man, since he consists in body and soul, and not in soul without a body;[1] (3) suggested in the analogy of sleep;[2] (4) in the changes in human development which would be incredible apart from experience;[3] (5) it is required by the moral necessity of a future judgment.[4] Such are the main lines of the argument of Athenagoras. As striking as any of its positive assertions are its omissions. Not a solitary reference is made to the Resurrection of Christ as the Christian ground for the Resurrection of Christians. Athenagoras indeed quotes the apostolic language (1 Cor. xv.), "this corruptible must put on incorruption."[5] But the apostolic reasons for the language are simply ignored. Even the very name of Christ is not mentioned. The argument is also strongly materialistic, even to the retention of the identical particles in the Resurrection-body.[6]

The fragments of the treatise on the Resurrection, often ascribed to Justin Martyr, present an essential contrast to the work of Athenagoras; for Justin deals with distinctively Christian doctrine. Contemporary opposition to the faith asserted that the Resurrection was impossible; undesirable, since the flesh is the cause of sins; inconceivable, since there can be no meaning in the survival of existing organs. They further maintained that the Resurrection of Christ was only in physical appearance and not in physical reality. To these objections and difficulties Justin replied: (1) That the resuscitation of existing physical organs did not necessarily imply a continuance of their existing functions;[7] and that no imperfections would be continued into the future life.[8] (2) As to the impossibility of Resurrection, Justin argues that the facts of human development from the germ to maturity would be, were it not for experience, equally incredible;[9] and that we cannot place limits on Divine power. Justin here feels constrained to apologise to the children of the Church for the use of secular and physical arguments: yet to God nothing is secular, and the argument is designed for unbelievers. And in the principles of unbelievers, Resurrection is not

[1] Ch. xv. [2] Ch. xvi. [3] Ch. xvii. [4] Ch. xviii.
[5] Ch. xviii. [6] Cf. Titius, 'Seligkeit,' p. 40. [7] Ch. iii.
[8] Ch. iv. [9] Ch. v.

inconsistent with philosophic and scientific conceptions. If matter and God, as many thinkers held, are indestructible, God can refashion the same material.[1] (3) Moreover, the flesh is not to be disparaged.[2] The flesh is, Justin argued, God's making, created in the image of God (ascribing to the body what applies to the soul). Nor is it true that the body is the cause of sin. The flesh cannot possibly sin by itself. (4) And, further, the perfect man is body and soul; therefore of necessity there will be a Resurrection of the flesh. (5) But above all there is the actual Resurrection of Christ. "Why did He rise in the flesh in which He suffered, unless to show the Resurrection of the flesh?"[3] As for the theory that this was mere appearance and not reality, Justin replies, "He let them handle Him, and showed them the print of the nails in His hands." "And when he had thus shown them that there is truly a Resurrection of the flesh, wishing to show them this also, that it is not impossible for flesh to ascend into heaven ... He was taken up into heaven while they beheld, as He was in the flesh."[4]

Therefore, Justin concluded, Resurrection is a Resurrection of the flesh which died.

Great interest attaches to Justin's exposition because it presents an essentially Christian type of argument. At the same time it clearly fails to appreciate S. Paul's conceptions, and is entangled in a deeply materialistic view.

I

Two opposing theories as to the nature of the Resurrection-Body divided early Christian thought between them. The first was profoundly materialistic. It affirmed the retention in the Resurrection not only of the existing particles and form of the human frame but also of the present physical organs, although frankly confessing an inability to explain their usefulness under changed conditions. The strongest early advocate of the gross materiality of the Resurrection-state is the African Tertullian. He defines body in the following terms:

"Since perverse interpretations are given of what is meant

[1] Ch. vi. [2] Ch. vii., viii. [3] Ch. ix. [4] Ch. ix.

by 'body,' I understand by the human body nothing else than all that fabric of the flesh, whatever be the materials from which it is constructed and modified, which is seen and touched, and even slain by men, just as the 'body' of a wall is nothing else than the mortar and the stones and the bricks. If anyone introduces into our discussion some subtle body, let him demonstrate that such a body is the one that can be slain, and I will grant that such is the body of which the Scripture speaks." [1]

Here we find the matter-of-fact unphilosophic conceptions of the ordinary man laid as the basis for a discussion on the Resurrection-state. The result of this is inevitable. According to Tertullian, if the hairs of our head are all numbered, this registration is with a view to their future reproduction.[2] The weeping and gnashing of teeth are to Tertullian literal, physical, material. The outer darkness is external gloom. The being "bound hand and foot" implies the solidity of the Resurrection-structure. The reclining at the feast, the standing before God, the eating of the tree of life, are in Tertullian's opinion most certain proofs of a corporeal form and structure (*corporalis dispositionis fidelissima indicia*). Human bones and teeth undecayed after being buried for centuries are to his mind "the lasting germs of the body which is to spring into life again at the Resurrection." [3] "It is," he says, "characteristic of a religious spirit to maintain the truth on the authority of a literal interpretation." [4] Accordingly he applies this principle.[5] Christ affirms as the Father's Will "that of all which He hath given Me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day." Now what had Christ received of the Father but that which He had Himself put on? Man, of course, in his texture of flesh and soul. Neither, therefore, of those parts which He has received will He allow to perish: nay, no considerable fraction—nay, not the least fraction, of either—"not even a hair or an eye or a tooth." [6]

But Tertullian is suddenly confronted with the words "flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God." Here

[1] 'De Resurrectione Carnis,' xxxv. [2] *Op. cit.* xxxv. [3] *Ibid.* xlii.
[4] *Ibid.* xxx. [5] *Ibid.* xxxiv. [6] *Ibid.* xxxv.

a literal interpretation would destroy his view. Accordingly that "characteristic of a religious spirit" is abandoned. The words must receive a figurative interpretation. Christ, urges Tertullian, rose again in the flesh. "The very same body which fell in death, and which lay in the sepulchre, also rose again." If, then, Christians are to rise after the example of Christ, they must rise in the flesh. Otherwise the example is meaningless. The "flesh and blood," therefore, which "cannot inherit the Kingdom of God" must be unregenerate behaviour. The incongruity of intruding this ethical idea into a discussion of physical experience is met by asserting that if "flesh and blood" must be literally interpreted, then it is not the Resurrection which S. Paul says they cannot inherit, but the Kingdom of God.

Tertullian's opponents recoiled from the gross materiality of this conception. If that which constitutes identity is sameness of outline and limbs and particles, then the blind and the lame and defective must perpetuate their characteristic defects. Tertullian replied that nature is prior to injury. The Almighty can remake what once He made. The restorer of the flesh is the repairer of its deficiencies.

His opponents pressed him further to explain the rationale of the retention of physical organs after their functions had ceased. What significance could be found in the mouth and the throat and the organs of assimilation, when assimilation has passed away? Tertullian was hard pressed. He maintained that, liberated from their functions, the physical organs are still required for judgment. Man cannot be entire without his limbs. Man consists, moreover, of the substance of his organs, and not of their functions. Perhaps some other function may be found for them. The mouth not necessary for food may be required for language and for praise.[1]

But it appears from another passage that Tertullian did not regard gross materiality as man's final bodily state. The Resurrection was not admission into Heaven, but into the Millennial reign of the Saints on earth: a period which

[1] *Op. cit.* lvii., lx., lxi.

would terminate in a further change in the physical condition of man. He writes:

"We confess that a kingdom is promised to us upon earth, but before Heaven, but in another state of existence, inasmuch as it will be after the Resurrection, for a thousand years in the divinely-built city of Jerusalem, let down from Heaven. ... We say that this city has been provided by God for receiving the saints on their Resurrection.... After its thousand years are over ... there will ensue the destruction of the world and the conflagration of all things at the judgment: we shall then be changed in a moment into the substance of angels, even by the investiture of an incorruptible nature, and so be removed to that Kingdom in Heaven of which we have now been treating."[1]

"Not that we indeed claim the Kingdom of God for the flesh; all we do is to assert a resurrection for the substance thereof.... But the resurrection is one thing, and the Kingdom is another. The resurrection is first, and the Kingdom afterwards. We say therefore that the flesh rises again, but that when it is changed it obtains the Kingdom." "Having therefore become something else by its change, it will then obtain the Kingdom of God, no longer the old flesh and blood, but the body which God shall have given it."[2]

Thus the force of Tertullian's profoundly materialistic conception of the Resurrection-state is considerably modified by his distinction between Resurrection-state and the final Kingdom of God.[3] The distinction, however, does not seem to have taken effect in the subsequent theology. The Millennium theory disappeared, but Tertullian's teaching on the change after the Resurrection disappeared with it. What survived in men's minds was his materialistic language, and this was quoted as a description of man's final bodily estate.

To do justice, however, to the materialistic elements of Tertullian's teaching it must be remembered that his theory was formulated in opposition to pagan disparagement of the body. The contemptuous and one-sided estimate of the ills and humiliations of the flesh was ringing in his ears and

[1] 'C. Marcion,' III. xxiv. [2] *Ibid.* V. x.
[3] Cf. Sheldon, 'History of Christian Doctrine,' i. 151.

exciting his anger. The gnostic depreciation of matter in general was prevailing all around him. The identification of moral evil with material substance was a fundamental axiom with many among his opponents. The Docetism which denied all reality to the physical nature of Jesus Christ complicated still further all treatment of the theme. And amid circumstances such as these it is scarcely to be wondered that his intolerant and uncompromising temper should have tended to give his theory a reactionary form which made the most of divergences and the least of common ground.

But assuredly Tertullian made belief in the Resurrection exceedingly difficult for any philosophic mind. His modern admirer, Schwane, allows that his philosophy was "insufficiently developed to give solution to such a problem."[1] But the fact is, as Neander asserted long ago, that Tertullian in spite of speculative tendencies was not a metaphysician.[2] He never really faced the problem of what constitutes identity. He held the superficial view that identity consisted in the material particles, disintegrated by corruption, reassembled by Resurrection. A vigorous dialectician, without logical consistency; a born debater, too impulsive to be impartial; too much of the advocate to seek for elements of truth in an opponent's mind; he was, as his more recent expounder says,[3] an embarrassing advocate, an interpreter more devoted than exact. He surpassed the apologists of the age rather in the splendour of his expressions than in the depth of his thought. He enforced the Faith with despotic argumentativeness. In behalf of Authority he would suppress all invasions of reason into the precincts of religious truth. His famous saying reveals his character: "We have no need of curiosity after Christ, nor of inquiry after the Gospel."[4] But he identified the Gospel too closely with his own expositions, and the spirit of further inquiry refused to be restrained.

[1] Schwane, 'Dogmengeschichte.' [2] Neander 'Antignosticus.'

[3] Adhémar d'Alès, 'La Théologie de Tertullien,' 496, 425.

[4] Præscr. 7, "Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum, nec inquisitione post Evangelium."

II

This grossly materialistic conception was not in undisputed possession. A second theory was advocated in the Alexandrian School, and, being adopted by Greek theologians, acquired extensive influence. This theory is primarily identified with the name of Origen. It emphatically refused to ascribe solidity and physical organs to the body in the Resurrection-state. Doubtless Origen is not the first to hold this view; but he is certainly its ablest exponent. His treatise on the Resurrection is unhappily lost; but its contents may be gathered from the fragmentary notices of opponents and friends.

According to S. Jerome,[1] who gives selected passages, Origen in his treatise on the Resurrection rejected two theories: that of the Latin school, and that of the Docetic heresy. The former he rejected as materialistic. Its advocates were simple-minded, and lovers of the flesh.[2] They believed that the same bones and blood and flesh, that is, features and members, and organisation of the whole body, would rise again at the Last Day. They supposed that in the next life we should still walk with feet, and work with hands, and see with eyes, and hear with ears. It would only be logical that we should also require food, as now. This theory, says Jerome, Origen characterised as simple and rustic. Its opposite extreme was the Docetic theory which also Origen rejected. The Docetic view restricted the future existence to the disembodied soul. It not only denied the Resurrection of the flesh, but of the body as well. The Resurrection of Christ was simply phantastic, as was also His assumption of the flesh. Both these contrasted theories Origen regarded as alien to the truth. They erred by exaggeration on opposite sides. Against the Docetist Origen held that the Resurrection was a reality: against the materialistic view, that it was not the gross resuscitation of the flesh. He preferred to call it Resurrection of the Body. There exists, said Origen, in seeds a principle which

[1] 'Liber contra Joannem Jerusolymitanum,' § 25. [2] Philosarcas.

germinates,[1] and in which the future body is virtually contained. The tree, the leaves, the branches and the fruit are all implied in this *ratio* or λόγος[2] of the seed. Similarly to this development there exists in the human body a principle which will germinate in the Resurrection: but there will be no restoration of the outward form. He taught, says Jerome, that the substance of the flesh and blood neither perishes nor returns to its former state. The solidity of the flesh, the liquid blood, the sinews, the structure of the veins, the hardness of the bones will not survive in the Resurrection. Thou sowest not that body that shall be. Here we see with eyes, act with hands, walk with feet. But in that spiritual body we shall be all sight, all hearing, all activity.[3] He will change this body of our humiliation;[4] *change*[5] it, reiterates Origen. To his mind this involved the transmutation of the present physical constitution into something of a purely ethereal type, inaccessible to all our present material organs of sense. Origen also declared, says Jerome, that the Resurrection-Body of Christ, although offered to the evidence of the senses in order to establish the fact of the Resurrection in the doubting minds of men, nevertheless certified its own profound spirituality by the manner of its entrance and disappearance.

This very valuable exposition of Origen by S. Jerome is worth reproducing because it contains illustrations of Origen's mind not found elsewhere. Origen's surviving treatises show that he approached the subject with certain metaphysical presuppositions:

First, he maintained the indestructibility of substance. "No destruction of substance," he wrote, "can befall those things which God created to exist and to continue."[6]

Secondly, he held that embodiment was a necessity for all created rational beings. God alone is incorporeal.

[1] Ratio quædam a Deo artifice insita. *Ib.* § 26.

[2] Sunt tamen in ratione seminis quam Græci σπερματικὸν λόγον vocant. *Ib.*

[3] In illo autem corpora spirituali toti videbimus, toti audiemus, toti operabimus, toti ambulabimus. *Ib.*

[4] Phil. iii. 21. [5] μετασχηματίσει. [6] 'De Principiis,' III. vi. 5.

Thirdly, he held a definite theory of matter. Matter[1] is that by which bodies subsist. It is the substratum underlying all varieties of form. Its characteristic is endless transmutation. Wood, for instance, is convertible into fire, fire into smoke, smoke into air. Bodies built up by assimilation from external sources necessarily exhibit perpetual fluctuation. Hence the comparison of the human body to a river is most appropriate.[2] The river remains, but the water departs. The human constitution is in perpetual flux.

But, in the fourth place, Origen postulates, beneath this endless variation of form and change of substance, a germinative principle—the *ratio insita*, as Jerome translates it—which is the constitutive unity of the body, both as it is and as it is to be.

The application of these principles to the Resurrection-Body is obvious. From the indestructibility of substance, and the necessity of embodiment, Origen infers that "if it is necessary for us to be invested with bodies, as it certainly is, we ought to be invested with no other than our own."[3] "Its substance certainly remains."[4] His theory of the substantial identity beneath the changes of wood into fire, into smoke, into air, shows how readily Origen could conceive total change in the form of the Resurrection-Body as being perfectly consistent with real identity. His conception of the germinative principle beneath all variations secured for him a principle of identity, most rational, most philosophic;[5] unquestionably the best attainable solution of the problem, Wherein does identity consist? Identity is to be sought neither in the particles, nor in the organs, nor in the form of the human frame; but in the spirit beneath them.

Thus the conditions of the Resurrection-state will be completely different from the existing gross materiality. The present fleshy solidity is necessitated by the environment. "The soul which is immaterial exists in no material

[1] ὕλη, 'De Principiis,' II. i. 4.
[2] In Psalm i.
[3] 'De Principiis,' II. x. 1.
[4] *Ibid.* III. vi. 5.
[5] 'De Principiis,' II. x. 3.

place without having a body suited to the nature of that place. Accordingly it at one time puts off one body which was necessary before, but which is no longer adequate in its changed state, and it exchanges it for a second."[1] The soul dwelling in material surroundings adopts an organism appropriate to such surroundings. If, says Origen, we were destined to live in water, we must assume bodies like those of fish.[2] Similarly if we are to live in *spiritual* surroundings we must assume bodies of a *spiritual* kind. Otherwise we shall not be in harmony with our surroundings. Yet this does not mean the annihilation of the former body, but its transmutation into something of a pre-eminently glorious character. Thus, to recall the remarkable sentence ascribed to him by S. Jerome, "here we see with eyes, act with hands, walk with feet. But in that spiritual body we shall be all sight, all hearing, all activity."

Origen utilised the principles of Greek thought, but his doctrine was derived from S. Paul. It was with him no question of abstract theology but of Scripture interpretation. The statements upon which he builds are chiefly these: "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God"; "we shall be changed"; "thou sowest not that body that shall be"; "God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him."

"None of Origen's opinions," says Bishop Westcott, "was more vehemently assailed than his teaching on the Resurrection. Even his early and later apologists were perplexed in their defence of him. Yet there is no point on which his insight is more conspicuous. By keeping strictly to the apostolic language he anticipated results which we have hardly yet secured. He saw that it is the 'spirit' which moulds the frame through which it is manifested; that the 'body' is the same not by any material continuity, but by the permanence of that which gives the law, the 'ratio' (λόγος), as he calls it, of its constitution. No exigencies of controversy, it must be remembered, brought Origen to his conclusion. It was, in his judgment, the clear teaching of S. Paul."[3]

Thus Origen laid the greatest stress on the difference

[1] 'C. Celsum,' VII. xxxii. [2] In Psalm i.

[3] 'Dictionary of Christian Biography,' s.v. iv. 138, footnote.

between the natural and the spiritual body. "We assert," he said, "that the qualities which are in bodies undergo change."[1] For the possibility of this he appealed to the Divine power. "That the matter which underlies bodies is capable of receiving these qualities which the Creator pleases to bestow is a point which all of us who accept the doctrine of Providence firmly hold; so that, if God so willed, one quality is at the present time implanted in this portion of matter, and afterwards another of a different and better kind." Origen here throws out the important principle that substantial identity is consistent with indefinite change; that the Resurrection-Body is material, but material endowed with new and nobler qualities. This teaching is surely most remarkable.

"We therefore," he said, elsewhere,[2] "do not maintain that the body which has undergone corruption resumes its original nature, any more than the grain of wheat which has decayed returns to its former conditions. But we do maintain that as above the grain of wheat there arises a stalk, so a certain power[3] is implanted in the body, which is not destroyed, and from which the body is raised up in incorruption." In this passage Origen shows that he did not regard the Resurrection-Body as a mere replacement of the old by something totally disconnected; but, on the contrary, as derived from the old. As he describes it again elsewhere,[4] "there is a seminal principle" in the earthly tabernacle, which is the producer of the new body. The soul "puts off one body which was necessary before, but which is no longer adequate to it in its changed state." It "assumes another ... suited to the pure ethereal regions of heaven."[5]

Origen's spiritual theory of the Resurrection enabled him to deal with the problem of eschatology in a totally different manner from Tertullian. While to the latter the penalties of the future life were physical and material, the gnashing of teeth being literally understood, the former holds that spiritual bodies cannot be subjected to material flames. To Origen the fire that is not quenched is the mental anguish

[1] Ag. Celsus, IV. lvii. [2] Ag. Celsus, V. xxiii. [3] λόγος.
[4] *Ib.* VII. xxxii. λόγον ἔχειν σπέρματος. [5] *Ib.*

of the sinner contemplating in retrospect his own unholy deeds.[1]

The general correctness of this exposition of Origen is confirmed by a number of modern writers.[2] According to Ramers, he taught that the Resurrection-Body will be flesh; yet not this corruptible flesh, but of a spiritual and ethereal nature. According to Turmel, what he denied was the doctrine of a material resurrection.[3] According to Neander, Origen endeavoured to occupy a *via media* between gnosticism and gross materiality.[4] According to Bovon, he denied the physical identity of the future body with that which we now possess.[5] According to Dr. Bigg, "Origen, like Clement, found a solution of all his doubts in the teaching of S. Paul, but he refined upon this in a way peculiar to himself."[6] According to Sheldon, he "is distinguished among the early Fathers by his steadfast endeavour to spiritualise the conception of the Resurrection.... Still he accepted the fact of a bodily resurrection."[7]

It should be carefully observed that Origen's doctrine is not derived from mere abstract speculation. It is an exposition of S. Paul. Origen has laid especial stress on such passages as speak of difference: thou sowest not the body that shall be;[8] God giveth to each seed its own body;[9] flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.[10] Due weight is also given to S. Paul's teaching on the earthly house of this present tabernacle, which must be dissolved and replaced by the house not made with hands.[11] But Origen succeeded in balancing the two sides of S. Paul's teaching on the Resurrection-Body—its identity and its difference—as no

[1] 'De Principiis,' II. x. 4.

[2] C. Ramers, 'Des Origines Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches' (Trier, 1851), p. 76.

[3] Turmel, 'Histoire de la Théologie Positive,' p. 182.

[4] Neander, 'Allgemeine Geschichte,' I. iii. 1097.

[5] Bovon, 'Dogmatique Chrétienne,' ii. 448.

[6] Bigg, 'Christian Platonists of Alexandria,' p. 225; cf. 291.

[7] Sheldon, 'History of Christian Doctrine,' i. 151.

[8] Cf. Ag. Celsus, v. xviii. and xxii. [9] Cf. v. xviii. and xix.

[10] Cf. v. xviii. [11] 2 Cor. v. Cf. Ag. Celsus, VII. xxxii. and v. xix.

other teacher before him and comparatively few since have been able to do.

And while Origen's doctrine was more easily misrepresented than that of the opposite school, precisely because it was more philosophic and more profound, it is nothing better than caricature to accuse him of teaching a theory in which body had become converted into spirit. He had reason in his life to deprecate misconstruction. "Let no one," he wrote, "suspect that in speaking as we do, we belong to those who are indeed called Christian, but who set aside the doctrine of the Resurrection as it is taught in Scripture."[1]

III

The history of the doctrine since Origen's time is the history of a conflict between the materialistic and the philosophic schools. Roughly speaking, the materialistic conception of Tertullian became identified with the Latin Church: the philosophic with the Greek. There were of course exceptions. Where a Greek theologian was unmetaphysical, he naturally sided with Tertullian; where a Latin writer was a metaphysician, he enrolled himself on Origen's side.

Methodius, the Lycian Bishop, and one of the Diocletian martyrs, set himself deliberately to refute the school of Origen. The fragmentary condition of Methodius' writings on the Resurrection increases the difficulty of giving a coherent account of his theory. Some of the theories which he ascribes to Origen may have been advocated by members of that school, but appear quite inconsistent with the great teacher's known convictions. Moreover, Methodius' own criticisms do not appear consistent with themselves. But some of these difficulties may be due to the state of the documents.

Methodius ascribes to Origen the distinction between material substance and form. The material flesh will not be restored to the soul: but the form, or external appearance by which the flesh is now distinguished will be stamped upon

[1] Ag. Celsus, v. xxii.

another spiritual body.[1] It is difficult to imagine that Origen asserted this. Methodius observes that the reproduction of the form without the material is inconceivable. Form cannot be separated from the material which informs it: nor can it possibly possess independent self-existence. "There is no resurrection of the form without the flesh." The quality cannot be separated from the material substance. The form of a melted statue disappears with the substance which is melted, "and has no longer a substantial existence."[2]

Indeed, says Methodius, if anyone melts a statue, "he will find the appearance of the form disappearing, but the material itself remaining."[3]

Origen's theory seems to Methodius, in spite of Origen's protest, entirely to deny the body's resurrection. Methodius accordingly insists that body is part of the essential constitution of man. "Man is neither soul without body, nor body without soul; but a being composed by the union of both":[4] whereas Origen seems to Methodius to adopt the Platonic doctrine that the soul alone is man. Origen certainly did regard the present body as a fetter of the soul, imposed upon it apparently as a consequence of the Fall. This laid him open to the criticism of Methodius that "if the body was given to the soul after the Fall as a fetter, it must have been given as a fetter upon the evil or upon the good. Now it is impossible that it should be upon the good: for no physician or artificer gives to that which has gone wrong a remedy to cause further error; much less would God do so. It remains then that it was a fetter upon evil. But surely we see that at the beginning Cain, clad in this body, committed murder; and it is evident into what wickedness those ran who succeeded him. The body is not, then, a fetter upon evil, nor indeed a fetter at all. Nor was the soul clothed in it for the first time after the Fall."[5]

The present body is then, according to Methodius, not a fetter at all upon the soul. He does not contemplate the

[1] Photius, 'Summary of Methodius,' § xii.
[2] *Ib.* §§ xiii. and xi.
[3] § xv.
[4] 'Second Discourse,' § iv.
[5] 'Second Discourse,' § iii.

possibility of its being at least an inadequate instrument to the soul's capabilities. Nor does he allude to the Scriptural language so constantly quoted by other Fathers: "the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."[1] Methodius certainly has not said the last word here. Origen would still have found material for reply.

Methodius rises into eloquence when describing the dignity and beauty of the human form. He asks what will be the appearance of the risen body, when this human form, according to Origen so useless, shall wholly disappear? "It is the most lovely of all things which are combined in living creatures, as being the form which the Deity Himself employs... for a man... is the image and glory of God." Methodius asks whether the human form in the future life will be a circle, a polygon, a cube, or a pyramid. "Well then," he exclaims triumphantly, "what are we to think of the assertion that the godlike shape is to be rejected as more ignoble... and that man is to rise again without hands and feet?"[2]

Methodius seems here to have forgotten the view, which he has previously ascribed to the school of Origen, that the form of man would be impressed upon the spiritual body.

In exposition of S. Paul, Methodius follows Justin Martyr[3] in the view that the flesh and blood which cannot inherit the Kingdom of God does not mean flesh itself but the irrational impulses of the flesh.[4]

Methodius' own theory is that Death and Resurrection correspond to the melting down a disfigured statue, and the remoulding it in ideal perfection. God seeing His fairest work corrupted "dissolved him again into his original materials, in order that by remodelling, all the blemishes in him might disappear."[5] The scene of the future life is to be the earth itself. "Wherefore it is silly to discuss in what way of life our bodies will then exist, if there is no longer air, nor earth, nor anything else."[6] "I cannot

[1] Wisdom, ix. 15.
[2] Photius, 'Synopsis,' § xi.
[3] *Ib.* § vi.
[4] *Ib.* § v. Cf. 'Discourse,' § xiii.
[5] 'Discourse,' § vi.
[6] *Ib.* § ix.

endure," he says again, "the trifling of some who shamelessly do violence to Scripture, in order that their opinion, that the resurrection is without flesh, may find support."[1]

The defence of Origen's theory was undertaken chiefly by Pamphilus,[2] founder of the famous library of Cæsarea, martyred in 309. He had been formerly a pupil in the Alexandrian School and a devoted admirer of its greatest master. The last two years of his life were spent in prison, writing Origen's apology. This was translated into Latin by Rufinus, and thus the Alexandrian School was introduced to the Western Church. There, however, it shared Origen's unpopularity, being viewed as one of his numerous eccentricities. Jerome, whose translations of Origen's works, and earlier laudatory remarks about him, were now considered to compromise his own repute, attempted to re-establish himself by vigorous attacks, after his own manner, on Origen's doctrine of the Resurrection-state.

Jerome charged the school of Origen with insincerity and duplicity. They repeated the accepted formulas in an uncatholic sense. While asserting their belief in the Resurrection of the Body, "they use the word body instead of the word flesh, in order that an orthodox person hearing them say 'Body' may take them to mean 'flesh,' while a heretic will understand that they mean 'spirit.'" This, says Jerome, is their first piece of craft. If pressed further they will adopt the orthodox confession and say, "we believe in the resurrection of the flesh."

"Now when they have said this, the ignorant crowd thinks it ought to be satisfied, particularly because these exact words are found in the creed. If you go on to question them farther, a buzz of disapproval is heard in the ring and their backers cry out: 'You have heard them say that they believe in the resurrection of the flesh; what more do you want?' The popular favour is transferred from our side to theirs, and while they are called honest, we are looked on as false accusers. But if you set your face steadily, and, keeping a firm hold of their admission about the flesh, proceed to press them as to whether they

[1] *Ib.* § ii. [2] Eusebius, 'H. E.' vi. 32.

assert the resurrection of that flesh which is visible and tangible, which walks and speaks; they first laugh, and then signify their assent. And when we inquire whether the resurrection will exhibit anew the hair and the teeth, the chest and the stomach, the hands and the feet, and all the other members of the body; then, no longer able to contain their mirth, they burst out laughing and tell us that in that case we shall need barbers, and cakes, and doctors, and cobblers. Do we, they ask us in turn, believe that after the resurrection men's cheeks will still be rough and those of women smooth, and that sex will differentiate their bodies as it does at present?

"Then if we admit this, they at once deduce from our admission conclusions involving the grossest materialism. Thus, while they maintain the resurrection of the body as a whole, they deny the resurrection of its separate members."[1]

As for Jerome's own opinion, he reproduced in harshest terms the crudest utterances of Tertullian. To these he added an appeal to the Transfiguration, and to Job. Even as our Lord in the Transfiguration did not lose His hands and feet, and suddenly assume the proportions of a sphere, nor exchange His material vesture for a robe of light, so will it be with mankind in the Resurrection. "In my flesh I shall see God," exclaimed Job: not in an ethereal, aerial body, comments Jerome; not resolved into wind and air. With the same eyes which saw corruption will Job see God. To remove the conditions in which Job subsisted is in Jerome's view to reduce Job himself to nonentity. The Catholic doctrine of Resurrection becomes absolutely unintelligible without blood and bones and members. Grant these, and Mary is Mary, and John is John. Otherwise identity has perished. As for the common objections of the pagan mind, a Christian has no business to employ them.[2] Or if Origen will employ them, let him take the pagan side, and incur the consequences.

Nevertheless the Alexandrian conception was affirmed by

[1] Hieronymi, Ep. lxxxiv. § 5 ('Nicene and Post-Nicene Library').

[2] "Qui Christianum esse te dicis, gentilium arma depone."

distinguished persons in the fourth century to an extent which certainly Jerome's strictures on Origen would not lead us to expect. S. Cyril of Jerusalem († 386) shows in his catechetical instructions closer affinities with the Alexandrian than with the Latin view. But the chief disciple of Origen is S. Gregory of Nyssa (about 390). Origen had greatly provoked Christian thought, and in the 130 years which separated him from Gregory reflection had matured. Gregory of Nyssa's interest lies partly in the philosophic character of his mind, but chiefly in the fact that various irreconcilable conceptions converge in him. He is strangely under the influence alike of Methodius and of Origen. On the one side he employs illustrations of the Resurrection-Body which have come from the former: for example, he suggests that as quicksilver poured out on a dusty slope is scattered in globules, and mingles with none of the bodies it may meet, and is capable of being re-collected, and of flowing back into unity with its kind, so some mutual affinity may exist in the scattered elements of the body of man whereby they may flow back into unity at the Resurrection.[1] This idea would have been quite congenial to advocates of the grosser view. But, on the other side, in his Dialogue with the Sister of S. Basil, he gives exceedingly forcible expression to the conceptions of the opposite school. "Let me say something else also," says Gregory, "from amongst the objections made by unbelievers to this doctrine. No part, they urge, of the body is made by nature without a function. Some parts, for instance, are the efficient causes within us of our being alive; without them our life in the flesh could not possibly be carried on; such are the heart, liver, brain, lungs, etc.... Now if the life to come is to be in exactly the same circumstances as this, the supposed change in us is reduced to nothing; but if the report is true, as indeed it is, which represents marriage as forming no part of the economy of that after-life, and eating and drinking as not then preserving its continuance, what use will there be for the members of our body when we are no longer to expect in that existence any

[1] 'On the Making of Man,' xxvii. 6.

of the activities for which our members now exist?... When therefore all these operations will be no more, how or wherefore will their instruments exist? So that necessarily, if the things that are not going to contribute in any way to that other life are not to surround the body, none of the parts which at present constitute the body would exist either. That life, then, will be carried on by other instruments; and no one could call such a state of things a resurrection, where the particular members are no longer present in the body, owing to their being useless to that life. But if, on the other hand, our resurrection will be represented in every one of these, then the Author of the Resurrection will fashion things in us of no use and advantage to that life. And yet we must believe not only that there is a resurrection, but also that it will not be an absurdity."[1]

This description of the difficulties attendant on the literal and gross idea of resurrection was assuredly composed by one himself acutely sensitive to them. The philosophic tendencies of Gregory's mind are in this passage sufficiently obvious. The solution of the difficulties so stated must clearly be in the direction of Origen. The reply which the Sister of S. Basil makes in the Dialogue represents much of Gregory's own view. "The true explanation," she says, "of all these questions is still stored up in the hidden treasure-rooms of Wisdom, and will not come to the light until that moment when we shall be taught the mystery of the Resurrection by the reality of it." At the same time she proceeds to lay down the principle that Resurrection may be defined as "the reconstitution of our nature in its original form." By which is to be understood the divesting ourselves of "the skin of the brute and all its belongings." All the animal functions will cease. Physical dimensions will have no meaning in the Resurrection-Body. Then comes the appeal to S. Paul: "thou sowest not the body that shall be."

Doubtless the conflicting theories are not worked out in this Dialogue, nor is any real harmony reached. But the

[1] S. Gregory, Nyssa, 'On the Soul and the Resurrection.'

tendencies of Gregory Nyssa, are conspicuously enough in favour of the Origenistic view.[1]

S. John Chrysostom (†407) greatly promoted the Alexandrian doctrine by maintaining that the manifestations of the Risen Master to the disciples were evidential, and did not reveal the risen life's essential character.

"It is worth inquiring, how an incorruptible Body showed the prints of the nails, and was tangible by a mortal hand. But be not thou disturbed; *what took place was a matter of condescension.* For That which was so subtle and light as to enter in when the doors were shut, was *free from all density*; but this marvel was shown, that the Resurrection might be believed, and that men might know that it was the Crucified One Himself, and that another rose not in His stead. On this account He arose bearing the signs of the Cross, and on this account He eateth. At least the apostles everywhere made this a sign of the Resurrection, saying, We, who did eat and drink with Him. As therefore when we see Him walking on the waves before the Crucifixion, we do not say, that that body is of a different nature, but of our own; so after the Resurrection, when we see Him with the prints of the nails, we will no more say, that He is therefore corruptible. For He exhibited these appearances on account of the disciple."[2]

More powerful in this, as in much else, than any hitherto named was S. Augustine. Originally he harmonised, as his philosophic instincts would suggest, with Origen rather than with Tertullian. His teaching is given in the 'De Fide et Symbolo,' an exposition of the faith delivered in 393 before a Synod of African Bishops, and published at their desire. At that date he maintained as follows:

"Therefore the body will rise again, according to the Christian Faith that cannot deceive. Which if it seem to anyone incredible, he regards what the flesh now is, but considers not what it will be; because in that time of angelic

[1] See further the introduction to the transl. of S. Gregory N., in Wace and Schaff, 'Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers'; also Dr. Srawley's edition of the 'Catech. Oration.'

[2] Chrysostom, 'Hom. lxxxvii. in Ev. Ioan.' ('Library of the Fathers,' p. 782).

change, it will be no longer flesh and blood, but only body. For the Apostle, speaking of the flesh, says, 'the flesh of beasts is one, the flesh of birds another, of fishes another, of creeping things another; and there are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial.' For he says not, 'and flesh celestial'; but he says, 'both celestial and terrestrial bodies.' For all flesh is also body, but all body is not also flesh; first in those things terrestrial, since wood is body but not flesh; but to man or cattle there belongs both body and flesh; but in things celestial no flesh, but bodies simple and bright, which the Apostle calls spiritual, but some call ethereal. And therefore that which he says 'Flesh and blood shall not inherit the Kingdom of God,' contradicts not the resurrection of the flesh, but declares what will one day be, which is now flesh and blood. Into which sort of nature whosoever believes not that this flesh can be changed, he must be led step by step unto faith. For if you demand of him whether earth can be changed into water; by reason of the nearness, it seems not to him to be incredible. Again, if you demand whether water can be changed into air; he answers, that neither is this absurd, for they are near one another. And if this question be asked concerning air, whether it can be changed into an ethereal—that is, celestial—body; already the very nearness persuades him. What therefore he allows may be done by these steps, that earth may be changed into ethereal body, why does he not believe that when there is added thereto the will of God, ... it may be done more speedily, as it is said, in the twinkling of an eye, without any such steps, just as generally smoke is changed into flame with wonderful quickness. For our flesh is certainly of earth; but philosophers, by whose arguments most frequently the resurrection of the flesh is opposed, in that they assert that there cannot exist any terrestrial body in Heaven, allow that any body whatever may be turned and changed into every kind of body."[1]

This opinion, however, Augustine afterwards withdrew, or, at any rate, very greatly modified in his latest utterances. Referring in the Retractations to the passage just quoted

[1] 'De Fide et Symbolo,' § 24.

from the 'De Fide et Symbolo,' he says that what he had written on the change of terrestrial bodies into celestial bodies was founded on S. Paul's statement that "flesh and blood shall not inherit the Kingdom of God." He now adds the following qualifying words:

"But whoso takes this so as to think that the earthly body such as we have now is by Resurrection so changed into a heavenly body as that there will be no limbs nor substance of flesh, must doubtless be set right by reminding him of the Lord's Body, Who appeared after Resurrection in the same members, not only to be seen by the eyes, but also to be handled with the hands, and even proved Himself to have flesh by saying, 'Handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have' (S. Luke xxiv. 39). Whence it is plain that the Apostle did not deny that there will be the substance of flesh in the Kingdom of God."[1]

S. Augustine's interpretation of S. Paul is controlled by the passage in S. Luke. It is assumed, without further reflexion, that the accessibility of our Lord's Risen Body to the senses of His apostles was its normal and essential characteristic. It does not here occur to him apparently to interpret S. Luke by S. Paul.

Elsewhere, however, he speaks more guardedly:

"As to the spiritual body which we shall have in the Resurrection: how great a change for the better it is to undergo, whether it shall become pure spirit, so that the whole man shall then be a spirit, or (as I rather think, but do not yet confidently maintain) shall become a spiritual body in such a way as to be called spiritual because of a certain ineffable facility in its movements, but at the same time to retain its material substance ... on these and on many other things which may perplex us in the discussion of this subject, I confess that I have not yet read anywhere anything which I would esteem sufficiently established to desire to be either learned or taught by men."[2]

This tentative and guarded utterance, characteristic of the great writer in his finest hours, was, according to the

[1] 'Retractations,' i. xvii.

[2] Aug. 'Ep. cxlviii. Commonitorium Fortunatiano.'

editors, formulated about the year 413. To this expression of uncertainty as to the nature of the Resurrection-Body he added a hope that in the future the subject might perhaps be better understood. "Let us inquire more calmly and carefully concerning the spiritual body; for it may be that God, if He knows this to be useful to us, may condescend to show us some definite and clear view on the subject, in accordance with His written word." And he suggests the possibility that further investigation may reveal capacities hitherto unrealised in the human body after the Resurrection.

This was in 413. The date is important. About the year 420 Augustine wrote at considerable length a reply[1] to questions on the Resurrection-Body. You ask, he says, whether the Lord's Body at the present moment possesses bones and blood, and the other characteristics of the flesh. What if you were to add the inquiry whether it is also clothed? Would not the problem be increased? And would not the difficulty be due to our inability to conceive what is meant by incorruption? "I," he says, "believe that the Lord's Body is in Heaven in the same condition as it was on earth when He ascended into Heaven." And for this he appeals to the Lucan passage:[2] "a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have." Thus Augustine assumes that the manifested condition exactly represents the glorified condition. For him, therefore, Christ seems to possess solid flesh and bones in Heaven. To an objector who is supposed to argue: If there is flesh [in the Risen Christ] there is also blood; and if blood then the other humours of the human body; and therefore there must be corruption: Augustine replies that some men think this acute; but he can only suggest that Divine power can prevent the corruption. He does not qualify his conception of the fleshly state. S. Paul's words: "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" are interpreted to be a synonym for corruption. Moreover, the Lucan passage, "flesh and bones, as ye see Me have" weighs heavily on Augustine's exposition, and is quoted again. The Pauline teaching, "thou sowest not the body that shall be," is reduced to the

[1] 'Ep. 205, Augustinus Consentio.'

[2] S. Luke xxiv. 39.

meagre assertion that if God can add to the original seed, much more can He make up that which was in the body of a man. Thus the Apostle's illustration from nature suggests to Augustine a restoring and replacing of the old rather than a development of the new.

There are, he says, some who consider that the spiritual body will come into existence by the transmutation of body into spirit; so that whereas man consisted of body and spirit on earth, he will consist entirely of spirit in heaven. It is this theory, wrongly ascribed to Origen, which Augustine has in mind: and this leads him to stronger emphasis on the other side. He says, very acutely, that if S. Paul had meant this he would have written, it is sown a body, it is raised a spirit: whereas what S. Paul actually wrote was, "it is sown an animal body, it is raised a spiritual body." And, adds Augustine, in terms constantly quoted since, and not infrequently ascribed to later authorship:[1] "as the animal body is body and not soul, so the spiritual body is to be considered body and not spirit." For the subject is resumed in the closing books of the 'De Civitate Dei,' which were written about 426. Augustine now fully adopts the materialistic opinion. The cautious utterances of 413 are replaced by much more decided and confident expressions. We miss the phrase, "I rather think, but do not yet confidently maintain," with reference to the body retaining its material substance. We have now discussions on the restoration of the original material elements to the same condition as before. He thinks that infants must acquire perfection of human stature in the next world, because this was ideally theirs, although unrealised on earth. He doubts whether "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ" is physical as well as spiritual. He thinks that all will rise in the vigour of maturity, which is about the age of thirty. He repeats Methodius' illustration of the figure of clay broken up and remade, which is substantially identical although its particles are redistributed. Through the process of redistribution all deformities disappear. The scars of the martyrs will remain to enhance their glory: but severed limbs will be replaced,

[1] *E.g.* to S. Thomas Aquinas.

while retaining the mark of severance. The problem of ownership of material particles which, through cannibalism or natural process, have become assimilated with other human constitutions, is solved on the principle that they must revert to their original proprietor.[1]

These are sufficient to show the entirely materialised character of his later speculations. At the same time to balance these he adds the following profound and luminous principle. "The flesh shall then be spiritual and subject to the spirit, but still flesh, not spirit; as the spirit itself, when subject to the flesh, was fleshly, but still spirit and not flesh."[2]

Here, then, as in so many cases, this wonderful religious genius yields conflicting thoughts, and leaves them simply unreconciled in mere juxtaposition. But what predominates is the grosser Latin view. It is that upon which his contemporaries seized: and his powerful influence strongly contributed to make the materialistic theory the exclusive tradition in the Church of the West. It may be a legitimate theme for wonder what that tradition might have become had this greatest of Western teachers been thoroughly familiar with the best theological conceptions of the East. As it was, the two Churches moved on their independent ways, to the detriment of both.

By the time of Gregory the Great the materialistic view so completely dominated the West that the philosophic school were denounced as nothing less than heretical. When Gregory in early manhood represented the Roman See at Constantinople he was scandalised by discovering that Eutychius the Patriarch maintained in his writings and instructions the opinion that the human body after the Resurrection will exist in an impalpable state, more subtle than wind and air. Eutychius was doubtless following the tradition of his philosophic forefathers, the Greek theologians: Gregory was no less determined by the tradition made dominant through Augustine. The interest of the controversy, then, consists in the encounter of two traditions. Gregory expressed grave concern at the Patriarch's unorthodox conceptions, and an

[1] 'De Civ. Dei,' XXII. xv. [2] *Ibid.* c. xxi.

earnest conference took place between them. Gregory declared that the theory of impalpability could not be reconciled with Scripture teaching. He acknowledged that the Resurrection-Body would be spiritualised, but appealed to the Lucan passage: "Handle Me and see," as a proof that the risen body will be tangible. Eutychius replied that the text was no contradiction to his theory: the solidity of the Risen Body of Christ being nothing more than an accommodation to the disciples' incredulity, temporarily granted in order to strengthen their faith. Gregory retorted that this interpretation reassures the disciples' faith at the expense of destroying its basis, namely the true Resurrection of the flesh. Eutychius then appealed to the text, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God." Gregory gave the passage an ethical interpretation: the "flesh and blood" which "cannot inherit the kingdom" is sinful desire. Eutychius did not apparently reject the interpretation, but he denied the inference, and reaffirmed the impalpability of the Resurrection-state. He reiterated his position that Christ's Risen Body was temporarily palpable; but, after serving its evidential purpose, reverted to its impalpable and normal condition. Gregory held that this contradicted the text, "Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no more": for if the Risen Christ were subject to further change, He would still be under the dominion of death. Eutychius failed to see the connexion, and appealed to the text, "Thou sowest not that body that shall be." Gregory replied that these words do not imply the future absence of anything now present, but the future presence of many things now absent.

By this time the controversy had created some sensation in Constantinople, and the two controversialists were summoned before the Emperor, who, after what Gregory regards as an impartial hearing of the arguments, gave decision that the Patriarch's book ought to be committed to the flames. Both disputants fell ill when the discussion was at an end. Both were compelled to take to their beds. Eutychius did not recover. But, according to messengers sent by Gregory to visit him, the Patriarch before he died came round to the Roman view. "He used to take hold of the

skin of his hand before their eyes and say: 'I confess that we shall all rise again in this flesh'; a thing which he was before accustomed altogether to deny." Thus, in Roman opinion, the Patriarch's reputation was saved. And in respect for his memory and character Gregory tells us that he refrained from pressing the subject any further.[1]

This conflict between the two traditions is most significant. Neither advocate was a really competent representative of his cause. Certainly Gregory's arguments do not explain the Greek Emperor's decision against the Greek tradition. What influence prompted it we do not know. The view which Gregory considered heresy, a lamentable blot on an ecclesiastic's reputation, a ground for which its adherent might justly be condemned by authority if he happened to survive, and which nothing but considerate forbearance and respect for his memory and character—especially in view of his death-bed recantation—prompted them to overlook and forget, was nevertheless the doctrine maintained by S. Hilary, S. Cyril of Jerusalem, S. Gregory of Nyssa, and S. John Chrysostom. The quiet assumption that the Eastern tradition was heresy would scarcely have been possible a century and a half before, in Augustine's time. The alternative suggestions of that great thinker, the cautious utterances of his letters, his occasional insight into profounder views, were all forgotten in the hundred and fifty years since he had died. The Greek tradition was evidently unstudied, its rationale unknown. And this asserted conversion, whether historical or not, of the expiring Patriarch to the Latin view was at any rate symbolical of the destiny awaiting the opposing conceptions of the Resurrection-state. The philosophic doctrine, although founded on S. Paul, passed into obscurity before the dominant authority of the materialistic view.

In the period after Gregory apparently no man lifted a voice for the Greek tradition. It seems to have expired with the Patriarch Eutychius. One solitary protest, so far as the present writer is aware, broke the uniformity of assent, when

[1] S. Greg. Magn. 'Moralia,' XIV. lvii. (trans. 'Library of the Fathers'), p. 168.

Erigena, on independent grounds, reaffirmed the Alexandrian conception.

Erigena maintained that our Lord's Resurrection-state transcended all material conditions and local relationships.[1] The visible manifestations, in the same material state into which He was born of the Virgin and in which He suffered, were accommodations to the requirements of His apostles, for the purpose of confirming their faith.[2] Realisation of the truth would have been impossible without recognition, and recognition without contemplation of the same familiar form.[3] But this condescension to their human needs involved no local transition on His part from a distance in order that He might appear, nor any departure to another place when He vanished out of sight. There was but a simple resumption of His natural invisible state.

On the basis of this view of our Lord's Resurrection-state, Erigena argued that the future condition of Christians will be similar in kind. The experiences of the senses will be exchanged for intellectual and immaterial experiences. It is frankly acknowledged that this theory had very considerable traditional authority against it. But Erigena endeavours to mitigate the force of the widely prevalent materialistic tradition by indicating the marked divergences of opinion among the Fathers on this point. It was not for us, said Erigena deferentially, to sit in judgment on the wisdom of the Fathers; yet neither are we precluded from adopting the inferences of reason in harmony with Holy Scripture. The style is significant of the age and of the writer. But Erigena could support his spiritualistic theory by an appeal to long-forgotten statements of several great authorities, and in particular to the teaching of S. Gregory of Nyssa.

Erigena's own conviction is expressed in the startling phrase that the body will be changed into spirit. The language sounds as if it meant an actual conversion of body into spirit. This, however, is not Erigena's meaning. He expressly affirms that he does not maintain the destruction of the substance, but its transmutation into something of a

[1] 'De Divisione Naturae.' Migne, 'P.L.' ii. 11.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 538. [3] *Ibid.* p. 539

nobler kind. He considers air as one substance and light another; and then observes that the air does not lose its substance when it is entirely converted into light: yet nothing appears except the light; although air is one thing, and light is another. He gives a second illustration.[1] "Iron or some other metal, molten in the fire, appears to be converted into fire, so that it seems to become pure fire, while yet the substance of the metal remains. In the same manner I consider that the substance of the body will *pass over into*[2] soul, not, however, so as to cease to be, but so as to be preserved in a nobler nature." Thus the *properties* of either nature remain; and what happens is a union (*adunatio*)[3] of natures, without confusion or intermingling. If the transmutation of an earthly body into spirit should appear incredible,[4] the changes known to occur in material natures, which modify their qualities without losing their substance, should, he thinks, go far to facilitate belief. The Resurrection-Body will, he believes, bear no relation to material senses nor to the conditions of space. If the phrase may be permitted him (*ut ita dicam*), body will be wholly converted into spirit; that is to say, it will be inaccessible to earthly senses, and endowed with indescribable subtlety and spirituality.[5]

As to the theory which affirms the reproduction of the bodies of the saints in their former stature and appearance and physical distinctions, with the retention of all the bodily organs of the present earthly condition,[6] Erigena, it is scarcely necessary to say, absolutely rejects it. In language which must have sounded very startling at the time when written, he says boldly that when he reads such statements in the writings of the Fathers he is simply astounded that men so spiritual should have sanctioned to posterity assertions of such a kind. And he can only explain the fact on the supposition that these statements were nothing more than concessions to a materially minded generation whom they hoped by such earthly figures and expressions to uplift to spiritual things. Men who realise nothing beyond the reach

[1] Lib. v. p. 879. [2] *Transituram.* [3] *Ibid.* p. 881.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 885. [5] *Ibid.* p. 902. [6] *Ibid.* p. 986.

of their senses are scandalised if informed that the Resurrection-Body bears no relation to space. They instantly jump to the inference that, if bodily solidity ceases to exist, there will be nothing left. Erigena thinks that, as a concession to these infirmities, the Fathers who advocated the materialistic view may have written as they did. But the protests of Erigena scarcely affected the mediaeval conceptions of the Future state.

The mediaeval conception as embodied in S. Thomas Aquinas was that while the Risen Body of Christ was spiritual, that is to say, subject to the spirit, in such a manner as to be submissive to the will, and so that Christ was seen when He willed to be seen, and unseen when He willed not to be seen;[1] yet, on the other hand, He retained all that belongs to the nature of a human body. Flesh, bones, blood, etc., were all integrally present in the Risen Body of Christ without any diminution: otherwise it would not have been a perfect resurrection. As Scripture says, the hairs of your head are all numbered, and not a hair of your head shall perish. To say that the Risen Body of Christ had not flesh and bones, and the other parts natural to a human body, is the error of Eutychius, Patriarch of Constantinople, which Gregory condemned.[2] Thus all the Blood which flowed from the Body of Christ in His Passion, belonging as it does to the truth of His human nature, rose again in His Resurrection. But the blood preserved among the relics in certain Churches did not flow from the side of Christ, but is said to be derived miraculously from some Image.

[1] Q. liv. A. [2] Q. liv. A. ii.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE FORMULAS OF THE CHURCH ON THE RESURRECTION BODY

THE theories of individual theologians on the Resurrection of the Body are not necessarily the convictions of the Universal Church. An essential distinction exists between that which Christian teachers assert, and that to which the Church itself is committed. The collective faith of the Church is expressed in very few words, being significantly formulated in three short phrases of the Creeds. The Athanasian formula is, "All men shall rise again with their bodies"; the Nicene, "I look for the Resurrection of the Dead"; while the Apostles' Creed professes belief in the "Resurrection of the flesh." Whether these three formulas are of the Universal Church must depend on the attitude of the Eastern Churches to the Athanasian Creed.

They all, at any rate, express the mind of the Church over an enormous extent of space and time. Each Creed has, on this doctrine, its own expressive difference. The Resurrection of the body, the Resurrection of the dead, the Resurrection of the flesh.

While the first and the second of these are unquestionably Scriptural, the last, at least in words, is not. "Resurrection of the body" is a Pauline phrase.[1] So is "Resurrection of the dead."[2] But "Resurrection of the flesh" is not a Pauline phrase. The question is whether, although it is not a Pauline phrase, it is a Pauline idea. The answer may appear decisively given in the sentence, "flesh and blood cannot

[1] Rom. viii. 11, 1 Cor. xv. 44. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 12.

inherit the Kingdom of God." Flesh seems here deliberately contrasted with body: the flesh, which cannot inherit the kingdom, with the body which will rise. And yet flesh and body are at times employed by S. Paul as synonymous. Thus while S. Paul can write "absent in body (σώματι) but present in spirit,"[1] he can also write "absent in the flesh (σαρκί), yet I am with you in the spirit."[2] So again the phrase, loving their wives "as their own bodies," is followed by the sentence, no man "hateth his own flesh."[3] And once more, after speaking of man and woman becoming "one body," he goes on to add "the twain shall become one flesh."[4]

In any case S. Paul's usage did not appear to the primitive Church to preclude the phrase "Resurrection of the flesh." It originated in the sub-apostolic age: as a protest against Docetic denial of the reality of our Lord's human nature. It is, as we have seen, already hinted at and suggested by S. Clement's quotation from the book of Job, "Thou shalt raise up this flesh of mine that has suffered all these things." It occurs definitely in the letter of S. Ignatius to Smyrna: "He was in the flesh after His Resurrection."[5] Christ's Resurrection was "both of the flesh and the spirit."[6] Much more definite and emphatic still is the language already quoted from Justin Martyr,[7] that the risen Christ let Himself be handled by the apostles to show "that there is truly a Resurrection of the flesh"; and even that He was taken up into heaven "as He was even in the flesh."

This language was evidently forced upon the Church partly by the heretical theory of a phantom Christ, and partly by the prevalent disparagement of the flesh as intrinsically worthless, and indeed as the real cause of evil. Against such conceptions the phrase "Resurrection of the flesh" would be most necessary and effective. It protected the doctrine of Incarnation, and the dignity of the body of man. Thus it safeguarded Christian essentials, under the conditions of popular thought, more securely than the phrase "Resurrection of the body" could have done. It

[1] 1 Cor. v. 3. [2] Col. ii. 5. [3] Eph. v. 28, 29. [4] 1 Cor. vi. 16.
[5] 'Ep. Smyrn.' ii. [6] *Ib.* xi. [7] Ch. ix. p. 343.

did not necessarily imply grossly materialistic views; although, undoubtedly, as interpreted by Athenagoras or Justin Martyr, it greatly contributed to that result. But this was due to prevalent unphilosophic conceptions rather than to the phrase itself. We can readily understand that when heresy interpreted the Pauline words "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" as a denial of the Resurrection of the Body, the Church of the period felt constrained to place other interpretations on the passage, and to employ the phrase "Resurrection of the flesh," in spite of any apparent contradiction with the apostolic expression. In many instances, it must be admitted, that the teachers of the Church were scarcely more adequate in their expositions of S. Paul than their heretical opponents were. But yet there was a true instinct in their defence however defective their interpretation.

S. Jerome regarded habitual omission of the phrase resurrection of the flesh, as a sign of heretical tendencies. He challenges the Origenists to employ both phrases, flesh and body, interchangeably. Flesh and Body are not synonymous. All flesh is body, but not all body is flesh. Flesh designates, strictly speaking, that which is composed of blood, veins, bones, and nerves. Body may be purely ethereal and invisible; although more commonly body is visible and tangible. Thus S. Jerome grew suspicious when he did not hear the phrase Resurrection of the flesh.[1]

Accordingly the phrase "Resurrection of the flesh" passed from the pages of individual writers into the authorised formularies of the Church. By the middle of the second century it was embodied in the Roman Creed. It remains in the Latin Creed of the apostles to the present day.

So far as it appears, no objection within the Church was raised to the phrase "Resurrection of the flesh." At the Reformation, however, Luther criticised it, and expressed a preference for the form "Resurrection of the Body." That criticism still remains substantially in the Lutheran Catechism.

The 'Lutheran Greater Catechism' says: "Quod autem

[1] 'Liber contra Joannem Jerusolymitanum,' ch. xxvii.

hic ponitur (carnis des Fleisches) ne hoc quidem valde apte et bene lingua nostra vernacula expressum est. Etenim carnem audientes non ulterius cogitamus quam de macello. Verum recte et genuine loquendo germanice diceremus Auferstehung des Leibes oder Leichnams, h.e. corporis resurrectionem. Attamen res est momenti non magni, dummodo verborum sensum recte percipiamus."[1]

In the Church of England the article in the Apostles' Creed on the Resurrection of Christians was now, for the most part, differently translated. Whereas in the early thirteenth and fourteenth century translations,[2] this Article ran "uprisigen of fleyes," or "fleiss uprising," or "risyng of flesshe," or "the resurrection of the flesh," it was now rendered "the resurrection of the body." So it appears to this day in the daily offices; while the older form, and more correct translation, is retained in the interrogatory form of the Apostles' Creed in the Baptismal Service. This inconsistency makes it difficult to explain the purpose of the altered rendering. Was it a mark of Lutheran influence? In 1537, in the 'Institution of a Christian Man,' the paraphrase is given "I believe... that... Almighty God shall ... raise up again the very flesh and bodies of all men."[3] And the Necessary Doctrine of 1543, while giving the heading "the Resurrection of the Body," explains it as meaning that "every man generally shall resume and take again the very self-same body and flesh which he had whiles he lived here on earth."[4] This does not give the impression of any deviation from the prevalent conception. The subsequent language of the Articles certainly manifests no anxiety to correct the mediæval materialistic views commonly associated with the Resurrection. It formulates the doctrine very much in the terms which Justin Martyr adopted. It is founded on the narrative of the Gospels, unqualified by the doctrine of S. Paul. And it assumes the Appearances to indicate the normal conditions of the Resurrection-state.

The official language of the English Reformation is that

[1] Quoted in Biedermann, 'Dogmatik,' ii. 391.
[2] See Maskell, 'Monumenta Ritualia,' iii. 251 ff.
[3] Lloyd's 'Formularies of Faith,' Henry VIII. p. 59. [4] *Ib.* p. 251.

"Christ did truly arise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature, wherewith He ascended into Heaven, and there sitteth until He return to judge all men at the last day."[1] It has been suggested that this intense literalism was specially designed to guard against the Docetic views adopted by some of the Anabaptists.[2] In the 'Reformatio legum Ecclesiasticarum' the error of some is denounced who maintained that before the Ascension the human nature of Christ was absorbed into the Divine.[3] But the language of the Article is in any case quite in keeping with the gross materialism of the middle ages, which seems in this particular doctrine to have been taken over unchallenged at the Reformation. While a strong reaction set in from similar Eucharistic conceptions, the doctrine of the Resurrection-Body was not restated in a more balanced and qualified form. The language is of course obviously drawn from that portion of the Gospels, and especially of the Lucan report, which lays the greatest stress on physical identity. But no attempt is made to balance those statements with the Pauline doctrine of the spiritual body. And whether the "flesh and bones" of the Appearances to the disciples was economic, temporary, evidential, or permanently characteristic of the Risen state is a question which does not come within the horizon of the Anglican Article. So striking is this absence of qualification that so cautious a commentator as Bishop Harold Browne felt constrained to add, after summarising the apostolic doctrine: "We must therefore conclude that though Christ rose with the same Body in which He died, and that Body neither did, nor shall, cease to be a human body; still it acquired, either at His Resurrection or at His Ascension, the qualities and attributes of a spiritual, as distinguished by the apostle from a natural body, of an incorruptible as distinguished from a corruptible body."[4]

A study of English teaching on the Resurrection will show convincingly that the substitution of the formula "Resurrection of the Body" for "Resurrection of the Flesh"

[1] Article iv. [2] 'Gibson on the xxxix Articles,' vol. i. p. 181. [3] *Ib.*
[4] Bishop Harold Browne, 'Exposition of the xxxix Articles,' p. 107.

had no effect whatever in refining and elevating the subsequent belief. This could hardly be expected considering the language of the Articles as the authorised exposition. Whatever gain might come from the altered rendering of the Creed was clearly neutralised by the exposition to which the clergy adhered.

Whether the translation of the words "carnis resurrectionem" into "resurrection of the body" can be justified is another matter. If the forms are not mere synonyms the loss of either should be deprecated. Both alike are open to misconstruction: Resurrection of the body may be easily refined away until it loses all sense of continuity and identity; Resurrection of the flesh may be easily materialised into the idea of identity without change. Thus the substitution of the former for the latter does not avoid risks but only introduces risks of a different kind. The phrase Resurrection of the Flesh is far too deeply ingrained in the formularies of Christendom to be obliterated by the action of any isolated portion of the Church. And there are tendencies in the present day which make such removal altogether undesirable.[1]

[1] Cf. Swete, 'Apostles' Creed,' p. 98. Zahn, 'Articles of the Apostles' Creed,' pp. 210-212.

CHAPTER XXVII

POST-REFORMATION ENGLISH TEACHING ON THE RESURRECTION-BODY

OUR task will be to trace the doctrine through individual English teachers to the present day.

1. Bishop Pearson's exposition of the doctrine may well stand first, alike for its date and its authority. In his exposition of the Creed, published in 1659, Pearson wrote, "Whatsoever we lose in death, is not lost to God; ... though therefore the parts of the body of man be dissolved, yet they perish not: they lose not their own entity when they part with their relation to humanity; they are laid up in the secret places, and lodged in the chambers of nature; and it is no more a contradiction that they should become the parts of the same body of man to which they did belong, than that after his death they should become the parts of any other body, as we see they do. Howsoever they are scattered, or wheresoever lodged, they are within the knowledge and power of God..."[1]

Bishop Pearson's teaching has obvious affinities with the Latin school rather than with the Greek; with Tertullian, to whom he appeals, rather than with Origen. And it is quite in keeping that the Bishop concludes with a strong expression of his belief "that the same numerical bodies which did fall shall rise."[2]

2. Next may be placed some remarks of the philosopher Locke.

Locke approached the subject of the Resurrection of the

[1] Sinker's Edition, p. 701. [2] *Ib.* p. 726.

Body in his Essay on the human understanding.[1] Discussing the problem of identity he maintained that "the identity of the same man" [meaning by man nothing else but an animal of a certain form] "consists in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organised body."[2] But personal identity consists in consciousness.[3] But the substance united to the personal self may be varied from time to time without change of personal identity.[4]

Thus personal identity does not consist in identity of substance but in identity of consciousness.[5] So far as our knowledge goes, urged Locke, although we are very much in the dark upon the subject, "there can from the nature of things be no absurdity at all to suppose, that the same soul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man.[6]

"Any part of our bodies vitally united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of ourselves: but upon separation from the vital union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that which a moment since was part of ourselves, is now no more so, than a part of another man's self is a part of me; and it is not impossible, but in a little time may become a real part of another person. And so we have the same numerical substance become a part of two different persons; and the same person preserved under the change of various substances."[7]

Applying this to the Resurrection Locke maintained that "thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it."[8] Locke based his theory of resurrection on the idea of identity. Personal identity "does not depend on a mass of the same particles"; for it is not altered by "the variation of great parcels of matter." Personal identity, that is sameness of a rational being, lies in self-consciousness and in that alone. Hence whether the person is annexed to one

[1] Published in 1689. [2] Bk. II. xxvii. pp. 6, 7, 8. [3] *Ib.* § 9.
[4] *Ib.* § 11. [5] *Ib.* § 19. [6] *Ib.* § 21. [7] *Ib.* § 25. [8] *Ib.* § 14.

substance or to a succession of different substances cannot affect its identity.

Consequently, according to Locke, the whole problem of Resurrection is resolved into a question of personal identity.

3. Stillingfleet,[1] in reply to Locke, discussed whether it is not necessary for the same substance which was united to the body to be raised up at the last day? Stillingfleet qualifies his statement of the problem by the curious remark: "I do not say the same individual particles of matter which were united at the point of death; for there must be a great alteration on them in a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into a consumption: I do not say the same particles which the sinner had at the very time of commission of his sins; for then a long sinner must have a vast body, considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration; but that which I suppose is implied in it is, that there must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here."

Thus Stillingfleet held that in the Resurrection the organisation and life of the body will be the same, "and this is a real identity of the body which depends not upon consciousness." It is thus the same body. To constitute identity of body, "no more is required but restoring life to the organised parts of it." "If by Divine power life be restored to that material substance which was before united, by a reunion of the soul to it, there is no reason to deny the identity of the body." S. Paul's language, it is sown in corruption, dishonour, and weakness requires this view. For, "Can such a material substance which was never united to the body be said to be sown in corruption and weakness and dishonour? Either, therefore, he must speak of the same body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended." The very idea of Resurrection, moreover, requires that the same material substance must be reunited. "Else it cannot be called a Resurrection but a renovation; *i.e.* it may be a new life, but not a raising the body from the dead."

To these criticisms and doctrines of Bishop Stillingfleet,

[1] Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter, Collected Works, London, 1710, vol. 3, p. 571-4.

Locke produced a reply,[1] in which he acknowledged the resurrection of the dead to be an article of the Christian faith; but as to the resurrection of the same body, in Stillingfleet's sense of the phrase, he confessed himself unable to determine. He submitted that the expression "resurrection of the same body" never occurred in Scripture. The same body in Stillingfleet's sense was "not the same individual particles of matter which were united at the point of death; nor the same particles of matter that the sinner had at the time of the commission of his sins. But that it must be the same material substance which was vitally united to the soul here." That is, says Locke, "the same individual particles of matter which were, sometime during his life here, vitally united to the soul."[2]

Stillingfleet had supported this by the words of our Lord: "they that are in the graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth"; arguing that a substance which was never in the grave cannot be said to come out of it. Locke replied that if such strict literalism be maintained, it will follow that unless the soul was in the grave it will make no part of the person that is raised.[3] Stillingfleet's idea of selection among the particles of our former bodies with a view to secure proportion and comeliness not unnaturally roused the philosopher to courteous sarcasm: "Your Lordship says that you 'do not say the same individual particles shall make up the body at the resurrection which were united at the point of death; for there must be a grave alteration in them in a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into a consumption.' Because it is likely your Lordship thinks those particles of a decrepit, wasted, withered body would be too few, or unfit to make such a plump, strong, vigorous, well-sized body, as it has pleased your Lordship to proportion out in your thoughts to men at the resurrection; and therefore some small portion of the particles formerly united vitally to that man's soul, shall be reassumed to make up his body to the bulk your Lordship judges convenient; but the greatest part of them shall be left out, to avoid the making his body more vast than your Lordship thinks will

[1] 'Collected Works,' ed. 1777, vol. i. p. 649. [2] p. 650. [3] p. 650.

be fit."[1] But then, asks Locke, what is to be done for one who dies in infancy? "Must we believe that he shall remain content with that small pittance of matter and that yet imperfect body to eternity, because it is an article of faith to believe the resurrection of the very same body? *i.e.* made up of only such particles as have been vitally united to the soul."[2] It is not wonderful if Locke felt constrained to protest against the identity of particles theory of Resurrection. "By these, and not a few other like consequences, one may see," he wrote, "what service they do to religion and the Christian doctrine, who raise questions and make articles of faith about the Resurrection of the same body, where the Scripture says nothing of the same body." It is very certain that the Church teachers of the time did not make faith in the Resurrection easier for a thoughtful mind, and that there was profound necessity for some influence to lift the whole subject above these gross and animal levels.

When Stillingfleet appealed to the physical solidity of the risen body of Christ, Locke was in difficulties. He admitted that the appearances of the risen Master represented the essential risen state: but he pleaded that the rapid resurrection of Christ's incorrupted body was unique; and that there could be no necessity that our human bodies dissolved and dispersed after death should be reassembled with the same identical numerically unaltered particles.[3] He suggested also that even Stillingfleet would not infer from Christ's participation of food after He was risen, that we also when risen should do the same. He realised also that the marks of the wounds were for evidential purposes; and that there would be nothing corresponding to this necessity in the case of the resurrection of Christians. "At the last day," said Locke, "when all men are raised, there will be no need to be assured of any one particular man's resurrection. It is enough that every one shall appear before the judgment seat of Christ, to receive according to what he had done in his former life; but in what sort of body he shall appear, or of what particles made up, the Scripture having said nothing

[1] 'Collected Works,' ed. 1777, vol. i. p. 653. [2] p. 654. [3] p. 655.

but that it shall be a spiritual body raised in incorruption, it is not for me to determine."[1]

Locke distinguishes throughout between different kinds of identity: same man, same person, same body, are phrases employed in diverse senses. Same body means same particles in rigid numerical identity: neither more nor less. According to Stillingfleet's assertion that the seed and the plant although differing so greatly in outward appearances as not to seem the same body, "yet, with regard to the seminal and organical parts, are as much the same as the man grown up is the same with the embryo"—Locke desires to know "same what?" Same body the man and the infant cannot be, "unless he can persuade himself that a body that is not a hundredth part of another is the same with that other."[2] This would be equivalent to saying that a part and the whole are the same.

4. Discussion on the subject was continued by Hody, Professor of Greek at Oxford in 1694. Hody's book is entitled 'The Resurrection of the Same Body Asserted.' Hody treated the subject from a historical point of view, and made an attempt to discover what was the doctrine of the primitive Fathers[3] on the Resurrection-Body. The doctrine of Origen is to his mind entirely uncongenial. The supposition of a germ or principle in the existing body becoming the cause of the future body he considers an absurdity. "To show the absurdity of this hypothesis," he says, "let us suppose that the body was never buried, but exposed to the air, or perfectly burnt to ashes, or drowned and dissolved in the sea, and let this be done some thousands of years ago: I would ask an Origenist, where is then his *principia resurrectionis*? Tis impossible to conceive any such *semina resurgendi* unless we will suppose that there always remains some little part of the Body undissolved."[4] Hody felt himself supported by Bishop Pearson on the Creed.[5] With regard to S. Paul's illustration of the grain of corn Hody appeals to the maxim of the Schools that no similitude walks on four feet. "All similitudes and comparisons are always lame, and ought to be understood loosely, and only in some respect. And so ought this comparison which the apostle uses. All that he

[1] p. 656. [2] p. 659. [3] p. 107 ff. [4] p. 111. [5] p. 113.

means by it is this, that as a grain of corn which springs up differs from that which was sown; so the body which rises shall not be altogether the same, but shall differ in some respects from that which was buried."[1]

Thus Hody minimises the differences between our Lord's earthly and risen Body. "What if by His Divine Power He was pleased to convey Himself into a room, when the doors were, or seemed to be, shut? What if He vanish'd away out of the sight of those that convers'd with Him? This was done to demonstrate His power."[2] These facts do not to Hody convey any more idea of change in the Risen Body than Christ walking on the water during His ministry. "Was not that contrary to the nature of a human body?"[3] "So likewise he might vanish away, either by an exceeding swift motion, or by altering the medium, or the sight of the spectators."[4] Hody then lays great stress on the Lucan report of the flesh and bones, and appeals to the language of the 4th Article,[5] and the literal school of the early Church.

The very term "Resurrection" seems to Hody to enforce his view. "If the same particles of matter that were buried be not to rise, if the body is to be altogether new as to its substance, how can it be said to be a resurrection?"[6] Thus he adopts the language of Methodius. Identity of particles, and identity of substance are, apparently, considered equivalent. If reminded that the particles of the body are perpetually changing yet identity is retained, his answer is that *gradual* change is one thing, complete change another. "If the body be dissolved and *new* particles be form'd into a body and united to the soul, it cannot be said to be the *same* or to *rise again*. I appeal to the commonsense of mankind."[7] These extracts will be enough to show that, learned though he was, Hody's place is not among the philosophers.

5. The extreme materialism of the literal school not unnaturally increased the influence of Locke's theory of identity, as may be seen in the writings of Samuel Bold, Rector of Steeple, Dorset, 1705.[8] Bold protests vigorously against

[1] 'Collected Works,' ed. 1777, vol. i. p. 119. [2] p. 124. [3] p. 125.
[4] *Ib.* [5] p. 126. [6] p. 131. [7] p. 133
[8] S. Bold, 'Discourses Concerning the Resurrection of the Same Body,' 1705.

advancing human interpretations of Gospel doctrines into necessary articles of Christian faith; and in particular against the view (which he ascribes to Whitby and Parker) that Resurrection is "the raising and uniting again all the particles of matter which the grave received."[1] These authors had misgivings whether some addition would not be required to complete the Resurrection-Body. They allowed that God might "add to the body rising or risen such new particles as may complete the perfection of a Glorified Body."[2] But these new particles are "purely additional." To which theory Bold opposes Locke's definition of bodily identity. "No body upon the removal or change of some of the particles that at any time make it up, is the very same material substance, or the same body."[3] Accordingly Bold reprints large selections from the letters of Locke against Stillingfleet.

We have in these discussions reached the low water mark of English thought on the Resurrection of the Body. It will be admitted that there was need for a return to apostolic and philosophic conceptions.

6. Another important eighteenth-century contribution to English ideas of the Resurrection-Body is Burnet's treatise 'De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium.'[4] Burnet understood Scripture to teach that the Resurrection-Body will be "inorganical."[5] It will possess no organs of nutrition. This he based on 1 Cor. vi. 13. "Meats for the belly and the belly for meats; but God shall destroy both it and them."[6] It will possess none of the present organs of movement. Members "made for walking upon some firm and solid pavement, as there is no such thing, and motion will not be after the manner of walking, but as angels move; these will be taken away as unnecessary and superfluous."[7]

With the disappearance of the organs flesh and blood must also disappear. And this Burnet claimed to be the Apostle's teaching when he wrote that "flesh and blood

[1] p. 23. [2] p. 11. [3] p. 1.

[4] Thomas Burnet was master of the Charterhouse, and died in 1715.

[5] p. 188. [6] p. 189. [7] *Ib.*

cannot inherit the Kingdom of God."[1] All figurative exposition of the passage Burnet rejected.

The inorganic character of the Resurrection-Body Burnet held to be confirmed by S. Paul's description of it as "made without hands" (2 Cor. v. i.), a description which our Lord Himself suggested in the words ascribed to Him in S. Mark xiv. 58, where the temple made with hands is contrasted with the temple made without hands, "and Christ applies both to His own Body, that then subsisting, and the Body afterwards to come." And further: the Epistle to the Hebrews[2] explains "not made with hands" as equivalent to "not of this creation." "That is to say," says Burnet, "of another fabric and form from the terrestrial and organical body."[3]

And Christ's comparison of our future state with that of the angels implies that "we shall have such bodies as angels have, *i.e.* inorganical ones."

Burnet considered that S. Paul's contrast between "the first Man," who "is of the earth earthy," and "the second Man," who "is the Lord from Heaven," together with the words, "as is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy, and as is the heavenly such also are they that are heavenly," apply to the body here and the body hereafter. The manner of body we shall have in Heaven will be heavenly. "Heavenly denotes the matter of which it is composed."[4] It will not be "concrete, gross, and like our own at this day," but thin, rare, light, and liquid, like ether or heavenly matter." Heavenly matter "is pure and rarefied, as ether, or air, and so will our celestial bodies be."[5]

The epithet "spiritual" as applied to body has, according to Burnet, a similar meaning. Burnet held that the Resurrection-Body of Christ confirms all this. "After His Resurrection He appeared in another form (Mark xvi. 5, John xx. 15, xxi. 4; Luke xxiv. 16) and made Himself either visible or invisible, according to his pleasure (Luke xxiv. 21). And after the doors were shut, he twice entered into the house where His disciples were (John xx. 19-26), and yet He

[1] p. 190. [2] Heb. ix. ii. [3] p. 193.
[4] p. 196. [5] p. 197.

appeared with bones and flesh to His disciples to confirm them in His Resurrection. By which he plainly showed He could either diffuse His body into a volatile and expanded substance, or contract it into a gross and concrete one."[1] In support of this opinion Burnet appealed to S. Clement of Alexandria:[2] "He did not eat for the sake of His body, which subsisted by an independent power and virtue; but for those with whom he conversed, that they might not think otherwise of him, as some suspected he was only a phantom or vision."

But Burnet maintained "the glorious body of Christ in Heaven is like a flame, or liquid ether, and therefore our own bodies are to be of the same matter, as they are to be like thereunto; and if we consult reason (see Origen, Ag. Celsus, iii.) and philosophy, no other matter can subsist in Heaven."[3]

To the objection that this theory, although not contrary to Scripture or reason, opposes the received doctrine upon the subject, which undoubtedly is that the flesh and blood of Christ remain even in His Body in Heaven, Burnet replies: "I answer, some of the Fathers thought otherwise; and others very much doubted of the flesh and blood of this celestial body of Christ. The Origenists denied it, and argued after another manner."[4]

Burnet's conclusion[5] is that "the glorious Body of Christ in Heaven does not consist of a fabric of bones, flesh, and blood, and other humours and entrails of a terrestrial and modern body; but is compounded of a more excellent matter of another kind of nature, purity and perfection; in one word, of a celestial matter, as to substance and accidents."[6]

Thus Burnet denied that we are to rise with the same bodies we lie down with in the grave, in the sense of "the same numerical body, with the same matter, and the same particles."[7] He acknowledged that "there are several places in the Scripture that very much favour the identical Resurrection."[8] For instance, S. John v. 28, 29; Rev. xx. 13

[1] p. 201. [2] Strom. vi. [3] p. 203. [4] p. 203.
[5] Burnet; also appealed to Greg. Naz. [6] p. 209. [7] p. 224. [8] p. 225.

("And the sea shall give up her dead.") And S. Paul, in 1 Cor. xv., "though at first he seems to hint that another body shall arise, different from that in the grave; yet in the following verses, he, according to the rigid literal sense, seems only to invest the former body with new qualities."[1] Upon this Burnet observes that "we must certainly adhere to the letter when the nature of the thing will bear it."[2] But he contends that adherence to the literal meaning is in this case impossible. He insists upon the uselessness of the organic structure of the existing body if transferred to a heavenly state. "God," he says, "never deals in superfluities; and, as in this mortal life we have none, even the most minute, without some use, would you have in a more perfect and excellent body most of the structure thereof useless, and vain?"[3]

7. Burnet's treatise, 'De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium,' was privately printed for the criticism of friends during his lifetime, but never published until after his decease. The few who were permitted to have a copy were bound in honour "not to have it transcribed or delivered to the press." However, after Burnet's death, it was not only published in Latin, but translated into English, by Matthias Earbery, a priest of the Church of England, with criticisms and replies.[4] Earbery himself was sharply attacked by Burnet's literary executors for venturing to translate and criticise the treatise.[5] He defended himself by claiming a liberty to make remarks upon a printed book. Earbery identified Burnet with the school of Locke for his denial of the Resurrection of the same body.[6] Of the two he considers Burnet to be the more candid. For while Locke "quibbles with the word identity," Burnet "plainly tells us we shall have new bodies framed, as cases for the soul, after the Resurrection."[7]

The question is, says Earbery, what constitutes identity? There is identity of essence; that is the duration of a particle of matter until it is annihilated. There is also a relative identity, which the flux and reflux of parts does not destroy. Thus "a river is said to be the same river, though

[1] p. 226. [2] p. 227. [3] p. 229. [4] Ed. 2, 1728.
[5] Advertisement note, p. 102 and p. 103. [6] p. 85. [7] p. 85.

the identical essence of the parts is not two moments there together, if the similitude remains." "But a discontinuation of this similitude destroys the identity, as when a river is dried up, and flows no more for some ages, and the channel is opened again by art, or by some natural accident, it will be termed a new river."[1] Thus, urged Earbery, "if a body moulders in the grave, and there is no succession of parts to keep up the integrality thereof, there can be no relative identity for the reasons above given; and if the same body arises, it must be an essential identity of the parts brought together, in the same situation they were in before the continuity was dissolved by putrefaction in the grave; for otherwise it is creation, a new formation, but no Resurrection of the same body."[2]

Earbery argued that both Locke and Burnet contradict the plain sense of Scripture. The formation of a new body "to encase a soul after death" cannot be inferred from Christ's going down to the grave and rising from the dead with His Body.[3] Thus the Gospel presentation is utilised to exclude the Pauline conception of the spiritual Body. Moreover, argued Earbery, we must place no limits to Omnipotence. Burnet's theory is to his mind "a very whimsical heresy."[4] "The gnostics bambouzled away all the corporeal Resurrection." But Burnet has "moulded the grave to his fancy, and dressed up the dead like fairies; he has given them fantastical shadows."[5] Earbery adopts the mediæval distinction between organs contrived for beauty and for use, and argues that the former may remain while the latter has become obsolete.[6] But he inconsequently criticises Burnet for holding the opposite view, on the ground that "this is a too nice inquiry into the Divine secrets."[7] He argues that if Burnet will not acknowledge an organical body in the Resurrection, at least he must acknowledge the survival of the organical eye.[8] And if an organical eye, how then no organical brain? And so the whole animal constitution of the human frame is reintroduced.

But that which disturbs Earbery most of all is Burnet's

[1] p. 86. [2] p. 87. [3] *Ib.* [4] p. 89.
[5] p. 213. [6] p. 214. [7] p. 215. [8] p. 217.

conception of the real nature of Christ's glorified Body. Burnet, he says, "seems inclined to fall into a most wicked heresy, though he dare not speak it plain, that the Body of Christ upon earth was a fantastical one." Earbery means apparently the Risen Body of Christ. Flesh and blood, argued Burnet, after St. Paul, cannot inherit the Kingdom of God. Flesh and blood, he added, cannot be rendered incorruptible. For in that case they would be no longer flesh and blood. Corruptibility is of their essence. But all that Earbery can do is to appeal to Omnipotence which surely can stop organical decay if He pleases. "If God is pleased to stop this depredation, if He will not suffer the particles to fly, nor to pervade the pores and perspire away; this consolidation will make our bodies incorruptible, they will be always then in one state, and so may continue for eternity."[1]

Such was Earbery's attempt to support the common view.

8. Samuel Horsley, Bishop of S. Asaph, treated the subject of the Resurrection-Body with an insight vastly superior to many of his English predecessors.[2] Contrasting the Scripture evidence as to the Lord's Body during His ministry and after His Resurrection, Bishop Horsley wrote, "After His Resurrection the change is wonderful. Insomuch as that, except in certain actions which were done to give His disciples proof that they saw in Him their crucified Lord arisen from the grave, He seems to have done nothing like a common man. Whatever was natural to Him before seems now miraculous; what was before miraculous is now natural."[3]

The Risen Master's manner of life was completely changed. "He was repeatedly seen by the disciples after His Resurrection; and so seen as to give them many infallible proofs that He was the very Jesus who had suffered on the Cross. But He lived not with them in familiar habits. His time, for the forty days preceding His Ascension, was not spent in their society. They knew not His goings out and comings in."[4] "The conclusion seems to be that on earth He had no longer any local residence.... He was become the inhabitant of another region, from which he came occasionally to converse

[1] p. 221. [2] Horsley, 'Nine Sermons on the Nature of the Evidence,' 1815.
[3] *Ib.* p. 202. [4] *Ib.* p. 206.

with His disciples. His visible Ascension, at the expiration of the forty days, being not the necessary means of His removal, but a token to the disciples that this was His last visit." [1]

Bishop Horsley calls especial attention to the words, "showed Him openly, not to all the people." Here, says Horsley, is in the English rendering a contradiction. "Not to be shown to all the people is not to be shown openly.... The literal meaning of the Greek words is this, 'Him God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be visible.' Not openly visible; no such thing is said; it is the very thing denied; but 'He gave Him to be visible.' Jesus was no longer in a state to be naturally visible to any man. His body was indeed risen, but it was become that body which St. Paul describes in the fifteenth chapter of his first Epistle to the Corinthians, which having no sympathy with the gross bodies of this earthly sphere, nor any place among them, must be indiscernible to the human organs, till they shall have undergone a similar refinement." [2]

This remarkable passage deserves particular attention. The influence of Origen is unmistakable. And behind it the influence of S. Paul. Jesus was no longer in a state to be naturally visible to any man. Here the significance of the special appearance is suggested. "As it was by miracle that, before His death, He walked upon the sea, it was now by miracle that, for the conviction of the apostles, he showed in His person the marks of His sufferings." [3]

9. Locke's reply to Stillingfleet was still appealed to as a standard authority in the middle of the nineteenth century, in Bush's 'Anastasis,' published in 1845. Bush was Professor of Hebrew in New York. In his anxiety to liberate believers from the gross terrestrial conceptions of resurrection widely prevalent, he asserted, after considerable quotations from Locke, that "the body in which Jesus rose and repeatedly appeared to His disciples during the space of forty days was in fact a *spiritual* body"; [4] that it was "a body divested of the conditions of matter, at least as matter is commonly and philosophically defined. It is one endowed with the

[1] *Ib.* p. 208. [2] *Ib.* p. 210. [3] *Ib.* p. 203. [4] p. 152.

power of entering a room when the doors were closed, and all the ordinary avenues of access precluded. Such a body must have been spiritual."[1] The evidential signs of solidity, the reception of food are a "*miraculous adaptation of the visible phenomena to the outward senses of the disciples.*"[2] To the author's mind it is certain that our Lord did not ascend in a material body: consequently if such material body were assumed at the Resurrection it must have been laid aside during the forty days; of which there is not the slightest proof.[3] Bush maintains that Christ's dwelling was in Heaven from the Resurrection onwards; that each withdrawal from the disciples was an ascension into Heaven; that the spiritual body was assumed at the Resurrection itself.[4] This is confirmed in the writer's view by the Pauline doctrine of 1 Cor. xv.: "Whatever else may be taught by it, we think nothing can be more unequivocally asserted than that man does not rise again with the same body which he had in this world."[5] What S. Paul's illustration of the seed declares is that some kind of germ which is developed from the one body becomes the essential vital principle of the other.[6] "We cannot understand the apostle's reasoning, unless he meant to affirm that there is something of the nature of a germ which emanates from the defunct body, and forms either the substance or the nucleus of the future resurrection-body. But this principle we contend to be what the apostle calls *spiritual*, that is invisible, impalpable, refined, ethereal."[7] Bush indeed goes as far as to say of 1 Cor. xv. that this celebrated chapter "fails to yield any satisfactory evidence of the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body*."[8] He means apparently in the sense popularly accepted. But when confronted with our Lord's utterance, "they that are in the graves shall hear His voice," he is at a loss how to make his theory harmonise with the materialism of the expression.[9] He suggests that the phrase is merely a reference to Daniel xii. 2: "Many that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake"; that our Lord is

[1] p. 153. [2] p. 154; italics in original. [3] *Ibid.* 155.
[4] p. 162. [5] p. 174. [6] p. 176.
[7] p. 178. [8] p. 202. [9] *Ibid.* p. 234.

emphasising an idea, and that the language must not be pressed.[1]

With whatever inconsistencies and crudities of exposition this writer's work was composed, he was nevertheless feeling his way to a more philosophic and more Pauline conception of the nature of the Resurrection-Body.

10. One of the most important attempts in English theology to lift the doctrine to higher levels was made in Goulburn's Bampton Lectures[2] on the Resurrection of the Body. The treatise is not so well known as it deserves to be. Considering the period at which it was produced, it marks a distinct stage upwards in English thought. Goulburn wrote with a knowledge of the two great historic theories on the subject, and he definitely placed himself on Origen's side.

"We may not cumber the Resurrection in our notions of it, with associations drawn from the carnal, animal, shifting scene which surrounds us. Misconceptions of this kind found place very early in the Church, and gave rise, in all probability, to errors in a contrary direction. It was probably a too earthly and animal view of the circumstances and constitution of the risen dead which stirred up Origen to spiritualise the doctrine, and set it, as he conceived, on a more Scriptural footing. And although certain of his assertions may too far trespass on the identity of the risen with the natural body; yet who can help yielding assent to his words as beautiful and true when he points out the necessity for an adaptation of every body to the surrounding element in which it exists, and thence infers that the heavenly state will demand glorified bodies such as those in which Moses and Elias appeared at the Transfiguration? Who does not feel almost instinctively that this remark gives a juster representation of Scriptural truth than Jerome's particularising commentary on the much-disputed text of Job, in which he represents the identity of the hairs and teeth as involved in the doctrine of the Resurrection—and then in order to rid himself of the difficulty thrown in his path by the inspired statement that flesh and blood cannot

[1] p. 239. [2] 1850.

inherit the Kingdom of God, draws a distinction between the Resurrection and the inheritance of the Kingdom?"[1]

"Resurrection is not to be conceived of as a loss of some constitutional element of our nature. In the passage of the nature from a lower stage of existence to a higher, and in the adaptation of its faculties to that higher stage, there is no loss of any essential element. I say of any *essential* element; for is it not clear that the transition process may involve the falling-off of certain properties which are serviceable only in the rudimentary state, and which in the higher state would have no scope for exercise? The lower sphere having been for ever quitted, it is but natural to suppose that such faculties as were exclusively adapted to that sphere will be dropped."[2]

"Is matter no less than spirit an essential constituent of that nature, so that the primitive constitution of the creature would be altered, and man would cease to be man if the natural element no longer attached to him? Then, undoubtedly, inasmuch as Resurrection is no radical alteration of the constitution, but only such a modification of formerly existing rudiments as adapts them to a higher condition, the process is not to be conceived of as a laying down of the body and an emancipation of the soul from its fetters. Yet, on the other hand, this preservation of the integrity of the nature does not exclude the possibility of a loss of such faculties as were adapted exclusively to the lower state. Man may still carry about a body, and yet it may be a body whose animal functions have been dropped in the transit of Resurrection."[3]

Thus urges Goulburn, "It is the essential basis, not the present organisation of the human body, of which the Scriptures affirm that it shall be raised again in incorruption."[4] And further, "If the essential basis of a substance be preserved when it is brought out under a new form, that is sufficient to warrant us in calling it the same, however great the change which its form may have undergone."[5] Thus Goulburn maintains that the body which shall be raised "is

[1] Goulburn, 'Bampton Lectures' for 1850, p. 33. [2] *Ib.* p. 34.
[3] *Ib.* [4] *Ib.* p. 81. [5] *Ib.* p. 82.

some elementary material basis, not apprehensible by our present faculties, which lies at the root of those superficial phenomena exhibited by all matter, and by the human body, which is matter organised in a particular form."[1] The changes may be exceedingly great. "Food and the organ adapted to its reception and digestion will pass away."[2] But the basis of the body will be material.[3]

"Flesh and blood, says the apostle, in language too explicit to be evaded, cannot inherit the Kingdom of God. And no less explicitly speaks he... of natural sustenance and the organ adapted to its reception—'God shall destroy both it and them.' But flesh and blood is not the body: it is only the present constitution of the body, the organisation attaching to it under existing circumstances. And so while the gross accretions of flesh and blood must fall away at our entrance into the kingdom of life and light, the body shall endure under another economy, of which all that we know is summed up in that one short word 'spiritual.'"[4]

11. Milligan's idea of the Resurrection-Body of Christ begins with dismissing every theory whose fundamental principle is "that His risen body, whatever its peculiar substance or form, was not a body in any true sense of the term."[5] He then affirms that it is "difficult... to form anything like a distinct conception of what the resurrection-body of our Lord really was. Were it possible, indeed, to adopt the idea generally entertained, that 'the very body which hung upon the cross and was laid in the grave, rose again from the dead,'[6] it would be easy to concur. But in the light of the collected statements of Scripture upon the point, such a view cannot be successfully maintained. It is true that the body of the Risen Saviour was, in various important respects, similar to what it had been.... It still retained the print of the wound inflicted by the spear of the Roman soldier, etc."[7]

But the whole of Milligan's argument is founded on the assumption that from the Risen Body as manifested to the

[1] *Ib.* p. 83. [2] *Ib.* p. 84. [3] *Ib.* 86. [4] *Ib.* p. 89.

[5] Milligan, 'The Resurrection of our Lord,' p. 10.

[6] Quoted from Dr. Hodge of Princeton.

[7] Milligan, 'The Resurrection of our Lord,' p. 11.

apostles we can infer the normal characteristics of the Resurrection-state. He refuses indeed to regard any changes in the Risen Appearances as indications that the change produced upon the body of our Lord was *gradual*, that it began at His Resurrection, and went on in a progressive course during the forty days:[1] but he clings to the view that other marks in the same Appearances are indications really corresponding with the Risen-state. Yet for the Risen body of Christians, after quoting S. Matt. xxii. 30, 1 Cor. xv. 50, 1 Cor. vi. 13, he could write: "Passages such as these, even if they stood alone, would be sufficient to show that the body with which the believer rises from the grave cannot be the same as it is now; and that the heavenly world demands an organisation and functions different from those possessed by us in our present state."[2]

The natural criticism on these extracts from Milligan is that his doctrine of our Lord's Resurrection-Body was derived from the Evangelist's account of the Appearances assumed as identical with the Resurrection-state; while his doctrine of the Resurrection-Body of Christians was derived from S. Paul's conception of the spiritual body. And the two doctrines are left unreconciled.

Yet Milligan could elsewhere write: "The body now possessed by Him was not His old body, with whatever amount of outward glory we suppose it to have been glorified; but rather that old body changed, transfigured from within, so that it might be the fitting and perfectly adequate expression of pure spirit."[3]

This statement goes much further than the previous. But it cannot easily be reconciled with them on Milligan's assumptions. For if "the heavenly world demands an organisation and functions different from those possessed by us in our present state," and therefore "the body with which the believer rises from the grave cannot be the same as it is now"—how can the organisation of "flesh and bones" ascribed to the Risen Lord be a perfectly adequate expression of pure spirit and adapted to a heavenly state? What is needed to reconcile Milligan's various ideas is the

[1] Milligan, 'The Resurrection of our Lord,' p. 16. [2] *Ib.* p. 19. [3] *Ib.* p. 129.

recognition that the Appearances of the Risen Lord were adaptations of the Risen Body to terrestrial conditions, and therefore do not describe the essential characteristics of the Resurrection-state. As it is, Milligan is reduced to the paradox of explaining "a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have" as intended to indicate "that Christ's state was *not* the same as that of His disciples, or as it had been before."[1]

Moreover, Milligan has not carried the subject so far as to ask whether the Risen Appearances, the flesh and bones, of Christ correspond with the future experience of believers? To ask this question is surely to throw much light on the character of Christ's manifestation, and on the essential qualities of the Resurrection-Body.

12. The same line of progress was followed by Bishop Westcott, whose immense influence did much to popularise the more philosophical view. He frankly accepted the principle taught by Origen, who, in his opinion, "by keeping strictly to the apostolic language, anticipated results which we have hardly yet secured. It is the spirit which moulds the form through which it is manifested. Continuity of the body is to be sought in the 'ratio' or 'logos' of its constitution."[2]

Bishop Westcott's account of our Lord's Resurrection-Body is, according to these principles: "A marvellous change had passed over Him. He was the same and yet different. He was known only when He revealed Himself. He conformed to the laws of our present life, and yet He was not subject to them. These seeming contradictions were necessarily involved in the moral scope of the Resurrection. Christ sought (if we may so speak) to impress on His disciples two great lessons: that He had raised man's body from the grave, and that He had glorified it. Nor can we conceive any way in which these truths could have been conveyed but by appearances at one time predominantly spiritual, at another predominantly material, though both were alike real. For the same reason we may suppose that the Lord took up into His glorified Body the material elements of that human body which was

[1] *Ib.* p. 242. [2] 'Dict. of Christian Biogr.,' s.v. Origenes, vol. iv. p. 138, n.

laid in the grave, though, as we shall see, true personality lies in the preservation of the individual formula or law which rules the organisation in each case, and not in the actual but ever-changing organisation which may exist at any moment. The resumption of the Crucified Body conveyed to ordinary minds a conception which could not otherwise easily be gained." "A little reflection will show that the special outward forms in which the Lord was pleased to make Himself sensibly recognisable by His disciples were no more necessarily connected with His glorified Person than the robes which He wore." [1]

13. It is greatly to be wished that the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body had been made the subject of a complete study by Dr. Moberly. The manner in which he touched incidentally on the relation of the human body to the spirit only suggests how valuable a complete treatment would have been.

Discussing the relation of inward and outward, Moberly wrote: "So with man, in the bodily life. What is he? It is the simple truth that he is flesh and blood. It is also true that he is a spiritual being. He is spirit, of spirit, by spirit, for spirit. Even while the lesser and the lower continues true, the higher is the truer truth. That man is spirit, is a deeper, more inclusive, more permanent, *truer* truth than that man is body. In comparison with this truth, the truth that he is body (though true) is as an untruth. It is a downright untruth, whenever or wherever, in greater measure or less, it is taken as contradicting, or impairing, or obscuring the truth that he is spirit. Thus S. Paul does not hesitate roundly to deny the truth of it—'Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so be that the spirit of God dwelleth in you'—denying it, of course, in the context of his thought, with absolute truth; even though the proposition that the Roman converts were in the flesh might seem to be, in itself, one of the most undeniable of propositions. Of course this is an inversion of the verdict of natural sense. If natural sense would say, Man's bodiliness is the fundamental certainty, man's spirituality is only more or less probable; there is

[1] Westcott, 'Gosp. Resurr.' p. 109, note.

another point of view to which man's spirituality is so the one over-mastering truth, that even his bodily existence is only a truth so far as it is an incident, or condition, or expression, of his spiritual being. As method of spirit, it is true, and its truth is just this—to be method or channel of spirit.

"Such is the case of the individual man; he is obviously bodily, he is transcendently spiritual. His bodily life is no mere type, or representation of his spiritual; it *is* spiritual life, expanding, controlling, developing under bodily conditions. The real meaning of the bodily life is its spiritual meaning. The body is spiritual.

"And conversely, the spiritual is bodily. Even when he is recognised as essentially spiritual, yet his spiritual being has no avenue, no expression, no method, other than the bodily; insomuch that, if he is not spiritual in and through the body, he cannot he spiritual at all. Is he then bodily or spiritual? He is both: and yet not separately, nor yet equally both. If his bodily being seems to be the primary truth, yet, on experience, the truth of his spiritual being is so absorbing, so inclusive, that his bodily being is but vehicle, is but utterance, of the spiritual; and the ultimate reality even of his bodily being is only what it is spiritually. He is body, indeed, and is spirit. Yet this is not a permanent dualism, not a rivalry of two ultimate truths, balanced over against one another, while remaining in themselves unrelated. More exactly, he is spirit, in and through body."[1]

"A human body is the necessary—is the only—method and condition on earth of spiritual personality. It is capable, indeed, of expressing spirit very badly; it is capable of belying it; indeed, it is hardly capable of expressing it quite perfectly; it is, in fact, almost always falling short of at least the ideal expression of it. And yet body is *the only* method of spiritual life; even as things are, spirit is the true meaning of bodily life; and bodies are really vehicles and and expressions of spirit; whilst the perfect ideal would certainly be, not spirit without body, but body which was the ideally perfect utterance of spirit."[2]

[1] Moberly, 'Ministerial Priesthood,' p. 40.

[2] Moberly, 'Problems and Principles,' p. 358.

14. Latham, in his book 'The Risen Master,' followed on Dr. Westcott's lines in his teaching on the Resurrection-Body. "What the Resurrection-Body actually *was* the Apostles probably could not know—but there are two things, either of which they might think it to be, which it *was not*—and, inasmuch as if they adopted one of these wrong suppositions, practical mischief would ensue, our Lord takes measures to put these errors out of their way. One error was ... the supposition that the Lord had resumed His old body, and that its vital functions went on as before. If this had been so, the Resurrection would have conveyed no revelation to men. But this error was precluded as regards the apostles, without the Lord Himself saying a word on the matter merely by what Peter and John 'saw and believed' and reported to the other nine. The other error was that of supposing that the apparent body was not Christ Himself but a phantom. From this view immediate mischief would have come, for beholders would have been too terrified to recollect properly what they heard or saw. Against this error accordingly our Lord anxiously guards the apostles, by words and actions of His own."[1] ...

"He dispels their terrors by enabling them to grasp Him with their hands, to feel His body as well as to hear Him and to see Him. 'A spirit,' said our Lord, 'has not flesh and bones as ye see Me have.' Here we come on a question which is altogether beyond us. What connection was there between the body that disappeared from the tomb and the body that the disciples were invited to handle? This I believe we cannot understand till we get out of the body ourselves."[2]

15. Bishop Gore, in his lectures on the Body of Christ, gives the following account of the spiritual Body: "The risen Body of Christ was spiritual ... not because it was less than before material, but because in it matter was wholly and finally subjugated to spirit, and not to the exigencies of physical life. Matter no longer restricted Him or hindered. It had become the pure and transparent vehicle of spiritual purpose. He rose from the dead (as is apparently implied

[1] Latham, 'The Risen Master,' p. 71. [2] *Ib.* p. 73.

in the narrative of S. Matthew), leaving the gravestone undisturbed. The angel rolled it away to show that He was risen.

"Now from the physical point of view, such spiritualisation of matter, as is involved in this conception of a spiritual body, is becoming perhaps, I will not say more imaginable, but more and more conceivable; less out of analogy with our ultimate conceptions of matter. But the important point to notice is that the spirituality of the risen Body of Christ lies not so much in any physical qualities as in the fact that His material presence is absolutely controlled by His spiritual will. The disciples, for example, could no longer argue with any approach to security that He was where they had last seen Him, until they had evidence that He had left that spot. All such subservience to conditions of space was over for ever. His manifestations were manifestations to special persons—*i.e.* those whose faith He willed to rekindle—under special forms for special purposes."[1]

This outline of English post-Reformation thought shows an increasing influence of the great philosophical school. Origen is recognised to have seen deeper into ultimate realities, into the problem of identity, than Tertullian or even Augustine. The matter-of-fact materialistic view is being exchanged for a philosophical conception of the Risen-state. The great Alexandrian teacher is on this doctrine in harmony with the best tendencies of modern thought.

[1] Bishop Gore, 'Body of Christ,' p. 129.

CHAPTER XXVIII

MODERN ROMAN TEACHING ON THE RESURRECTION-BODY

IT is necessary for the completion of our subject to give an outline of the present day teaching given by Roman Catholic theologians on the nature of the Resurrection-body. The literature is large. It will be sufficient to select some of the chief representatives. We therefore take the following: Perrone, Janssens, Wilhelm and Scannell, Scheeben, Hurter, and Heinrich. It may be well to point out the wide distribution of these writers. Perrone taught in Rome, Janssens is a monk of Maredsous, Wilhelm and Scannell are for English members of the Roman Church, Scheeben, Hurter and Heinrich are authorities in Germany.

1. Perrone's treatment of the subject is important from the position which he held as professor in the Jesuit College in Rome. In 1877 his 'Prælectiones'[1] appeared in their thirty-second edition. The treatment is curious. The Resurrection of Christ is considered in the Treatise on True Religion.[2] It is dealt with there exclusively on its evidential side. It is regarded as the chief proof of our Lord's Divine mission. The difficulties of the evidence are discussed much on the assumptions of the eighteenth century. The general atmosphere is that of Sherlock's 'Trial of the Witnesses,' of Bergier's 'Theological Dictionary,' of Gilbert West and of Ditton.[3]

But the doctrine of the Resurrection is not discussed. The dogmatic significance of Christ's Resurrection is merged

[1] Nine volumes. [2] Vol. i. p. 70. [3] All these are appealed to, p. 87.

in the doctrine of His priesthood.[1] His Resurrection disappears under a discussion of His priestly work. Thus the Pauline inferences from the Resurrection are ignored. And the whole proportion is singularly different from that of the New Testament. Christ's Resurrection does not occupy in the theology of Perrone the place which it occupies in that of S. Paul. However, in the Treatise on God the Creator,[2] the subject is resumed in the aspect of eschatology, and a discussion is given on the future Resurrection-body. The theory here maintained is that "we shall rise with that physical identity of body which we possessed when we departed from this life; so that we shall all resume the same body physically which we lost by death. For this purpose, however, it is not necessary that God shall restore all and each particle, or molecule, of matter which constituted our body: it is sufficient to maintain its identity that God shall raise that which constitutes an essential part of our bodies; that by which one body is differentiated from another, and is made the property of the individual." [3]

The characteristics of the risen body, according to Perrone, will be impassibility, glory, agility, subtlety; "but not, as some have imagined, intangibility or invisibility." That was the mistake of the Patriarch Eutychius, who, however, recanted his error before he died. Thus we witness still the dominance of the Latin view. There is no real discussion of the Greek theology. Tertullian is the chief authority. The "flesh and blood" which "cannot inherit" means carnal works.[4] The problem presented to the materialistic view by cannibalism and assimilation of human bodies into other organisms is met precisely as Augustine met it fifteen hundred years before in his less philosophic moods; by the assertion that sufficient material would still remain to constitute a body; that particles must revert to their original proprietor;[5] and that in all probability resurrection-bodies do not require so large a mass of material as mortal and passible bodies do.

[1] Vol. vi. 196. [2] Vol. v. p. 272. [3] v. 273.
[4] p. 280. [5] "restituentur illis ad quos spectabant," p. 289.

2. The Theological Treatises of Janssens[1] belong to the opening of the twentieth century. They are published with the approval of Leo XIII. The work is really an adaptation of S. Thomas to modern needs. Accordingly we have the advantage of a much completer theology of the Resurrection than that of Perrone, although strictly on the scholastic scheme of the older writer, even including a reverential adherence to his sub-divisions. On the other hand, Strauss is criticised.

The Body of Christ, says Janssens, arose in its integrity. The question is, how is that perfection consistent with the retention of the scars of the Passion? Janssens replies that, abstractly considered, scars detract from the perfection of the body, yet in the case of Christ they possess the glory of merit, and so increase the perfection of the risen body.[2]

If, says Janssens, not a hair of our head shall perish, the inference is that the Almighty bestowed especial attention to the work of restoring the sacred body of Jesus Christ. Indeed, Janssens holds it to be a pious belief that the angels reverently gathered up the blood shed during the Passion, as well as the fragments of the flesh or hairs torn by the violence of the executioners.[3] It can scarcely be said that this line of thought contains an adequate refutation of Strauss.

3. In Wilhelm and Scannell's 'Manual of Catholic Theology,'[4] which is based on the vast four volume work of the German Scheeben, the doctrine of the Resurrection of Christ occupies a single page.[5] Consequently no attempt is made to deal with the Scriptural doctrine. There is an obvious disproportion. Extreme unction, for example, occupies nine pages.[6] On the other hand, the Resurrection of the Body is discussed in six pages.[7] But since the doctrine of our Lord's Resurrection and its nature have not been proportionately treated, it is not surprising that the doctrine of the Resurrection of Christians is lacking in its real foundation.

The usual four characteristics of impassibility, brightness,[8] agility, spirituality[9] are ascribed to the Resurrection-body.

[1] Summa Theologica. Auctore Laurentio Janssens. 5 vols. 1901.
[2] Vol. v. pt. 2. p. 903. [3] *Ib.* p. 904. [4] 2 vols. 1898. [5] Vol. 2, p. 179.
[6] ii. 485-493. [7] pp. 535-541. [8] p. 539. [9] p. 540.

By spirituality is understood an endowment "by means of which the body becomes so completely subject to the soul, and participates to such an extent in the soul's more perfect and purer life, that it becomes itself like to a spirit.... This quality is generally explained in the special sense of subtlety or penetrability, that is, of being able to pass through material objects, just as our Lord's risen body did."[1]

Most important is the statement of the problem how bodily identity is preserved—"That we shall all rise again with the *same* bodies is of the very essence of the doctrine.... Nevertheless, the particles of the body are continually passing away, and being replaced by others; and the particles of one human body may enter into the composition of other human bodies. We must not, therefore, press too far the material identity of the earthly and the risen body. Some theologians, following S. Augustine, have thought it sufficient if any of the particles which at any time formed part of the earthly body are preserved. Others have not required even so much as this. We cannot here enter into the discussion."[2]

4. Scheeben himself taught that the future human body is not only essentially or specifically, but also individually or numerically the same as that which men now possess.[3] The essential and individual identity is involved in the very idea of Resurrection, it is at least implicit in the Conception. Scheeben held that Scripture and Tradition alike require it. But his treatment of Scripture is not critical. Job is his first authority. The Fathers are affirmed to have taught from the beginning the numerical identity of the earthly and the risen body.[4]

As to the actual nature of this identity Scheeben held that the Church had not defined. But there are theological inferences which appear to be logically involved. That which constitutes the form or inner principle of the body is the soul. The body only subsists through the soul. It is therefore the same soul which will constitute the inner principle of the Resurrection-body. This may be described as the formal identity of the body which is to be. Scheeben is very near in this thought to the fundamental conception

[1] p. 540. [2] *Ib.* p. 541. [3] Vol. iv. p. 916. [4] p. 917.

of Origen: that the identity of the Resurrection-body is to be sought in the soul. Scheeben however rapidly drops this thought, and asserts that the human body, in itself and as part of the substance of man, is composed of chemical particles or elements, or molecules; and infers that this same chemical material is necessary to constitute the identity of the Resurrection-body. This is the natural identity, just as the soul is the formal identity.

In Scheeben's opinion Origen was the first to maintain only the formal identity to the exclusion of the material identity.

Scheeben, however, proceeds to add that the material identity between the body which dies and that which rises is not to be taken in an absolute sense but only in a relative: for bodily identity is maintained even in the present life amid incessant alteration of material.[1] Whether this identity is maintained in spite of total exchange of its constituent elements he appears to leave undecided. He curiously suggests that human origins imply that the sum total of a material requisite for the building up of a human body is but small.[2]

It is evident that Scheeben's entire discussion is founded on materialistic presuppositions. The Augustinian theory that elements misappropriated by cannibalism must revert to their original proprietor seems to be regarded by Scheeben as a satisfactory solution of the problem.[3]

On the other hand he maintains the qualitative superiority of the future body. Yet he asserts that the resurrection-body will be a true organised human body, possessing the same appearance as in the present life, and endowed with the same parts, members and organs which constitute its natural properties. Its superiority will chiefly consist in the fact that other bodies will present no obstruction to its progress.[4]

5. Hurter's 'Compendium of Dogmatic Theology'[5] is one of the best known manuals for the use of Roman seminaries. The thesis here maintained is that all men shall rise with the

[1] p. 918. [2] p. 919. [3] p. 920. [4] p. 923.
[5] 3 vols. 1885. Fifth Edition.

selfsame bodies which they carried while they lived on earth. The method by which this thesis is confirmed is characteristic. First, it is rested on the authority of the Church in the Creeds and Councils.[1] Secondly, on the statements of Job, S. Paul, and the Maccabees.[2] Thirdly, on the teaching of the Fathers, chiefly of Tertullian.

Hurter affirms that if it is the Divine Will to restore the human body, the elements which constitute its identity will be providentially secured from becoming part of the property of some other body.[3] The necessity, however, of retention of all the elements is not maintained. And Omnipotence can supplement deficiencies without destroying identity. Here again Augustine in his least spiritual moods is regarded as having spoken the last word upon the subject.[4]

6. One of the completest dogmatic expositions of the subject by a modern Roman writer will be found in the 'Dogmatical Theology' of Heinrich, Professor in the Seminary at Maintz.[5]

Starting from the axiom that the identity of the Resurrection-body with the earthly body is implied in the very idea of Resurrection,[6] he proceeds at once to found his doctrine on Tertullian's inference; "therefore the flesh shall rise again, the entire flesh, the same flesh, and in its integrity."[7] According to Heinrich the idea of Resurrection precludes both the substitution of some heavenly material or indeed of some earthly material in the future body in place of the existing frame. The patriarch Eutychius is once more adduced as an illustration of heresy abandoned on the bed of death.[8] The Resurrection requires a twofold identity: identity of the material elements; identity of the constitutive principle; that is material and formal identity. The ordering and the distribution of the parts into stature, size, structure, and members, is the consequence of formal identity. And since this form-giving element holds the predominating place in the constitution of the body, many

[1] p. 601. [2] p. 603. [3] p. 604. [4] p. 604.

[5] 'Dogmatische Theologie' von Dr. Heinrich. Ed. by Gutberlet. 10 vols. 1904.

Vol. x. p. 852. [7] 'de Resurr. Carnis,' ch. lxiii. [8] p. 855.

have believed that all that is necessary to secure identity in the future state is the retention of appearance, stature, and order of the members. Others believe that identity consists in the constitutive principle. Heinrich himself does not maintain the latter view.[1] The problems created by assimilation of human bodies into other animal constitutions is answered by Heinrich, partly by an appeal to omniscience and omnipotence, and partly by Augustine's principle, approved by S. Thomas, that the elements must revert to their original proprietor.[2] Heinrich thinks that further light is thrown upon the problem by the reflection that cannibals did not subsist exclusively and for generations upon human flesh.[3] The difficulties are caused by too restricted a conception of identity. There is no necessity for a restoration of all the particles. The conception of identity only requires the restoration of all substance which belongs to the truth of human nature. Essentially, generally, and broadly, there must be the same material, above all, the same formal principle. Distribution of the members, appearance, flesh, bones, nerves, veins, muscles, must be substantially the same, however glorified; but there is no necessity for the complete restoration of all the substance.[4]

Heinrich is then confronted with the question, What about blood? He is perplexed between a desire to refine, and the reflection that complete withdrawal of blood from the brain produces insensibility. He holds that the physical organs of self-maintenance will be retained, although their functions will cease.[5] This he considers confirmed by the existence of functionless organs in the present frame. Organs may exist for beauty, if not for use.

Thus Heinrich reproduces the theology of the Middle Ages. He does little more than translate and expand S. Thomas. The physical conceptions of the twelfth century are still assumed to be those of the twentieth. Except for an occasional modern name, chiefly mentioned to be set aside, we need scarcely be aware that thought had moved since the Scholastic period. No breath of modernity has ruffled the lecture room at Maintz. There seems no consciousness of

[1] p. 857. [2] p. 859. [3] p. 860. [4] p. 861 [5] p. 863.

the effect of these theories on the outer world, or whether they touch the problems of modern thought.

Of the modern Roman discussions of the Resurrection-state it appears true to say that they are almost entirely restricted to the Latin School. The real value of the Greek theology does not seem understood. The discussions rest more on the Resurrection of Christ as reported in the Gospels than on the doctrine as given by S. Paul. The treatment is far stronger in its knowledge of tradition than in its appreciation of S. Paul. The treatment of Scripture is constantly uncritical. Thus Job, S. Paul, and the Maccabees are discussed in this order as evidence for the nature of the Resurrection-body. The really dominating personality is Tertullian. There is serious absence of philosophical inquiry, of appreciation of the real drift of the school of Origen.

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CHAPTER XXIX

CONCLUSIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION-BODY

ALL the history of belief in the doctrine of the Resurrection-Body shows the existence of two opposing schools, the materialistic and the philosophic: the one traced ultimately to the Evangelists and their reports of the Risen Body of Christ; the other to S. Paul and his conception of the spiritual body. The former lays all the stress on the solidity and tangibility of the Lord's Risen Body, and may be said to concentrate itself on the phrase "flesh and bones, as ye see Me have"; the other lays all the stress on the differences, and ethereality, and unearthliness of the spiritual body, and may be said to concentrate itself on the phrase, "flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God."

Since the origin of these two schools is thus distinctly traceable to a Scriptural diversity, it is natural for criticism to suggest that the Evangelistic and the Pauline accounts are not to be reconciled; that they are in fact alternative versions, and that the modern mind must therefore make its choice between them.

I

Now, that the differences between the more materialistic aspect of the Evangelist's account of the Lord's Risen Body and the spiritual body of S. Paul's doctrine is very great is undeniable. The question is, *Can they be reconciled?*

The longer one thinks upon this whole question the clearer it becomes that no man approaches it without presuppositions

as to the nature of body, and that it must make all the difference what those presuppositions are. Our summary of the history of belief in the Resurrection of the Body has forced us to see that the statements made, and the theories maintained, have constantly depended on the maintainer's conception of what constitutes body and what constitutes identity: that is to say, on the philosophic outlook of the individual theoriser. It is impossible for any man to approach this discussion with his mind a perfect blank. Approach it with presuppositions he must. The essential thing is that he should be conscious that this is so; and that his presuppositions should be at least in accordance with the best knowledge of his time. We have only to recall, by way of illustration, the presuppositions prevalent in the eighteenth century as to identity consisting in the same individual particles of matter, to realise how greatly the conclusions were influenced by such contemporary ideas.

Our duty therefore seems to be to inquire of the best learning of our time, What is Body? We can scarcely do better than take again Moberly's explanation already quoted: "A human body is the necessary—is the only—method and condition, on earth, of spiritual personality. It is capable, indeed, of expressing spirit very badly; it is capable of belying it; indeed, it is hardly capable of expressing it quite perfectly; it is, in fact, almost always falling short of at least the ideal expression of it. And yet body is *the only* method of spiritual life; even as things are, spirit is the true meaning of bodily life; and bodies are really vehicles and expressions of spirit; whilst the perfect ideal would certainly be, not spirit without body, but body which was the ideally perfect utterance of spirit."[1]

Body, then, is a form of self-expression; an instrument for the manifestation of spirit. Now, as Origen taught, the instrument of self-manifestation must agree with the environment in which the manifestation is to be made. Body, as we possess it now, relates the spirit to terrestrial conditions. The serviceableness of the present body consists in its harmony with those conditions. It is constructed relatively

[1] Moberly, 'Problems and Principles,' p. 358.

to given surroundings. All the senses owe their value to their correspondence with environment. Unless the spirit adopts an organism appropriate to its surroundings life and manifestation become impossible. Our existing body corresponds to a certain atmospheric condition, to a certain temperature, to the solidity of the earth. Its entire system of maintenance, of movement, of sensation, has its meaning and purpose as related to surroundings such as now exist.

Now it is certainly no untrue disparagement of the existing human body, admirable and wonderful as it is, to say with Moberly that "it is capable of expressing spirit very badly"; that "it is hardly capable of expressing it quite properly"; that "it is, in fact, almost always falling short of at least the ideal expression of it." This is only to say in other words what was said in the book of Wisdom, that "the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things."[1] The limitations to the body as an instrument for the expression of spirit are speedily reached in many directions. Body is not under the complete control of spirit. As nature conceals God more than it reveals Him so the human body conceals spirit more than it reveals it. This cannot be the ultimate condition. As Dorner says, "Since matter originates with God and is correlated with spirit by creation, a more effectual penetration by soul or spirit through union with spirit must be possible, instead of its present imperfect penetration by spirit."[2]

This idea of the perfect penetration of matter by spirit throws great light on the doctrine of Resurrection.

Man, as writers already mentioned have constantly reminded us, is not soul without body: but soul and body combined. If on the one side "his bodily being is but the vehicle, is but the utterance of the spiritual,"[3] yet on the other "his spiritual being has no avenue, no expression, no method, other than the bodily."[4] And this blending of spirit and body in unity cannot be temporary, but is rather an essential characteristic of man. Thus as Moberly puts it

[1] 'Wisdom,' ix. 15. [2] 'System of Christian Doctrine,' iv. 134.
[3] Moberly, 'Ministerial Priesthood,' p. 40. [4] Moberly, *ib.*

"the perfect ideal would certainly be, not spirit without body, but body which was the ideally perfect utterance of spirit."[1] Accordingly body will exist in the future state: but body which furnishes a perfect instrument to spirit. The body of the future life must be conceived as in no sense limiting the activities and manifestations of spirit. It must be a body which will not "press down the soul," or "weigh down the mind that museth upon many things." It must be body "become the pure and transparent vehicle of spiritual purpose."[2]

But we may see a little further than this. The value of body as an organ of spirit consists in its correspondence with environment. There must be "adaptability to the surrounding element in which it exists."[3] As Origen said, if we were destined to live in water we must assume bodies like those of fish. The serviceableness of the present human body consists in its harmony with terrestrial conditions. The human body is adapted for life on earth: and for that purpose it is admirably adapted. But it could not live in the moon or in the sun. Raise or depress the temperature beyond a certain limit, and in either case the correspondence of the body with its environment ceases. The transference of the existing human organised frame to other and non-terrestrial conditions is inconceivable. The solidity of the present body, the whole structure, the organs of maintenance, constructed for assimilation of food, are not only meaningless but absolutely impossible for transference to non-terrestrial conditions. S. Paul's words are sufficiently decisive of the change which he conceived to have passed over the solidity of the existing frame: "then we that are alive, and are left, shall together with them be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air; and so shall we ever be with the Lord."[4] That implies total disappearance of all the normal characteristics of the earthly body of man. The human senses, as they now exist, are all differentiations of the sense of touch; they all require

[1] 'Problems and Principles,' p. 358.
[2] Bishop Gore, 'Body of Christ,' p. 127.
[3] Goulburn. [4] 1 Thess. iv. 17.

corresponding external conditions to render them available; they cannot any one of them avail as instruments of spirit except in such an atmosphere as that which surrounds the earth. This means that the entire system of sensation is merely terrestrial, and must disappear, and be replaced by methods of self-expression adapted to non-terrestrial conditions. A large number of the writers already quoted, from Origen downwards, agree in emphasising this. "Here," said Origen, "we see with eyes, act with hands, walk with feet. But in that spiritual body we shall be all sight, all hearing, all activity." So Burnet taught that the Resurrection-Body will be "inorganical"; that is, relatively to the existing constitution. The organs of nutrition and of movement will have passed away. With this may be compared the statement of Reville: 'Le corps humain, tel qu'il est constitué organiquement, ne se prête pas à d'autres conditions de vie que celles qui résultent de la nature de ses organes et des lois qui régissent l'existence terrestre. Il ne peut se passer ni d'air, ni d'alimentation, ni d'un milieu en rapport avec son organisation physique et chimique."[1]

The idea of the retention of existing organs in a future life without their use, urged over and over again by the materialistic Latin school and their successors, is not only a hopeless suggestion, but it fails to realise that the entire animal constitution cannot exist outside a certain earthly environment. The materialistic theory cannot explain the rationale of the retention of physical organs after their functions have ceased. No really modern mind would be persuaded by Tertullian's reply, that they will be wanted for judgment; or that the mouth not necessary for food may still be required for language and for praise. To carry consistently out the conception of life under non-terrestrial conditions is to realise that no animal mouth and tongue can be transferred to it, that human languages and sounds of human voices must be exchanged for nobler, if to us partly inconceivable, methods of intercommunication. Many are the languages of mortals, the language of the immortals

[1] Reville, 'Jesus de Nazareth, Etudes critiques,' ii. 454.

is but one, and it is not expressed in symbols of earthly sound.

And carrying the conception out to its full results, life under non-terrestrial conditions must mean that the whole existing outline and form of man will disappear. The thought, widely prevalent, that the form will survive while the organs of the same body are changed, cannot be consistently maintained. Outward and inward cannot in this way be divorced. The outer form is determined by the inward organisation. The structure disappears: the outline cannot remain.

Is this Body of the Resurrection material? Surely the answer must be, Yes. The spirit is not furnished with a body entirely new, and unconnected with the old. What Goulburn calls "the essential basis" of the present organisation forms the substance out of which the future body is developed. This is what Origen taught. "The matter which underlies bodies is capable of receiving those qualities which the Creator pleases to bestow." Not only is the Resurrection-Body material, indeed only so can we form any conception of body at all, but it is derived substantially from the body which dies. And it is this which constitutes its identity, and justifies the very term Resurrection.

II

It will undoubtedly be felt that the conception of the Resurrection-Body just given may be that which S. Paul suggests when he spoke of the spiritual body: but it will also be objected that it cannot be reconciled with the reports of the Evangelists.

The Evangelists describe the reappearances of the body which had been crucified, and which died, and was buried; and which, however endowed with new faculties, and recognisable with difficulty at times, still bore upon it the marks of the wounds received during the Passion; was capable of test by the senses of sight and touch; and above all is expressly declared by our Lord Himself to consist of "flesh and bones."

Criticism therefore asks, How is it possible to reconcile

this conception of the Resurrection-Body with that of S. Paul? While it is true that the Evangelists report something very different from a mere resuscitation of the buried corpse, while their teaching is marked by conspicuous originality, being neither the conception of the Jewish Pharisee nor that of the Greek believer in the immortality of the soul, occupying indeed a place between the two; yet, allowing for all this, the difficulty still remains that the report of the Evangelists presents characteristics exactly opposed to S. Paul's doctrine of the spiritual body.

Now, if both the Evangelists and S. Paul are describing the normal conditions of Resurrection Life, it will probably not be possible to achieve their reconciliation. It may be said that "flesh and bones" are not the same as "flesh and blood"; and the endeavour may be made to extort a metaphorical meaning from the latter phrase: but this is only done by interpolating a moral metaphor into the midst of a physical discussion on the body, where it is wholly inappropriate. And, in any case, no reader of S. Paul's doctrine of the spiritual body, if ignorant of the Evangelists' report, could ever have drawn from it the idea that the Resurrection-Body included solid flesh and bones. If a reconciliation between S. Paul and the Evangelists is to be found it must be sought elsewhere.

Now, what is obvious is that the Evangelists are reporting the occasional Appearances of our Lord's risen Body within the sphere of terrestrial manifestations. They are concerned exclusively with what was seen and touched during the great Forty Days. And the question to be considered is, What relation do those Appearances bear to the normal Resurrection-state? They are all of them a temporary return of the risen Lord into earthly conditions; conditions, that is to say, in which He could be seen and heard by men leading the ordinary earthly life. Is it necessary to assume that the characteristics of the Appearances during the period of forty days are essential and permanent qualities of the Resurrection-state? Or are they economic, evidential, assumed for a definite purpose and a limited time: the necessary conditions of communicating with men on earth, not

the essential characteristics of the spiritual body? Upon the answer given to this question the reconciliation of S. Paul with the Evangelists depends. A study of the historical discussions on this doctrine has shown us beyond all dispute that the reason why Christians have differed so greatly on the Resurrection-Body is that they have differed in their interpretations of the Evangelists' reports. One school has understood the whole of the Appearances to be purely evidential and economic: the other school has viewed them as an actual account of the eternal resurrection condition. Now the importance of this diverse interpretation is exceedingly great. To interpret the Appearances of our Lord as revealing to us that the future body will consist of flesh and bones is to make the Evangelists contradict S. Paul. But is it necessary? Very striking utterances have reached us from various older writers protesting against any such necessity. According to Locke, the marks of the wounds were evidential. According to Bishop Horsley, Jesus, after the Resurrection, "was no longer in a state to be naturally visible to any man." According to Professor Bush, there was a "miraculous adaptation of the visible phenomena to the outward senses of the disciples." According to Bishop Westcott, "a little reflection will show that the special outward forms in which the Lord was pleased to make Himself sensibly recognisable by His disciples were no more necessarily connected with His glorified Person than the robes which He wore."

These statements, which might easily be multiplied, are after all only repetitions of the Greek school in the primitive Church. S. Chrysostom said that if asked how an incorruptible body showed the prints of the nails, and was tangible by a mortal hand, the answer was "what took place was a matter of condescension." The Resurrection-Body was "free from all density."

The Evangelists themselves report that our Lord after the Resurrection was normally invisible. As Bishop Horsley put it: "He lived not with them in familiar habits. His time, for the forty days preceding His ascension, was not spent in their society. They knew not His goings out and comings

in. Where He lodged on the evening of His Resurrection, after His visit to the apostles, we read not; nor were the apostles themselves better informed than we."[1] In other words He had entered into life under heavenly conditions. His Resurrection-Body was normally unascertainable by any human being living under earthly conditions. But in that glorified Body the penetration of matter by spirit was so complete that He could at will re-enter into terrestrial conditions, and become perceptible to the senses of human beings on earth. It may be that such power is no unique prerogative of His Divinity, but part of the normal endowment of every perfected human individual. We cannot tell. At any rate this glorified human body, habitually dwelling in non-terrestrial conditions, temporarily reassumes the human outline, and solid frame, and former appearance, and marks of the wounds, for evidential and instructive purposes.

But all this is condescension, and adaptation to the disciples' needs. Without it they could scarcely have been convinced. It showed identity with His earthly past, rather than revealed the heavenly state. Indeed solidity of flesh and bones can tell us nothing of a life essentially different from our own. So far as these manifestations suggest the "spiritual body" at all, it is in the unearthly entrance and disappearance; in the difficulties of recognition; in the impossibility of going after Him and of finding Him; and not in the indications of physical identity, or in the solid flesh and bones.

To some this conception of solid frame and flesh and bones as temporarily existing in the Resurrection-Body for evidential purposes appears theatrical and deceptive. We have been accustomed to sing the words:

> "Those dear tokens of His Passion
> Still His glorious Body bears."

To regard the marks or the wounds as merely assumed during the occasional Appearances seems fictitious and inseparable from unreality.

But this objection would be valid against every external form of supernatural communication with men. It would

[1] 'Nine Sermons,' p. 206.

tell against the form of a dove at Christ's baptism, as not being that of the Holy Spirit; and against the words spoken to Saul of Tarsus in the Hebrew language—"Why persecutest thou Me," as not being the language of Heaven. If the perfected human body, which cannot in its normal state be detected by earthly senses, is to come within the reach of men on earth, it must adjust itself to their conditions. It is not that another body is created for each manifestation, but that the one same glorified body is made instrumental in such a form that earthly mortals are enabled to discern it. Either this condition must be complied with, or else no manifestation can be made.

Indeed the same objection might be raised against the usual explanation of the Risen Lord's reception of food. Was this reception for the purpose of maintaining physical life? The immediate answer is no. It was exclusively for the purpose of proving His identity, and the reality of His human nature. Was this theatrical, delusive, deceptive? It will be generally answered no. It was required by the state of the disciples' mind. But if such condescension to human needs for evidential purposes was permissible, so is the whole assumption of corporeity equally permissible. If S. Clement of Alexandria was justified in saying "He did not eat for the sake of His body, but for their sakes with whom He conversed," such action is identical in principle with the assumption also of the marks of the wounds.

III

Here, then, as we believe, the reconciliation between S. Paul and the Evangelists becomes perfectly simple. It lies in the sphere with which each is dealing. The Evangelists are historians. They describe the re-entrance of the glorified Body of Christ into terrestrial conditions, effected for the purpose of convincing His apostles of His Resurrection, and of giving them instructions and commissions. They do not attempt to go behind the occurrences into the speculative and theological problems which these occurrences create. S. Paul on the other hand is the theologian. He is not concerned so much with the occasional manifestations as

with the essential condition of the Body of Christ in the risen state. Accordingly it is not in the Evangelists but in S. Paul that we find the profounder teaching, whether as to the Resurrection of Christ or of that of Christians. It will be entirely misleading to make inferences from the Evangelical reports as to the real condition of the body of man in the future life. If this principle had been followed in the course of the history of doctrine the effect on human belief would have been simply incalculable. Christendom would have been spared the gross materialism of the Latin School, and the unhappy exegesis which explained away S. Paul's "flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God," thereby forcing it into unnatural harmony with the words of Christ, "flesh and bones as ye see Me have"; the latter being mistakenly supposed to describe the spiritual body's normal state. Christendom would have been spared also those conceptions, gross and animal, which have been the despair of philosophic minds, and have certainly made belief very difficult for them, and have probably by reaction induced men to take refuge in the survival of the soul alone as a reasonable alternative and a positive relief. It is not, we think, too much to say that the mistaken interpretation of the Evangelists' reports, and especially of the Lucan narrative, accounts for much repugnance to the Christian truth. To be subjected to the teaching of a Tertullian or of a Jerome on the Resurrection of the Body must have tended to keep thoughtful contemporaries outside the Christian Church. And the powerful Latin tradition has largely affected, as we have seen, the course of English post-Reformation ideas. A study of the history of the doctrine shows that the Greek philosophic school has held its place in English thought, and has of recent years risen more and more into a dominant position, from which in all human probability it is not likely to be dislodged. But it is undeniable that great confusion, largely the result of eighteenth century traditions, still prevails in popular thought. While it may be true that the crude realism of the Latin School has protected a truth through centuries incompetent to grasp it in a purer form; at any rate it complicates the situation to-day. "I often regret,"

wrote Max Müller, "that the Jews buried, and did not burn their dead, for in that case the Christian idea of the Resurrection would have remained far more spiritual."[1] It is difficult not to see more than enough in Christian schools of teaching on the subject to account for such an utterance. But the fault must be laid to the charge of imperfect Christian teachers, and not to the method of the committal of our Lord's body to the ground. If the Body of Christ had been cremated, His Resurrection-Appearances must have assumed much the same characteristics of physical identity as those which the Evangelists report. The spiritual theory of Resurrection is as definitely taught within the New Testament as it could be under any conceivable conditions. All that is wanted is for Christian exegesis to utilise the data therein bestowed. No doctrine of Bodily Resurrection can be more spiritual than that of S. Paul. The solution of all the difficulty lies in recognising that the Evangelists describe the terrestrial occurrences, while S. Paul discusses the essential nature of the Risen Body. If this recognition were to prevail the future history of the doctrine must become far more spiritual than the dominant Latin tradition has made it hitherto.

This discussion on the nature of the Resurrection-Body has its obvious bearing on the question of the empty grave. If the resumption of the material particles which constitute our physical frame is no part of the doctrine of the Resurrection, then the inquiry meets us, What is the relation between the body which dies and the body which rises? Is their co-existence conceivable? Does the continuance of the physical corpse in the grave militate with belief in the reality of the body's Resurrection? If the Body of Jesus had been found in Joseph's grave could His bodily Resurrection still be equally true?

That it could be equally true seems undeniable. The relation between the body dead and the body risen is not of such a kind as to require the absorption, disappearance, annihilation of the former. When the Resurrection is understood in the Pauline sense of the spiritual body, the co-existence

[1] 'Biographical Essays,' p. 140.

of the corpse and the Resurrection form of self-manifestation is quite conceivable.

But it is clear that the credibility of this must depend on the accepted idea of Resurrection. It by no means follows that primitive belief in Christ's Resurrection would have been equally possible if His natural body had seen corruption. If when S. Peter and S. John visited the grave on Easter Day the body had still been there, no belief in the Resurrection could have been created. There was no philosophic conception of identity existing in the circle of Galilæan discipleship. There was no profound conception of the spiritual Body yet announced. There was no possibility of evading the evidence of the senses by the evidence of the reason. Even if, by an effort superhuman, the apostles could in spite of the piteous facts of dissolution have believed what their senses seemed to refute, the propagation of such a doctrine in spite of the existing corpse is absolutely inconceivable. Just imagine the impression of the crowd at Whitsuntide if S. Peter had said, His body saw corruption: the remains lie there, in the gloom of Joseph's sepulchre! The empty grave was unquestionably indispensable for the disciples' work and the disciples' faith.

And surely the empty grave has been a necessity to Christian faith from the apostolic age to the present time. How could the truth have overcome the materialism of the middle ages without the Scripture statements, "He is not here, He is risen." "Come see the place where the Lord lay."

And that necessity still holds good. However possible it might be for those who have grasped S. Paul's conception of the spiritual body to contemplate undisturbed the body of Jesus in the sepulchre, this is not possible for the great majority of men even yet. It may not be true that the Christian faith is founded on an empty grave: but it may yet be true that the empty grave is a necessary element in the confirmation and extension of faith. It may yet be true that as a historic fact it has been evidentially necessary.

A modern writer says: "The survival of Jesus, and with a body, as we understand that term, would have been to our-

selves as credible even if the buried clay had mouldered in the death-chamber. But since we believe on the evidence that this did not happen, we suppose a withdrawal of it from the world of sensible things, which is no doubt a miraculous occurrence, in the same sense in which the creation of matter is miraculous. It lies on us then to suggest a reason for this intrusion of the miraculous, or, we would rather say, the creative, and we find one, where we find the reason for the whole action described as the Forty Days. The withdrawal of the body was a coherent and necessary detail in the Incarnation event which culminated in the Resurrection. That the body should not moulder in the grave was an indispensable mental condition of men's recognising Christ's Person as present to them: without it, they could not have effected on their part that vital relation to the Risen Master which we name the Appearing. Just as the Body presented to their sight must wear the scars which all knew as marking it when laid in the tomb, so too it must not seem to be proved a delusion by men's knowledge that the clay which died still lay there dead. 'Seem,' I say, because the existence of it in the grave would not, for a modern, have proved the Appearances to be a delusion. But for simple Galilæans, or indeed for other and not simple men of that era, it would have made belief well nigh impossible. This incident then is ... a part of the outward and visible sign of the whole Sacrament of Reconciliation."[1]

Much of this statement we could cordially accept, only experience convinces us that the evidential necessity of the empty tomb is, as we have already urged, not confined to "simple Galilæans" nor to men of the apostolic age. It would equally apply to a vast mass of mankind, the great majority, in every age, including the present.

The more refined our conception of the Resurrection-Body the more certainly we are confronted with the difficult problems of recognition in a future state. For those who accepted a gross and materialistic view the question of recognition seemed comparatively simple. Just as the Risen Lord was recognised by the scars and by His features and by

[1] J. H. Skrine, 'Contemporary Review,' 1904, p. 870.

His voice, so it was assumed that the future body would in outline and appearance closely resemble that which we now possess. But when it is understood that the manifestations of the Risen Lord assumed a nature corresponding to the recipients' terrestrial conditions, and do not really tell us anything of the spiritual body in its natural state; and when it is also understood that none of the present earthly organs can be transferred into non-terrestrial conditions: then the question, how shall we know each other again in a future world, becomes urgent. There is no doubt that this spiritual theory of the Resurrection-Body suggests to the unphilosophical mind a feeling that its reality is destroyed. The comfortable sense of solidity is evaporated, and nothing of the former condition of things is left. The difficulties of recognition seem intensified. It might be wisest to say that such a subject is purely speculative, that we have no knowledge of future conditions of body, and that it must be left to be solved by experience. On the other hand, this problem of recognition tends to throw the popular mind back to materialistic and untenable ideas, which become in turn obstructions to faith. For assuredly if belief in the Resurrection is to remain a permanent element in modern thought, it must rid itself of gross materialistic associations, and must assume a Pauline character. After all, the problem of recognition is not created by S. Paul's conception of the spiritual body. It besets even the most materialistic view. Rothe, for instance, asks how will a mother recognise her child who died in infancy, after a separation say of 30, 40, or 50 years? Recognition certainly cannot be in that case by external resemblance. If companionship in this life has been interrupted by distance for 20 years and then resumed, what is it which produces recognition? Certainly not external resemblance. The difference between the youth and the middle-aged is too great for that. It is not physical recognition but mental. The identity not detected at first becomes perfectly certain. The developed and matured character is, at once, the same, and not the same. It is in many ways exactly what we might have foreseen, had we been sufficiently gifted. In

other ways it surprises us. But its identity is overwhelmingly clear. Mutual intercourse is resumed on the basis of the earlier companionship, but as modified by the separate development. It is suggested that this experience in earthly life illustrates recognition hereafter. Recognition hereafter must be greatly on the basis of spiritual affinity. It must be recognition of the soul rather than of the exterior.

Whatever be the value of such speculations, they are only referred to here to show that the problem of recognition need be no obstacle to a real and complete acceptance of S. Paul's doctrine of the spiritual body. It is suggested also that one of the tasks before the modern mind is to think persistently, and right through, the implications of this great doctrine of the Resurrection-Body.

It would seem that modern scientific writers who believe in man's survival of physical death are quite prepared to maintain that the future life will not be a disembodied state. Sir Oliver Lodge, for instance, while he complains, and surely with justice, of many crude and untenable forms in which Christians have expressed their creed, is nevertheless distinctly strong in his belief that body will be a permanent accompaniment of mind in a future state. "It is plain," he writes,[1] "that for our present mode of apprehending the universe a material vehicle is essential;... A purely spiritual agency may be active—and the activity may be guessed at or inferred, and may be believed in—but the only evidence of its existence that can be allowed is the manifestation of that activity through matter." And he maintains that "this dependence of the spiritual on a vehicle for manifestation is not likely to be a purely temporary condition: it is probably a sign, or sample, of something which has an eternal significance—a presentation of some permanent truth.

"That is certainly the working hypothesis which, until negatived, we ought to make. Our senses limit us, but do not deceive us: so far as they go they tell us the truth. I wish to proceed on that hypothesis. To suppose that our

[1] 'Man and the Universe,' p. 277.

experience of the necessary and fundamental connection between the two things—the something which we know as mind, and the something which is now represented by matter—has no counterpart or enlargement in the actual scheme of the universe, as it really exists, is needlessly to postulate confusion and instrumental deception."[1] "This probability, or possibility, may be regarded as the substantial basis of an orthodox Christian doctrine. For . . . Christianity emphasises the material aspect of religion, and clearly supplements the mere survival of a discarnate spirit, a homeless wanderer, or melancholy ghost, with the warm and comfortable clothing of something that may legitimately be spoken of as 'body'; that is to say, it postulates a normally invisible and intangible vehicle, or mode of manifestation, fitted to subserve the needs of future existence, as our present bodies subserve the needs of terrestrial life—an ethereal or other entity constituting the persistent 'other aspect,' and fulfilling some of the functions which atoms of terrestrial matter are employed to fulfil now."[2]

"Our argument throughout has been that, since our identity and personality in no way depend upon identity of material particles, and since our present body has been 'composed' by our characteristic element or soul, it is legitimate to suppose that some other 'body' can equally well be hereafter composed by the same agency; in other words, that the spirit will retain the power of constructing for itself a suitable vehicle of manifestation, which is the essential meaning of the term 'body.'"[3]

The writer, indeed, goes on to propose that the ancient Christian language about Resurrection should be abolished, and new phrases invented to denote the changed idea. The crude and popular idea of bodily resurrection should no longer be perpetuated merely by an ancient phrase. "The phrase 'resurrection of the body' undoubtedly dates back to a period when it was thought that the residue laid in the grave would at some future signal be collected and resuscitated and raised in the air: and superstitions about missing fragments and about the permissibility of cremation, even to this

[1] 'Man and the Universe,' p. 279. [2] *Ibid.* p. 280. [3] *Ibid.* p. 282.

day, are not extinct. But all this is infantile, and has long been discarded by leaders of thought; and it were good if the phrases responsible for the misunderstanding could be amended also."[1] Accordingly Sir Oliver Lodge proposes that the phrase "resurrection of the body" should be effaced. The Nicene version of "resurrection of the dead" is also, he considers, open to objection: "for that which survives is just that which never was dead; it did not cease to be, and then arise to new life."[2] And yet the author adds: "But God forbid that I should presume to pragmatise or dogmatise as to the language which ought to be employed."[3] "The formula of centuries must be respected." Accordingly it must be explained. "Perhaps the word 'resurrection' may be interpreted as meaning *revival* or *survival*."[4]

These later suggestions appear far less happy than the earlier part of the essay. Indeed the former seems to supply the answer to the latter. For since our 'identity ... in no way depends upon identity of material particles";[5] and the present body is not the same as that which we possessed some years ago; the question rises whether, strictly speaking, we can speak of the present body as having experienced what was really experienced in the body possessed some years ago? After all, what constitutes identity? It is almost impossible for a complex spiritual and yet material being to speak of himself in unity without contradiction. Would any language be accurate? Moreover, the phrase "resurrection of the dead" is not merely a "Nicene version," it is the language of the apostles. It is the language of S. Paul. And S. Paul's conception of the spiritual body is much more akin to that of Sir Oliver Lodge than to the crude materialistic conceptions of popular theology. What is needed then is not the abolition of the term, but its exposition in the Pauline meaning.

On the subject of the Resurrection of the Body, there are, says a recent German writer,[6] three possible views of body and soul. Either man consists of both, and requires both to

[1] *Ibid.* p. 284. [2] *Ibid.* p. 285. [3] *Ibid.* p. 286.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 285. [5] *Ibid.* p. 282.
[6] Grützmacher, 'Modern Positive Vorträge,' 1906, pp. 120, 121.

his completion ; or man is body, and soul is nothing more than a function of the material substance ; or man is soul, and body is a superfluity, a prison of the soul, from which he must be set free. Of these three conceptions the last is for the modern mind the least modern, and the least congenial. Modern psychology postulates an intimate association of body and soul, and affirms that man consists of both. The second conception that man consists of body, the materialistic view, is nearer to the modern spirit : but closer investigation shows it to be untenable. There remains the first conception that man is a unity of soul and body. This is the really scientific view. Thus for the modern mind there is no analogy and no suggestion of a bodiless immortality of the soul.

BOOK IV. THE RESURRECTION AND MODERN THOUGHT

CHAPTER XXX

THE DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE

AFTER analysing the evidence in detail it is necessary to ask, What impression this evidence ought to produce upon the modern mind?

I

The general character of the evidence is attended with considerable difficulties. Whether we consider the details of the Third Day, or the empty grave, or the locality of the Appearances, or the Appearances themselves, or the words of the Risen Master, in every instance there are difficulties, and these difficulties very real. While the evidence may in some cases carry conviction to the modern mind, it may fail in others.

1. For example, the earliest document is the list of the witnesses given by S. Paul.

Now what is the value of this list as evidence? It gives the names or numbers of the chief witnesses to the Resurrection, as they were summarised by the Mother Church of Christendom, and ascertained by S. Paul, and taught to converts during the first thirty years after the occurrence. But it is a list and nothing more. It was not composed with a view to the requirements of later centuries; nor in compliance with modern standards of historical evidence. That S. Paul inserted the list of witnesses at all was primarily due to his instinct for systematic completeness, while answering the difficulties propounded by the Corinthian Church. He might have given his argument and omitted the list. Moreover, as

Augustine pointed out, "this succession of the Appearances is one which has been given by none of the Evangelists."[1]

As documentary evidence this is certainly different from what we might have anticipated. We might imagine a full report by the witnesses at first hand: a document signed and sealed by S. Peter and S. James and the other leading authorities. We might imagine a full report of his own conversion by S. Paul in his own letters. But we have to deal with facts. If we have not what we might desire, we may still have what is adequate to the purpose. If we have not sufficient to compel belief, we may yet have sufficient to justify it. If the Evangelists and S. Paul's list were in close agreement would it not raise the suspicion that these were not independent witnesses but a harmonised account?[2] There is certainly no attempt in the Gospels to conform to the summary in S. Paul.

2. Or again, there is the earliest of the Gospel documents, that of S. Mark. Criticism has familiarised us with the fact that the ending of the Marcan narrative is lost, but no criticism can reconcile us with the disconcerting character of the fact. It is, and must remain, permanently disconcerting, from the critical and religious point of view, that the earliest narrative of the Resurrection should have been permitted to perish. Whatever may be said of its substantial reproduction in the later Gospels, the strangeness and mystery of this unaccountable loss remains. And, more especially, since the contents of the Gospel of S. Matthew and of S. Luke are not in harmony, and both cannot represent the lost contents of S. Mark, the evidential value of the documents is made more perplexing to the modern mind.

3. Again, there are the peculiarities of the record in S. Luke. The Lucan narrative presents still further difficulties. It has been pointed out[3] that S. Luke places first among the witnesses of the Resurrection Appearances a person unnamed and another who, although named, is quite unknown. The Emmaus travellers are then received, by the Jerusalem

[1] 'De Consensus Evv.' iii. 70. [2] Grützmacher, p. 123.
[3] A. Resch, 'Der Paulinismus und die Logia Jesu,' 1904, p. 361.

disciples, with the announcement, "the Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon"; and this is all that S. Luke tells us of S. Peter's experience. And yet, immediately after this confident announcement of the Resurrection, when the Lord appears in their midst, they are terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they beheld a spirit.

As Origen read the text, the unnamed disciple of Emmaus is S. Peter himself: and in the Cambridge Codex D. the announcement "the Lord is risen indeed, and has appeared to Simon," is made by the Emmaus travellers, not by the assembled apostles. In the existing conclusion of S. Mark the Emmaus disciples' words are met with unbelief, instead of any announcement that the Lord had risen indeed.

Now, it may not unnaturally be felt that there is much in these omissions which is exceedingly tantalising. There seems to be an unconsciousness of the relative importance of things, at least from the standpoint of the modern mind. The expansiveness of the Emmaus incident, the curt brevity of the allusion to S. Peter's experience, gives us what seems the less important at the sacrifice of the invaluable. The Synoptic tradition does not tell the circumstances of S. Peter's ascertaining the Resurrection. But these, above all other, would have been invaluable to subsequent ages. The evidential value of a passing reference, in a subordinate half-sentence, may be considered relatively small.

II

Now the effect of all this on the modern critical mind, the mind which is above all things critical and to which inexactness is the unpardonable sin, is, naturally, exceedingly disconcerting. The whole result of modern critical methods has been to throw a glare of light on the least discrepancy. The modern ideal of historical and biographical writing is clearly at the opposite pole from that of the Evangelists.[1] Thus, for example, a critic says: "That the spirit of Christ remained with His followers and dwelt among them we have an enormous volume of testimony. *And to people of that country and that age this*

[1] P. Gardner, 'Historic View,' pp. 165-6.

spiritual presence would seem illusive unless the body also rose from the grave. It may be added that the relations of spirit and body remain altogether mysterious. And I suppose that if there were any sufficient consensus of tried testimony as to the appearance of Jesus after death to His disciples with a tangible body, anyone, even some of our most sceptical physicists and biologists, would be ready to accept that testimony, though we might all hold different views as to what facts were in reality guaranteed by it.... The great difficulty in regard to the physical Resurrection arises from the unscientific frame of mind of the early disciples, who did not in the least understand how to test or value evidence."

And Harnack, much in a similar spirit, exclaims: "Documents, when all is said, to what do they amount?"

III

1. Whatever may be said about the documents, they are not the only evidence. There is the evidence of the Institution: the Christian Church. It is explicitly founded upon belief in the Resurrection. The Institution would still exist, even if all the documents had perished. The tradition of the Resurrection is embodied in imperishable phrases, in the presuppositions of religious worship, which go far deeper than any words. It cannot be explained as the intrusion of Hellenistic thought into a Semitic soil. Whatever the Resurrection may be it is indigenous to the Christian origins. Very striking is the way in which the Resurrection was impressed by the Church upon the gnostic sects around, so that Anastasis and Ecclesia both became exalted among the gnostic divinities.[1]

2. The Resurrection of Jesus Christ is not an abnormal incident in an otherwise normal career. His Resurrection may, for purposes of study, and for the simple reason that the human mind cannot contemplate everything at once, be temporarily isolated from all other experiences ascribed to Him. But it must be remembered that it is the Resurrection of Jesus, and not of some chance individual. Such an experi-

[1] See S. Irenæus.

ence would not equally arrest the attention if related of any other man. It is not the Resurrection of one of whom nothing else exceptional is known. The Resurrection of Jesus forms part of a self-consistent series of unique prerogatives which the apostolic experience ascribed to Him. The primitive community ascribed to Him (1) a moral uniqueness and perfection of character; (2) a personal uniqueness and equality with the Father; (3) an official uniqueness towards humanity in consummating a redemptive work. The consciousness of the first Christian community is a consciousness of deliverance by Him from personal guilt and uncleanness, and of relationship towards Him of reverence deepening into adoration.

Then the Resurrection of Christ takes its place in a consistent series of profound religious facts and conceptions. It is ascribed to One Who is unique in His character, in His person, and in His work. It forms together with them a complete systematic whole.

Is it not therefore right to plead that no adequate treatment of the question, whether Jesus rose, is possible which does not take into account the entire series of experiences of which this forms only a part?

It is therefore amazing that volumes should be written confined exclusively to criticism of the historic details, with scarcely any reference whatever to the spiritual interpretation of the history, to the asserted historic preparation for it, and to the dogmatic value which the apostles assigned to it; and yet with an assumption that the subject has been adequately treated. Surely it must be self-evident that the mere resurrection of an individual Galilæan prophet is one thing: especially if it be divorced from all religious philosophy of history, and all belief in religious development, and religious crises; while the resurrection of such a one as Jesus, with His moral characteristics and spiritual uniqueness, especially in view of preparations and consequences in history, is another thing.

If it were clearly understood, and as frankly affirmed, that the mere critical analysis of historic documents is an arbitrary if convenient restriction, and that consequently the results

obtained can be only provisional, until philosophy, theology, and religion, have all said their say, and have been maturely balanced with the critical results—we should arrive at a juster and truer estimate of the religious facts before us. Too often, however, there is an air in criticism that it is all sufficient.

Of course, criticism must do its work upon the documents: and interpretations of a fact are valueless, if there be no fact to interpret. If Christ be not risen then is our preaching vain. But if the moral uniqueness, the sinless self-consciousness, of Jesus is regarded as forced upon the modern conscience as a fact (so Herrmann maintains) by the contents of the documents, then this fact must be taken into account in dealing with the apostolic witness to the Resurrection.

3. Modern criticisms on the kind of evidence required to produce conviction rest on several important assumptions which are not so indisputable as they are sometimes assumed to be.

The objection to the apostolic testimony to our Lord's Resurrection, on the ground of "the unscientific frame of mind of the early disciples, who did not in the least understand how to test or to value evidence," is virtually an objection against all historic religion. For the methods and standards of earlier ages can never be so highly developed and matured as those of later. If the apostolic evidences had been marshalled under the methods of the present day, they might satisfy ourselves; but they would still be open to the criticisms of a century to come. The question is whether these difficulties must necessarily preclude the Almighty from utilising historic evidence in behalf of religious truth. And that is precisely what we are not competent to determine *a priori*. It is perfectly useless for beings constituted as we are to decide that the evidence of a previous age cannot contain a Divine revelation, owing to the difficulties inseparable from its issuing or its transmission. It is clear that a criticism which makes such assumptions has gone beyond its province, and is really resting on religious or philosophical presuppositions.

This really leads us into the problem of the nature of

religious certainty. The critical superiority of documentary evidence composed in the present day is indisputable. Its religious superiority is not so certain. We may still have doubts whether, if the Gospels had been originally revised by a modern critic, with modern methods, they would be more productive of religious faith in the modern mind. The evidence we possess for the Resurrection falls short of demonstration. So does the evidence we possess for the existence of God. It is constantly assumed that religious evidence must be well nigh irresistible. But what if well nigh irresistible evidence would be morally injurious? How can we judge beforehand of the nature of its effect? Would it promote spiritual religion? Who can tell? We may have our own opinions either way. But we have no right to assume them as certain, and then utilise them as objections against a historical religion.

CHAPTER XXXI

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

THE most distinctively modern element in recent discussions on the Resurrection is that which is based on psychology, telepathic communication, and psychical research. A very considerable literature has arisen both in England and America dealing with the subject of the future life from this point of view. If the late F. W. H. Myers was the most distinguished advocate of this school he has been followed by a number of able men. Myers himself was convinced that psychical research is at least on the way to establish a scientific basis for human immortality. To quote his own statement: "Observation, experiment, inference, have led many inquirers, of whom I am one, to a belief in direct or telepathic inter-communication, not only between the minds of men still on earth, but between minds or spirits still on earth and spirits departed."[1]

He considered that psychical research had definitely established the reality of telepathic inter-communication between this world and another. Accordingly, on the basis of evidence laboriously collected, he drew an inference as to the credibility of our Lord's Resurrection; and predicted the probable future in store for this article of the Christian Creed. "I venture now on a bold saying; for I predict that, in consequence of the new evidence, all reasonable men, a century hence, will believe the Resurrection of Christ, whereas in default of the new evidence, no reasonable man, a century hence, would have believed it. The ground of this forecast

[1] Myers, 'Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death,' ii. 287.

is plain enough. Our ever-growing recognition of the continuity, the uniformity of cosmic law has gradually made of the alleged uniqueness of any incident its almost inevitable refutation."

The prediction of Myers is that psychical research will set immortality upon a scientific and therefore indisputable foundation. It is assumed that to have the future life certified by experiment would be a real gain. But is this assumption justified? At least let it first be realised what the reduction of immortality to a fact of science means. It means the transference of the subject from the sphere of faith to the sphere of experiment. It would make the matter impossible to deny. Would that be beneficial? I believe on the contrary that there is a high moral value in an undemonstrated immortality. The place hitherto occupied by the belief in immortality in human development is, to say the least, profoundly significant. It is sometimes assumed that all men desire to be immortal. And at first, perhaps, it sounds a religious thing to say. Certainly in some the desire is very strong: so strong that they have found it impossible to credit the Indian with aspirations towards Nirvana in the sense of personal extinction. And yet it is not really inconceivable that millions have found in the thought of their own annihilation a refuge from unrest. It is quite intelligible that the prospect of endless transmigration through successive human and animal existences dismayed the heart and the will, and created by reaction a positive relief in the thought of becoming merged in eternal unconsciousness which terminated struggle and created peace. Nor is it necessary to appeal to Oriental experience on this point. Modern Europe exhibits many illustrations of practical indifference to personal continuance, as the statistics of suicide prove.

There is also a theoretical and reasoned indifference, or a judgment held in suspense, coupled with the belief that earthly life loses nothing by the omission of the doctrine of immortality. These opinions are not at all uncommon at the present among psychologists and speculative writers. The late Professor William James, for instance, wrote as

follows: "Religion, in fact, for the great majority of our own race *means* immortality, and nothing else. God is the producer of immortality . . . I have said nothing, in my lectures, about immortality or the belief therein, for to me it seems a secondary point. If our ideals are only cared for in 'eternity,' I do not see why we might not be willing to resign their care to other hands than ours. Yet I sympathise with the urgent impulse to be present ourselves, and in the conflict of impulses, both of them so vague, yet both of them noble, I know not how to decide. It seems to me that it is eminently a case for facts to testify. Facts, I think, are yet lacking to prove 'spirit-return,' though I have the highest respect for the patient labours of Messrs. Myers, Hodgson, and Hyslop, and am somewhat impressed by their favourable conclusions. I consequently leave the matter open. . . ."[1]

Prof. Höffding of Copenhagen protested that the confusion of particular definite values with eternal values was irreligious. To make the question whether I individually shall persist or not the basis of value is, he considered, an "egotistical form of religiosity,"[2] "as though existence might not have a meaning even if I were *not* immortal!" He urged that "the Evangelical exhortation, take no thought for the morrow, can be applied with far greater justification to the life after death than to our attitude towards the actual morrow of this earthly life. Whether the precise forms of value known to us will persist, experience alone can decide." He saw "no reason why we should demand at all costs an answer which shall take us beyond what science can teach."[3] In Höffding's opinion, "The spiritual healthiness of the Greeks is shown in the fact that they recognised the great task of life to be the discovery and creation here, amid the reality of this life, of such values as 'the beautiful and the good.' They did not borrow their criterion for this life from the conception of a life to come."[4] Here then we are confined to the present, as viewed by the physical healthiness of the natural man.

[1] James, 'Varieties of Religious Experience,' p. 524.
[2] 'Philosophy of Religion,' p. 259. [3] *Ib.* p. 376. [4] *Ib.* p. 380.

After all, Strauss said the same thing, only much more forcibly, years ago. Goethe remarked three years before his death, "the conviction of continuous existence suggests itself to me from the conception of activity; for if I am unceasingly active to my very end, nature is bound to assign to me another form of being, if the present one is no longer capable of fulfilling the requirements of my spirit." Strauss' criticism was: "Doubtless a grand and a beautiful utterance, as pregnant with the force of subjective truth on the lips of the dear old poet, indefatigably active to his dying day, as it is entirely devoid of all objective cogency. 'Nature is bound'—what is the meaning of that? Goethe, if any one, knew that Nature acknowledges no duties—only laws; but that man rather, even the most gifted and energetic, has the duty of humbly submitting to them." "To demand more than this was a weakness of old age."[1] Strauss himself held that "most of the old people known to us are complete: they have yielded up all they had to bestow."[2] "He who does not inflate himself is well aware of the humble measure of his capacities, and while grateful for the time allowed him for their development, makes no claim for its prolongation beyond the duration of this earthly life; nay, its eternal persistence would fill him with dismay."[3] Strauss even went so far in his opposition to S. Paul as to say, "the last enemy which shall be destroyed is man's belief in his own immortality." Frederick Denison Maurice, after quoting these words, observed "Some may suppose that he has merely uttered an audacious paradox, for the sake of startling us, and showing how far his vehemence against our ordinary faith will go. I do not think so. If we question our own minds honestly, we may find that there have been many hours, days, weeks, perhaps years, in which we have practically yielded assent to his proposition."[4] "The sense of immortality," says Maurice. "*is* very dreadful."[5] This is a truth which greatly needs to be emphasised. There is an assent to immortality which is purely conventional. Where the belief is little more than acquiescence in an inherited

[1] Strauss, 'The Old Faith and the New,' p. 147. [2] *Ib.* p. 148.
[3] *Ib.* p. 149. [4] 'Theological Essays,' p. 131. [5] *Ib.* p. 134.

religion, whose implications have never been seriously faced or thought out, a sudden awaking to reality, by which the ancient term receives a deeper contents, does fill the consciousness with positive dismay. There is something appalling in the thought of living everlastingly. Many persons have probably experienced strange variations in their hold on immortality. Perhaps emotion has alternated between the extremes of repulsion and vehement desire. We have longed for it: we have shrunk from it. That is to say that our relation to it must change with our moral state. It needs a moral effort to long to live for ever. A life of moral intensity will eagerly long for its own permanence. A consciousness of the futility and worthlessness of one's life will issue easily in the pessimistic utterance—"and now, O Lord, take away my life for I am not better than my Fathers." Now surely all this means that immortality has been hitherto a great venture of faith; something appropriated by moral effort; becoming real to us individually just in proportion to our own reality; a thing that can be won and lost and regained; sometimes remote, and sometimes near, correspondingly with a man's religious depth. Now psychical research expects to convert this venture of faith into an established fact of science. Once more, one is constrained to ask, Would the alteration be a moral gain? Of course if the time has come, or should come, in the providential enlightenment, to transfer this question from the sphere of religion to that of science, and henceforward to make immortality a fact impossible to doubt, then it must be for the best. But those who confidently predict this change do not appear remotely conscious of the immensity of the revolution it would produce in the religious development of men. And until such prediction is indisputably realised, it is assuredly permissible to claim that immortality is better left unprovided with any scientific foundation; better left to be individually appropriated, according to individual earnestness, by moral effort, rather than forced by experimental evidence of a purely external kind, upon all alike, indiscriminately, and apart from the question whether the fact would be to their spiritual gain or loss.

Then, again, the attempt to provide a scientific basis for belief in immortality is supposed to be in the interests of Christianity. But Christianity is a religion. And immortality, however momentous, is not the foundation of religion. The foundation of religion is God. And God, it is universally acknowledged, is not ascertainable by the senses in the way of ordinary information. Nor can His existence be demonstrated by a course of irresistible reasonings. Modern apologetics conspicuously abandon any such attempt. Few ancient maxims are more cordially endorsed by modern theology than that of S. Ambrose: non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum. God refuses to be put at the end of a syllogism. That is to say that God is the ultimate postulate. His existence and character are for us a supreme venture of faith. Belief in God is bound up with an optimistic faith in the ultimate triumph of good. And it is on the basis of that belief in God that the religious belief in immortality arises. This is the basis upon which our Lord Himself placed immortality: God is not the God of the dead but of the living. But if belief in God is itself a venture of faith, why should immortality, which is based on that belief, possess a certainty which does not belong to that upon which it is founded?

Indeed, the curious feature of this attempt to establish immortality on a scientific foundation is that it divorces immortality from God. It is an attempt to establish telepathic intercommunication with human beings: it is distinctly not a search for communion with the living God. Rather it appears as a definite substitute for the latter. This is very significant. While the postulate of Deity involves the idea of human immortality, this statement cannot be reversed. Immortality does not involve Deity. Bishop Butler's remarkable affirmation of this truth is opportune: "A proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is."[1] Certainly if it be compatible with atheism that

[1] 'Analogy,' pt. i. ch. i.

we exist, it is equally compatible with it that we should continue to exist in another state. Now one would like to know more fully what the attitude of psychical research is toward Deity. The phenomena of spiritualism as a rule leave God out. To introduce Him would disconcert scientific procedure. In the scientific method He is discreetly omitted. Thus the search is restricted to the human. Survival, then, and immortality are separated from religion. But can this divorce of immortality from God yield results satisfactory to the needs of the human spirit? Does not immortality require religious associations? It is really, if it is to receive its proper contents, and hold its proper value, inseparable from the idea of God. What is the religious worth or meaning of immortality with God left out? How can the problems of existence be met and solved merely by postulating their transference from one godless region into another equally godless? Conversely, if God be accepted, by a venture of faith, a true foundation is made for human immortality. But even if man were immortal, he could not create an immortal Deity. Or is it that man, could he prove himself immortal, would no longer feel a need of God: having established himself in a position of permanence from which he could not be dislodged?

CHAPTER XXXII

HISTORICAL JUDGMENTS AND DOGMATIC JUDGMENTS

MODERN religious thought has become increasingly clear that the reality of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is not determinable exclusively by the methods of historical criticism. The favourite statement of the older apologetics that the Resurrection was as certain as any other fact in history would not find favour with the apologists of to-day. It was an ordinary maxim with the English theologians of the eighteenth century.[1] It was asserted, even close to our own time, by Arnold of Rugby.[2] But it does not represent the modern believing position.

1. History is the account of the development of man, his thoughts and his actions. It describes the evolution of ideas and principles; the growth of religions. But history lies within a province definitely limited. It is within the strictly natural. It is concerned with man between the limits of birth and death. But it is not concerned with pre-existence, nor with subsequent existence after departure hence. It is concerned with religions; but subjectively, as human beliefs: it is not concerned with the question of their objective truth.

Just as the province of science is confined, for purposes of investigation and utility, within the limits of natural forces beyond which any inquiry would be, for science, a transgression; so history is confined to the natural order of life. The supernatural, the miraculous, God and immortality,

[1] Sherlock, West. [2] 'Sermons.'

are all beyond the province of history. The historian as such has nothing to say either for or against. If he does, he does it as a theologian, or a metaphysician; but not in his capacity as a historian.

Thus a historical judgment is a decision as to occurrences, after critical investigation, on data strictly within the limits of the natural. It is an impersonal investigation in the sense that it has no individual interest in the issue. It can be made by the agnostic or the believer; by the man of this or of that religion. That which is inexplicable by natural laws can be registered by the historian as a human belief but not as an objective occurrence. A historical judgment is a purely critical and intellectual exercise within the department ascertainable by ordinary research and investigation; being restricted to assumptions equally acceptable to the agnostic and the theist.

2. But, in the modern view, there is a judgment of another kind. It is also concerned with facts, but it brings to bear upon them not only the intellectual faculties, but also the moral and emotional: indeed the entire personality. It does not profess, says Rüdel,[1] complete indifference whether the matter in contemplation is false or true. This may be called a *dogmatic judgment*, a judgment on the value of the asserted fact to life. Dogmatic judgments are founded on religious presuppositions: they do not rest on purely historic evidence, as confined within the limits of the merely natural. They are, to some extent, ventures of faith. They are largely concerned with a sphere outside the purely human.

3. If an application of this distinction between critical and dogmatic judgments be made to the Articles of the Christian Creed its importance becomes immediately obvious. (1) We find in the Christian Creed that some Articles are purely historic; for instance, that Jesus lived and was crucified under Pontius Pilate. This is within the province of human history, and is ascertainable by the same critical methods as any other human fact. But (2) secondly, some Articles of the Creed are purely dogmatic; for instance,

[1] See Rüdel, 'Historische und dogmatische Urteile,' N. K. Z., 1906, p. 226.

"He sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty." This is subject to none of the critical methods of ordinary historic investigation. (3) Thirdly, other Articles of the Creed appear to be mixed judgments; partly historic and partly dogmatic; as for instance, "the Third Day He rose again from the dead." Now this, at first sight, might be considered a historical judgment. That he died is historical. That He was buried is historical. That the grave was empty is a question purely within the limits of the historical. That the Galilæans believed that they had seen Him after He was risen, is, as a psychological experience, within the limits of the historical. But the objective reality of His Resurrection: this transcends the sphere of history. It is a dogmatic judgment, a venture of faith. It is impossible to place the Resurrection of Christ on the same level as mere ordinary events of history. It was not an event in the natural order at all. To begin with, it was witnessed by no human eye. The subsequent witness to the Appearances was confined to the circle of discipleship. He never reappeared within the arena of the common world. That the disciples passed through a stupendous change is within the historic sphere. But the cause of it lies outside that sphere, and refuses to be brought within the circle of scientific critical investigation. Here the mere historian is baffled. He may talk of "the marvellous incident in Joseph's garden, which, however, no human eye saw"; but he is quite consistent if, as a historian, he is unable to make any decision.

From the purely critical standpoint history is confined within the limits of birth and death. It naturally stands helpless before a career for which is claimed pre-existence and Resurrection. As a German writer of a Life of Christ observes: "Every other human biography ends with death." What can criticism within the limits of the purely natural make of a life which does not end that way? We must surely recognise that the historic judgment has reached its limit here, and must allow the dogmatic judgment to decide.

The modern mind will not assent to the proposition that

the Resurrection of Jesus is as certain as any other historical fact. Such lines of argument as the once famous book called 'Historical Doubt as to the Existence of Napoleon' may illustrate the possibility of universal scepticism, or the truth that no fact of history is a mathematical demonstration. But it would not convince the modern mind that the Resurrection of Christ took place.

We are constrained to say that if religious men advocate assent to the Resurrection as being the most certain fact in history, they are resting it on a wrong foundation, and cannot touch the modern mind.

Belief in Christ's Resurrection is a religious assent, and not a mere historic assent. And the parallel sometimes drawn between our assent to facts we cannot verify and belief in the Resurrection is, however supported, quite misleading. Its only result would be to withdraw the Resurrection from the sphere of religion, and to reduce it to the level of mere history. But this would destroy its worth. It is really of great importance that Christ's Resurrection cannot be made as certain as any other event in history. Belief in it must ultimately depend on a judgment of its worth. And that again will depend on our entire interpretation of life. It is inseparable from religious presuppositions.

The Resurrection, says Hegel,[1] belongs eventually to the province of faith. Christ appeared exclusively to His friends. This is not external history for the unbelieving. These appearances are for the believing alone.

[1] Hegel, 'Philosophy of History,' ii. 250, quoted by Hermann Fichte, 'Vermischte Schriften,' ii. 135.

CHAPTER XXXIII

CHRIST'S RESURRECTION AS AN OBJECT OF FAITH

AMONG recent foreign writers a conspicuous place belongs to Herrmann, because while he is deeply impressed by Christ's moral uniqueness, he appears to disregard the Resurrection as if it were of no particular religious significance. According to Herrmann, God communes with us not so much through nature as through the "historical phenomenon" of Jesus Christ.[1] And our certainty of the reality of this historical portraiture of the Gospel rests partly on the fact that this "picture of Jesus' inner life could be preserved only by those who had experienced the emancipating influences of that fact upon themselves";[2] partly because "Jesus becomes a real power to us when He reveals His inner life to us."[3] This last takes us beyond the mere historic evidence, and translates a tradition into a living personal experience. Now "the fact remains unquestioned that the Christ of the New Testament shows a firmness of religious conviction, a clearness of moral judgment, and a purity and strength of will such as are combined in no other figure in history."[4] The phenomenon of the Gospels shows "the portrait of a man who is conscious of no inferiority in Himself to the ideals for which He sacrifices Himself."[5]

"The fact that Jesus thought of Himself as sinless stands out powerfully before us when we remember what He said and did at the Last Supper with his disciples. In face of a death whose horror He Himself felt, He was able to say that

[1] 'Communion with God,' pp. 57, 59. [2] *Ib.* p. 61.
[3] *Ib.* p. 62. [4] *Ib.* p. 71. [5] *Ib.* p. 73.

this death He was about to die would take away the burden of guilt from the hearts of those who should remember Him." "And so mighty within Him was the consciousness of His own purity, that He clearly saw that the impression which His death would cause would loose the spiritual bonds of those who had found Him and could remember Him." Herrmann's conclusion is, "Jesus could not have spoken as He then did if He had been conscious of guilt within Himself."[1] As to the documents wherein this portraiture is contained, Hermann observes, "Such records are incomparable, and that not because of their contents alone; but their very existence is a wonderful fact, for it comes to us through the minds of men who did not experience in their own lives such untrammelled freedom in being good as He had."[2] Herrmann describes with no less force the self-identification of Jesus with His Gospel as being no less a unique and amazing characteristic of this sinless individual. Buddha and Socrates impress him most in history with the originality of their moral strength. "But," he adds, "these two hid themselves modestly behind the teaching for which they lived and died, whereas Jesus knows no more sacred task than to point men to His own person. His life and death proclaim the conviction that no man who desires true life can do without Him."[3] We see in Jesus, says Hermann, the Almighty God.[4] "God makes Himself known to us as the power that is with Jesus." With Herrmann's peculiar Ritschlian theories and consequent limitations we are not necessarily concerned. The whole purpose of these quotations is that Herrmann declares that this great picture of Jesus' inner life "not merely compels our reverence, but also makes good the wonderful claim He makes as the Messiah."[5] And yet Herrmann could protest "we do not help men into that way of salvation if we tell them, on the strength of New Testament narratives and doctrines, that Jesus was born of a Virgin as the Son of God; that He taught this and that; that He wrought many miracles and even raised the dead, and that He Himself rose again, and now, having

[1] 'Communion with God,' p. 74. [2] *Ib.* p. 75. [3] *Ib.* p. 76.
[4] *Ib.* p. 78. [5] *Ib.* p. 63.

ascended to the Father, rules with Almighty Power. Such a story is no gospel be it never so impressively delivered."[1] He further declares that "such statements are a great hindrance to men to-day, for the majority can no longer accept them with childlike simplicity."[2]

Now while Herrmann's exposition of the moral perfection of Jesus Christ, as a revelation of God, is most impressive and venerable, yet its indifference to the Resurrection is indefensible, for several reasons.

1. In the first place, the moral perfection of Jesus and His Resurrection are both parts of the impression of the same personality upon the disciples. The primitive believing mind was not more certain of the one than of the other. It is pure eclecticism to bow reverently before part of the influence of Jesus, and at the same time to reject the other part; as if the impression were just as complete without it. Surely it is self-evident that a personality which stamps upon the mind of the witnesses only a belief in its sinlessness is not the same personality as one which also produces a belief in its Resurrection. Resurrection introduces a further cycle of ideas. It suggests the conquest of death, the transcendence of lower conditions, the exaltation in heavenly experiences.

2. In the next place if Jesus Christ is really a revelation of God, in the sinlessness of His life, how is it possible to determine *a priori* that He is not also a further revelation of God in the wonder of His Resurrection? Will it be said that His life is ethical and His Resurrection is not? Even supposing that were true, cannot God be revealed by faith? Can material nature suggest no thoughts about Him? The Resurrection, supposing it were true, cannot be severed from moral conceptions; it cannot be described as a meaningless appendix to the life; it cannot be said that, as a fact, the Resurrection of Jesus has exerted no influence on the ideas of the life to come.

But in truth the Resurrection of Christ is a fact of the largest ethical and religious significance. It throws a new light back on all His earthly work. It endorses His claims.

[1] *Ib.* p. 66. [2] *Ib.* p. 66.

It adds a fresh manifestation of power over the world and death and sin. It certifies infinitely more than Christ's personal survival of death. It means His exaltation in the world beyond. It means the complete subordination of the natural to the spiritual. It is a brilliant proof of the paradox that the weakness of God is stronger than men.

3. And yet again. Herrmann strenuously maintains the sinlessness while excluding the Resurrection. As for the latter it is "a hindrance to men to-day; for the majority can no longer accept it with childlike simplicity." But Herrmann is undoubtedly well aware that the conception of a sinless human being is the very last to deserve the name of easy. Recent criticism shows plainly enough that many modern minds cannot accept it with childlike simplicity. If the test of truth be acceptance by the majority with childlike simplicity it may fare as badly with the doctrine of sinlessness as with that of Resurrection.

4. It may be further suggested that the idea of sinlessness has never hitherto long survived the denial of the Resurrection. There is an intimate, if subtle, affinity in conceptions. This has been the case in the history of Christian belief. Again and again instances may be pointed out where one of these two doctrines held in isolation withered and died. The strength of Herrmann's convictions may endure as a personal belief; but we question altogether whether it will be able to extend itself to the next generations.

The fact is that if the Gospel-portraiture of the inner life of Jesus as morally perfect "not merely compels our reverence, but also makes good the wonderful claim He made as the Messiah," there can be no *a priori* reason why it may not also make good His claim to rise from the dead. His Resurrection enters as deeply into the apostolic experience as any other fact about Him. It is, of course, true that we moderns cannot test His Resurrection by our moral consciousness as we can His character: but neither can we His claim to be Messiah. To accept His Christhood on the ground of His moral uniqueness, and yet to rule out His Resurrection, is arbitrary and unconvincing. After all, His Christhood is local and Jewish: His Resurrection is human

and universal. The Resurrection of Jesus must mean more for modern thought than the Christhood of Jesus; in whatever terms that office be interpreted and modernised.

Indeed, to many modern minds the sinless perfection of Jesus is in itself the strongest ground for yielding to the idea of His physical Resurrection. Oscar Holtzmann, for instance, who certainly will not be accused of a conservative or orthodox predisposition, and who denies its occurrence, is yet constrained to say: "In the case of a person so extraordinary as Jesus, even the greatest miracle might be accepted as an actual occurrence, and it might not seem incredible that the dead body, after having been laid in the rock grave, was resuscitated and restored to life by God."[1]

If in Jesus Christ human nature attained its ideal morally and spiritually, much may thereby have become possible on the physical side also which would otherwise be impossible. Let us at any rate do full justice to the moral data which confront us. Here, admittedly, we contemplate the morally unique. Of Him also other exceptional things are spoken. Now manifestly we must not look for parallels: we have admitted that we are in the sphere of the unique. The physical Resurrection of Jesus is not more unique than His sinless perfection. And, for aught we know to the contrary, there may be an intimate connection between these two orders of being.

II

It may be of interest here to follow the criticisms of Reischle[2] on the problem of faith in the Resurrection. Reischle, who differs considerably from Herrmann, asks, On what ground can the modern mind rise to faith in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ?

(*a*) Shall I believe it, he asks, because the apostles assure us that they saw Him again as living, or because the Church affirms it? But to do this would be faith in mere authority.

(*b*) Shall I believe it because scientific research makes it probable that the Easter phenomena are best accounted for

[1] 'Life of Jesus,' p. 500. [2] 'Der Streit über die Begründung des Glaubens.'

by Resurrection? But that would make faith dependent on scientific research. Faith would rest on nothing more secure than a historical foundation.

(*c*) Shall I believe because the Resurrection of Jesus satisfies the conscience and the heart? But then do I not run the risk of illusion?

(*d*) Shall I believe because there can be no redemption without it? But this is a theological inference from an intellectual theory.

(*e*) Moreover, do not all these proposals involve a misconception of the nature of true faith? Evangelical faith is trust: and trust can only be directed to a person, not a fact or an idea.

1. First, then, it is objected that belief in the testimony of the apostles, or in that of the Church, is unreasonable; because it is faith on mere authority.

The subject here suggested is, of course, immense. But it is surely obvious that all religious belief is primarily faith on mere authority. Whatever our matured convictions become, our first belief was through assent to human authority. And if all religious belief is socially transmitted rather than individually and independently discovered, the principle of authority must continue to possess a living worth. Doubtless, a man has only to reflect what his religion would now be if it had been the product of isolated reflection apart from mankind, or if it had been inherited from a Buddhist environment, to feel at once the power and the limitations of authority. Authority may lead him right or wrong. But still it is impossible to escape it. With authority his religion must begin. And even if his religion becomes ultimately exchanged for an opposite type, yet even then the form of the reaction is determined by that from which it sprang. Assent to authority is also reasonable because it is necessary to accept religion at first upon authority. And if it be reasonable to assent on such a ground to the existence and character of God, it cannot be unreasonable on the same ground to assent to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Both beliefs must in process of time be by each individual

experimentally verified. If it be said that we can verify experimentally the existence of God, but not the occurrence of an incident some 2000 years ago; it must be answered that while no great historic event can be experimentally verified, the Christian idea is not that the Resurrection of Jesus is a mere past event. The existence of Jesus as risen, with all that this Resurrection involves, can be for the individual experimentally verified just as certainly as the existence and character of God. And while, in neither case, the individual experience can become a logical demonstration for others, it is more satisfying than logic to its recipient. It is a religious experience, which verifies for him the assertions of authority, and enables him in turn to form part of the social authority by which religious truth is transmitted to the succeeding generations.

2. As to the doubt, whether belief in the Resurrection can be justified on the ground that it satisfies the conscience and the heart, since subjective satisfaction opens the gate to all illusion, it may be answered that the risk of illusion is shared by every other religious belief. It is not a peculiarity of belief in the Resurrection. The conscience and the heart are after all the profoundest religious test we have. And every religious belief we hold is held because it satisfies.

Herrmann's belief that Jesus reveals the character of God is just as certainly held because it satisfies the conscience and the heart. And it is just as open to the cold sceptical challenge that the believer is liable to illusion. Reischle for instance inquires, Does the life and character of Jesus demonstrate for us the reality of the God and Father of Whom He spoke? Or does it do more than demonstrate that this was Jesus' own subjective belief; that for Jesus Himself God was no theory but the great Reality, more real than the visible world? His life indeed displays an inner certainty of the holy love of His Heavenly Father toward sinful men: a certainty so clear and deep that all He did, and was, revealed its mighty power; a certainty stronger than all natural instincts, stronger than all external influences, stronger than pain and death. But how are we to know that this inner certainty corresponded with the timeless reality?

What answer can Herrmann give but that it satisfies the conscience and the heart? That is to say, that the ultimate religious belief, the belief in the most ancient of all mysteries, the Personal and Holy God, is a venture of faith; and therefore, like belief in the Resurrection, like belief in Jesus as the revelation of God, open to the challenge that it involves a risk of illusion. Theoretically this is true. Experimentally it is found to be false. But it is a dangerous argument for men who possess any religious belief. And he who has already made the most stupendous venture of faith that man can make, a venture compared with which all other ventures are relatively insignificant—belief that the ultimate principle of the universe is personal holiness—cannot consistently urge against a belief in Christ's Resurrection, held on the ground that it satisfies the conscience and the heart, that such assent involves the risk of illusion.

Of course to say of a religious belief that it satisfies the conscience and the heart is not necessarily to say that the conscience and the heart produced it, and are therefore satisfied with their own creation. Otherwise we should be obliged to confess the pure subjectivity of belief in God. The conscience and the heart may certainly take their time before they find their satisfaction in that which is really true. The conscience and the heart are our highest tests of truth, yet they themselves require training into the appreciation of the highest truth. Thus the Resurrection may satisfy neither. That would be no argument against its truth, but merely an indication of individual unsusceptibility. It is part of the function of Christianity to create the disposition to which its truths can appeal. And this is the rationale of the existence of social institutions in religion. The function of the Catholic Church is to perpetuate, and to extend, the collective experience; to be the corporate witness to truths of whose value the individual is to be matured into appreciation. This aspect of religion is one which Protestantism has largely lost. By an exaggerated individualism it has assumed that the conscience and the heart of each are equally competent to test the value of religious truths. Whereas experience proves that what the individual sorely

needs is the support and training which the collective conscience alone can give.

3. We now approach the question, What is the nature of faith? Evangelical faith, it is objected, consists essentially in trust; and trust can only be directed to a person: it cannot rest upon a fact or an idea. Faith, as a religious quality, consists in surrender of heart to heart; whereas acceptance of facts and theories is a mere intellectual assent, having no necessary relation to religion. "Hence," it is urged, "the bodily Resurrection of Jesus, as a mere historic event, can only be an object of intellectual conviction, but not of faith in the proper sense."[1]

To this objection there are two replies, of which the first is that although undoubtedly faith is a personal relation, it cannot be destitute of an intellectual element. If it were religion would be reduced to mere emotion. Faith cannot be a mere feeling of dependence and an exercise of trust. Faith in God must necessarily include conceptions about Him. For trust in God must surely mean trust in Him as being what He is: trust on certain intellectual grounds. "He that cometh to God must believe," that is to say, exercise faith, in certain facts about Him; such as "that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him"; in other words His existence and His character. It has indeed been said that faith does not reflect on the question whether God exists, because that existence is as self-evident as that of the father whom he does not at the moment see, and whom he yet trusts, is to the child. But the Divine existence is not necessarily self-evident. Or, if it is, the assurance originated none the less in an act of faith. He that cometh to God must believe that He is. And that belief is the great venture of faith. Trust in God is inseparable from faith in His existence and in His character. Belief in both is essential to trust in Him. If it be said that these are the presuppositions rather than the contents of faith: they are presuppositions without which trust is impossible; they are presuppositions to which assent must

[1] Schwartzkopff, 'Prophecies,' p. 135. Cf. Martineau, 'Authority,' and Harnack, 'Hist. Dogm.,' i. 85 n.

be given. And then some name must be found for this assent. And it will be difficult to give it any other name than faith. At least it is a restriction of the meaning of faith to say that assent to the existence of God is not faith. The desire to give all honour to religious faith, and to distinguish it from an intellectual assent which is not necessarily religious, may be pushed to the extreme of doing injustice to the more rudimentary form.

Undoubtedly intellectual assent to a religious proposition is not faith in the highest form of living self-surrender to a personal Deity: but nevertheless it is a permanent element in the very highest form of faith; it is part of that capacity for venture in the unseen which constitutes true faith's essential character. Thus the depreciation of the intellectual and theoretic element in faith, however well meant, is yet unwise. Could the intellectual assent be eliminated the justification of faith would be destroyed. It is therefore better to say that faith exists in various degrees, and in different kinds, than to make faith in God rest on intellectual presuppositions to which the name of faith is denied.

And, in the second place, faith in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is not mere belief in a historical event. The Christian attitude is one of faith in Jesus Christ as Risen. If the Resurrection be called a presupposition rather than contents of Christian faith, at any rate it is an essential presupposition. Just as we could not exercise trust in God, except on the presuppositions, first that He exists and secondly that He is perfect, so neither could we exercise Christian trust in Jesus Christ, except on the presupposition that He passed through the experience of Resurrection, and as Risen is the object of human faith. Whether we call our assent to the presuppositions of God's existence and character, and of Christ's Resurrection by the name of faith is a question of definition. The main point is that the Resurrection is indispensable to Christian faith and trust in Jesus Christ. The faith directed to Him as one who never rose would be a different faith, and not the distinctively Christian.

If S. Paul can write: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth Jesus as Lord, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved,"[1] it follows that faith, in the Pauline sense of the term, includes the attitude of the Christian toward dogmatic facts.

Faith in Jesus Christ is indeed faith in a Person. But it is faith in Him as what? If it be answered as Incarnate, as Mediator, these answers represent historic facts. Faith in His Person, in the Christian sense, cannot be separated from faith in His Incarnation and His Death and His Resurrection. For these facts are inseparable from the history of Redemption. They are of such a character that, without them, faith in Christ would be impossible.

[1] Rom. x. 9.

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